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The European Union’s Generalised System of Preferences  
 
Abstract 
 
The Generalised System of Preferences, known as GSP, is defined as “a formal system 
of exemption from the more general rules applied by the European Union on its trade 
relationship with third countries”. Specifically, it is a system of exemption from the 
GATT MFN clause that obligates WTO member countries to treat the imports of all 
other WTO member countries not worse than they treat the imports of their "most 
favoured" trading partner. The objective of GSP is to assist developing countries on 
poverty reduction, by helping them to generate revenue through international trade. 
In EU law, the GSP traditionally comes under the Common Commercial Policy, Article 
133 of the EC Treaty as amended by Article 188C of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Implementation and utilisation of GSP should not solely be a duty of the preference-
granting country but of the beneficiary country as well. Strengthening trade facilitation 
between the preference-granting country and the beneficiary country is deemed as an 
important factor to achieve the purpose of the GSP. Implementation of the GSP is 
considered as a multi complex task, associated with international trade law, 
international taxation law (tariffs, custom duties and administrative procedures), 
trade facilitations, capacity building of trade institutions, import export procedures, 
good governance and information technology (e-governance, e-trade, and e-statistics). 
All these factors are interrelated and mutually supported to optimise the utilisation of 
GSP by the beneficiary country. 
 
Il sistema di preferenze generalizzate, conosciuto come GSP, è definito come "un sistema 
formale di esenzione dalle regole più generali applicate dall'Unione Europea sulle sue 
relazioni commerciali con i Paesi terzi". In particolare, si tratta di un regime di esenzione 
dalla clausola MFN GATT, che obbliga i Paesi membri del WTO a trattare le importazioni 
di tutti gli altri Paesi membri del WTO in maniera non peggiore di quella in cui trattano le 
importazioni dei loro partner commerciali "preferiti". L'obiettivo del GSP è quello di 
assistere i Paesi in via di sviluppo nella riduzione della povertà, aiutandoli a generare 
reddito attraverso il commercio internazionale. Nel diritto dell’Unione Europea, il GSP 
proviene tradizionalmente dall'ambito della politica commerciale comune, l'articolo 133 
del trattato EC, come modificato dall’articolo 188C  del Trattato di Lisbona. L'attuazione 
e l'utilizzo di GSP non devono essere intesi esclusivamente come un dovere per il Paese che 
concede la preferenza, ma anche (come dovere) del Paese beneficiario. La facilitazione 
degli scambi e la cooperazione tra il Paese che concede la preferenza e il Paese 
beneficiario è stato identificato come un fattore importante per raggiungere lo scopo del 
GSP. L'attuazione del GSP è considerata come un compito più complesso, associato al 
diritto commerciale internazionale, al diritto tributario interno (tariffe, dazi doganali e 
procedure amministrative), alle agevolazioni commerciali, al potenziamento delle 
capacità di istituzione del commercio, alle procedure di import export, alla good 
governance e ai sistemi di tecnologia dell'informazione (e -governance, e-trade, and e-
statistics). Inoltre, l'esistenza di accordi commerciali regionali e organizzazione 
regionale, per esempio l'ASEAN, ha contribuito allo sviluppo del diritto nel settore del 
commercio internazionale. Tutti questi fattori sono correlati tra loro e si sostengono a 
vicenda al fine di ottimizzare l'utilizzo del GSP da parte del Paese beneficiario. 
 
Keywords : GSP, Trade, Governance, EU, Law. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
I. Context of Study 
 
The Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) has multidimensional aspects, 
covering national policy, regional policy and international policy. These 
multidimensional aspects involve many sectors and stakeholders. Along with the 
dynamic change of international economic development, the GSP has undergone many 
improvements in order to cope with the development needs of beneficiary countries. 
The GSP is established under the legal framework of the Enabling Clause, which was 
incorporated into Part IV of the GATT on November 1979. It is stipulated that 
developed countries might accord preferential tariff treatment to products originating 
from developing countries under the GSP system.1 According to the Appellate Body 
decision on the EC Preferences Case, only preferential tariff treatment that complies 
with the principles "generalised, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory" treatment is 
justified under Paragraph 2(a). The Enabling Clause explicitly permits the states 
exempted from MFN obligation to provide more favourable treatment to developing 
countries. 
The embryo of such preferences was created in the first United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The negotiation process in 
the second session of UNCTAD in 1968 led to Resolution 21(II)2, through 
acknowledgement of “unanimous agreement” to provide preferential arrangements. 
The preferential arrangement contains tariff discrimination, which departs from the 
basic principles of MFN. Implementation of the preferential tariff schemes was first 
authorised by waiver 1971. This waiver was only effective for 10 years or was about to 
expire after 10 years. Therefore, on 28 November 1979 the GATT contracting parties 
established “differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller 
participation of developing countries”, known as the “Enabling Clause".  Later, the 
Marrakesh Agreement “Enabling Clause” was incorporated into the law of the WTO, as 
Part V of the GATT Agreement.3 
From the legal perspective, Part IV of the GATT leaves space for interpretation, 
for instance, its provisions apply the word “shall” rather than “should”. According to 
Hudec, the wording “shall” has no precise meaning. In other words, the GATT does not 
impose binding legal obligation to developed countries. Part IV of the GATT is “a non-
binding text that imposed greater commitment”, and “contained no definable legal 
                                                 
1 See Article 2 paragraph (a) of Enabling Clause 1979 (L/4903) and the Decision of the Contracting Parties of 25 June 
1971 regarding Waiver : Generalized System of Preferences, relating to the establishment of "generalized, non-
reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries" (BISD 18S/24) : 
“[...] in favour of the early establishment of a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries in order to increase the export earnings, to 
promote the industrialization, and to accelerate the rates of economic growth of these countries [...]” 
“[...] that mutually acceptable arrangements have been drawn up in the UNCTAD concerning the establishment 
of generalized, non-discriminatory, non-reciprocal preferential tariff treatment in the markets of developed 
countries for products originating in developing countries [...]”. 
2 However, as stated by the Panel Report on EC-Preferences Case paragraph 7.82 : “...the Resolution 21(II) itself did not 
set up the details of the GSP arrangements although it did set out its objectives  and principles.  The Resolution 
established a Special Committee on Preferences as a subsidiary organ of the Trade and Development Board, with 
the express mandate to settle the details of the GSP arrangements...” 
3 See Grossman, Gene M., & Sykes, Alan O. (2004). A Preference for Development: The Law and Economics of GSP. UC 
Berkeley: International Legal Studies Program, pp. 1-2, available at : http:// escholarship.org/uc/item/6jn6q6gj, 
last accessed : on 16 August 2010. 
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obligations”.  Principally, Part IV of the GATT is considered as an “agreed statement” 
between developing countries and developed countries.4  
The objectives of the UNCTAD to establish a system of generalised, non-
reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences is explained in the UNCTAD research 
memorandum as follows: 
“[…] in the relationship between developed and developing countries the most-
favoured-nation clause is subject to important qualifications. These qualifications 
follow from the principle of a generalised, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory 
system of preferences. Developed market-economy countries are to accord 
preferential treatment in their markets to exports of manufactures and semi-
manufactures from developing countries. Only the developing suppliers of these 
products should enjoy this preferential treatment. At the same time, developing 
countries are required to grant developed countries reciprocal concessions […]".5 
According to Resolution 21 of UNCTAD II 1968, it was agreed that the objectives 
of the GSP in favouring developing countries, should be dedicated to increase export 
earnings, to promote industrialisation, and to accelerate economic growth.6 The 
Enabling Clause 1979 was designed to facilitate trade of developing countries but not 
to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties.7 The non-reciprocal principle 
is stipulated in Article 5 of the Enabling Clause 1979: 
“[…] the developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them 
in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of 
developing countries […]”. 
The GSP is established based on the unequal relationship of economic 
development between developing and developed countries.8 The world’s economic 
development disparities become obstacles to obtain the same concessions. Therefore, 
it is difficult to apply the reciprocity principle in the unequal level. Beginning in the 
1960s, developing countries expressed a demand for exceptional treatment, known as 
"special and differential treatment".9 
The philosophy of the UNCTAD establishment was rooted from the assumption 
that the trade needs of a developing economic are substantially different from those 
that have developed. Consequently, those unequal economic situations should not be 
subject to equal rules. Applying the MFN clause to all countries regardless of their level 
of development only complies with the formal conditions of legal equality but not with 
the essence of equality itself. The MFN principle constitutes an “implicit” 
discrimination against countries that lack economic capacity. The opening sentence of 
                                                 
4 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., pp. 55-56. 
5 See United Nation, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission:Report of the International Law Commission on 
the work of its twenty-seventh session, Document: vol. II, 5, May - 25 July 1975, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Thirtieth session, Supplement, No. 10, A/10010/Rev.1, 1975, vailable at : 
www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm, last accessed : September 2010. 
6 See Commentaries on the ILC’s Draft Articles, see Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Thirtieth session , 8 May – 28 July 1978, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third session, 
Supplement No. 10, Doc. A/33/10 ILC Report), 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1978), p. 59, 
available at : http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/A_33_10.pdf, last accessed : 28 October 2010. 
See also Grossman, Gene M., & Sykes, Alan O. (2004). 
7 See Paragraph (a) The Decision of the Contracting Parties of 25 June 1971 regarding Waiver: Generalized System of 
Preferences. 
8See Commentaries Draft Articles on most-favoured-nation clauses 1978, p. 59, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_3_1978.pdf,  last accessed : 28 October 
2010. 
9 See Yanai, Akiko, The Function of the MFN Clause in the Global Trading System,  Working Paper Series 01/02-No. 03, 
APEC Study Center, Economic Cooperation Studies Departement Institutes of Developing Economies, JETRO, 
March, 2002, available at :  http://202.244.105.129 / English /Publish /Download /Apec/ 1863ra0000006alg-
att /1863ra0000006cgb.pdf, last accessed : 15 September 2010.  
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the General Principle Eight states that international trade should be conducted to 
mutual advantage based on the MFN treatment. The recognition of the “development 
needs of developing countries” requires that, for a certain period, the MFN should be 
excluded in certain types of international trade relations to help the beneficiary 
countries at least to have the capacity to pay the same concession. 
Article 23 of the Draft Articles on MFN clauses 197810 regulates the MFN clause in 
relation to the treatment under GSP regime, where it is stated that: 
“[…] a beneficiary state is not entitled, under an MFN clause, to treatment extended 
by a developed granting state to a developing third state on a non-reciprocal basis 
within a scheme of generalised preferences, established by that granting state, 
which conforms with a GSP recognised by the international community of states as a 
whole or, for the state members of a competent international organisation, adopted 
in accordance with its relevant rules and procedures […]”.11 
Tariff Preferences are designed “to respond positively” to the “development, 
financial and trade needs” of developing countries.12 The wording “to respond 
positively” is interpreted by the Appellate Body on EC Preferences Case, based on the 
assumption that developing countries have different economic and trade needs from 
developed countries. Such special needs are met by developed countries through tariff 
and other preferential treatment allowed under the Enabling Clause.13 
The current EU14 GSP is embodied in Council Regulation (EC) Number 732/2008, 
which was applicable from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011. This scheme 
consisted of a general arrangement and two special arrangements. The special 
arrangements were designed based on “the various development needs of countries” 
in “similar economic situations”. The general arrangement was granted to all 
beneficiary countries that were not classified by the World Bank as high-income 
countries and had not sufficiently diversified their exports.15 
                                                 
10 See Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its thirtieth session, in 1978, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (at para. 74). The report, which 
also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
1978, vol. II, Part Two, available at : 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_3_1978.pdf, last accessed : in 17 
September 2010. 
11 See Commentaries on the ILC’s Draft Articles, see Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Thirtieth session , 8 May – 28 July 1978, Offi cial Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third session, 
Supplement No. 10, Doc. A/33/10 ILC Report), 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1978), 
available at : http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/A_33_10.pdf, last accessed : 28 October 2010. 
See also Grossman, Gene M., & Sykes, Alan O. (2004). 
12 See Article 3 paragraph (3) of Enabling Clause 1979 (L/4903). 
13 See Julia Ya Qin, Defining Nondiscrimination Under The Law Of The World Trade Organization, available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/qinnondiscrimination.pdf, last accessed: 27  August 2010. 
14Since 1 December 2009, “[…] European Union has been the official name in the WTO as well as in the outside world. 
Before that, “European Communities” was the official name in WTO business for legal reasons, and that name 
continues to appear in older material. The EU is a WTO member in its own right as are each of its 27 member 
states making 28 WTO members altogether. While the member states coordinate their position in Brussels and 
Geneva, the European Commission — the EU’s executive arm alone speaks for the EU and its members at almost 
all WTO meetings and in almost all WTO affairs. For this reason, in most issues, WTO materials refer to the “EU” 
(or previously the legally official “EC”). However, sometimes references made to the specific member states, 
particularly where their laws differ. This is the case in some disputes when an EU member’s law or measure is 
cited, or in notifications of EU member countries’ laws, such as in intellectual property (TRIPS). Individual EU 
members speak in committee meetings or sponsor papers, particularly in the Budget, Finance and 
Administration Committee. Sometimes individuals’ nationalities are identified, for example the nationalities of 
WTO committee chairpersons […]”, available at : http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_ 
communities_e.htm, last accessed in 13 November 2010. 
15 See Recitals 7 Council Regulation (EC) Number 732/2008. “[…] Such instrument for instance such as the 1986 UN 
Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, and the 
2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development […]”. 
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As noted in Public Consultation, the EU GSP is essentially aimed to contribute to 
alleviating global poverty, promoting sustainable development, and encouraging the 
implementation of good governance in developing countries. It is reiterated in Recitals 
2 of Council Regulation (EC) Number 732/2008, that the primary objective of the 
GSP16 is to contribute to the reduction of poverty and the promotion of sustainable 
development and good governance.17 It is widely accepted by economists that 
economic growth generally reduces poverty. It creates the resources to increase 
incomes and delivers benefits to the poor. When income increases, the prosperity of 
people increases and poverty is eliminated.18  
Globalisation creates interdependency between states, especially in trade and 
development.19 It shifts the pattern of the trade relationships between developed and 
developing countries, where in the past their relationship was established as donor 
and recipient countries. Developing countries see themselves in an unequal situation 
and impose higher protectionism policies, obviously this impedes their full integration 
into the global trading system. The EU's GSP plus is aimed to encourage developing 
countries to fully participate in international trade and increase their export revenue. 
This policy is established to support the implementation of sustainable development 
and alleviate poverty in developing countries.20 The GSP is expected to reduce the 
dependency of developing countries on exports of primary products and to promote 
industrialisation.21 
Naturally, the GSP is not an obligation for developed countries. It is a voluntary 
obligation which they can choose to adopt or not to adopt. Developed countries design 
their GSP scheme individually under their national laws. Practically, preference-
grating countries impose various limitations on the product coverage and eligibility 
criteria for beneficiary countries. For instance, the eligibility criteria in the general 
arrangement of EU GSP are based on economic criteria, in this regard, the income 
classification of the countries.  
Generally, preference-granting countries, grant greater benefits or “more 
favourable treatment” to the LDCs due to political and national interest considerations. 
In fact, the establishment of eligibility criteria for beneficiary countries brings 
implication of different tariff treatment. This raises the question whether the GSP 
programme is truly “non-reciprocal” and “non-discriminatory”.22 According to Lorand 
                                                 
16 See Waiver of Generalized System of Preferences, Decision of 25 June 1971, BISD 18S/24 : “[...] Recalling that at the 
Second UNCTAD, unanimous agreement was reached in favour of the early establishment of a mutually 
acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences beneficial to the 
developing countries in order to increase the export earnings, to promote the industrialization, and to accelerate 
the rates of economic growth of these countries […]”. 
17 See Recitals 2 of Council Regulation (EC) Number 732/2008, “[…] The Community’s common commercial policy is to 
be consistent with and to consolidate the objectives of development policy, in particular the eradication of 
poverty and the promotion of sustainable development and good governance in the developing countries. It is to 
comply with WTO requirements, and in particular with the GATT ‘enabling clause’ of 1979 according to which 
WTO Members may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries […]”. 
18 See Winter, L Alan., McCulloch, Neil., and McKay, Andrew., Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence So Far, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLII (March 2004) pp. 72-115. Winters, L. Alan., Critical Perspective on the 
Global Trading System and the WTO : The WTO and Poverty and  Inequality, Volume I,  An Elgar Reference 
Collection, UK , 2007. 
19 See Public Consultation exercise on the revision and updating of the European Union's scheme of Generalised System 
of Preferences (the GSP scheme), available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/march/tradoc_145972.pdf, last accessed : 27 September 2010. 
20 See Factsheet, EC Generalised Scheme of Tariff Preferences (GSP) 2009-2011, Available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/july/tradoc_139988.pdf, last accessed: 07 May 2010. 
21 See Grossman, Gene M and Sykes, Alan O, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R), American Law Institute, 2005. 
22 See Julia Ya Qin, Op.cit. 
 5 
Bartels, the EU GSP scheme was ambiguous. The GSP principle is legally binding under 
the Enabling Clause, despite the fact the nature of GSP is “voluntary”.23 
Along with the development on international trade, some preference-granting 
countries have started to apply conditions24 in their GSP scheme. These conditions are 
politically used as a tool to compel developing countries complying with international 
standards in order to accelerate their integration in the global trading system. The 
compliance of such conditions would be rewarded by greater preferences. While, non 
compliance towards such conditions would lead to punishment, such as suspension or 
withdrawal.  
The origin of GSP as a “non-reciprocal” programme resulted from developing 
country demands.25 The main issue raised in the EU Preferences case concerned the 
“condition of non-discriminatory preferences”. In the submission, India argued that 
the Enabling Clause imposed a non-discrimination obligation on preference granting 
countries, which prohibited them from differentiating between beneficiary countries. 
Differentiation was only allowed subject to the exceptions set out in the Enabling 
Clause (more favourable treatment to LDCs).26 
In the EC Preferences Case, the Appellate Body reversed the panel’s findings of 
Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause and Footnote 3. The Appellate Body decision on 
the EC Preferences Case stated that the preference-granting country shall grant 
preferential tariffs to all similarly situated beneficiary countries based on the “non-
discriminatory” principle.27 Yet, for different reasons the Appellate Body upheld the 
panel’s conclusion that the EU failed to demonstrate the measure challenged justified 
under Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.28 
The simplification of the EU’s GSP is aimed to respond positively to special 
development needs of developing countries consistently with the Enabling Clause. The 
dynamic concepts of economic development influence the conception of GSP beyond 
economic criteria. Trade preferences are not merely about trade, but it should also 
consider social values such as human rights and environmental protection. For 
                                                 
23 See Bartels, Lorand, The Appellate Body Report In European Communities – Conditions For The Granting Of Tariff 
Preferences To Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R and Its Implications For Conditionality In GSP Programs, 
available at : http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/bartelsgsp.pdf, last accessed : 2 March 2011.  
24 See Mason, Amy M, The Degeneralizaton of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): Questioning the Legitimacy of 
The US GSP, available at : www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl ?54+Duke+L.+J.+513+pdf, last accessed : January 
2011.  “[…] All GSP schemes condition preferences to some degree in the form of either “positive” or “negative” 
conditionality. Positive conditionality is the practice of granting additional concessions to developing countries 
that fulfil prescribed criteria; positive conditionality affects preferences offered to countries that are already GSP 
beneficiaries. For instance, the EU provides additional reductions in GSP tariffs to countries that take prescribed 
legislative steps to protect fundamental labour rights. In contrast, negative conditionality more commonly used 
in GSP schemes denotes the withdrawal of concessions from countries that fail to comply with prescribed 
criteria, or the refusal to grant concessions to such countries from the outset. As such, negative conditionality 
affects the designation of beneficiary status. Virtually all conditions in the U.S. GSP scheme are origin neutral: 
that is, the conditions, such as those conditioning GSP benefits on compliance with labour standards, apply to all 
potential beneficiaries. Consequently, the conditions violate Article I:1 only if they are de facto discriminatory. 
However, the precise meaning of de facto discrimination remains unclear. Developed countries might argue that 
a measure is not de facto discriminatory if it merely imposes conditions that all countries are equally capable of 
fulfilling or are even required to fulfil […]”. 
25 See Grossman, Gene M., & Sykes, Alan O. (2004), Op.cit. 
26 See Ibid : “[…] According to India, when a nation grants a preference on a particular product, it must extend that 
preference to all developing countries, subject only to the proviso that least-developed nations can receive 
greater preferences. Because the drug-related preferences in the European scheme afford special benefits to 
twelve enumerated beneficiaries that are not co-extensive with the set of least-developed nations, India 
contended, the preferences failed the requirement of non-discrimination under the Enabling Clause and in turn 
violated GATT Article I […]”. 
27 See Appellate Body  Decision on EC — Tariff Preferences, para 173, 190 (e), (g). 
28 See European Communities — Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds246_e.htm, last accessed : 27 Octobre 2010. 
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instance, nowadays development is associated with terms of environment, improved 
social conditions, anti-corruption measures, and good governance practices. Moreover, 
development and poverty eradication are major agenda items of the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration. This declaration emphasises the importance of creating a 
favourable and conducive environment at the national and global level to support 
economic development and eliminate poverty. A practical example of a favourable 
environment is clean bureaucracy and environmentally sound policies.29 
The development needs of developing countries grow more complex along with 
globalisation. Among those various development needs, the EU as the GSP preference-
granting country considers the demand of sustainable development and good 
governance as crucial and urgent for developing countries to guarantee that welfare is 
delivered properly and the common needs of the people are fulfilled.  
The basic concept of GSP is to reduce tariffs for developing countries to boost 
their exports and improve their economic development. Yet, it is debatable by some 
experts that the design of the GSP scheme delivers significant improvement for the 
export earnings of developing countries. The obstacles of GSP utilisation do not only 
come from the preferences-granting country but also from beneficiary countries. 
Indeed, the GSP is the unilateral preference where all its policies are decided by the 
preference-granting country, yet the beneficiary country also has the important role of 
ensuring these preferences are properly utilised by its traders or any business actors. 
It has to be noted that GSP is a kind of favour providing opportunities for beneficiary 
countries to participate in the EU market. The benefits of the GSP are prominently 
dedicated for the improvement of the economic growth of the beneficiary countries, 
therefore, it needs the support and cooperation from the grantor and the grantee of 
preferences to ensure this policy is utilised properly. 
Some problems of the beneficiary country have been identified as factors that 
impede GSP utilisation. It has been written in many references that corruption, 
excessive formalities and procedures on export procedures, bureaucracy complexities, 
insufficient infrastructures and lack of human resource availabilities aggravate the 
problems faced by developing countries in economic development.  The GSP should be 
designed appropriately to address such problems. 
Therefore, the EU as a preference-granting country is considering to revise the 
GSP scheme to be more open and responsive towards such situation. The design of the 
special arrangement is based on the incentive concept to encourage developing 
countries to implement international standards of sustainable development and good 
governance. Inherently, the special incentive arrangement is open to all developing 
countries fulfilling certain criteria set out in the regulation.30  
Underlining the main objective of the GSP schemes is to assist developing 
countries to benefit from trade and globalisation, in this regard, the scheme must be 
compatible with the Doha Development Agenda programmes.31 Particularly, the 
contribution of trade to sustain development and increase people’s quality of life. 
                                                 
29 See United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 18  September 2000, 
available at : http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/ Milleniumsdeklaration.pdf, last accessed : on 14 September 
2010. 
30 See Communication rom The Commission to the Council, The European Parliament and the European Economic and 
Social Committee Developing countries, international trade and sustainable development: the function of the 
Community’s generalised system of preferences (GSP) for the ten-year period from 2006 to 2015. 
31 See United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 18 September 2000, 
available at : http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/ Milleniumsdeklaration.pdf, last accessed : on 14 September 
2010. 
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The establishment of the GSP departing from the MFN principles should not 
create new discriminatory measures by taking into consideration similarly situated 
conditions and development needs. The GSP should not be used as a tool to raise 
barriers to trade or create indirect concessions of the beneficiary country. Therefore, 
Article 3 Paragraph (a) of the Enabling Clause stipulates “any differential and more 
favourable treatment provided under this clause shall be designed to facilitate and 
promote the trade of developing countries and not to raise barriers to or create undue 
difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties”. 
There are some economic studies about utilisation of the GSP by developing 
countries. In 2007, Janaka conducted a research in the Utilisation of the GSP in Sri 
Lanka by comparing the utilisation of this preference under two schemes, i.e. US and 
EU. His research uses qualitative analysis of utilisation rates across sectors and across 
schemes (US and EU). Data collected is based on discussions made with stakeholders 
(government officials of various departments/institutions, chambers/associations and 
top exporters) in order to obtain their opinions on Sri Lanka’s performance under both 
schemes. Janaka was assessing Sri Lanka’s performance under both schemes using a 
number of variables rules of origin, product coverage, and awareness knowledge 
among exporters, administration, and issuance of certificates. His study compares the 
GSP scheme between the EU and US, and highlights the main features of both schemes. 
The UNCTAD identifies some factors that affect utilisation of non-reciprocal 
preferences, which include lack of security of access (unpredictable scheme), 
insufficient coverage of products, lack of understanding/awareness of the preferences 
available and conditions, lack of capacity to supply and non-trade related 
conditionality.32 In his research, Janaka used utilisation rate and utility rate. Utilisation 
rate is the ratio between imports that actually receive preferential treatment and 
those that are covered by the scheme. Utility rate is the ratio of the value of imports 
that receive preferences to all dutiable imports (covered or not).  Since the research 
conducted by Janaka is focused on non-GSP related problems affecting exports in 
general and relating to supply side capacities of a country, therefore, he concludes that 
awareness of GSP schemes, and administration and issuance of certificates are not a 
significant problem in the utilisation of preferences.33 
In 2006, Candau et al. conducted economic studies on trade-preference 
utilisation. According to their research, the EU preferences are not fully utilised by 
developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. To benefit from a preferential 
scheme, the beneficiary countries need to comply with several technical and 
administrative requirements, such as providing a certificate of the origin of the 
products. The benefits of preferential agreements are not granted automatically, 
costless nor unconditional. They found significant dependency on the EU preferences 
by a limited number of African and Caribbean countries and improved utilisation of 
tariff preferences facilities. They also address issues of under-utilisation in the EBA 
initiative by South-Asian LDCs. They argue that the main reason for under-utilisation is 
the constraint imposed by the rules of origin on textile and clothing exports (the 
foremost export specialisation of South-Asian LDCs).  
                                                 
32 See UNCTAD (2001); See also Wijayasiri, Janaka, Utilization of Preferential Trade Arrangements:  Sri Lanka’s Experience 
with the EU and US GSP Schemes, Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade, Working Paper Series, No. 
29, January 2007, Published in International Economic Series No.8, IPS, Colombo, 2007, Presented in “Third 
ARTNeT Consultative Meeting of Policy Makers and Research Institutions” Macao, China 1-2 November, 2006, 
available at : http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/wp2907.pdf, last accessed : 1 February 2011. 
33 See Wijayasiri, Janaka, (2007), Op.Cit. 
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As a contractual non-reciprocal preference, the Cotonou Agreement has played a 
significant role for Sub-Saharan African countries. The strongest dependency on the 
EU preferences is found in non-LDC Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African countries.34 In 
addition, Candau et al. previously studied the utilisation rate of preferences in the EU 
from an economic perspective. They analysed how effective the EU's preferential 
agreements were to improve market access of the beneficiary countries. Candau et al. 
conclude that utilisation appears weak under the GSP for textile and clothing, and most 
of all for EBAs for the same products. In addition, restrictive rules of origin are 
considered as the major constraint that undermines such utilisation of preferences.35 
Under the EU GSP Scheme, Indonesia is included as a beneficiary country of general 
arrangement. Indonesia is entitled to the facility as regulated under Section 1 Article 
636. Indonesia received sector graduation on Section IX” Wood and articles of wood; 
wood charcoal; cork and articles of cork“37.  Pursuant to Article 13 of the current GSP 
Scheme Indonesia also granted section graduation38 on Section III,39 which covered 
“animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products, prepared edible fats, 
animal or vegetable waxes” have been removed. It has to be noted that approximately 
40% of EU imports come from developing countries. In this regard, the EU has 
absorbed one fifth of developing country exports.40  
According to the mid-term evaluation of the EU’s GSP, about 45.50 % of 
Indonesia’s exports enter into the EU under the duty free of the MFN tariffs; 20.93% 
pay a positive MFN tariff; 11.54% under duty free of the GSP scheme; and 17.18 pay a 
positive tariff under the GSP Scheme. Total imports from Indonesia are 11,183.20 
million euros.41 In 2005, Indonesia was included in the big three countries that have a 
large amount of exports under the GSP scheme. It approximately covered an amount of 
5% of EU imports under the GSP scheme after India with 11.8% and China with 35.8%, 
respectively.42 According to statistical data from 2008, of the twenty top importer 
countries under the GSP Scheme, Indonesia was placed in sixth position.43 In 2008, the 
utilisation rates of GSP by Indonesia reached 60.8%.44  
                                                 
34 See Candau, Fabien, Jean, Sébastien, What Are EU Trade Preferences Worth for Sub-Saharan Africa and Other 
Developing Countries?, May 3, 2006, JEL Codes: F13, N77, available at : 
http://www.hubrural.org/pdf/candau_jean_eu_preferences.pdf, last accessed : 23 March 2011. 
35 See Ibid. 
36 Available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/july/tradoc_139963.pdf, last accessed : 12th  March 2011. 
37See Factsheet EC Generalised Scheme of Tariff Preferences (GSP) 2009-2011, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/july/tradoc_139988.pdf, last accessed : 12 Octobre 2010. 
38 See Annex I : Beneficiary countries and territories of the Community’s scheme of generalised tariff preferences of Council 
Regulation (EC) Number  1236/2009, available at : http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:332:0038:0045:EN:PDF, last accessed : 12 March 2011. 
See also http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/april/tradoc_143050.pdf. 
39See Table of list rules applicable to products (following the classification in the CN), available at : 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/nonpreferential/article_1622 
en.htm. See also http://www.eds-destatis.de/en/method/download/cnen03.pdf. 
40See GSP: The new EU preferential terms of trade for developing countries, MEMO/05/43, Brussels, 10 February 2005, 
available at : http://www.subel.be/myDocuments/01/001/004/gsp_eu_com_memo-06-43_050210_e1.pdf, last 
accessed : 23 December 2010. 
41See Center for the Analysis of Regional Intergartion at Sussex, Mid-term Evaluation of the EU’s Generalised System of 
Preferences: Appendices to the Final Report, Table A.3: Share of Each Regime in Total Country Exports (2008), p. 
17, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146195.pdf, last accessed : 12 March 
2011. 
42See GSP: The new EU preferential terms of trade for developing countries, MEMO/05/43, Brussels, 10 February 2005, 
available at : http://www.subel.be/myDocuments/01/001/004/gsp_eu_com_memo-06-43_050210_e1.pdf, last 
accessed : 23 December 2010. 
43See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/march/tradoc_145946.pdf, last accessed : 12 March 2011. 
44See Addendum, Notification by the European Communities, Generalized System of  Preference, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/april/tradoc_143051.pdf, last accessed : 12 March 2011. 
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In 2002, Indonesia was the most important beneficiary among ASEAN members, 
with preferential imports in the EU of approximately €3 billion Euros. 45 According to 
Cuyvers and Verherstraeten, the utilisation rate is a significant indicator to measure 
the success of a preferential scheme. They define utilisation as the imports receiving 
preferential treatment as a share of imports eligible for receiving such preferences 
under the GSP in a certain year. Therefore, the utilisation rate indicates how well the 
potential benefits of the GSP scheme are fully “utilised” by beneficiary countries.46 
Wulf and Sokol define the utilisation rate as a ratio of imports receiving preferences to 
eligible imports.47 According to the Delegation of the European Union to Indonesia, 
almost 40% (around €4.9 billion Euros) from the total imports from Indonesia (€13 
billion Euros in 2007) are qualified under the GSP scheme.  
The GSP exists on behalf of demands from developing countries to obtain “fair” 
treatment based on economic development disparities. The EU GSP was established 
under exemption of international trade principles of MFN and derogation of common 
customs tariffs. It reflects how this system has been given a prominent place within 
international trade relations. In the Report of the International Law Commission on 
the work of its thirtieth session the measures to increase the utilisation of preferences 
are mentioned48: 
“[…] Efforts should be made by all preference-giving countries and beneficiary 
countries to increase, as much as possible, the degree of utilisation of the different 
schemes of generalised preferences by all appropriate means. In this connection, 
developed countries should make efforts to give technical assistance to countries 
benefiting from generalised preferences, particularly to the least advanced 
countries, to enable them to draw maximum advantage from preferences […]”.  
Many scholars characterise GSP as a “grant, gift, autonomous right, unilateral 
action, non-obligatory policy, or optional policy”, which is provided by developed 
countries for developing countries. Scholars identify these terms as the weakness of 
GSP. Preference-granting countries can change or review their policies on such system. 
Therefore, GSP is considered as an unstable and unpredictable system.  
Nowadays, the EU is developing its GSP based on the stability principle, 
predictability, objectivity, and simplicity. The EU argues that its GSP reform is aimed to 
improve its system for it to be more effective, efficient, and to give more benefit to 
development in developing countries. This is justified under Paragraph 3 (c) of the 
Enabling Clause “to respond positively” to development needs of developing country. 
Development needs of developing country must be taken into account as a dynamic 
variable.  
Preference-granting countries set out some requirements to be fulfilled by 
traders from developing countries in order to get benefits. Most of these requirements 
relate to trade facilitation, rules of origin, export-import formalities, custom and duties 
regulations and others non-tariffs barrier.  
Based on EU data from 2008, Indonesia only has a 60.8% utilisation rate of GSP. 
It has shown that Indonesia cannot fully utilise the GSP benefits. This research takes a 
different perspective about how developing countries, in this term Indonesia, utilise 
                                                 
45 See Cuyvers, Ludo and Verherstraeten, Stijn, The EU’s Generalized System of Preferences and its ASEAN beneficiaries: 
a success story?, CAS Discussion paper No 47, December 2005, available at : 
http://webh01.ua.ac.be/cas/PDF/CAS%2047.pdf, last accessed : 12 March 2011. 
46 See Ibid. 
47 See Wulf, Luc De., Sokol, Jose B., Customs Modernization Handbook, The World Bank, Washington, 2005. 
48 See Commentaries on the ILC’s Draft Articles, see Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Thirtieth session , 8 May – 28 July 1978, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third session, 
Supplement No. 10, Doc. A/33/10 ILC Report), 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1978), p. 64. 
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the “gift” from the EU. Since, GSP has some weakness for instance the unstable scheme 
that might be changed or reviewed periodically. It will be examined how Indonesia 
prepared its trade system and policies to cope with this matter. Hence, this research is 
focused on how government trade institutions in Indonesia established its trade policy 
to support Indonesian traders to maximise EU GSP utilisation. According to the context 
of the study presented above, we have raised three questions in this research, as 
follows: 
1. How does the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) trade facilitations 
policies support the utilisation of the European Union’s Generalised System of 
Preferences in Indonesia?  
2. What are the trade policies of the Indonesian Government in maximising utilisation 
of the European Union’s Generalised System of Preferences scheme?  
3. Does the European Union’s Generalised System of Preferences affect implementation 
of good governance in the bureaucracy of Indonesia’s foreign trade policies? 
  
The research methodology has a juridical normative approach. Data used in this 
research is secondary data in the form of related documents and archives. The 
research will identify data systematically in order to answer the problems. Secondary 
data will be divided into primary legal material, secondary legal material, and tertiary 
legal material. The primary legal material of research uses relevant references of EU 
law and regulations, Indonesian law and government regulations in trade policies, 
relevant international law, DSB decisions, other WTO legal texts, jurist doctrines and 
other legal documents. The secondary legal material of research uses textbooks, law 
journals, articles, working papers, papers presented at conferences, seminars, 
workshops, news, public hearings, press releases, other relevant documents, 
interviews with Indonesian Government Institutions related to trade and online 
research. Tertiary legal material covers news, articles from magazines or newspapers. 
Interviews with some stakeholders in the institution trade in Indonesia were 
conducted as primary data. The method to analyse the data is a qualitative descriptive 
in order to answer the problem statement of the research. 
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CHAPTER II 
Principle of most favoured nation  
 
This chapter will focus on the non-discrimination principle in the World Trade 
Organization. The non-discrimination principle is the core principle in establishing 
liberalisation of the trading system. The objectives of the Marrakech Agreement are to 
direct the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to eliminate 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations. The non-discrimination 
principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 is divided into 
two treatments, which are the Most Favoured Nation Treatment and National 
Treatment. The non-discrimination principle was embodied in Article I:1 of the GATT 
1947. The National Treatment was embodied in Article III of the GATT 1947 and aimed 
to reduce trade barriers and the practice of protectionism by member states. Under 
the National Treatment clause, member states are obliged to treat the “like products” 
from any other contracting parties in the same way as its own “like product”. These 
principles of non-discrimination become the main spirit in promoting free and fair 
trade in the multilateral trading system. However, there are still some issues regarding 
the implementation and interpretation of the non-discrimination principle by the WTO 
member states on their national regulations.  
 
I. General overview of the basic principles of WTO.  
The existence of the economic development gap among WTO member states 
cannot be abandoned by forcing equal rules and equal treatment. The integration of 
the global trading system should be deemed as a need for global understanding and 
global cooperation between rich and poor countries. Peter Sutherland, former WTO 
Director General, highlights the WTO as a tool “to achieve greater measure of equity” 
and to assist “marginalised country” efforts to participate in the global trading system.1 
The importance of achieving “a greater measure of international equity” was deemed as 
recognition of inequality in international trade relations. Taken from the words of 
Henri-Dominique Lacordaire "entre le fort et le faible, entre le riche et le pauvre, entre le 
maître et le serviteur, c'est la liberté qui opprime et la loi qui affranchit",2 to take those 
differences into “equity” it is necessary to enforce a set of rules that recognises the 
existence of a gap between two different conditions. These rules must make it possible 
to facilitate inferior parties to afford the same opportunities in the global trading 
system with “positive discriminatory treatment” according to their special needs.  
International trade policy started being designed after Second World War 
through international negotiations from 1946 to 1948. Starting with the Atlantic 
Chapter that was concluded between the US and United Kingdom in 1941, which laid 
down post-war economic order. The Atlantic Charter led to the enactment of the 
United States-United Kingdom Lend-Lease Agreement of February 1942 and the US 
“Proposed Charter” of December 1945. It should be noted that within those 
agreements there was no clue that the “provisions of special and differential 
treatment” should be granted to the developing country in the sphere of international 
trade policy.3 The objective of the Atlantic Charter was to carry out “the enjoyment by 
                                                 
1 See Peter Sutherland, 1997; Van den Bossche, Peter., The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Text, Cases 
and Materials, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2005, p. 35. 
2 See Henri-Dominique Lacordaire, 1835 Conferences at the Notre Dame in Paris; Van den Bossche, Peter., 2005, Op. Cit., 
p. 37. 
3 See United States considers that the special treatment of developing countries would be included in the Economic 
Development Sub-Commission of the United Nations and Social Council and by institutions such as the World Bank, 
not in the area of trade policy.  
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all states, great and small, victors and vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the 
trade and raw materials of the world which are needed for their prosperity”. In this 
regard, it seems that the early drafting of international trade policy in the post-war 
period was based on one-package rules applied for all countries without considering 
the various development stages and economic needs in every country.4 
The history of GATT can be traced back to after Second World War. The GATT 
was not an organisation but only an international treaty in trade. After Second World 
War, the States intended to establish a new economic order aimed to eliminate the 
tension between states in international trade. From 1 to 22 July 1944, a conference 
was held by the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, known as the 
Bretton Woods conference. This conference was held at the Mount Washington Hotel, 
located in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in the US, and was attended by the 44 
nations. The conference mainly established the new order of world economics on 
monetary and financial issues. Although trade was not included as the main agenda, 
the conference recognised the need to establish an institution to govern international 
trade.5 The Bretton Woods conference also established modern institutions for 
international commerce including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD). 
The GATT was signed as the foundation of establishing the international 
organisation of trade. Therefore, in 1947 the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment, held in Havana, Cuba, known as the Havana Charter, established the 
International Trade Organization as a multilateral trade organisation. Eighteen 
countries joined the preparatory committee that held four meetings to draft the 
Havana Charter from October 1946 to March 1948.6 The United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment or the Havana Charter consists of 106 Articles and 16 annexes. 
It contains employment and economic activity, economic development and 
reconstruction, commercial policy7, an inter-governmental commodity agreement, and 
International Trade Organization.8 The establishment of the Havana Charter is in 
accordance with the objectives of the United Nations as set forth in Article 559 of its 
Charter, particularly the attainment of higher standards of living, full employment and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development.10 A majority in the 
                                                 
4 See Hudec, Robert E., Developing Countries in the GATT/WTO Legal System, Rowman & Littlefield, Cordell Hull 
Institute, Washington, DC, Gower Publishing Company Limited, UK, 1987, p. 20, available at : 
http://lawweb3.law.umn.edu/uploads/hy/Jz/hyJzgIiHRF7Q3VUx-XRBZQ/wto-trachtman.pdf, last accessed : 17 
April 2011. 
5 See Van den Bossche, Peter., 2005, Op. Cit., p. 37. 
6 See World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2007: Sixty Years of The Multilateral Trading System: Achievements 
And Challenges, p. 180, para. 4, Available at : http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr07-
2d_e.pdf, last accessed : October 2010. 
7 It covers tariffs, preferences, and internal taxation and regulation, quantitative restrictions and related exchange 
matters, subsidies, states trading and related matters, general commercial provisions, special provisions, 
restrictive business practices. 
8 See The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, known as Havana Charter, held At Havana, Cuba From 
21 November 1947, to 24 March 1948, Final Act and Related Documents, Available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf, last accessed : October 2010.  
9 See Article 55 Charter of United Nation, Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter9.shtml. With 
a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the 
United Nations shall promote: a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development; b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and 
international cultural and educational cooperation; and b) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.  
10 See Chapter I Article 1 Purpose and Objective of the United Nations Conference On Trade and Employment, Available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf, last accessed : October 2010. 
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United States Congress rejected the Charter. Further, several business groups in the US 
judged the Charter as not being part of the topic. This judgment was based on the 
contents of the Charter, which covers some matters indirectly related to trade, such as 
employment and antitrust. Others were concerned that foreign investment was 
insufficiently protected under the Charter.11 
The Havana Charter was the standpoint to facilitate the birth of the ITO as an 
international trade organisation with a legal personality. As noted by Hajnal, ITO has 
an organisational infrastructure to administer, apply, develop, and enforce the detailed 
and extensive substantive obligations contained in the Havana Charter. The 
substantive contents of the Havana Charter are related to employment, economic 
development and reconstruction, commercial policy, restrictive business practices, 
investment and intergovernmental commodity agreements.12 
The organisational organ of ITO as stipulated in the Havana Charter, is similar 
to the WTO, which consists of governance, decision-making, and dispute settlement. As 
noted by Hudec, “the ITO represented a new idea in international economic affairs, the 
idea that the governments of the world, by acting together in concerted rule-making 
activity, could shape the international trade environment in which their economies 
would operate”.13 Decision making in ITO was performed by the plenary Conference 
and the eighteen members Executive Board by simple majority vote including 
amendments to the Charter. The dispute settlement in the Havana Charter aimed to 
settle disputes between states. Based on the dispute mechanism, any complaint from 
the member states was submitted to the political organs of the organisation for 
investigation. In the dispute mechanism, ITO only concluded the final word on 
economic and financial questions. While concerning pure questions of law, an advisory 
opinion can be requested from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The 
enforcement of dispute settlements in ITO is carried out based on the authorisation of 
sanctions on a limited and compensatory basis.14 
There are six objectives of the Havana Charter as stated in Article 1 of the 
charter. The first objective is to assure a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, to increase the production, consumption and exchange 
of goods, and thus to contribute to a balanced and expanding world economy. The aims 
are related to international trade flows and international economic balance. The 
second objective is to foster and assist industrial and general economic development, 
particularly of those countries, which are still in the early stages of industrial 
development, and to encourage the international flow of capital for productive 
investment.15 
The third objective is related to equality for all countries on access to the 
markets, products, and productive facilities, which are needed for their economic 
prosperity and development. This implies reducing trade barriers between states and 
contains the principle of non-discrimination. The fourth objective is to promote, on a 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis, the reduction of tariffs and other barriers 
to trade and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.16 
The fifth objective is to increase trade and economic development opportunities, 
to abstain from measures, which would disrupt world commerce, to reduce productive 
                                                 
11See World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2007, Op. Cit., p. 180. 
12 See Hajnal, Peter I, International Information : Documents, Publications and Electronic Information of International 
Organizations, Volume 2, Second Edition, Libraries Unlimited, Inc, USA, 2001, p. 74. 
13 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit, p. 23. 
14 See Hajnal, Peter I, 2001, Op. Cit, p. 74. 
15 See Havana Charter, 1948. 
16 See Ibid. 
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employment, or retard economic progress. The sixth objective is to promote mutual 
understanding, consultation, and co-operation in the solutions of problems relating to 
international trade in the fields of employment, economic development, commercial 
policy, business practices, and commodity policy.17 
Related to trade and economic development, the ITO negotiations are split into 
two major factions, developing countries and the US that was supported by some 
developed countries. Developing countries struggled to get recognition of “legitimate 
reasons” to depart from the general principle due to the inequality of economic 
development. In order to limit the scope and application of the exception or special 
treatment granted to developing countries, the US and developed countries proposed 
“additional substantive criteria”. For instance the graduation system, preferential rules 
of origin, withdrawal system and other conditions of preferences refer to trade policy 
objective of the preference-granting country. As noted by Hudec, GATT included 
Article 13 of ITO concerning “infant-industry exceptions for tariffs and quantitative 
import restrictions”, on the other hand, the US did not agree to include Article 15 of 
ITO which permitted new preferences for developing countries. The US argued that 
this provision was one of its major concessions. In this regard, the US was unwilling to 
grant the concession without any reciprocal concession. However, due to the failure of 
the ITO, the negotiations held during the establishment of ITO did not produce any 
agreement relating to specific policies for developing countries.18 
After the Havana Charter completed in March 1948, the signatories had to ratify 
the Charter by the approval of their legislative body. To be in effect, the charter 
required approval from the majority of the signatory nations. However, most 
signatories decided to wait for the United States Congress to ratify the charter before 
sending it to their legislative bodies for approval.19 The Havana Charter was signed by 
53 countries on 24 March 1948, but for various reasons, the charter never came into 
force.20 As noted by Hajnal, the domestic political situation, which occurred in the 
United States and Great Britain at that time, had caused ratification in their national 
legislatures to fail.21 The differences concerning the substantive of the charter, the Cold 
War, and increasing socialism in Western Europe, were also allegedly the cause of the 
ITO failing to come into force.22 
From the beginning of its establishment, the GATT was not intended to be an 
organisation because the GATT was established as a provisional agreement until the 
ratification of the ITO Charter.23 The GATT 1947 only served as a trade agreement 
until the ITO came into force.24 In other words, when the ITO came into effect the 
GATT would not prevail.25 The United States Congress assigned the United States 
negotiators during 1947 to "tentatively agree to draft GATT clauses", which seemed to 
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18 Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., pp. 23-24. 
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imply an organisation. To ratify the Havana Charter it was necessary to get approval 
from the Congress, but according to the 1945 Act, the President does not have any 
authorisation to enter into agreement for an international organisation. The President 
only has authorisation to enter into agreement to reduce tariffs and other restriction 
trade. Therefore, the United States Congress disagreed with the organisational clauses 
in the GATT because it would exceed the authority of the President in conformity with 
the Act or, in other words, it would be included as executive infringement on the 
congressional domain because of the authority given to the President over tariff 
policies under the Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) programme.26 The United States 
Congress declared that the GATT was an organisation that came under the Congress’s 
authority, and that the president had exceeded his constitutional authority.27 This was 
one of the main reasons why the United States negotiators redrafted the general GATT 
clauses to eliminate the suggestion of an organisation.28 
Finally, in April 1949 the charter was sent to the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. In this regard, numerous hearings were held, but unfortunately, Truman’s 
request for a joint resolution permitting US participation in the ITO failed in the 
committee. This is one of the reasons why the charter did not get any approval from 
the Congress, because it never had the opportunity to be voted by the entire House.29 
In addition, the other reason behind the absence of approval from Congress of 
the ITO Charter was the domestic political situation. In 1948, the US Congress returned 
to be dominated by the Republicans, while the Presidency remained a Democratic 
Party. The US Congress rejected the ITO Charter as the Charter would threaten its 
national sovereignty in trade policy. Under this political pressure where the opposition 
had a very strong position in the Congress, President Truman, did not send the 
proposal to Congress.30 Therefore, by the end of 1950 President Truman announced 
that "he would not resubmit the proposal of ITO to the Congress to get approval". This 
statement terminated the chance of ITO to come into existence.31 According to Jackson, 
the irony of the situation was that the United States was the initiator to develop the 
Havana Charter.32 With the United States, the decision not to ratify the ITO caused a 
domino effect where other states also re-considered ratifying it. As noted after Second 
World War, the US held a strong economic position and an international trade 
organisation without US participation was considered as nonsense.33 After the ITO 
never came into existence, the GATT became the founding document for an 
international institution.34 The GATT had its function as a de facto international 
organisation of international trade.35 Hudec notes, after the failure of ITO, the GATT 
1947 tended to approach the perspective of the US.36 
During ITO negotiations, the US submitted a draft resolution to the Economic 
and Social Council, which did not include any particular provisions, related to the 
developing country. The Economic and Social Council made a very significant 
recommendation that it is important to “take into account the special conditions which 
                                                 
26 See Kaplan, Edward. S, 1996, Op. Cit, p. 53. 
27 See Ibid, 
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29 See Kaplan, Edward. S, 1996, Loc. Cit, p. 53.  
30 See Mshomba, Richard E., Africa and the World Trade Organization, La Salle University, Philadelphia, 2009. 
31 See Kaplan, Edward. S, 1996, Loc. Cit, p. 53.  
32 See Jackson, John Howard, 1997, Op. Cit, pp. 37-38. 
33 See Choi, Byung- il and Howe, Brendan M, International Negotiations : Theory and Practice, Jang-Hee Yoo Series on 
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34 See Kaplan, Edward. S, 1996, Loc. Cit, p. 53. 
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prevail in countries whose manufacturing industry is still in the initial stages of 
development".37 However, the US abandoned the recommendations by proposing the 
“Suggested Charter” without accommodating particular provisions for developing 
countries.38 The US argued that special treatment for developing countries under legal 
exception would not give them any extra “favour” or “assistance”, in this regard, legal 
exception to distort the market was not an advantage.39 The US approach was based on 
the global economic and political policy, in order to reduce trade protection generally 
and to eliminate discrimination. Concerning the elimination of discrimination, the US 
had an agenda to eradicate trade preferences based on colonial ties. Furthermore, the 
US had most advantages from export under international globalisation.40 
According to Hajnal, during the review session in 1954–1955, the contracting 
parties of the GATT attempted to create the Organization for Trade Cooperation or 
“OTC” aimed to administer the GATT 1947. The contracting parties realised that GATT 
needed an institutional structure to support its operation. The OTC was designed as an 
international organisation with a legal personality, so it had the legal capacity to enter 
into agreement with other intergovernmental organisations. The OTC agreement was a 
separate legal instrument, which exclusively contained institutional and procedural 
provisions. In the OTC agreement there were provisions on the organisational 
structure consisting of the secretariat, and executive and administrative organs which 
would be able to carry out many functions of the GATT.41 In the area of decision 
making, it was exercised by seventeen members of the Executive Committee. The 
Plenary Assembly with a two third majority vote elected the member of the Executive 
Committee. The Eisenhower administration supported42 the OTC, which was designed 
as a substitute for the ITO. Principally, the OTC had no authority to amend the GATT 
1947 or to create any decision that would have the effect of imposing a new obligation 
on a Member.43 However, once again, Congress refused to give approval.44 Therefore, 
OTC also ended and never came into existence45 and the GATT became the only 
multilateral instrument governing international trade from 1948 until the WTO was 
established in 1995.46 
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Although the establishment of an international organisation of trade met a 
failure once again, the contracting parties did not give up and continued trying to make 
reforms. In the GATT reviews session, the participating governments made three basic 
changes whereas one of these basic changes had significant meaning for the 
developing countries. The first basic change was the agreement to re-write Article 
XVIII that contained the infant-industry exceptions. This provision supported the 
opportunity of infant industries to grow especially in developing countries. The second 
major change concerned the use of quantitative restrictions by developing countries in 
times of balance-of-payments difficulties. The Contracting Parties agreed on provisions 
that were more flexible in order to help developing countries face a balance-of 
payments crisis. The third modification was a further attempt to accommodate the 
special needs of developing countries.47 
According to Hoekman, the WTO has some differences with GATT, where the 
WTO as an international organisation has a legal personality and has its own 
organisational structure where all of its members bind to dispute settlement 
procedures. In addition, the WTO also provides a mechanism for accession of new 
members, in this regard, the WTO can develop and play an important role in the 
international trading system.48 
The objectives of GATT are to reduce barriers to trade, to bind tariffs, and to limit 
the use of certain trade barriers, such as quotas. The negotiating parties agreed that 
substantial tariff cuts could only be achieved if certain exceptions were included in the 
structure of trade rules, in order to embody this arrangement, therefore GATT 
provisions provided several exemption clauses.49 
The GATT has a long negotiating history due to the dynamic changes of world 
economics and the continued increase in members from developing countries that 
acceded to the GATT. The history of GATT can be traced back to the successive rounds 
of negotiations, which led to new schedules of tariff concessions and new 
commitments towards greater liberalisation. Since the establishment of the GATT until 
the Marrakech Agreement, eight negotiating rounds have taken place. The first six 
rounds of negotiations focused on reducing tariffs. These six negotiating rounds are 
the Geneva Round (1947), the Annecy Round (1948), the Torquay Round (1950), the 
Geneva Round (1956), the Dillon Round (1960-1961) and the Kennedy Round (1964-
1967). The seventh round held in Tokyo, known as the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), 
addressed the various non-tariff barriers to trade.50 The eighth round of negotiations, 
known as the Uruguay Round, which was probably the most important round in the 
history of the GATT, not only because it lasted the longest (1986-1993), but also 
because the International Organisation of Trade, known as the World Trade 
Organization, was established during this round.51 
The first round of the GATT, known as the Geneva Round, was held from April to 
October 1947. The participants completed 123 negotiations and established 20 
schedules containing the tariff reductions, which became an integral part of GATT. The 
first round noted some successful histories where the US agreed to cut its tariffs on 
imports from Europe and did not put pressure to remove Europe tariff restriction. The 
                                                 
47 See World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2007, Op.Cit. 180. 
48 See Hoekman, Bernard, et. al, A Handbook : Development, Trade, and The WTO, The World Bank, Washington, D.C, 2002, 
p. 41. 
49 See World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2007, Op.cit. 
50See Understanding The WTO: Basics, The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh, Available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm, last accessed : July 2010. 
51 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO History, Available at 
:http://www.adb.org/documents/others/ogc-toolkits/wto/wto0100b.asp, last accessed : July 2010. 
 18 
first round successfully covered 45,000 tariff concessions and about $10 billion USD in 
trade. The Protocol of Provisional Application regarding tariff concessions came into 
effect on 30 June 1948, as the new General Tariff and Trade Agreement.52 
The second round of GATT, known as the Annecy Round, was held from April to 
August 1949 in Annecy, France. Member states negotiated an additional 13,000 tariff 
reductions. In the second round there were 10 new accessions of member states. It 
should be noted that accession of a new member country does not require unanimity, 
but only a two-third majority of all existing member countries (23 countries). In the 
case of  members voting against the accession of a new member, these members do not 
need to extend their trade policy concessions to the new member. During the second 
round, the 23 original members only negotiated with the acceding countries; 
consequently, the negotiation only covered 5000 items.53 While in 1948, the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, known as OEEC, had been founded 
as a tool to administer the Marshal Plan for the recovery of Europe after Second World 
War. The members of OEEC agreed to reduce the trade barriers in Europe, which 
included licenses, quotas, and exchange restrictions. As noted by Irwin, the elimination 
of quotas in 1949-1950 led to strong recovery of intra-European trade volumes and 
became the foundation of the establishment of a Common Market some years later.54 
The third round of trade negotiations was held in Torquay, England, from 
September 1950 to April 1951. It was known as the Torquay Round. The Torquay 
Round brought a significant result because the contracting parties agreed to leave 
most of the commitments agreed upon during the Geneva and Annecy Rounds. The 
Contracting Parties also decided to add another 8700 tariff items to the agreement.55 
However, some points were not adequate; some European countries could not bargain 
further because they could not afford to offer any more concessions.56 
Within the context that gave rise to the Cold War, meanwhile, the developed 
countries tried to minimise the tensions among the contracting parties of the GATT 
after the failure of ITO. The USSR insisted on encouraging the creation of an 
international organisation of trade under the United Nations. Related to this 
background, in 1956, 22 contracting parties held a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, to 
engage in the fourth round, which was then known as the Geneva Round.57 During the 
Cold War, the US began implementing protectionism while Europe started reducing its 
trade barriers.58 
Beside the difficult question of how better to integrate developing countries into 
the world trading system, the GATT faced another mounting challenge. Since the 
beginning of the 1950s, six European countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands,) had made considerable 
efforts to achieve deeper economic integration. After the successful creation of a 
common market for coal and steel in 1951, the six countries adopted the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, which established the European Economic Community. For the GATT, 
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the question was how to manage trade relations between the members of this 
upcoming customs union and the other Contracting Parties. The fear was that an 
unsatisfactory adjustment would undermine the multilateral trading system.59 
The fifth round was held once more in Geneva and lasted from 1 September 1960 
to July 1962. The negotiations were named the Dillon Round in honour of C. Douglas 
Dillon, US secretary of state under President Eisenhower. Dillon was also formerly 
Treasury Secretary under President Kennedy (during the round in January 1961) and 
the man who proposed the negotiations. The essential aim of this round was to change 
the tariffs of the six EEC members into a common schedule applied by all six towards 
non-member countries. In accordance with Article XXIV of the GATT, the new common 
external tariff was not allowed to be higher on average than the separate tariffs of the 
six countries, but if the EEC members wanted to depart from this rule, they were 
obliged to offer tariff concessions on other items such as compensation. Positive 
progress was made in the overall negotiations, but not in the field of agriculture.60 
The establishment of market integration in Europe was one of the factors of the 
opening of the fifth round in September 1960. There were 26 contracting parties 
involved in the negotiation. The fifth round consisted of two stages. First, related to the 
negotiations with EEC member states for the creation of a single schedule of 
concessions for the EEC based on its Common External Tariff (CET). At the same time, 
the establishment of the EEC had to compete with the influence of economic power of 
the US. The second stage was dedicated further to general tariff negotiations.  
Most trade negotiations, which were carried out until the Dillon Round, 
concerned industrial products. Unfortunately, the US and the EEC, as the strong 
economic powers among the GATT members, were unwilling to join negotiations in 
the agriculture field. This was due to the fact that both of these countries were 
designing their agriculture policies for their domestic prices not to be included in the 
global market mechanism. Related to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), in the 
Dillon Round negotiations, the EEC refused to agree to new bindings on several 
agricultural products because it needed under determined rates for policy design in 
the future.61 
The Dillon Round concluded in July 1962; about 4000-tariff concession had been 
made by the Contracting Parties covering $4.9 billion USD of trade. The major result of 
the negotiations was the Arrangement on Cotton Textiles, which was agreed upon by 
the negotiating parties agreed as an exception to the GATT rules and permitted 
negotiations of quota restrictions with cotton exporting countries. Principally, the 
Dillon Round gave a foundation for the future rounds concerning agriculture and the 
integration of developing countries into the world trade system.62 
The sixth round was held from 1964-1967, in Geneva, Switzerland. The GATT 
trade rounds took more time and were more complicated. In the sixth round 
participation surged to more than 60 countries and 66 nations attended the opening 
ceremony.  
In the 1960s, President Kennedy conveyed to the congress, on behalf of political 
and economic reasoning, that it was necessary to start a new round of negotiations.63 
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Then the sixth round was held in May 1963 during the Ministerial Meeting of the 
GATT. Nevertheless, the negotiations officially began one year after this ministerial 
meeting. Therefore, the sixth round was known as the Kennedy Round, after the US 
President J. F. Kennedy.64 
The Kennedy Round ended in 196765, it recorded some achievements, including 
significant reductions of tariff protection in manufacturing in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. That reduction influenced almost 75 per cent of world trade because industrial 
countries estimated a reduction in their tariffs of around 36-39 per cent.66 The 
Kennedy Round was the first round to discuss some areas of trade beyond tariffs and 
related to certain non-tariff measures. In addition, in 1967, the International Anti-
Dumping Code was enacted to regulate the complex problem of dumping. The Basic 
Code provided a valuable model for the next negotiation on similar problem areas. 
Another achievement of this round was a separate protocol agreement embodying 
several non-tariff measures.67 
There were some issues brought onto the negotiation table during the Kennedy 
Round. These issues covered liberalisation of agricultural commodities, the insertion 
of non-tariff measures, and the special treatment of developing countries. The other 
significant progress that was achieved related to bargaining, when countries started to 
negotiate with the EEC on its common external tariff. Therefore, contracting parties no 
longer made bargaining negotiations with individual countries. By the 1950s, the EEC 
had grown as a major economic power.68 
Disparity and deficit in trade were one of the reasons why the United States was 
eager to start a new round of negotiations. Another reason was the expansion of the 
EEC by the accession of new members, in addition, the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) applied by the EEC, was considered by the US administration as a new barrier 
towards US exports of agricultural. Another issue, which emerged between the GATT 
Contracting Parties, was non-tariff measures, which played an important role when 
industrial tariffs decreased. These backgrounds encouraged the establishment of the 
new round of negotiations after the Kennedy Round.69 
From 12-14 September 1973, during the ministerial meeting held in Tokyo, 
Japan, the seventh round of negotiations was launched. Hence the name Tokyo Round. 
At that time, Japan had become one of the economic powers because its exports had 
covered most shares of world trading.70 On the other hand, some other Asian 
economies also began to make positive progress in undertaking participation in world 
trading.71 There were 102 countries taking part in the negotiation, which meant that 
the number of participants had increased significantly. Most of these participants were 
developing countries.72 The decreasing of tariff duties was the essential part of the 
tariff negotiations, thus, the agreement also resulted in some kinds of agreements 
about non-tariff barriers.73 This agreement was known as the plurilateral agreement 
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because only a few state participants signed it. The plurilateral agreement did not bind 
all the states but only the states who signed the agreement.74 In addition, this type of 
agreement was known as the Tokyo Round "codes".75  
In the Tokyo Round, developing countries insisted on embodying some 
rules accommodating their special needs which were different from the developed 
countries. As noted by Abdulqawi, developing countries participated in the trade 
negotiations and proposed specific measures in the Group on Tariffs for the 
improvement of GSP and for the safeguarding of preferential tariff margins from 
erosion, which may result from MFN tariff reductions, as well as for the securing of 
compensation in the case of such erosion. The negotiations also succeeded on the 
elaboration of an enabling clause that would permanently insert the preferences in the 
general body of GATT law.76 In the Declaration of Ministers approved in Tokyo on 14 
September 1973, the Contracting Parties to the GATT recognised the importance of 
maintaining and improving the Generalised System of Preferences. As a result, the 
GATT Contracting Parties approved the “enabling clause” which provides a permanent 
legal basis within the GATT for the preferential treatment of developing states.77 Thus, 
one of the outcomes of the Tokyo Round was the declaration, which concerned “the 
need for special measures to be taken in the negotiations to assist the developing 
countries in their efforts to increase their export earnings and to promote economic 
development”.78  
The focal point of the first five negotiation rounds of GATT was on the reduction 
of tariffs. However, starting from the Kennedy Round (1964-7) the topic of negotiation 
was broadened and shifted to non-tariff barriers, it was noticed that its non-tariff 
barriers had become a more serious barrier to trade than tariffs. The Tokyo Round 
(1973-1979) resulted in more agreements in the area of non-tariff barriers than the 
Kennedy Round. Nevertheless, the agreements were made mostly in the plurilateral 
context; in this regard, difficulties were created in its implementation because it did 
not bind many state parties. The GATT was not very successful in reducing non-tariff 
barriers compared to tariff reductions. In the regard of negotiations of non-tariff 
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The Antidumping Agreement regulated the use of anti-dumping duties and associated procedures when 
governments decided to impose such duties in situations where exports were sold at less than their normal 
value. 
76See Yusuf, Abdulqawi, Legal Aspects of Trade Preferences for Developing States: A Study in the Influence of Development 
Needs on the Evolution of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Netherland 1982., p.149. 
77 See Ibid., p.160. 
78 See World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2007, Op.Cit, p. 186. 
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barriers, which were more complex, more than simply commitment was needed, and 
thus urged the establishment of an international organisation of trade. The United 
States and a few other countries brought a new issue in the area of Intellectual 
Property Rights onto the negotiations table.79 As noted by Jackson “the world was 
becoming increasingly complex and interdependent”, in this context, the GATT rules 
were needed to regulate the measures carried out by the states in international 
trade.80 Hence the establishment of a new round of trade negotiations in the early 
1980s was extremely urgent because international trade was dealing with more 
extensive and complex problems.81 
The next Ministerial Meeting took place in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on 14 
September 1986. Two main important topics were brought onto the negotiations table. 
The first topic concerned “greater liberalisation” (in agriculture), as demanded by 
developing countries, and certainty for “more discipline and predictability”, 
considering the EC position. The second topic was related to a new subject, i.e. 
intellectual property rights, services, and investment. The Punta del Este meeting was 
completed82 in one week, on 20 September 1986, thus the new round, known as the 
Uruguay Round, eventually commenced.83 
The Final Agreement of the Uruguay Round was concluded on 15 April 
1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco and was signed by 120 contracting parties. However, the 
results of the final agreement were not satisfying for all of the participating states 
because the scope of agreement was very limited and far from the outset of the Punta 
del Este Declaration.84 Even so, the Uruguay Round was noted as the greatest 
achievement in history on the multilateral trading system. Fundamental progress in 
the international trading system had been born in the form of the World Trade 
Organization.85 The fundamental basis for establishing the international trade 
organization is stipulated in the Preamble of the WTO Agreement. 
“[…] Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while 
allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the 
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with 
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development 
[…].” 
                                                 
79 See Van den Bossche, Peter., 2005, Op. Cit, p. 82; J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization : Constitution and 
Jurispridence (Royal Institute of International Affair, 1998), Op. Cit, p. 24. 
80 See Ibid. 
81 See Van den Bossche, Peter., 2005, Op. Cit, p. 82. 
82 The Declaration of Punta del Este covered many important issues for negotiations on tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
tropical products, natural resource-based products, textiles and clothing, agriculture, GATT Articles, safeguards, 
the codes of the Tokyo Round, subsidies and countervailing measures, dispute settlement, trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights, trade-related investment measures, the functioning of the GATT system and trade in 
services. The scope of topic covered by Uruguay Round was the most ambitious trade negotiation ever undertaken. 
There were 15 negotiating groups establishes and started their work in February 1987. World Trade Organization, 
World Trade Report 2007, Six Decades of Multilateral Trade Cooperation : What We Have We Learnt?, World Trade 
Publications, World Trade Organization, ISBN 978-92-870-3401-4, Switzerland, 2007, p. 190. 
 
84 The Punta del Este Declaration set the goal of “bringing all measures affecting import duties and export competition 
under strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines”. See Ministerial Declaration on 
the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. MIN. DEC (Sept. 20 1986), at 6, reprinted in GATT, BISD 33d Supp. At 19, 24 (1987) 
[Punta del Este Declaration].  
85 See Stewart, Terence P., The GATT Uruguay Round : Negotiating History (1986-1994), Volume IV: The End Game (Part 
I), ISBN 9041192921, Kluwer Law International, The Haque, The Netherland, 1999, p. 3. 
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“[…] Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure 
that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure 
a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their 
economic development […].” 
In conclusion, the critical objectives of the World Trade Organization are to 
increase standards of living, the attainment of full employment, the growth of real 
income and effective demand, and the expansion of production, and trade in goods and 
services. In order to achieve these objectives, the WTO has to consider the “needs” of 
protecting the environment and “development needs” of developing countries.86 The 
urgency of sustainable economic development and integration of developing countries, 
especially LDCs, in the multilateral trading system was emphasised in the preamble of 
the agreement. While, both those features were not covered by GATT 1947.87 
The key function of the WTO is providing the common institutional framework 
for conducting trade relations among its members under legal instruments 
incorporated in the Agreement.88 The WTO constitutes codes of conduct for member 
states to establish international cooperation on trade-related policies. These codes 
enacted through negotiations among member states.89 Explicitly, Article III of the WTO 
Agreement stipulates its main function’s in the international trade: 
1. The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and 
further the objectives, of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and 
shall also provide the framework for the implementation, administration and operation 
of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. 
2. The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their 
multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in the Annexes 
to this Agreement. 
3. The WTO may also provide a forum for further negotiations among its Members 
concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a framework for the implementation 
of the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference. 
4. The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter referred to as the "Dispute Settlement 
Understanding" or "DSU") in Annex 2 to this Agreement. 
5. The WTO shall administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (hereinafter referred to 
as the "TPRM") provided for in Annex 3 to this Agreement. 
6. With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making, the WTO 
shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and with the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies. 
                                                 
86 See Van den Bossche, Peter., 2005, Op. Cit, p. 87. 
87 In the US-Shrimp cases para. 153, the Appellate Body states : [The languange to the Preamble to the WTO Agreement] 
demonstrates a recognition by WTO negotiators that optimal use of the wolrd’s resources should be made in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development. As this preambular language reflects the intentions of 
negotiators of the WTO Agreement, we belief it must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the 
agreement annexed to the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994. We have already observed that Article XX 
(g) of the GATT 1994 is appropriately read with the perspective embodied in the above preamble.  
88 Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization article II paragraph 1; in terms to provide a legal framework 
for incorporating the result of negotiation directed toward  “reciprocal and mutually advantageous exchange of 
market access commitments on a non-discriminatory basis”. Typically, such an outcome is obtained through 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade. 
89 See Hoekman, Bernard, et. al, 2002, Op.Cit, pg. 46. The WTO can be seen as a market in the sense that countries come 
together to exchange market access commitments on a reciprocal basis. It is, in fact, a barter market. In contrast to 
the marketsone finds in city squares, countries do not have access to a medium of exchange: they do not have 
money with which to buy, and against which to sell, trade policies. Instead they have to exchange apples for 
oranges: for example, tariff reductions on iron for foreign market access commitments regarding cloth. This makes 
the trade policy market less efficient than one in which money can be used, and it is one of the reasons that WTO 
negotiations can be a tortuous process. One result of the market exchange is the development of codes of conduct. 
The WTO contains a set of specific legal obligations regulating trade policies of member states, and these are 
embodied in the GATT, the GATS, and the TRIPS agreement. 
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The Agreement Establishing the WTO basically adopted the traditional concept 
theory of state in the matter of “functions of public authority”. According to this 
theory, with regards to the “state’s inner sphere”, there are three public functions, 
consisting of legislative, executive and adjudicative functions.90 These three functions 
are set forth in Article III of the WTO Agreement with regard to Functions of the WTO. 
The executive function is laid down in Article III:191, the legislative function is laid 
down in Article III:292 and the adjudicative function is laid down in Article III:393. 
While Article III:594 of the WTO Agreement puts concern on international relations. 
Article IV of the WTO Agreement combines executive and adjudicative aspects.  In this 
regard, the WTO followed the separation powers theory.95 
Concerning the exercising of the legislative function, the agreement stipulates 
that the WTO “shall provide the forum for negotiations”96. The executive function is 
exercised by “facilitating the implementation, administration, and operation” of the 
Agreement. According to the negotiation process the WTO is not intended to 
“institutionalise any autonomous political process”. Therefore, its objective 
emphasises the “serving” function to its members, considering itself as a “member-
driven institution”97. In this context, contrast with the function of another institution, 
for example IMF which equipped a “greater operational autonomy” of the IMF 
Executive Board. On the other hand, the function of the WTO Director General is only 
regarded as “institution driven”.98 
The adjudicative function, as laid down in Article III:3, referred to the Dispute 
Settlement of Understanding or DSU. This mechanism of dispute settlement 
substantively has an autonomous function. With respect to the fairness principle, 
referring to Article 6.1 of the DSU, the adjudicative procedure “does not depend on the 
consent of the respondent member”. Articles 8.6 and 8.7 of the DSU embody the 
independency principle of the adjudicative process of “the nomination of the 
panellists” by the Secretariat and the Director-General. The adoption of the 
adjudicative decision is stipulated in Articles 16.4 and 17.14 of the DSU, respectively.99 
The WTO is considered as the means of globalisation, and has given a great 
contribution to international trade relations and the development of world economy 
for more than 50 years. The multilateral trading system (MTS) catalyses the rapid 
liberalisation of trade based on “stability, predictability, and transparency”. The 
achievement of the WTO has been proved by enlargement of membership, as noted, in 
                                                 
90 See G. Jellinek, Allegemeine Staatslehre, 3rd edition, 1928, 609 et seq.; G. Zimmer, Funktion – Kompetenz – 
Legitimation: Gewaltenteilung in der Ordnung des Grundgesetzes, 1979, 33 et seq. 
91 The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further the objectives, of this 
Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and shall also provide the framework for the 
implementation, administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. 
92 The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations in 
matters dealt with under the agreements in the Annexes to this Agreement. The WTO may also provide a forum for 
further negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a framework for the 
implementation of the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference. 
93 The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 
94 With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making, the WTO shall cooperate, as 
appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and with the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and its affiliated agencies. 
95 See Von Bogdandy, Armin., p. 609 ; Frowein, Jochen A, et. al, 2001, Op. Cit., p. 614. 
96 In WTO Negotiation Rules Governments negotiate only if they want and what they want based on general rule of 
consensus between states members.  
97 Available at :http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10mis_e/10m01e.htm “In fact . it’s governments who 
dictate to the WTO”. 
98 See Von Bogdandy, Armin., p. 609 ; Frowein, Jochen A, et. al, 2001, Op. Cit., p. 615. 
99 See Von Bogdandy, Armin., p. 609 ; Frowein, Jochen A, et. al, 2001, Loc. Cit., p. 615. 
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23 July 2008, the WTO had 153 members100, and with more than 30 countries in the 
process of accession. Consequently, the WTO has covered 97% of world trade 
volume.101 
The member states of the WTO have the opportunity to take part in the decision-
making of essential aspects of international trade and to design their development 
policies to be more predictable and stable.102 However, the insufficiency of 
understanding about the WTO could slow down the implementation of national 
ratification. As noted by Jackson, “the implications of the Uruguay Round Agreement 
are undoubtedly not fully understood yet by any government that has accepted them”, 
this is particularly critical since the agreement “has such potentially profound effects 
on the economic well-being and activity of billions of citizens”.103 
Currently, the accession issues of WTO have become very important for 
developing countries and non-market economies because most industrialised 
countries had joined GATT from the early negotiation rounds. As noted, the demand of 
developing countries with respect to Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment is 
accommodated in pragmatism and compromise during the negotiation rounds.104 
Most developing countries joined WTO by succession rather than accession, 
because most were former colonies, such as countries in the Caribbean and Africa and 
in some parts of Asia. For instance, Ghana and Malaysia both joined in 1957 under a 
succession mechanism that allowed newly independent territories to succeed to the 
rights and obligations of their “parent states”.105 Former colonies entered the WTO 
under the exceptional condition as set forth in Article XXVI:5(c). Under this provision 
former colonies received the ease of joining by acquiring de facto GATT status on 
achieving independence, later the states could then convert de facto status into full 
GATT contracting party status by succession. The mechanism of succession was not so 
difficult and had fewer new commitments than the accession process under Article 
XXXIII of GATT. Nevertheless, several countries of former colonies preferred to wait 
several years and joined WTO using the accession mechanism, which is more difficult 
and more complicated. However, it should be noted that half of the developing 
countries joined WTO using the accession mechanism. On the other hand, some former 
colonies refused to use the succession mechanism on the grounds of ideological issues, 
considering both the institution and the rule as neo-colonialism.106 
The mechanisms of accession provided by the WTO are more difficult compared 
to accession to GATT 1947 based on various reasons.107 In the accession mechanism, 
                                                 
100 See Understanding The WTO: The Organization: Members and Observers, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, last accessed : 2 March 2011. 
101 See Naray, Peter, Integration of countries into the multilateral trading system: The role of institutions and the human 
factor, Aspects of economic and institutional integration into the WTO, Former Permanent Representative of 
Hungary to the UN Office in Geneva, , United Nations Conference On Trade And Development, WTO Accessions and 
Development Policies, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2001, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/11, p. 96, Available at : 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd11_en.pdf, last accessed : September 2010. 
102 See Ricupero, Rubens, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, United Nations Conference On Trade And Development, WTO 
Accessions and Development Policies, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2001, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/11, 
available at : http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd11_en.pdf, last accessed : September 2010. 
103 See Von Bogdandy, Armin., p. 609 ; Frowein, Jochen A, et. al, 2001, Loc. Cit., p. 615. 
104 See VanGrasstek, Craig, Why demands on acceding countries increase over time: A three-dimensional analysis of 
multilateral trade diplomacy, President, Washington Trade Reports, USA, United Nations Conference On Trade And 
Development, WTO Accessions and Development Policies, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2001, 
UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/11, p. 84, available at : http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd11_en.pdf, last accessed : 
November 2010. 
105 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 31. 
106 See VanGrasstek, Craig, 2001, Loc. Cit, p. 84. 
107 Accession to the WTO involves a considerably more complex and difficult process than that for accession to the GATT 
1947. First, the WTO Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs) involve more stringent and detailed rules and 
disciplines covering trade in goods, and the scope of these rules and disciplines has been expanded to cover trade 
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recognised as a unilateral procedure108, the trade regime of the acceding country must 
comply with all the rules and disciplines as set out in the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements (MTAs). Further, it includes policies in the area of trade, service, 
agriculture, investment, communications, and transportation, aspects of immigration 
laws and other related areas109. Consequently, it openly affects their trade policies and 
practices110. In addition, the acceding country has an obligation and has to pay a 
“membership fee”, “in conditions of specific concessions on tariff rates, commitments 
on agricultural subsidies and commitments on trade in services”. They are then 
granted rights to enjoy the profits from the liberalisation achieved during the previous 
multilateral negotiations under the WTO on an equal basis, in compliance with the 
principle of reciprocity and mutual benefit.111 
As noted by Ognivtsev et al., accession to the WTO, as before the GATT 1947, is 
shown as the organisation’s institutional specificity as an “umbrella” organisation for 
the administration, implementation and negotiation of intergovernmental contractual 
obligations with regard to multilateral trade relations.112 Throughout the accession 
process, the acceding country has to accept rules and disciplines to be adopted in its 
strategic sector such as its economic, legislative, judicial and administrative systems in 
order to participate effectively in negotiations and afterwards to implement its 
obligations as a WTO member. The mechanism process of accession actually gives a lot 
of contribution “to building the country’s institutional capacity”, such as the 
implementation of good governance (transparency, accountability, rules of law, and 
fairness), sustainable development and efficiency in economic and trade regimes. This 
building foundation is very important to enhancing its capacity to defend its rights in 
future negotiations at all levels.113 
According to Gibbs, the backdrop of accession negotiations is disparities in the 
WTO rights and obligations itself. In several cases, demands for commitments have 
departed from the scope of the WTO Agreements. For example, countries required to 
accept plurilateral agreements, which are an optional Agreement under Annex 4 of the 
WTO Agreements, with respect to privatisation and economic reform, elimination of 
                                                                                                                                          
in services (which could cover investment, transport, communication, the movement of persons, etc.) as well as the 
protection of intellectual property rights. These new rules and disciplines intrude further into areas traditionally 
perceived as belonging to domestic policy. In addition to bringing their trade regime into conformity with the 
multilateral disciplines, acceding countries are required to negotiate concessions on reduction and bindings of 
tariffs, commitments on agricultural subsidies, and specific commitments on trade in various services sectors. 
Second, the attitude of the major trading countries vis-à-vis acceding countries has become more demanding, thus 
effectively increasing the “standard of accession”. Some have taken the position that acceding countries should 
accept a level of obligations higher than that accepted by the original members of the WTO. In practice, this has 
meant that acceding countries have had to accept a degree of tariff bindings and commitments on services 
comparable to that of the most advanced countries, and that they have not been able to benefit from all the 
relevant special and differential (S&D) provisions in favour of developing countries and economies in transition, 
and have been required to accept some of the “plurilateral” agreements.( Ognivtsev, Victor, et. al, 2001, p. 116.) 
108 See Ognivtsev, Victor., et. al, Accession to the WTO: The process and selected issues, United Nations Conference On 
Trade And Development, WTO Accessions and Development Policies, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2001, 
UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/11, p. 122, available at : http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd11_en.pdf. In the sense 
that all requests and demands are placed by WTO members on the acceding country, while the acceding country 
cannot submit requests to WTO members. 
109 See Gibbs, Murray, Senior Advisor to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, United Nations Conference On Trade And 
Development, WTO Accessions and Development Policies, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2001, 
UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/11, available at : http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd11_en.pdf. 
110 See Ognivtsev, Victor, et. al, 2001, Loc. Cit, p. 122. 
111 Ibid., p. 122. In the sense that all requests and demands are placed by WTO members on the acceding country, while 
the acceding country cannot submit requests to WTO members. 
112 See Ibid. 
113 See Ricupero, Rubens, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, United Nations Conference On Trade And Development, WTO 
Accessions and Development Policies, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2001, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/11, 
available at : http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd11_en.pdf. 
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price and profit controls, and the binding of export duties. The provisions for special 
and differential treatment (S&D) in the Multilateral Trade Agreements are considered 
inadequate by developing countries. For example, with respect to the transitional 
periods, it has been demonstrated very difficult for acceding developing countries to 
get benefit from such provisions. The other result is that the acceding developing 
countries become subject to a set of obligations and commitments that may not be able 
to be implemented  In other words, developing countries lack infrastructure and 
resources to implement all WTO commitments.114.  
To sum up, there are two main obligations of WTO members. First, the Members 
of WTO have to ensure the conformity of their laws, regulations, and administrative 
procedures with the agreements. Second, the Members of WTO have to participate 
actively in trade liberalisation rounds. As derived from the emergence of the 
GATT/WTO system, both obligations constitute difficulties for all developing countries, 
though in different forms and degrees, depending on the level of economic and 
institutional development.115  
There are five essential principles which have importance in understanding both 
the pre-1994 GATT and the WTO, consisting of the non-discrimination principle, 
security and predictability of market access, fair trade, transparency and increasing 
the participation of developing countries in the multilateral trading system.116  
The principle of non-discrimination has two main components: the Most 
Favoured Nation (hereinafter MFN) rule, and the national treatment principle. Both of 
these two principles are assembled across the WTO rules on goods, services, and 
intellectual property. However, those rules have different essence. The WTO applied 
the unconditional MFN. The background of applying the MFN system was for economic 
reason, if the policy does not discriminate between foreign suppliers, importers and 
consumers there will be an incentive to use the lowest cost foreign supplier. MFN also 
provides given specific countries preferential treatment for foreign policy reasons 
through an exemption system.117 The national treatment obliges each WTO Member to 
treat nationals of other Members at least as well as it treats its own nationals as stated 
by Article III of GATT 1994. The GATT addresses trade in goods, and in that context, 
national treatment requires non-discriminatory treatment of “like products” or 
tangible118 things. The national treatment applies only when the product or service has 
entered the market in which it should be treat equally. Subsequently, imposing 
customs duty on an import is not considered as a violation of national treatment even 
though locally produced products are not charged an equivalent tax.119 The national 
treatment principle has often invoked dispute settlement cases brought to the GATT. 
What matters is the existence of discrimination, not its effects.120 
The second principle of the WTO is security and predictability of market access 
with respect to the tariffs binding commitment and lowering trade barriers. The 
stability and certainty of tariffs policies play a crucial role in international trade. For 
                                                 
114 See Gibbs, Murray, 2001, Op.Cit. 
115 See Naray, Peter, Integration of countries into the multilateral trading system: The role of institutions and the human 
factor, Aspects of economic and institutional integration into the WTO, Former Permanent Representative of 
Hungary to the UN Office in Geneva, , United Nations Conference On Trade And Development, WTO Accessions and 
Development Policies, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2001, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/11 p. 98, available at : 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd11_en.pdf. 
116 See Hoekman, Bernard, et. al, 2002, Op.cit. ; Understanding The WTO: Basics Principles of the trading system, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm. 
117 See Hoekman, Bernard, et. al, 2002, Op. Cit, p. 42. 
118 Availbale at : http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/RB_Part1_Nov_1.3Update.pdf  
119 See Understanding The WTO: Basics Principles of the trading system, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm. 
120 See Hoekman, Bernard, et. al, 2002, Op. Cit, p. 43. 
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example, once a state has entered into agreement of tariff binding at a certain level in 
GATT,  this means that the state has committed itself not to raise the tariff above that 
level except by negotiation with compensation for affected trading partners. In other 
words this means that it is prohibited for a state that has signed an agreement on tariff 
binding to increase the tariff level “unilaterally” above the tariffs boundary.121 Signing 
consent into agreement whether to increase or to lower trade barriers is crucial in 
trade, since, the agreement provides assurance and security for the trader and 
investors.122  According to Hoekman, “once tariff commitments are bound, it is 
important that there be no resort to other, non-tariff, measures that have the effect of 
nullifying or impairing the value of the tariff concession”.123 In this regard, the WTO 
regime requires governments to open their policies and practices to the public and to 
notify the WTO. Stability and predictability encourage investment growth, which 
generates employment and creates fair competition, so that consumers can enjoy 
competitive prices and the best quality of trade and services. In short, the purpose of 
the multilateral trading system is to establish stability and predictability in the 
business environment.124 Once countries have signed the agreement under the WTO 
regime, they are required to open their markets for goods or services, and are “bound” 
to their commitments. However, such countries, as explained above, may re-negotiate 
their commitment with the trading partners in order to agree on compensation for the 
loss of trade. The Uruguay round has increased the number of tariff binding 
agreements, for example, 100% of agriculture products now have bound tariffs.125  
The third principle of the WTO is to promote fair trade in the multilateral trading 
system.126 Fair Trade is considered as a strategy for alleviating poverty and 
implementing sustainable development. Fair trade or fair business competition 
complies with the objectives of the WTO to raise standards of living, whereas it opens 
equal opportunities to the producers, traders, investors or other business actors who 
have been economically deprived or marginalised by the unfair conventional system. 
Fair trade is defined as equal trading partnership. Fair trade must be done based on 
fair negotiation, transparency, and must take into consideration the equity in 
international trade relations. Offering better trading conditions and securing the rights 
of marginalised producers and workers, especially in developing countries, 
contributes to sustainable development. Fair Trade Organisations, as organisations 
backed by consumers, are involved actively in supporting producers, awareness 
raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of conventional 
international trade.127  
Fair trade under the WTO regime is embodied in Article VI of the GATT on Anti-
dumping, Countervailing Duties,128 and Article XXVI on Subsidies. Both of these articles 
                                                 
121 See Ibid, p. 43. 
122 See Ibid, p. 43. 
123 See Ibid, p. 43. 
124 See Ibid, p. 43. 
125 See Ibid, p. 43. 
126 Non-tariff barriers are the most frequent targets of complaint, followed closely by a large number of cases dealing 
with “unfair” trade practices or the measures taken to offset them (subsidies, antidumping/countervailing 
duties).(World Trade Report 2007, p. 34). 
127 Definition as agreed by FINE : In 1998, four key international organizations, based in Europe, created a widely 
accepted definition of Fair Trade. Fairtrade Labeling Organization (FLO), International Fair Trade Association (now 
World Fair Trade Organization, WFTO), the Network of European Worldshops (NEWS) and the European Fair 
Trade Association (EFTA) created a workgroup known as FINE, an acronym of their names, available at : 
http://www.fairtraderesource.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/what-is-fair-trade.pdf.  
128 GATT (Article 6) allows countries to take action against dumping. The Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands 
Article 6, and the two operate together. They allow countries to act in a way that would normally break the GATT 
principles of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners typically anti-dumping action means 
charging extra import duty on the particular product from the particular exporting country in order to bring its 
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provide provisions on unfair trade conduct, particularly on dumping and subsidies.129 
The measures of anti-dumping and countervailing are only invoked if the presence of 
domestic injury by unfair trade practices of imports is proven.130 There are some 
foreign anti-competitive practices that come from outside their jurisdiction but could 
injure competition in the domestic market, such as international cartels or some 
mergers.131 Under the GATT regime on non-discrimination, MFN and national 
treatment are aimed to protect fair conditions of trade.132  
The fourth principle of the WTO is transparency133, as the primary principle of 
the WTO, and it is a legal obligation, embedded in Article 10134 of the GATT. Provisions 
                                                                                                                                          
price closer to the “normal value” or to remove the injury to domestic industry in the importing country. Anti-
dumping measures can only be applied if the dumping is hurting the industry in the importing country. Therefore, 
a detailed investigation has to be conducted according to specified rules first. The investigation must evaluate all 
relevant economic factors that have a bearing on the state of the industry in question. If the investigation shows 
dumping is taking place and domestic industry is being hurt, the exporting company can undertake to raise its 
price to an agreed level in order to avoid anti-dumping import duty, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm.  
129 See Hoekman, et. al, 2002 : Articles aimed at ensuring “fair competition” include the right to impose countervailing 
duties on imports that have been subsidized and antidumping duties on imports that have been dumped (sold at a 
price below that charged in the home market). 
130 Differentiation of application anti-dumping and countervailing duties with safeguard measures: dumping or 
subsidization may be supplier- or country-specific, anti-dumping and countervailing measures are imposed only on 
those suppliers whose products are found to be dumped or subsidized, i.e., the measures are not applied on an 
MFN basis. Safeguard measures are in principle applied on an MFN basis, i.e., are meant to apply to all sources of 
imports, although developing countries can be excluded from their application if those countries account for a 
small share of imports. Finally, since anti-dumping and countervailing measures are applied in response to 
specified trade practices (dumping or subsidization), there is no requirement to offer compensation to the affected 
trade partner. In contrast, a country applying a safeguard measure – which is in response to an import surge that 
has harmed its domestic industry, rather than in response to the effects of a particular trading practice – has to 
offer compensation for the adverse effects of the measure on trade partners 
131 See Bilal, Sanoussi, Trade and Competition Policy: Perspectives for Developing Countries, Overseas Development 
Institute, London, available at : http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3598.pdf. 
132 Trade agreements define rules for the conduct of trade policy. These rules must strike a balance between 
commitments and flexibility. Too much flexibility may undermine the value of commitments, but too little f 
lexibility may render the rules politically unsustainable. This tension between credible commitments and flexibility 
is often close to the surface during trade negotiations. Many of the kinds of flexibilities associated with trade 
agreements are generally referred to as escape clauses, contingency measures, trade remedies or safety valves. 
These terms will often be used interchangeably. The fundamental reason for incorporating escape clauses of 
various kinds into trade agreements is for governments to manage circumstances that cannot be anticipated prior 
to their occurrence. These may involve unexpected increases in imports from foreign suppliers or “unfair” trade 
practices, such as dumping and subsidies or the political desire to modify existing policy commitments. A trade 
agreement that offers such possibilities without unduly weakening existing contractual commitments has a better 
chance of remaining robust than an agreement that results in regular non-compliance by World Trade 
Organization (WTO) members in response to such circumstances. In addition, these measures allow governments 
to undertake deeper commitments, while reducing the political costs of signing the agreement. (See World Trade 
Report, 2009). 
133 Internal and external transparency have less to do about clarification of the provisions in multilateral agreements as 
with laying bare the process of decision-making in the institution or organization itself. The objective of internal 
transparency is to make decision-making in the WTO transparent and genuinely inclusive. It includes the outreach 
by the WTO to the smallest and poorest WTO Members, particularly to those without WTO missions in Geneva 
(non-resident delegations). External transparency refers to the WTO’s efforts to engage with civil society groups 
and the public at large. Much of this involves making available official WTO documents, reports, submissions by 
WTO Members and trade-related statistics. Other activities related to external transparency involve giving civil 
society groups access to relevant WTO meetings, including the Ministerial Conferences, and the holding of public 
forums to better explain the institution and WTO Agreements. (See World Trade Report 2007, p. 207). 
134 See Article X of the GATT requires Members to “publish promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and 
traders to become acquainted with them” all information related to the administration of trade regulations. The 
essential idea behind the publication obligation is that other WTO Members that are likely to be affected by 
governmental measures should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire information about such measures and 
either to adjust their activities or to seek modification of such measures. Notification provisions are, in terms of 
count, the most commonly found transparency mechanism in the WTO Agreements. Notifications are required to 
inform other Members about the enactment of legislation, or the adoption of new measures, or the progress made 
in the implementation of commitments (World Trade Report 2007, p. 207). 
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on transparency are spread across the range of WTO Agreements.135 Transparency 
gives many advantages to trade. The WTO members are required to publish their trade 
laws and regulations, to establish and maintain institutions allowing for the review of 
administrative decisions affecting trade, to respond to requests for information by 
other members, and to notify changes in trade policies to the WTO. The Trade Policy 
Review is a periodic country specific report, prepared by the secretariat and discussed 
by the WTO General Council, as a tool to enhance internal transparency which is 
supplemented by multilateral surveillance of the trade policies of WTO members. 
External surveillance136 also promotes transparency, both for public society inside the 
country and for foreign business actors. It is also considered as a tool to reduce the 
scope for countries to breach their obligations and minimise uncertainty with respect 
to the prevailing policy measures. Trade policy reviews are used by public access 
general trade policies taken by their government as a source of information. In order 
to encourage public participation in the mechanism of public policy planning of trade. 
As viewed from an economic perspective, transparency can also help reduce 
uncertainty related to trade policies.137 The Trade Policy Review Mechanism is an 
effective tool to encourage transparency both domestically and at the multilateral 
level.138 Information transparency is crucial for business actors such as traders and 
investors, because it is also used for the appraisal of feasibility of the business 
prospectus. The government and other authorities are required to publish all laws, 
regulations, and practices that can have an effect on trade or investment under WTO 
rules and regulations.139 
                                                 
135 See Article X of the GATT, Article III of the GATS, and Article 63 of the TRIPS agreement all require that relevant laws, 
regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings be made public. More than 200 notification requirements 
are embodied in the various WTO agreements and mandated by ministerial and council decisions 
136 Surveillance in the WTO, takes place principally through the various committees or WTO bodies that have been 
established by the WTO Agreements. The raw material of this surveillance comes from the notifications, complaints 
and requests for consultations by Members as well as reports prepared by the Secretariat. Thus there is an 
important link between the observance of transparency by Members, their ability to provide timely and accurate 
notifications to various WTO organs and the quality of the surveillance function of the WTO. (See World Trade 
Report 2007, p. 207). 
137 See Hoekman, Bernard, et. al, 2002, Op. Cit, p. 44. 
138 The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) established under Annex 3 of the Marrakech Agreement. Its purpose is: 
“to contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the 
smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding 
of, the trade policies and practices of Members. Accordingly, the review mechanism enables the regular collective 
appreciation and evaluation of the full range of individual Members’ trade policies and practices and their impact 
on the functioning of the multilateral trading system. It is not, however, intended to serve as a basis for the 
enforcement of specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures, or to impose new 
policy commitments on Members.” This objective is to be realized through regular reviews of a Member’s trade 
policies and practices. Before this, a peer review mechanism of a Member’s trade policy had been provisionally 
established in 1988, (World Trade Report 2007, p. 206). The TPRM was originally motivated in part by concerns 
stemming from the fact that the only available review of global trade policies at the time was produced by the 
United States (Keesing 1998). The TPRM is an important element of the WTO because it fosters transparency and 
enhances communication, thereby strengthening the multilateral trading system. Country specific reviews are 
conducted on a rotational basis, and the frequency of review is a function of a member’s share in world trade. The 
four largest players the European Union, the United States, Japan, and Canada are subject to review by the WTO 
General Council every two years. In principle, the next 16 largest traders are subject to reviews every four years, 
and the remaining members are reviewed every six years. A longer periodicity may be established for least-
developed countries. The trade policy review (TPR) for a country is based on a report prepared by the government 
concerned and on a report by the WTO Trade Policies Review Division. TPRs are supplemented by an annual report 
by the Director General of the WTO that provides an overview of developments in the international trading 
environment (Hoekman, et.al, 2002). 
139 See WTO Origin and Principles, p. 13, avalaible at : 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/mekongpsdf.nsf/attachmentsbytitle/wto-eng-chapter4/$file/wto-eng-chapter4.pdf, last 
accessed : November 2010. 
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In the 1950s, the major change in the relationships between poor and rich 
countries began. According to Karin Kock140, the critical issue that influenced GATT 
affairs between developed countries and developing countries is when “the large 
number of British and French colonies” achieved their independency.141 This situation 
changed the legal relationship between parent countries and its former colonies 
became equal trading partners with the inequalities of economic development 
stages.142 
The original contracting of the GATT 1947 consisted of twenty-three states of 
which ten were developing countries.143 Afterwards in the Annecy Round 1949, four 
developing countries joined GATT.144 Indonesia as a new independent state, became a 
contracting party of GATT in 1950, five years after it had declared its independence on 
17 August 1945. The developing countries that joined GATT increased as the period of 
colonialism came to an end. During the Torquay Round 1951, Peru and Turkey 
negotiated their memberships. As noted by Hudec, by the end of the decade, the total 
membership of developing countries in the GATT stood at only 37 and developed 
countries still held a 21-16 majority.145 By the mid-1970s, there were seventy-seven 
contracting parties in the GATT, consisting of 25 developed countries and 52 
developing countries.146 Thus, after the Marrakech agreement, there was a significant 
increase in the membership of the WTO, whereas the developing countries dominated 
the majority147of membership. The principle embodied in the WTO, which recognised 
special needs of economic development, had attracted developing countries to 
participate in the multilateral trading system.148  
Hence, it was proven that trade liberalisation gave a positive impact to economic 
development especially in developing countries.149 Fundamentally, the WTO regime 
aimed to contribute to the development. In addition, developing countries needed 
“leniency” to implement the agreements in their domestic policies. They needed to 
                                                 
140 The Swedish expert on GATT affairs. 
141 See Karin Kock, International Trade Policy and the GATT 1947-1967, op. cit., p. 236; Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 
42. 
142 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 42. 
143 The Developing countries, which are the original Contracting Parties of GATT: Brazil, Burma, China, Ceylon, Chile, 
Cuba, India, Pakistan, Syria and Lebanon, however, within the first few years China (by then the Taiwan 
government), Lebanon and Syria withdrew from the memberships. 
144 The Developing countries, joined in Annecy round : The Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua and Uruguay. 
145 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 31. 
146 See Ibid., p. 32. 
147 Over three quarters of WTO members are developing countries and countries in transition to market economies. 
During the seven and a half years of the Uruguay Round, over 60 of these countries implemented trade 
liberalization programmes autonomously. At the same time, developing countries and transition economies were 
much more active and influential in the Uruguay Round negotiations than in any previous round, and they are even 
more so in the current Doha Development Agenda. At the end of the Uruguay Round, developing countries were 
prepared to take on most of the obligations that are required of developed countries. A ministerial decision 
adopted at the end of the round says better-off countries should accelerate implementing market access 
commitments on goods exported by the least-developed countries, and it seeks increased technical assistance for 
them. More recently, developed countries have started to allow duty-free and quota-free imports for almost all 
products from least-developed countries. On all of this, the WTO and its members are still going through a learning 
process. The current Doha Development Agenda includes developing countries’ concerns about the difficulties they 
face in implementing the Uruguay Round agreements. 
148 See Who are the developing countries in the WTO?, Available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm. ; Hoekman, Bernard M., and Martin, Will., 
Developing Countries and the WTO: A Pro-Active Agenda, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., UK, 2001. 
149See Thomas J., Schoenbaum., The WTO and Developing Countries, available at : 
http://subsite.icu.ac.jp/ssri/Publications /SummaryFolder/J54Summaries/016TJSchoenbaum_Eng.pdf; 
Michalopoulos, Constantine., Developing Countries in the WTO, Palgrave, New York, 2001 ; Commonwealth Business 
Council, Developing countries and The WTO Trade Debate: A Compelling Case For Full Participation In The New 
Round ; Hoekman, Bernard M., and Martin, Will., Developing Countries and the WTO: A Pro-Active Agenda, Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd., UK, 2001. 
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prepare and to build both macro and micro infrastructures including the institutional 
building in order to support the implementation of WTO agreements. As noted, GATT 
1994 inherited the earliest provisions of GATT 1947 which allowed special assistance 
and treatment, and also trade concessions for developing countries. Nowadays, 
developing countries view trade as a vital tool to support their development. In the 
WTO, there are no exact definitions or criteria which clearly distinguish between 
“developed” and “developing” countries. As recognised by customary state practice, 
members declare for themselves whether they are “developed” or “developing” 
countries. However, other members can confront the declaration of a member to take 
advantages from provisions, which are provided for developing countries. Therefore, 
the WTO Member, which declares itself as a developing country, does not 
automatically get privileges from the unilateral preference schemes provided by some 
developed countries members such as the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). In 
practice, the preference-granting country has the authority to arrange the scheme and 
criteria to decide the list of developing countries that will benefit from the 
preferences.150 
The status of developing country in the WTO brings certain rights. The WTO 
regime has provided some provisions with respect to the special needs of developing 
countries and provides developed countries the possibility to treat developing 
countries more favourably than other WTO Members. There are provisions in some 
WTO Agreements, which provide for developing countries. These special provisions151 
include, for example, longer time periods for implementing agreements and 
commitments or measures to increase trading opportunities for developing countries 
and developing countries can receive technical assistance.152 
 
II. Non-discrimination principle in WTO: MFN treatment clause. 
The history of the non-discrimination obligations concerning international 
economic matters can be traced back for centuries. However, in recent decades it has 
become increasingly complex. Although it has been argued that customary 
international law imposes a non-discrimination obligation on nations in the conduct of 
their international trading relationships, such an obligation only exists based on the 
agreement. Non-discrimination obligations are found in almost all sub-fields of 
international economic law, particularly in trade goods and services, investment 
security or the protection of intellectual property rights.153 
Over the centuries, various treaties have contained a variety of non-
discrimination clauses. After the Second World War, the principal of non-
discrimination norms were included in the GATT provisions. The non-discrimination 
                                                 
150 See Who are the developing countries in the WTO?, Available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm. ; Hoekman, Bernard M., and Martin, Will., 
Developing Countries and the WTO: A Pro-Active Agenda, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., UK, 2001. 
151 These provisions are referred to as “special and differential treatment” provisions, which cover longer time periods 
for implementing Agreements and commitments, measures to increase trading opportunities for these countries, 
provisions requiring all WTO members to safeguard the trade interests of developing countries, support to help 
developing countries build the infrastructure for WTO work, handle disputes, and implement technical standards, 
and provisions related to Least-Developed country (LDC) Members. 
152 See Work on special and differential provisions, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special 
_differential_provisions_e.htm. 
153 See Diebold, Nicolas F., Non-Discrimination And The Pillars of International Economic Law, Emerging Scholars Papers, 
A sub series of IILJ Working Papers, IILJ Emerging Scholars Paper 18, Institute for International Law and Justice, 
New York University School of Law, 2010, p. 3, available at : http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/ESP18-
2010Diebold.pdf, last accessed : 25 January 2011. 
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provisions concern these norms expressed in GATT.154 The WTO contract essentially 
requires its members to ensure that they will not conduct discrimination treatment 
either de jure or de facto between domestic and foreign goods/services/suppliers of 
services.155 The WTO agreement is not (or should not be interpreted as) an instrument 
for deregulation. Therefore, governments have the freedom to establish the regulation 
and take a measure whenever they consider it appropriate to intervene through 
regulatory means. The WTO members are free to enact any legislation they deem 
appropriate to achieve their stated goals provided, but they have to respect the non-
discrimination principle.156 
With respect to the international economic behaviour, essentially, there are two 
types of non-discrimination157 norms. The first norm is the “Most Favoured Nation” 
(MFN) treatment. The second norm is non-discrimination, which is called the “National 
Treatment” obligation. The National Treatment norm obliges a state to treat within its 
own borders, goods, services, persons, originating from outside its borders, in the 
equal manner it treats those of domestic origin.158 These norms are embodied in GATT 
Articles I and III. The MFN rule also appears in several WTO Agreements.159  
The MFN principle stipulates that each member shall give equal treatment to the 
like products originating from all other members that it extends to its most favoured 
trading partner. This means that the WTO members are not allowed to discriminate 
among their trading partners. Subsequently, if a country improves the benefits that it 
gives to one trading partner, it has to give the equal “best” treatment to imports of like 
products from all other WTO Members so that they all enjoy “most-favoured” 
                                                 
154 See Jackson, John H., The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations, 
Cambridge University Press, UK, 2000/2007, p. 57. 
155 The MFN treatment was one of the core obligations of commercial policy under the Havana Charter where Members 
were to undertake the obligation “to give due regard to the desirability of avoiding discrimination between foreign 
investors”. The inclusion of MFN clauses became a general practice in the numerous bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral investment-related agreements which were concluded after the Charter failed to come into force in 
1950. Its importance for international economic relations is underscored by the fact that the MFN treatment 
provisions of the GATT (Article I General Most- Favoured-Nation Treatment) and the GATS (Article II MFN 
Treatment) provide that this obligation shall be accorded “immediately and unconditionally” (although in the case 
of the GATS, a member may maintain a measure inconsistent with this obligation provided that such measure is 
listed in, and meets the conditions of, the Annex on Article II Exemptions). See J.H.H. Weiler, S. Cho & I. Feichtner, 
International and Regional Trade Law: The Law of the World Trade Organization, Unit IV: Tariffs and Customs 
Law/The Most-Favored Nation Principle, 2007. 
156 See Cottier, Thomas, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Blatter, Patrick, Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-
Discrimination in World Trade Law, The World Trade Forum, Volume 2, The University Michigan Press, USA, 2002, 
p. 4. 
157 The notion of non-discrimination is a complex one. Its content is highly elastic and context-dependent. Recognizing 
the “infinite complexity” entailed by the concept, a WTO panel once warned: “‘Discrimination’ is a term to be 
avoided whenever more precise standards are available, and when employed, it is a term to be interpreted with 
caution, and with care to add no more precision than the concept contains.” Despite such perceived difficulties in 
defining the concept, the Appellate Body has recently interpreted the generic term “non-discriminatory” as a 
requirement of not treating similarly-situated countries differently. This interpretation is a significant 
development in WTO jurisprudence because it introduces a key for defining the general obligation of non-
discrimination under WTO law. Under this interpretation, discrimination occurs only when differential treatment 
is accorded to “similarly situated” countries; thus, the central issue is to determine the basis for comparing 
similarity between WTO Members. See Julia Ya Qin, Op.Cit, p. 218.  
158 See G. Schwarzenberg, “Equality and Discrimination in International Economic Law” in The British Yearbook of World 
Affairs 1971 (London Institute of World Affairs, 1971), 163-181; J.N Hazard, “Editorial Comment; Commercial 
Discrimination and International Law” (1958) 52 American Journal of International Law 495; John H Jackson 
“Equality and Discrimination in International Economic Law : The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” in The 
British Yearbook of World Affair 1983 (London Institute of World Affairs, 1983), 224-239; ; Jackson, John H., 2000, 
Op. Cit. 
159 See Anderson, Kym and Hoekman, Bernard, The WTO’s Core Rules and Diciplines Volume I : Critical Perspectives on the 
Global Trading Sytem and the WTO, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc, Massachusetts, USA, 2006. pp xvi ; Bernard 
Hoekman (2002), “ The WTO : Functions and Basic Principles’, in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Phillip 
English (eds), Development, Trade, and the WTO : A Handbook, Chapter 6, Washington, DC : The World Bank, 41-9, 
references.  
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treatment. The MFN is the dominance of the principle in multilateral trade 
negotiations; it is often referred to as one of the so-called “pillars” or “cornerstones” of 
the WTO.160 
As noted by Jackson, the use and scope of the MFN clauses have varied over time 
depending on the prevailing ideologies in international economic and political 
relations.161 MFN was originally used in trade-related agreements. Thus, MFN has a 
long history and has been used in commercial treaties since the 12th century.162 In the 
early 18th century, these clauses were developed and used broadly. They generally 
applied to “all privileges, liberties, immunities and concessions… already granted to 
foreigners or being granted in the future.”163 According to Schill (2009), “the objective 
of these early treaties is to lay down the terms of equal treatment in trade between 
different nations on the basis of equal balance and equal competition”.164 Regarding 
economics, MFN treatment has also broader implications for the structure of 
international relations in implementing equal treatment among nations.165 
Schill (2009) argues that the function of the MFN clauses changed under the 
influence of mercantilist ideology between the 17th and 18th centuries. Mercantilist 
economics assumed that the wealth of a nation depends upon its supply of capital. 
With respect to the volume of trade it further believed unchangeable. Protectionism 
policy and high tariffs could lead to the discouragement of imports among the 
instruments of choice of mercantilist politics. During the mercantilist era, MFN clauses 
were not the sole instruments of multilateralism, but also a form of bilateral and a 
protectionist view on international economic relations.166 
As mentioned above, discrimination in WTO jurisprudence consists of two types: 
de jure and de facto. De jure discrimination constitutes legal rules which distinguish in 
their express terms between foreign and local nationals. For instance, the distinctions 
are not justified by non-discriminatory purposes or on the basis of origin. The legal 
rules that use identical terms to address foreign and local nationals may appear 
neutral, but in fact produce discriminatory results through operation in practice. 
Therefore, when neutral legal rules are discriminatory in effect, this is referred to as de 
facto discrimination (discriminatory measures).167  
                                                 
160 See World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2007, Op. Cit, p. 132; See also Ukpe, Aniekan Iboro, 2009, Op. Cit 
p. 2. The MFN principle is one of the oldest principles of international trade law, predating the 1947 GATT system. 
It is widely described that MFN in WTO circles as a ‘cornerstone’ of the GATT. The MFN clause which is the 
embodiment of this principle ensures that no trading partner is treated worse off than third partners in a 
subsequent Free Trade Agreement. No discrimination is allowed between trading partners. 
161 See Generally Helmut Brandt, Die Durchbrechung Der Meistbegünstigung (1933) (discussing the dialog between State-
centered theories of foreign trade and liberal theories of foreign trade and their relation to and influence on the 
diffusion of MFN clauses); Schill, Stephan W., Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most Favoured Nation 
clauses, Cambridge University Press, 2009, Available at : http://www.boalt.org/bjil/docs/BJIL27.2_Schill.pdf, last 
accessed : 21st November 2010, p. 509. 
162 See Georg Schwarzenberger, The MFN Standard in British State Practice, 22 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 96, 97 (1945) British 
MFN Standard]. Unilateral grants of MFN treatment can even be traced back to the Eleventh Century. See Endre 
Ustor, First Report on the MFN Clause, [1969] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 157, paras. 10-12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. 
A/1969/Add. 1 [hereinafter First Report on the MFN Clause]; Schill, Stephan W., 2009, Loc. Cit, p. 509. 
163 See, Baron Boris Noldé, Droits et Technique des Traités de Commerce, 3 RECUEIL DES COURS 295, 307-08 (1924 - II) 
(trans. by Author) (quoting the Latin text of an MFN provision in a 1679 treaty between the Netherlands and 
Sweden). Only during the course of the Eighteenth Century, treaties started differentiating more clearly between 
political and commercial aspects relating to the presence of foreign merchants. See Ustor, First Report on the MFN 
Clause, supra note 38, para. 17; Schill, 2009, Op. Cit, p. 509. 
164 See Schill, 2009, Loc. Cit, p. 509. 
165 See Schill, 2009, Op. Cit, p. 508. 
166 See Schill, 2009, Op. Cit, p. 510. 
167 See Diebold, Nicolas F., Non-Discrimination And The Pillars of International Economic Law, Emerging Scholars Papers, 
A sub series of IILJ Working Papers, IILJ Emerging Scholars Paper 18, Institute for International Law and Justice, 
New York University School of Law, 2010, p. 3, available at : http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/ESP18-
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II. a. Historical and political perspective of multilateral MFN.  
II. a. 1. Most Favoured Nation before GATT 1947. 
The starting point of the MFN treatment can be found in the feudal age168, from 
the 11th to 13th century, when Lords granted equal concessions to merchants of 
different foreign cities.169 According to Hornbeck, Caplin, et al., the first appearance of 
an MFN clause in written treaties occurred on 8 November 1226, when the Emperor 
Frederick II extended the same trade privileges to Marseilles that had previously been 
granted to Pisa and Genoa.170 The lords unilaterally granted privileges to the citizens 
outside of the territory. The favours granted were limited to those privileges already 
granted to others.171 
According to Jackson and Cottier et al., the first use of the MFN clause can be 
traced back to the 11th century, where the town of Mantua in Italy obtained in its 
charter from the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry III, the guarantee that it would benefit 
from all privileges granted to “whatsoever other town”.172 The term “most favoured 
nation” first appeared at the end of the 17th century.173 Afterwards, the MFN clauses 
became more common features in commercial treaties.174 
After the 15th century, the concept of MFN treatment developed along with 
sovereign states and the ideals of equality that prevailed at the time. Along with the 
scope of commerce, which had increased among European nations, the use of MFN 
clauses in bilateral commercial treaties also increased. Until the second half of the 17th 
century, MFN clauses generally obliged the contracting parties to grant each other 
existing and future concessions given by either party to any nation.175 
In the 17th and 18th centuries the MFN clauses were commonly used in 
international commercial matters. The MFN clause in a treaty between two states 
                                                                                                                                          
2010Diebold.pdf, last accessed : 25 January 2011; See also : 
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/RB_Part1_Nov_1.3Update.pdf 
168 See Traditionally, American and British historians have used the term "feudalism" to describe a political, military, and 
social system that bound together the warrior aristocracy of western Europe between ca. 1000 and ca. 1300. This 
"system," it is asserted, only gradually took shape, and differed in detail from region to region. The elements of this 
system were : 1) the personal bond of mutual loyalty and military service between nobles of different rank known 
as vassalage/lordship; 2) 'fiefs' (land or moveable wealth) held by vassals/men from their lords, whose property, 
in theory, the tenements remained, in return for specified service, which was usually a combination of military and 
social duties (e.g. attendance at the lord's court, hospitality to the lord and his men) and miscellaneous payments 
that reflected the lord's continued rights over the property; 3) jurisdictional and political power in the hands of 
'private' individuals, that is, of nobles who held franchises, immunities or banal rights, which meant 4) 
decentralized rule under a weak king who was, nonetheless, defined (in theory) as the apex of this network of 
personal loyalty and land tenure (i.e. the lord of lords and the ultimate source of all rights over land). In this feudal 
paradigm the king possessed more authority than actual power. “Classical feudalism” (before the rise of strong 
feudal monarchies in which kings claimed the role of liege lords) is characterized by the fragmentation of political 
authority and the passage of public power into many different private hands. In this paradigm, "feudalism" is 
essentially a military recruitment system, in which land tenure is exchanged for knight service. See Richard Abels, 
Feudalism, available at : http://www.usna.edu/Users/history/abels/hh315/Feudal.htm, last accessed : 01 
February 2011. 
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typically requires each state to accord to the other state any advantage of the type 
covered by the treaty that the state accords to a third state.176 
According to Murase and Akiko Yanai, the concept of MFN treatment in modern 
history differs from the feudal treatment in three respects. First, modern MFN 
treatment refers to exchanges between sovereigns (commonly state to state), whereas 
MFN treatment during the middle ages was unilaterally conducted by lords or kings. 
The new mutual form of the MFN agreement appeared for the first time in the treaty 
between England and Bourgogne, which was concluded on 1 August 1417.177 Second, 
in the modern MFN clauses, the definition of third parties was extended from specified 
to unlimited nations. For example, the provision between England and the cities of 
Flanders and Brabant (4 August 1446) stated:  
“[…] Item: que les marchands d’Angleterre […] seront traités aussi doucement et 
gracieusement comme les autres nations fréquentant ces pays et villes (that the 
merchants of England would be treated as gently and graciously as the other nations 
visiting its country and cities) […].”178  
Third, the concessions that would be granted in modern clauses went beyond 
privileges that existed at the time to include future privileges. A treaty between Great 
Britain and Sweden, dated 11 April 1654, stipulated:179  
“[…] The people, subjects and inhabitants of both confederates shall have, and enjoy 
in each other’s kingdoms, countries, lands, and dominions, as large and ample 
privileges, relations, liberties and immunities, as any other foreigner at present doth 
and hereafter shall enjoy […].”180 
Such a clause only guaranteed treatment that was as good as other foreigners 
were to receive. It was not a guarantee of national treatment. Nationals may receive 
better or worse treatment than foreigners. Therefore, the MFN clause, which was 
established before the existence of GATT, was not a comprehensive non-
discrimination provision.181  
The aims of granting MFN treatment as shown in the Great Britain/Sweden 
agreement was for the benefit of the “people, subjects and inhabitants” of both states, 
thus commonly recognised as FCN (Friendship, Commerce and Navigation) treaties. 
Those MFN clauses were designed not exclusively on economic activities. However the 
advantage granted under those agreements was aimed to facilitate the economic 
activities of the subjects of each state within the territory of the other state. Indeed, the 
rational reason for granting MFN treatment was economic desire by the recipient of 
the MFN treatment to avoid its own subjects from being economically disadvantaged 
by comparison with the subjects of third states. Therefore, the reason the MFN clauses 
existed in the commercial agreement was not based on any notion of the equality of 
states.182 
The term MFN treatment in the agreement has various names. There are two 
examples which include the terms “le people de n’importe quelle nation étrangère (the 
people of any foreign nation)” as stipulated in the treaty between Great Britain and 
Denmark of 1660, and “all other strangers” as stipulated in the treaty between Great 
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Britain and Spain of 1667.183 The first usage term of “la nation la plus favorisée (most 
favoured nation)” appeared in the treaty between Denmark and the Hanse in 1692. In 
the early 17th century, most European countries insisted on mutual MFN status.184 
Article 18 of the preliminary Anglo-French peace treaty of 20 January 1783 
provided for the appointment of ‘Commissioners to discuss new commercial 
arrangements of reciprocity’.185 According to Henderson, the Anglo-French 
commercial treaty established in 1786, was one of the most important trade 
agreements of the 18th century. It reforms a commercial system that had long been 
accepted as the only method in regulating international trade. It also marketed a 
serious attempt to end the traditional rivalry between France and Britain.186 
Since 1713, Anglo-French commerce had been regulated by the Treaty of 
Utrecht. However, the reciprocal freedom of trade guaranteed by this agreement had 
never come into effect since Britain failed to ratify Articles 8 and 9.187 Afterwards, 
France and Britain favoured the establishment of more liberal trade relationships 
between the two countries.188 
In the 1794s, the Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation was established, 
later known as the Jay Treaty, signed between His Britannic Majesty and The United 
States of America. The Jay Treaty specifically sought to guarantee reciprocal treatment 
in trade privileges enjoyed among partners. Effectively, this meant that ‘the receiving 
nation is provided with a guarantee that it will receive all trade advantages, such as 
lower tariffs or easier access for its service suppliers, which its trading partner may grant 
to any third country in the future’.189 
During the 1830s and 1840s, Great Britain unilaterally reduced tariffs on many 
kinds of goods. Moreover it revoked the Corn Act in 1846 and the Navigation Acts in 
1849. This decision changed Britain’s policy from protectionism to liberalism which 
was afterwards followed by the French. These changes reflected the shift in the 
dominant trade theories of the time from mercantilism and protectionism to market 
economy and free trade.190 
According to Murase, while mercantilist ideas exercised significant influence on 
the development of MFN clauses, a more important factor that led to MFN clauses was 
the formation of the tariff system.191 During the middle ages, feudal domains imposed 
various kinds of duties and taxes. It was replaced by the establishment of one nation 
state, which integrated local duties into single tariff systems within their own 
territories. The sovereign had authority to establish and revise tariffs unilaterally 
depending on the circumstances. The sovereignty needed to protect industry and gain 
profits by imposing tariffs and regulations on imports. However, if tariffs were raised 
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by one nation, others retaliated, which led to tariff wars. The bilateral agreement could 
avoid and control the state to change rates unilaterally. This led to the creation of a 
conventional tariff system. This system meant that when a nation revised the tariff 
rates of a certain agreement it had to modify all other agreements with tariff rates. 
States also feared overlooking concessions when negotiating agreements. 
Consequently, alternative MFN clauses were devised that could avoid such repetitions 
and assure partner states the benefits of previous or subsequent concessions by 
providing MFN clauses for third states.192 
The other treaty which contains the MFN clause was the treaty between England 
and the town of Danzig in October 1706, which contained the following stipulation: ‘for 
what remains, if any greater privileges, which any wise respect the persons, ships, or 
goods of foreigners at Danzig, shall be hereafter granted to any foreign nation, the 
British subjects shall in the like manner fully enjoy the same themselves, their ships and 
commerce”. Since the second half of the 18th century, most European states included a 
MFN clause in their treaties.193 
Furthermore, the Anglo-French Treaty was followed by other similar treaties 
between France and many other countries. These treaties led to tariff ‘disarmament’ in 
continental Europe, mostly resulting from the MFN clause. Thereafter a treaty was 
signed between France and Belgium on May 1861. In August 1862, Germany (Prussia 
in the name of the Zollverein) ratified a treaty with France which led to a reduction in 
import duties of about 40-80 per cent on cotton goods, 25 per cent on crude iron, 80 
per cent on manufactured iron goods, and 60-80 per cent on woollen clothes. Thus, 
between 1863 and 1866, by means of treaties with France, most European countries 
entered the free trade network, or what had been called the network of Cobden-
Chevalier treaties. Italy joined in January 1863; followed by Switzerland in June 1864; 
Sweden and Norway in February 1865; the Hanseatic towns one month later; Spain in 
June 1865; The Netherlands in July of the same year; and, finally, Austria in December 
1866. Portugal and Denmark were integrated into the free trade network by means of 
their commercial treaties with England.194 
The network of Cobden treaties played a critical role in the trade liberalisation of 
continental Europe. It influenced trade policies in most continental Europe countries 
between 1860 and 1877. The general tariff (that was applicable to countries not party 
to a treaty) had rather less impact when the network of treaties was as wide as that in 
force at the end of the 1860s.195  
The unification of Italy in 1861 lead to the application of the whole country of the 
Piedmontese tariff liberalised by Count Camillo Cavour in 1851 and 1859. Moreover for 
certain states a dramatic reduction in duties was applied, especially in southern Italy, 
where it led to a drop of 80 per cent. This drop probably contributed to the industrial 
setback in this region.196 
The period free trade reached its climax in Europe lasted twelve years (around 
1866-1877). In the middle of this period (around 1870-1872) the great depression of 
the European economy began.197 The European depression ended in around 1892-
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1894, when the return to protectionism in continental Europe had become really 
effective. This policy created great problems which influenced tariff policies on 
economic development.198 
Following the 1870s, protectionism spread rapidly in Europe because of 
economic depression.199 During the period of 1860-1913, world trade relations 
centred on a network of bilateral trade treaties containing the MFN clause. Each 
country was generally free to set and change its tariff code so long as it adhered to the 
MFN clause.200 Among the states that made use of the MFN clause in 18th century, Great 
Britain led in the number of MFN treaties, while the United States came second.201 
Free-trade was triggered by the increasing economic nationalism in power after 
First World War  (around 1914–17) and the Great Depression in 1929. Throughout 
this period major countries such as Great Britain and France imposed high tariffs and 
other trade barriers to protect their own industries. They also built economic blocs 
with their autonomous territories and colonies. The establishment of the preferential 
treatment system encouraged countries to discriminate against non-allied states. The 
economic bloc trade system and currency devaluation, triggered a chain of events that 
resulted in a substantial reduction in world trade, and aggravated the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. This situation forced the US to change its attitude towards 
trade policy and started to conclude bilateral treaties that included unconditional MFN 
clauses.202 
There are two variants of the MFN concept. The first variant is the unconditional 
MFN concept.203 The second variant is the conditional MFN concept.204  
 
II. a. 1. a. Unconditional Most Favoured Nation. 
According to Hornbeck, only about one fourth of the treaties established 
between 1826 and 1830 contained the unconditional MFN clause. However there were 
some treaties, constituting the conditional form of MFN, on the basis of reciprocity, for 
example treaties between: the US and Denmark on 26 April 1826; the Hanse Cities, on 
27 November 1827; Prussia, on 1 May 1828; Brazil on 12 December 1828; Austria on 
27 August 1829; Brazil and the Ilanse Cities on 27 November 1827; Prussia on 18 April 
1828; and Colombia and the Netherlands on 1 May 1829.205 
As mentioned above, the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860 was concluded by 
Great Britain and France, and substantially reduced tariffs on some goods and 
removed prohibitions on exports and imports between the two countries. According to 
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Winham and Akiko Yanai, this treaty demonstrated that trade agreements could be 
effective tools of trade liberalisation.206 In Article XIX of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, 
Great Britain and France also secured MFN treatment without conditions. It stipulated:  
“[…] Each of the two High Contracting Powers engages to confer on the other any 
favour, privilege, or reduction in the tariff of duties of importation on the articles 
mentioned in the present Treaty, where the said Power may concede to any third 
Power. They further engage not to enforce one against the other any prohibition of 
importation or exportation which shall not at the same time be applicable to all 
other nations […].”207 
According to Schill, this clause is different from the conditional MFN clause.208 
The unconditional clause did not entail the beneficiary state to make the same 
concessions vis-à-vis the granting state as the MFN treatment.209 Both parties of the 
agreement regard the adoption of the unconditional MFN clause as aimed to mutual 
benefit. The reason of Great Britain to use unconditional MFN in the agreement was 
aimed to avoid a less favoured nation treatment. Because it had unilaterally reduced or 
eliminated its tariffs already on the basis of its free trade policy, it had nothing further 
to offer in return for a reduction of tariffs.210 In this regard, if Great Britain had signed 
a commercial treaty containing the conditional MFN clause, it might have been unable 
to receive concessions granted to other nations. Therefore, Great Britain strongly 
insisted that an unconditional MFN clause should be included in the treaty. While in 
France, at that time, the industrial revolution had progressed, it had reached a certain 
level of manufacturing capability whereby it began to export its products aggressively. 
Therefore, France considered that excessively high tariffs as an obstacle to trade and 
began to prefer liberalism instead of protectionism.211 
In its development the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty had a great impact on the 
European nations. Most of the European nations, which had commercial policies 
leaning towards free trade, discovered the advantage to participate in a free trade 
alliance between Great Britain and France. Afterwards, those nations expressed a 
preference for concluding commercial treaties that included an unconditional MFN 
clause. As a result, unconditional MFN clauses became common practice in European 
commerce. Therefore, in the 1860s, the major European powers concluded 
commercial treaties with unconditional MFN clauses. For example, Italy concluded 
twenty-four treaties, the German Custom Union had eighteen, Austria-Hungary had 
fourteen, France had nineteen and Belgium had twelve.212 Despite such circumstances, 
the US maintained a conditional MFN clause due to the tariff system of the US.213 
Belgium made treaties (between 1860 and 1870) with France, Great Britain, 
Switzerland, Italy, Lubeck, Holland, Hamburg, Denmark, Norway-Sweden, the 
Zollverein, Austria, and Spain. It was the most determined champion of the general and 
unconditional MFN treatment in all Europe. Italy was also enthusiastic making treaties 
in the decade after 1860 with Sweden, France, Great Britain, the Zollverein, Austria, 
Switzerland, and Spain. France made treaties with Belgium, Italy, the Zollverein, Spain, 
Austria, and Portugal.214  
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The unconditional form of the MFN obligation was used exclusively until the late 
18th century.215 Much credit has been given to the use of the unconditional MFN clause 
in a number of European bilateral treaties in the latter half of the 18th century to 
promote a multilateral trading system.216 European countries still held in their treaties 
inter se to the unconditional form of the clause until about 1830.217 
The unconditional clause had evolved to become “the almost universal basis of a 
vast system of commercial treaties” and developed into the “cornerstone” of 
international commercial relations until the era of First World War.218 Furthermore, 
the US abandoned its support for conditional MFN clauses after First World War and 
henceforth based its commercial treaties on unconditional MFN treatment.219 
According to Schill, the abandonment of the conditional clause was closely connected 
to the free trade movement in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Ideologically, this 
reflected liberal ideas about the equality of states and the contribution of clause to 
liberalising international trade by fostering equal competition.220 
As stipulated in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant regarding former 
colonies “equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the 
League” were to be secured.221 Similarly, there were other international treaty regimes 
that endorsed equality of opportunities as an ordering principle before and after First 
World War.222  
In 1934 the US enacted the Reciprocity Trade Agreements Act (RTAA)223, which 
was based on the recognition that flourishing international trade was vital in domestic 
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prosperity224, and endorsed the adoption of unconditional MFN clauses. In accordance 
with the RTAA, the United States concluded bilateral trade agreements225 with twenty-
seven countries from 1934 to 1945226. Each agreement contained a reciprocal 
exchange of tariff reductions and an unconditional MFN clause.227 
Multilateralism has been recognised as an instrument in governing international 
relations either politically or economically. After the re-emergence of multilateralism, 
the MFN reappeared and became the basis for ordering international trade relations. 
After First World War, the MFN treatment proved to play a crucial role in keeping 
world peace. MFN held a function to prevent international conflicts by prohibiting 
bilateral alliances and bloc building in economic context prone to spilling over military 
conflicts.228 
As noted by Cottier and Mavroidis, several reasons may be cited to support the 
application of the unconditional MFN principle. According to GATT economists, the 
application of the MFN treatment brought five significant advantages. First, in 
economic terms, applications of the MFN rule enhance economic efficiency because the 
country’s imports will be supplied by the most efficient international suppliers. 
Moreover, under this circumstance, the monopoly of business practices will be avoided 
and a fair competition environment will be created. When tariffs are varied according 
to the source of goods, new tension on trade and unfair competition of goods are 
created. Second, for trade policy purposes, the application of the MFN rule protects 
bilateral concessions and generalises them as the basis for the multilateral trading 
system. In this sense, the MFN principle serves as a positive force for liberalisation in 
the system, in particular, it protects the interests of small trading countries, whether 
rich or poor, weak or strong. Moreover, small trading companies can benefit from 
concessions without necessarily making concessions themselves. To sum up, 
applications of the MFN rule in trade policies have given equal opportunities and 
enhanced the economic growth of all member states in the multilateral trading system. 
Third, application of the MFN principle promotes better international relations since it 
avoids the unfair trade competition and tensions that may result from discriminatory 
policies that can lead to new conflict between states. Fourth, it has the advantage of 
administration simplification. The domestic producers benefited from administration 
simplification of tariffs and other forms of protection (no origin rules are needed) and 
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it promotes more transparent policies. Finally, it serves as a constraint on the ability of 
special interests to obtain discriminatory trade measures.229 
As noted by Yanai, in the GATT 1947 based multilateral trade system, non-
discrimination was adopted as a fundamental principle. Unconditional MFN clauses 
were considered to be an effective measure for applying this principle to actual trade 
practices. The unconditional MFN clause embodied in the GATT 1947 is different from 
the unconditional clause that was applied by the US in its bilateral trade agreements in 
the pre-war period.230 At that time, the US utilised an unconditional MFN clause as a 
tool to enter into its trade partners’ markets so that it could expand its exports. Thus, 
the US has used the clause as a countermeasure against the other major nations, who 
had tended to enclose their economies within the walls of preferential or imperial 
trading blocs. In other words the US has used the unconditional MFN clause as a 
penetrating tool into the trading blocs.231 
The GATT principle, non-discrimination and reciprocity, have contradicted one 
another because trade policy is aimed to pursue national interests. On the other hand 
trade liberalisation is conducted through both unilateral action and reciprocal 
bargaining in order to gain maximum benefits. If one state has lowered or removed its 
trade barriers, the expectation is that the other states will make a consequent and 
equivalent response. It is argued that contingency and equivalence are necessary 
aspects of reciprocity conduct. However, in the GATT system, such reciprocal 
concessions should be automatically multilateralised through unconditional MFN 
clauses.232 
As noted by Yanai, when bilateral relations governed the world trade system, an 
MFN clause (even the unconditional form), could be compatible with reciprocity. This 
was because the decision of whether to grant unconditional MFN treatment to some 
nations could be made case-by-case.233 The concept of reciprocity is typically used to 
convince domestic interests that trade liberalisation is in their interest. The 
unconditional MFN principle is, of course, the antithesis of reciprocity, and the lack of 
reciprocity could create difficulties for governments to undertake trade liberalisation. 
This concern is closely related to the foregoing issue and the problem of critical 
mass.234 However, it has become problematic to pursue MFN treatment and trade 
liberalisation through reciprocal bargaining in the framework of the multilateral trade 
system.235 
It is true that the application of the MFN rule not only promotes multilateralism 
but also results in the so-called “free rider” problem.236 There are two aspects of this 
problem. On the one hand, countries benefit automatically from the liberalisation 
measures of others, whether or not they undertake such measures on their own. This 
enables smaller trading nations, in particular, to free ride on the concessions made by 
others. Thus, they may make fewer concessions themselves. On the other hand, 
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excessive free riding may cause major trading nations to agree to less liberalisation 
than they would if reciprocity were required. Again, the result may be fewer 
concessions if unconditional MFN treatment is required. It is not clear that this fear of 
free riding has significantly slowed down the process of multilateral trade 
liberalisation, but it is clear that it is a factor in negotiations. Unless a so-called “critical 
mass” is willing to make liberalisation commitments, some major trading nations may 
not make commitments.237 In this respect, it could be argued that it would be better to 
make progress towards freer trade with smaller groups of countries willing to do so 
immediately on a reciprocal basis, rather than to wait for the “critical mass” to 
emerge.238 
Generally, it appears that unconditional MFN treatment is the most desirable 
policy for the world as a whole. While the problems of free riders and the need for 
perceived reciprocity are significant, they do not counteract the argument in favour of 
unconditional MFN.239 The unconditional MFN clauses still play an important role in 
bringing about multilateral trade liberalisation.240 
 
II. a. 1. b. Conditional Most Favoured Nation. 
As noted, in the Report of the Working Group of the MFN Clause by the 
International Law Commission, between the 19th and early 20th centuries, MFN was 
often granted conditionally in the economic field. During that period a state would only 
grant MFN treatment in exchange for a benefit provided by the other state. Therefore, 
the grant of MFN treatment had to be paid for. The practice of this treatment was 
known as “conditional MFN”. By the time the granting of conditional MFN declined, 
there was greater realisation that there were economic benefits to the granting state 
from granting MFN unconditionally. The practice of conditional MFN has little 
significance today.241 
As mentioned above, it was the US who brought reciprocity into trade policy. 
After gaining independence, the US signed the first commercial treaty in 1778 with 
France, which contained provisions for reciprocal trade concessions in order to secure 
a free flow of goods and ships.242 Afterwards, the US entered the arena of world 
commerce with the principle of opening their ports and guaranteeing equal treatment 
to all comers upon a basis of reciprocity.243 The MFN treatment in the treaty was made 
conditional on providing the same compensation as had been provided by the third 
party that obtained the advantage.244  
Starting with the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, conditional MFN clauses were 
introduced and subsequently became dominant in international treaty practice. 
According to Schill, conditional MFN treatment required that rights and privileges be 
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extended to the beneficiary state under the condition that the beneficiary state grant 
the same concessions offered by the MFN in return for the more favourable rights in 
question. The conditional form of MFN clauses ensured that the beneficiary state could 
not benefit from more favourable treatment accorded to third parties without 
concurrently assuming potential disadvantages incumbent upon the third state. The 
purpose of the conditional MFN clause was ultimately to arrive at lower tariffs.245 
As stated in the preamble of the treaty, emphasis was placed on the significance 
of reciprocity with the phrase that a fair and permanent commercial relationship 
between the two countries could not be attained without the most perfect equality and 
reciprocity based on the agreement.246 This principle of reciprocity embodied in the 
MFN clause of Article II reads as follows: 
“[…] The Most Christian King and the US engage mutually not to grant any particular 
favour to other nations in respect of commerce and navigation, which shall not 
immediately become common to the other party, who shall enjoy the same favour, 
freely, if the concession was freely made, or on allowing the same compensation, if the 
concession was conditional […]”.247 
Under this provision, if the US made new concessions to any third party, France 
could receive these concessions only when it provided the US compensation which 
would be equivalent to that offered to the US by the third party. However, the second 
party (France) may have the right to require the favour on allowing the same 
concessions.248 
In other words, it was explicitly stipulated that the favours granted to any third 
party could not be automatically extended between the two initial parties to the MFN 
clause. The idea of a conditional MFN clause is that MFN treatment at the time of 
concluding an agreement would be secured, while future discrimination would not 
necessarily be denied. The US insisted that a conditional MFN clause would not 
discriminate because it did not exchange MFN treatment without a conditional MFN 
clause and did not conclude any exclusive arrangements with specified nations. In this 
sense, the US treated every nation equally. Hornbeck, in describing this US attitude, 
suggests that “the opportunity was to be given for each country to purchase for itself 
such favours as might be granted to others for compensation”.249 
The incorporation of a reciprocal principle in the MFN treatment by the US 
divided MFN clauses into two types: an unconditional MFN clause that extended 
favours freely and a conditional or “American” clause that required equivalent 
compensation.250 Prior to 1923, the US had used a conditional form of MFN. The 
conditional251 MFN form was used by the US in nearly all commercial treaties until 
1923, when President Harding approved the adoption of the unconditional form in US 
trade treaties. During the same period, most European countries used the 
unconditional form.252 Under the conditional MFN, if a country grants a preferential 
tariff rate to another country, then it must extend the same rate to its MFN partners 
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only if they “pay” for it with reciprocal tariff cuts. In the unconditional MFN form used 
under the GATT regime, no such reciprocity is required.253 
As noted by Yanai, conditional MFN clauses applied by the US in the second half 
of the 18th century were a point d'entre into world trade securely and equally. At that 
time, Great Britain and Europe as large economic powers implemented preferential 
trade arrangements with their colonial tie. As a result, Great Britain and Europe 
discriminated other countries by imposing high tariffs. The US approach of conditional 
MFN clauses was plainly described in a US Tariff Commission report: 
“[…] By the means of reciprocity treaties, the United States has granted various 
concessions to certain countries, for compensation, and has accepted concessions 
from them. This has involved in each case particular reductions from the rates 
established in the general tariff. In most cases the determination to enter into such 
agreement has come as a result of unusual circumstances, such as a peculiar 
geographical factor or peculiar political relations. Having made concessions under 
special circumstances, or for special compensation, the US has not considered it 
obligatory or even just to extend the same favours to third states “freely” […].”254 
On the 3 March 1815 the US enacted the Reciprocity Act. This act allowed the 
president to promote and establish duties on foreign ships entering US ports on the 
same terms that a foreign nation charged US ships entering their ports.255 This Act 
stipulated a clause which eliminated US discriminatory tariffs in accordance with the 
principle of reciprocity. The Act was followed by an agreement with Great Britain in 
the same year to eliminate discriminatory tariffs reciprocally. In the 1830s, the United 
States had also concluded bilateral commercial agreements that contained conditional 
MFN clauses with most Latin American countries. Furthermore, the conditional MFN 
clause was gradually accepted by the European states, where only the unconditional 
form had been used previously. Great Britain, for instance, enacted the Reciprocity of 
Duties Act in 1823, under which it entered into bilateral treaties to provide conditional 
MFN treatment for the exports of both signatories. Subsequently, the French 
government also followed the British trade policy of free trade based on reciprocity.256 
In the period from 1825 to 1860, conditional MFN clauses were commonly adopted in 
the commercial treaties of the European states, which had dominated the 
unconditional MFN clause. Three-quarters of the important treaties made between 
1826 and 1830 contained a conditional MFN clause. Conditional clauses accounted for 
more than 90 per cent of all MFN clauses in treaties until 1860.257 
Starting from that period the conditional form of MFN became the majority 
practice by states in the commercial agreement. In the treaty between Great Britain 
and Portugal, on 19 February 1810, Article II, stipulated:258 
“[…] gratuitously if the concession in favour of that other state shall have been 
gratuitous, and on giving, quam proxime, the same compensation or equivalent, in 
case the concession shall have been conditional […].” 
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As noted by Yanai, the basis had been laid for conditional MFN treatment to 
spread in Europe. The conditional MFN clause was used by most European countries 
as a reasonable instrument of protectionism from foreign products.259 
According to Hornbeck, the period from 1830 to 1859 was outspokenly a 
reciprocity period. The unconditional form of the MFN clause appeared more and 
more rarely in treaties. Great Britain still held the practice of the unconditional MFN 
clause. Instead of using the unconditional MFN clause Great Britain also used the 
conditional one. In 1810 Great Britain concluded a treaty with Portugal. To this treaty, 
that of 3 July 1838 may be added, with Austria, in which, Article XI, stipulates: 
“[…] et leurs majestés …. s'engagent réciproquement a n'accorder aucunes faveurs, 
privilèges [etc. to a third state] qui ne soient en même temps accordes [to the co-
contractant] gratuitement, si la concession … a été gratuite, ou en donnant, en autant 
qu'il sera possible, le même équivalent, dans le cas où la concession aura conditionnelle 
[…]”.260 
In January 1843, Great Britain made a treaty with Russia containing the same 
formula. The treaty with Liberia on 21 November 1948 contained the conditional form, 
and the same appeared in treaties which Great Britain made between 1849 and 1853 
with Costa Rica, Dominica, Peru, Hawaii, Sardinia, Ecuador, and Paraguay.261 
According to Hornbeck, an examination of the treaties made in this period by 
Austria, Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sardinia, Sicily, Spain, and the 
Zollverein, as well as those already mentioned, indicated the large use of the 
conditional MFN clause in the agreement. The agreement contains definite provision 
that compensation must be made for the privileges demanded. Moreover, an 
examination of commercial and tariff history, between 1825 and 1860, shows most 
western nations in conducting commercial relations based on the reciprocity 
principle.262 
The use of conditional MFN clauses became more widespread in the early 19th 
century, but the unconditional form regained its dominance in the second half of the 
19th century. However, the US only began to pursue unconditional MFN agreements in 
the 1920s.263 The GATT generally enshrines the unconditional MFN concept, although 
there are significant general exceptions to the MFN requirement.264 The purpose of 
conditional MFN clauses to gain a more liberal system of international trade is based 
on equality of treatment and non-discrimination coupled with increasingly lower 
tariffs. As noted above, the conditional MFN treatment was a tool to participate more 
actively in international trade. It formed part of US foreign economic policy until 1923, 
but also appeared in Europe until 1860.265 
The treaty concluded between the US and Columbia had introduced conditional 
MFN clause practice to South America. Thus, a similar treaty in 1825 was established 
between the US and Central American Confederation. Henceforth for 35 years South 
and Central America included the conditional form in their treaties.266 
In many cases, governments used a conditional MFN clause, by which 
concessions granted to one country would be granted to another on a MFN basis only 
if the other country granted compensatory or reciprocal concessions. Gradually 
governments moved towards an unconditional MFN. Starting with the Tariff Act of 
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1922267, the US pursued a policy of granting MFN treatment on such an unconditional 
basis.268 According to Polley, the conditional MFN clause, if used by a country with an 
MFN Clause with any other country, cannot be truly conditional. Furthermore, if used 
as the basis of negotiations with all countries, it can be empty of content.269 
The policy of conditional MFN treatment was ultimately abandoned, because it 
was too complicated and economically inefficient. The Secretary of State Hughes, for 
example, explained the reason why the US abandoned the conditional MFN treatment:  
“[…] The ascertaining of what might constitute equivalent compensation in the 
applications of the conditional most-favored-nation principle was found to be 
difficult or impracticable. Reciprocal commercial arrangements were but temporary 
makeshifts; they caused constant negotiation and created uncertainty. Under 
present conditions, the expanding foreign commerce of the US needs a guarantee of 
equality of treatment which cannot be furnished by the conditional form of the 
most-favored-nation clause[…].”270 
The conditional MFN clause had been used to protect national interests.271 In 
other words, the conditional MFN clauses were an effective tool to obtain foreign 
market access while protecting domestic industries. On the other hand, unconditional 
clauses were potentially useful for maintaining an open and free world trading system. 
Interestingly, the dominant nations in world trade tended to prefer unconditional MFN 
clauses: the two most obvious examples being Great Britain during its Pax 
Britannica272 period and the US during Pax Americana.273 274 
As noted by Hornbeck, while European practice changed in the manner 
indicated, first from the unconditional to the conditional, and then turned to the 
uniform use of the unconditional, the US maintained throughout the form and 
construction of the conditional. South and Central American practice varied. In some of 
the early South American treaties the unconditional form was used. After 1860, South 
American practice represented a tendency to wave between the two forms, in the way 
characteristic of European practice in the preceding period. Numerous treaties of 
Venezuela, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Peru with European countries 
contained the unconditional form. This may be readily accounted for the policies of the 
latter. Mexico mainly used the unconditional form of the clause. The practice of 
reciprocity had, however, held firmly in the treaties of American states inter se, and in 
a majority of those made with European, Asiatic, and African states.275 Only the 
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negative side of MFN treatment was specified in the treaties of Brazil and others 
before 1827. Treaties made by the US with Colombia in 1824, and with the Central 
American Confederation, Brazil, and Mexico in 1825, 1828, and 1832, contained the 
conditional form, and from then on the leading American states embraced this 
principle. Their treaties with the US regularly contained this form. In addition, 
between 1830 and 1860 they made no exception to this principle in their dealings with 
European states. Reciprocity was at the basis of their commercial policies. They 
guaranteed that " no higher or other duties " would be charged or applied, as had been 
done to the general tariff in US tariffs. For special concessions, equivalents were 
demanded in return.276 
At the beginning of 1908, Great Britain had MFN agreements with forty-six 
countries. The MFN clause appeared in forty-five of the Italian Treaties. The US and 
Germany had MFN treaties with more than thirty countries. Then Spain, France, and 
Japan made twenty MFN agreements.277 
 
III. The legal nature of the Most Favoured Nation treatment clause. 
The MFN clause is an integral part of all multilateral trade agreements. For 
example, this clause constitutes the very first article of the GATT. Similarly, all the 
other major multilateral agreements of the WTO (such as the GATS or the Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) also contain the MFN clause. 
As noted by Horn and Mavroidis and Hoekman and Kostecki, the MFN constitutes one 
of the pillars of the WTO system. At the core of MFN is the idea of non-
discrimination.278 
As mentioned above, non-discriminational conduct proved to alleviate the 
potential of tensions occurring from trade agreements.279 Indeed Pomfret notes that 
frequent controversies involving the US and nations excluded from its discriminatory 
trade agreements was one of the reason why the US embraced the notion of the 
unconditional MFN after the First World War.280 Furthermore, Ghosh et al., argued that 
the origin of advocacy of the MFN clause by the OECD countries stemmed from a desire 
to prevent newly independent developing countries from being drawn into adopting a 
communist regime.281 Thus, MFN can be viewed as a strategic tool in international 
relations.282 There is widespread belief among policy makers that a strong economic 
rationale for the MFN provision was based on the presumption that discrimination is 
inherently undesirable.283 
The MFN principle became the core of the principle of non-discrimination under 
GATT, and this has continued under the WTO. Under the WTO regime MFN has been 
further used in the specific area of services and the protection of intellectual property 
rights. For example, Article II of the GATS provides for a very broad application of MFN 
in respect of “any measure covered by this Agreement”.284 
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Notwithstanding the centrality of the MFN treatment under GATT Article I, the 
GATT and the WTO also provide important exceptions to MFN treatment. The major 
exception provided by Article 1 of the GATT is regional arrangements, customs unions 
and free trade areas, which grant preferences to the members of those agreements and 
hence do not provide MFN treatment to all GATT contracting parties. In accordance 
with GATT Article XXIV, these benefits need not be extended to other GATT 
Contracting Parties or WTO Members.285 
As noted by Folsom, GATT 1947 was never about free trade, merely freer trade. 
This was achieved over decades through tariff-reducing multilateral trade negotiations 
(known as “negotiating rounds”) and an ever-expanding membership. The essential 
contents of GATT 1947 and its successor GATT 1994 cover the principle of general 
MFN trading. This principle is essentially one of non-discrimination, that is to say a 
rejection of discriminatory tariff and trade preferences.286 
Jacob Viner describes the use of the principle going back to the American 
Revolution. The MFN has been coded in the world trade system since the signing of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. The GATT obliges the 
contracting parties to leave off discrimination rates. The principle is stipulated clearly 
in the very first article of the agreement.287 
The MFN clause embodied in Article I of the GATT was the defining principle for 
a system that emerged in the post Second World War era as a response to 
protectionism and preferential trading arrangements. As noted by Hoekman et al., 
both policies had contributed to the global economic depression of the 1930s.288 
The League of Nations Covenant included a reference to the goal of “equitable 
treatment for the commerce of all members”. The League of Nations 1936, with respect 
to the standard of the MFN clause, established the basis for the MFN clause embedded 
in an early draft of the ITO charter, and had an important influence on the MFN clause 
that was incorporated into the GATT.289 
Schill notes that the MFN Clause was not a rule of general international law that 
is universally applied among all States. It is a conventional norm that is widely 
included in the regulation of trade relations among States. However, since its 
conclusion in the GATT, to which eighty-five governments accounting for over four-
fifths of world trade have joined, it has to be considered as a cornerstone of 
international trade relations.290 According to Abdulqawi, MFN treatment has a 
constitutional function, because it locks states into a multilateral framework and 
makes abandoning previously adopted standards of protection more difficult. 
Therefore MFN clauses in this regard are considered as an instrument to push towards 
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an order that is multilateral in substance even though it is based on bilateral 
treaties.291 
 
III. a. Structure and Interpretation of Article I :1 of the GATT 1994. 
As noted by Cottier and Mavroidis, the MFN that prevails now is different from 
the MFN that existed in European policy from 1825 to 1860.292 The demand to deal 
with the complexity of modern treaty systems requires the old form of MFN to be 
modified by the mechanism of modern tariff policies.293 
Since, MFN clauses have been adopted into the world trading system; many 
disputes have occurred within its application and interpretation.294 According to 
Cottier and Mavroidis, several of the issues which often appear, concern the scope of 
the coverage of Article I:1, interpretation of any “advantage, favour, privileged or 
immunity”, “originating”, “accorded… unconditionally” and the concept of “like 
product”.295 
The scope of Article I:1 of the GATT is defined in its primary clauses. Basically, it 
covers duties and charges levied on goods or related payment transfers; the methods 
of levying such duties and charges; all rules and formalities related to importation and 
exportation; and internal regulations of the type covered by Article III:4. Importantly, 
sometimes forgotten, Article I:1 applies to exportation as well as importation.296 The 
phrases “methods of levying such duties and charges” and “all rules and formalities” 
have been interpreted to include the application of antidumping rules and 
countervailing duty rules. It has also been suggested that the phrases include such 
matters as customs valuation rules and more generally “improved sets of rules”, such 
as those entered in respect of some GATT provisions in the Tokyo Round.297 
Referring to Article III, Paragraphs 2 and 4, the Chairman of the Contracting 
Parties ruled in 1948 that with respect to rebates of excise taxes, Article I:1 would be 
applicable to any advantage, granted with respect to internal taxes. In 1955 it was 
proposed to amend Article I:1 to specify that it applied “with respect to the application 
of internal taxes to exported goods”, but the amendment had not been ratified by all 
Contracting Parties at the time it was abandoned in 1967.298 As a general proposition, 
it can be said that the scope of Article I:1 had been interpreted broadly in WTO/GATT 
practice.299 Article I:1 covers advantages, favours, privileges, and immunities granted 
by a WTO member to any country, including countries which are not WTO members. 
Any such advantage, etc., needs to be extended immediately and unconditionally to all 
WTO members. As noted, countries which are not WTO members cannot claim such 
extension.300  
One may also note that only those advantages, favours, privileges, and 
immunities, “granted […] to any product” are subject to the MFN obligation in Article 
I:1. Advantages, favours, privileges, and immunities are not linked to the import, 
export or internal taxation, sale, distribution or use of products but, for example, 
exclusively linked to producers or service suppliers (without direct or indirect 
repercussions on the related products), would not seem to be subject to the MFN 
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requirement.301 In the panel report on EC-Bananas, a number of aspects of the EC 
import regime for bananas was considered to be advantageous and found to violate 
Article I:1 because they were not accorded to all WTO members.302 
It is generally agreed that under existing WTO/GATT rules, members have 
considerable freedom to set their own rules of origin. However, as a result of the 
Uruguay round negotiations, the WTO complex of agreements include an Agreement 
on Rules of Origin. That agreement established a work programme which will set 
standard rules of origin for non-preferential purposes. For the moment, the agreement 
requires several general principles to be followed in the application of the rule of 
origin, such as that rules of origin shall not be used to pursue trade objectives; shall 
not create restriction and disruptive effects on international trade: and shall be 
transparent. Disciplines to be observed once the harmonisation programme has been 
implemented include the principle that the country of origin of a good needs to be 
either the country where the good has been wholly obtained or, for instance, where 
more than one country is concerned in the production of goods, the country where the 
last substantial transformation was carried out.303 Article I:1 establishes an 
unconditional MFN obligation.304 
Recently, a WTO panel concluded that the grant by Indonesia of customs and tax 
advantages to cars produced by one company in Korea violated Article I:1 because 
those advantages were conditional, inter alia, on the existence of a contractual 
relationship between an Indonesian company and the Korean company. According to 
the panel, advantages granted by a WTO member cannot be made conditional on, nor 
even be affected by, the existence of contractual obligations, such as the existence of a 
deal between a domestic company designated by the government and foreign 
company. Advantages accorded to products of one country in that case, to Korean cars 
and parts and components need to be granted to import like products from all other 
WTO members “immediately and unconditionally”. In reaching its conclusion, the 
panel noted that in 1973, the working party on the concession of Hungary where the 
GATT Secretariat had expressed the view that the prerequisite of having a co-
operation contract in order to benefit from certain tariff treatment appeared to imply 
conditional MFN treatment and would therefore not be compatible with GATT rules.305 
The concept of “like product” is a fundamental issue in the application of the 
MFN obligation in GATT Article I:1. The advantage afforded to one product (originating 
in or destined for any country) must be afforded to another product (originating in or 
destined for all other WTO Members) only if the other product is a like product.306 
Article I:1 deals with differences in treatment between products which result 
from the regulatory distinction made by the governments. If such distinctions are 
made exclusively on the basis of the origin of the product rather than on the basis of 
factors affecting the properties, nature, qualities or end use of the product itself, no 
doubt Article I:1 would be violated. Such a violation could be referred to as de jure 
discrimination contrary to Article I:1. Origin-based discrimination between products is 
one extreme. The other extreme consists of regulatory distinctions made between 
products that manifest differently.307 
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The concept of “like product” is incorporated in not less than nine articles of the 
GATT. It has long been accepted in GATT thinking that the concept might have a 
different meaning in the different provisions in which it is used. This view has been 
explicitly adopted by the Appellate Body, which states that:308 
“[…] the concept of “likeness” is relative to one that evokes the image of an 
accordion. The accordion of “likeness” stretches and squeezes in different places as 
different provisions of WTO agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in 
any one of those places must be determined by the particular provision in which the 
term “like” is encountered as well as by the context and circumstances that prevail 
in any given case to which that provisions may apply […].” 
WTO law generally uses the concept of ‘likeness’, such as ‘like products’ in GATT 
or ‘like service and service suppliers’ in GATS. In addition, one GATT non-
discrimination provision also uses the concept of ‘directly competitive or substitutable 
products’ instead of ‘likeness’. The TFEU309 refers to ‘similar products’ and ‘other 
products’ in Article 110. In spite of the different terminologies, all comparator clauses 
share the identical fundamental problem of identifying the relevant tertium 
comparationis, i.e. the quality or element which two ‘situations’ or ‘objects’ must have 
in common in order to conclude that they are ‘alike’ for the purpose of the 
comparison.310 
 
III. b. Codification of Most Favoured Nation clause by the International Law 
Commission. 
According to the International Law Commission, outside the economic field, MFN 
was a principle of non-discrimination suited to circumstances where relations 
between states were regulated through bilateral arrangements. However, as noted 
over history, most multilateral agreements in the economic field have included the 
MFN clause. This indicates that the MFN has engaged its pre-eminence in the economic 
field.311 
The MFN clause has become such a typical clause in treaties that the 
International Law Commission (ILC) has drawn up draft drticles on MFN clauses 
(hereinafter The ILC’s draft articles on MFN clauses).312 Notwithstanding, the ILC’s 
draft articles never came as a treaty and are non-binding. Nevertheless, the ILC’s draft 
Articles did codify the definition and the rules governing the operation of the MFN 
clause.313 However, in 1978, the ILC adopted draft articles on the topic of the MFN 
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clause, but no conclusion was drawn up by the General Assembly.314 The Commission 
justified the provisions by arguing that the agreement of both the GATT and UNCTAD 
to this principle had established its general observance. Although the United Nations 
had never adopted the model MFN clause itself, the Commission's recognition of the 
exception for preferences was regarded as a major step forward. This draft consisted 
of some 30 articles designed to clarify and elaborate the MFN concept. Among the 
provisions of the draft were two articles providing that the preferences given to 
developing countries should be exempt from the standard MFN obligation.315 
Provisions of the ILC’s draft articles on the MFN clauses consisted of the 
definition of the MFN clause and MFN treatment (Draft Articles 4 and 5), its scope, the 
conventional rather than customary international law basis of MFN treatment (Draft 
Article 7), the scope of MFN treatment (Draft Articles 8, 9 and 10), the effect of 
conditional and unconditional MFN (Draft Articles 11, 12 and 13), the source of the 
treatment to be provided under an MFN clause (Draft Articles 14-19), the time that 
rights arise under an MFN clause (Draft Article 20), termination or suspension of an 
MFN clause (Draft Article 21), and the relationship of the MFN clause to a generalised 
system of preferences (Draft Articles 23 and 24), and the special cases of frontier 
traffic and transit rights of land-locked states.316 
Article 8 of the ILC’s draft on the MFN Clause regulates the basic act (acte regie) 
as the agreement between the granting state and the beneficiary state. According to 
Schill, to apply MFN clauses in international law a relationship of at least three states is 
presupposed. The “Granting State” enters into an obligation vis-à-vis the “Beneficiary 
State”. Extended rights and benefits are granted in a specific context to any “Third 
State”. The existence of the MFN clause in the treaty between the “Granting State” and 
“Beneficiary State” can authorise the “Beneficiary State” to extend all benefits the 
“Granting State” grants vis-à-vis the “Third State”, as long as the granted benefit is 
within the scope of application of the MFN clause in the relationship between the 
“Granting State” and the “Beneficiary State”. The “basic treaty” is a treaty that contains 
the MFN clause between the “Granting State” and the “Beneficiary State”.317  
The third-party treaty (between the “Granting State” and the “Third State”) will 
not affect the parties of the basic treaty. In other words the third-party treaty does not 
have any legal effect to the basic treaty. Rather, the content of the third-party treaty 
becomes operative by means of the MFN clause of the treaty.318 The decision of ICJ in 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company stated:319 
“[…] It is this [that is, the basic] treaty which establishes the juridical link between 
the [beneficiary state] and a third-party treaty and confers upon that state the rights 
enjoyed by the third party. A third-party treaty, independent of and isolated from 
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the basic treaty, cannot produce any legal effect as between the [beneficiary state] 
and [the granting state]: it is res inter alios acta […]”.320 
Referring to Article 8321 of the ILC’s draft articles, Yannick notes that the indirect 
effect that exists between the parties in the basic treaty, is unintentional.322 According 
to Article 36323 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which deals with 
rights emerging from a treaty for a third state, it is stipulated that such a benefit 
granted to a third state can only derive from a clear intention expressed by the parties 
to the treaty.324 
In order to define the scope of the MFN clause relating to dispute settlement 
provisions, it is necessary to interpret the intention of the contracting states in 
conformity with Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.325 
The ILC’s draft on the MFN clause never came into existence326 because the Draft 
Articles did not exclude the customs unions and free trade areas, which became a 
significant issue of the EU. Since the EU (EEC) members did not want to extend the 
benefits under the Treaty of Rome to states that were not EU (EEC) members. The 
same reasons were also raised by developing countries that were entering into 
regional free trade.327 The development issue of the Draft Articles which includes the 
treatment of the generalised systems of preferences is also one of the reasons why the 
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ILC’s draft on the MFN clause is still a draft. Therefore, some states consider that the 
Draft Articles have been used as guidelines.328 Consequently, the ILC’s draft on the 
MFN clause is used as guidelines329 of state practice and opinio juris on the general 
understanding and interpretation of the MFN clauses in international treaties.330 
 
III. c. Interpretation of the Most Favoured Nation clauses under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
According to Schill, “all agreements between member states of the WTO¸ in the 
form of derivation from an integral part of the WTO Agreement must comply with the 
principals of the WTO Agreement”.331 In this regard, all the member states of the WTO 
when they established the treaty under the “WTO umbrella norms” must not oppose 
the fundamental norms of the WTO. Their treaty should be able to reflect the spirit of 
WTO norms. 
Referring to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it is 
stipulated that a treaty ‘shall be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose’. This provision is part of the customary rule of international 
law, which the WTO Dispute Settlement Body is obliged to take into consideration.332 
The Appellate Body itself has emphasised that WTO provisions must be interpreted in 
conformity with the preamble of the WTO Agreement.333 For example, the process of 
incorporating the Enabling Clause into the GATT Agreement should be in line with the 
Preamble of the WTO Agreement, which states “commensurate with the needs of their 
economic development”, which is considered as a conscious ‘positive effort’ of WTO 
members.334 The Enabling Clause is exempted from Article I:1 of the GATT. The 
Appellate Body in the EC Preferences case upholds decisions of the panel, it stated that 
the Enabling Clause "does not exclude the applicability” to Article I:1 of the 
GATT 1994.335 The preservation of MFN in the WTO regime and its dispute settlement 
process has given a large contribution to the development of the world trading system. 
Finally, the MFN treatment as a basic principle must be interpreted in a consistent 
way.336 
 
III. d. Exceptions and waivers of Most Favoured Nation clause under the GATT 
1994. 
As noted above, that MFN principle is one of the basic principles governing 
obligations under the WTO. However, the GATT Agreement itself contains a number of 
exceptions, to depart from MFN. During the development of the World Trading System 
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the MFN eroded due to dynamic change in world economic development and different 
interests between member states.337 
There are four major exceptions to the MFN obligations found in the WTO 
agreements; the general exceptions, the exceptions for customs unions and free trade 
areas, the security exception and for special and differential treatment of developing 
countries. Article I:2 of the GATT provides an exception for historical preferences.338 
This Article allows exceptions for preferential arrangements listed in Annexes A to F of 
the GATT, many of which arose out of colonial ties. For example, the British 
Commonwealth preferences gave preferences to its former colonies from MFN under 
this exception. The formation and enlargement of the European Economic Community 
(European Union), a major “exception” itself, has further distorted the meaning of the 
historical preferences of GATT. However, the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions between 
the EEC and a number of developing countries, many of which were former colonies of 
EEC member states, in some cases might be able to be regarded as a form of 
continuation of these historical preferences.339 Such historical preferences have now 
been replaced by Economic Partnership Agreements with some revisions within their 
scheme. 
Article XXV340 of the GATT contains a general power of “waiver” by a special 
(two-thirds) majority of the contracting parties. As noted by Jackson, this power 
should not be used to modify the effects of GATT Article I because amendments to that 
article require unanimity. Nevertheless, a number of waivers have been adopted to 
grant exemption from MFN obligations. The most important standpoint of MFN 
erosion was the 1971 waiver for the preference system for the trade of developing 
countries.341 More generally the reason to depart from MFN could be argued that it is 
more understandable when discrimination would increase welfare in the basis of 
responding to the “special needs” of developing countries.342 
 
III. d. 1. General exception of Article XX of the GATT 1994.  
In general, non-discrimination provisions of the WTO agreements use the term 
“discrimination” per se, unfortunately, specific standards or criteria to define the 
obligation have not yet been provided. One of the articles, which permit a measure to 
depart from non-discrimination, is Article XX of the GATT. This article allows a 
member to adopt measures that are inconsistent with GATT obligations for particular 
policy reasons. Imposing an obligation on members not to apply such measures “in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail.”343  
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(i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which other voting requirements shall apply for the 
waiver of obligations, and 
(ii) prescribe such criteria as may be necessary for the application of this paragraph. 
341 See  Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, p. 549; Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, 100; John H. 
Jackson, 2000, p. 62. 
342 See World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2007, , 2007, Op. Cit., p. 133. 
343 See Julia Ya Qin, Op. Cit, p. 217.  
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III.d.1.a. The negotiating history of Article XX of the GATT 1994. 
The history of the general exceptions, which are listed in Article XX of the GATT 
1994, can be traced back to 1927 within the International Agreement for the 
Suppression of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions.344 This Article 
contained an exception for trade restrictions applied for the protection of public health 
and the protection of animals and plants against diseases and against ‘extinction’.345 
Subsequently, the drafters incorporated the same general exceptions346 during 
negotiations for the creation of the International Trade Organization ("ITO").347  
The preparatory work of the General Exceptions provision, later becoming 
Article XX of the GATT 1947348, was notorious. The scope of the exceptions proposed 
under the article and the “divergence of national practices” became a debatable issue. 
The disagreement between the parties was explained in a report by the Preparatory 
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment in 1947: 
“[…] A substantial degree of agreement among the members of the Preparatory 
Committee was reached on questions of the principle underlying these [General 
Exception] provisions. However, as was to be expected, there were numerous 
differences of opinion, and a number of reservations were made on account of 
national variations in the practice of detailed administration […].”349 
Eventually, the drafters of the ITO Charter included the General Exceptions 
provision which was proposed by the US and included as "Annexure II" of the London 
Draft Charter.350 The US draft contained the introductory language as follows: “Nothing 
                                                 
344 See International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, League of Nations 
Doc. C.559 M.201 1927.II[B] (1927). Article 4 provides an exception for, among other things, rules and regulations 
that are "issued on grounds of public health" or "imposed for moral or humanitarian reasons... ." See Ala'i, Padideh, 
Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis Of The WTO Appellate Body's Shift To A More Balanced 
Approach To Trade Liberalization, p. 1132, available at : http://www.auilr.org/pdf/14/14-4-5.pdf, last accessed : 
28 January 2011. 
345 See Charnovitz, Steve., Trade and The Environment In The WTO, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 10, Public 
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper NO. 338, Legal Studies Research Paper NO. 338, 2007, p. 2, available at : 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007028, last accessed : 10 February 2011. 
346 For the full drafting history of the ITO Charter general exceptions, see Report of the First Session of the Preparator, 
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., at 33, U.N. Doc. 
E/PC/T/33 (1946) [London Draft Charter] (illustrating that general exceptions were considered, but were not 
drafted); Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Annexure I, at 52, 60, U.N. Doc. EPCiT/33 (1946) [United States Draft Charter] 
(illustrating draft exceptions); Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. ESCOR, 2d. Sess., at 31, 77, U.N. Doc; /PC/T/34/Rev. 1 (1947) 
[New York Draft Charter]; Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., at 7-65, U.N. Doc. E/PCIT/186 [Geneva Draft Charter]; 
Final Act and Related Documents of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, U.S. ESCOR, at 33, 
U.N. Doe. E/Conf.2/78 (1948) [Havana Charter]; See Ala'i, Padideh, Op. Cit., p. 1133. 
347 At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, there was agreement among the participants that protectionism and 
restrictive trade policies had led to the worldwide recession, which had in turn caused World War II. As a result, 
partly to forestall history from repeating itself and partly to rebuild the economies of many parts of the world-
specifically Europe and Japan-after the devastation of World War II, the Conference drafted outlines for three 
"Bretton Woods" institutions. Two of these institutions, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF') and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD" or "World Bank"), began operating in 
Washington, D.C. in 1946. The third institution was the International Trade Organization ("ITO"). Negotiations for 
the creation of the ITO began in 1946 but the organization itself never came into existence, largely due to the fact 
that the United States Congress refused to ratify it. As a result, the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade 
("GATT"), which was originally envisioned to be a subsidiary agreement and part of the ITO, was concluded as an 
executive agreement and was left to fill the void that the failed ITO had left; See John H. Jackson, The World Trading 
System: Law And Policy Of International Economic Relations 35 (2d ed. 1997). See Ala'i, Padideh, Loc. Cit., p. 1133. 
348 The GATT was never contemplated to be an organization and it was implemented on a "provisional basis" for almost 
fifty years. Because the GATT was not an institution, signatory countries were referred to as Contracting Parties 
and not Members. Under the WTO, all signatory countries that have successfully joined and acceded to the 
organization are called Members. See Ala'i, Padideh, Op. Cit., p. 1133. 
349 See London Draft Charter ; See Ala'i, Padideh, Loc. Cit., p. 1133. 
350 See Ala'i, Padideh, Loc. Cit., p. 1133. 
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in Chapter IV [on commercial policy] of this [ITO] Charter shall be construed to 
prevent the adoption of enforcement by any member of measures.”351 
The introductory language in the proposed draft suddenly provoked concerns 
about the possible abuse towards the enforcement of provisions. Therefore 
delegations from the Netherlands and Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union 
concerned that “the stipulations” “to protect animal or plant life or health “would be 
abused as the new form of indirect protectionism.”352 On that basis, in order to avoid 
further misuses of exceptions and, in this regard, to prohibit the use of the exceptions 
for protectionist objectives, the introductory language was amended as follows:353 
“[…] Subject to the requirement that such measures not be applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in Chapter V [General Commercial Policy] shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of any member of measures 
[…].”354 
This amendment prevented the abuse of Article XX in the regard of protection 
measures as an abuse by the member states. In conclusion, the drafting history of 
Article XX signifies the accommodation of the balance of trade liberalisation and 
national interest of each member state in the framework of the multilateral trading 
system.355 
                                                 
351 See The full text of the General Exceptions provisions from the United States Draft Charter provided: Nothing in 
Chapter IV, article 32 [on commercial policy] of this (ITO] Charter shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any Member of measures: 
a) necessary to protect public morals; 
b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; 
c) relating to fusionable materials; 
d) relating to traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as 
is carried on for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; 
e) in time of war or other emergency in international relations, relating to the protection of the essential security 
interests of a Member; 
f) relating to the importation or exportation of gold and silver; 
g) necessary to induce compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
Chapter IV,su ch as those relating to customs enforcement, deceptive practices, and the protection of patents, 
trade marks and copyrights; 
h) relating to prison-made goods; 
i) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archeological value; 
j) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are taken pursuant to 
international agreements or are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption: 
k) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security; or 
l) imposed in accordance with a determination or recommendation of the Organization [ITO] formulated under 
paragraphs 2. 6, or 7 of Article 55 [Powers and Duties of the Conference]. 
352 See GATT, Analytical Index: Guide To GATT Law And Practice 563 (1995) (citing U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.11/32 (1946) 
(note of the Netherlands and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union). "Indirect protectionism is an undesirable 
and dangerous phenomenon. Many times stipulations to 'protect animal or plant life or health' are misused for 
indirect protection. It is recommended to insert a clause which prohibits expressly [the use of] such measures [to] 
constitute an indirect protection …”. 
353 See Ala'i, Padideh, Loc. Cit., p. 1133. 
354 See New York Draft Charter. 
355 See Ala'i, Padideh, Loc. Cit., p. 1133. 
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III.d.1.b. Interpretation and application of Article XX of the General Exception of 
GATT 1994: Article XX (b) of GATT 1994 as a justification for the Drug 
Arrangements in the EC preferences case. 
The interpretation of GATT Article XX has begun to play a significant role in 
defining the relationship between different areas of international law.356 As noted by 
Jackson, “this exception has a short limited freedom” which should not be misused 
against the basic principle of WTO. The sub provisions within articles give limitations 
and guidance of the measures, which can be taken by member states under the 
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT.357 
The Article XX of General Exception of GATT 1994 provides: 
            Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:  
a) necessary to protect public morals;  
b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver;  
d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the 
enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the 
protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive 
practices;  
e) relating to the products of prison labour;  
f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological 
value;  
g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption;  
h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity 
agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and not 
disapproved by them or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved;*  
i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential 
quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the 
domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as part of a governmental 
stabilization plan; Provided that such restrictions shall not operate to increase the 
exports of or the protection afforded to such domestic industry, and shall not depart from 
the provisions of this Agreement relating to non-discrimination;  
j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply; 
Provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle that all 
contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of 
such products, and that any such measures, which are inconsistent with the other 
provisions of the Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise 
to them have ceased to exist.  
Article XX (b) and (g) of GATT 1994 authorise WTO Members to adopt trade-
restrictive measures aimed at protecting the environment, thus, it is allowed to depart 
from basic norms, such as non-discrimination, however, this is subject to certain 
specified conditions.358 
                                                 
356 See Condon, Bradly J., GATT Article XX and Proximity of Interest: Determining the Subject Matter of Paragraphs b and g, 
p. 2, available at 
:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=666984&http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=666 984&re=1&srcabs=301404, last accessed : 15th Februari 2011. 
357 See John H. Jackson, 2003, p. 791; Condon, Bradly J., Op. Cit. 
358 See Gabiatti, Sonia., Trade-Related Environmental Measures Under GATT Article XX (b) and (g), 2009, p. 24, available at 
: http://skemman.is/stream/get/1946/3044/10073/4/Sonia_Gabiatti_fixed.pdf, last accessed : 21 January 2011. 
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In US-Shrimp case, the Appellate Body interpreted the nature and purpose of 
Article XX as a balance of rights and duties:359 
“[…] balance must struck between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under 
Article XX and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other 
Members. The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, essentially the delicate 
one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to 
invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under 
varying substantive provisions (e.g., Article XI) of GATT 1994, so that neither the 
competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the 
balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that 
Agreement. The location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not 
fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at 
stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ […].”360 
The Appellate Body linked the balance of rights and obligations under the 
chapeau of Article XX to the general principle of good faith:361 
“[…] The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good 
faith. This principle, at once a general principle of law and a general principle of 
international law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One application of this 
general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, 
prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s rights and enjoins that whenever the 
assertion of a right “impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be 
exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably.”362 An abusive exercise by a Member of 
its own treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights of the other Members 
and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member so acting. Having said 
this, our task here is to interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking additional 
interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles of international 
law […]”. 
 
“[…] The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the 
delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a 
Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members 
under varying substantive provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that neither 
of the competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or 
impair the balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Members themselves in 
that Agreement. The location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is 
                                                 
359 See World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index : Guide to WTO Law and Practice, Second Edition, Volume I, 
Cambridge University Press,  2007, Para. 575, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_07_e.htm#article20, last accessed : 21 
November 2011. 
360 Appellate Body Report on US Shrimp case, paras. 156 and 159. 
361 See World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index : Guide to WTO Law and Practice, Second Edition, Volume I, 
Cambridge University Press,  2007, Para. 585, Available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_07_e.htm#article20, last accessed : 21 
November 2011. 
362 See B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 
1953), Chapter 4, in particular, p. 125 elaborates: 
… A reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right in such a case is one which is appropriate and necessary for the 
purpose of the right (i.e., in furtherance of the interests which the right is intended to protect). It should at the 
same time be fair and equitable as between the parties and not one which is calculated to procure for one of them 
an unfair advantage in the light of the obligation assumed. A reasonable exercise of the right is regarded as 
compatible with the obligation. But the exercise of the right in such a manner as to prejudice the interests of the 
other contracting party arising out of the treaty is unreasonable and is considered as inconsistent with the bona 
fide execution of the treaty obligation, and a breach of the treaty. Also see, for example, Jennings and Watts (eds.), 
Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed, Vol. I (Longman’s, 1992), pp. 407–410, Border and Transborder Armed 
Actions Case, (1988) I.C.J. Rep. 105; Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco Case, (1952) I.C.J. Rep. 176; 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, (1951) I.C.J. Rep. 142. 
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not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at 
stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ […].”363 
Related to the analytical approach of discrimination under Article XX (g), in the 
regard of feasible similarities or differences in conditions from one country to another, 
which include social values or economic conditions, however, they burden 
responsibilities to the conservation purposes of the measure. The Rio Declaration as 
an international environmental policy stipulates the “differentiated responsibilities” of 
countries based on their developmental status.364 In the light of certain aspects of 
trade policy, it also authorises distinction between countries in terms of economic 
development.365 
Environmental interests is covering the protection of human, animal and plant 
life or health and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.366 The function of 
Article XX related to national measures taken for environmental protection is 
concluded by the Appellate Body in US-Gasoline case, as follows:367 
“[…] It is of some importance that the Appellate Body point out what this does not mean. 
It does not mean, or imply, that the ability of any WTO Member to take measures to 
control air pollution or, more generally, to protect the environment, is at issue. That 
would be to ignore the fact that Article XX of the General Agreement contains provisions 
designed to permit important state interests including the protection of human health, as 
well as the conservation of exhaustible natural resources to find expression. The 
provisions of Article XX were not changed as a result of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Indeed, in the preamble to the WTO Agreement and in 
the Decision on Trade and Environment, there is specific acknowledgement to be found 
about the importance of coordinating policies on trade and the environment. WTO 
Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the 
environment (including its relationship with trade), their environmental objectives and 
the environmental legislation they enact and implement. So far as concerns the WTO, 
that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the 
General Agreement and the other covered agreements […].”368 
The panel and Appellate Body discovered methods to implement Article XX to 
justify the inconsistent measures of the GATT. The justification of the inconsistent 
measure in GATT involves issues such as burden proof, the sequence of steps for the 
application of Article XX, the policy choice and fulfilment of the requirements of the 
paragraphs in Article XX as well as its introductory clause, known as the chapeau369. In 
order to interpret the chapeau of Article XX, the Appellate Body should refer back to 
the guidelines in the Preamble of the WTO Agreement, and consider the Uruguay 
Round Decision on Trade and Environment. In addition, the Appellate Body 
                                                 
363 See Appellate Body Report on US Shrimp case, paras. 158–159. 
364 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
(“In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities.”). 
365 One of the most well-known of such differentiations is the Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”), allowing 
developed countries to grant preferential trade status to the poorer of the developing countries. For one of several 
ministerial decisions reached in conjunction with the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, see Decision on Measures in 
Favour of Least-Developed Countries (April 15, 1994) WTO Agreement, Part III, 33 I.L.M. 138 (1994) (reaffirming a 
1979 decision to create the GSP); See Gaines, Sanford., The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A 
Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, p. 781, available at : 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301404, last accessed : 13 January 2011. 
366 See Gabiatti, Sonia., 2009, Op. Cit., pg. 26. 
367 See World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index : Guide to WTO Law and Practice, Second Edition, Volume I, 
Cambridge University Press,  2007, Para. 576, Available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_07_e.htm#article20, last accessed : 21 
November 2011. 
368 Appellate Body Report on US — Gasoline, pp. 30–31. 
369 See Gabiatti, Sonia., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 25. 
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surprisingly stated that to interpret the chapeau, it is possible to seek additional 
interpretation of the referral guidelines, which are appropriate from general principles 
of international law. The Appellate Body also explained that the remedy or measure of 
Article XX must be exercised ‘reasonably’ under general principles of law and 
international law.370  
The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO has evolved a two-step test based on 
these listed exceptions and the so-called ‘chapeau” of Article XX to be used in the 
analysis to determine whether a particular environmental measure is consistent with 
the GATT/WTO obligations. First, the measure must fall under one of the listed 
exceptions stipulated in Article XX. Then the objectives of the measure must be 
examined to determine whether it falls under the scope of any of the listed exceptions 
or not. The second step of the test of the applicable measures aims to determine 
whether the application is discriminatory in specific ways. This subject of 
discrimination, at the second step, is determined by referring to the “chapeau” of 
Article XX. The chapeau disallows the application of a measure, which otherwise is 
compliant with the scope of Article XX (g), if it constitutes “arbitrary discrimination” 
(between countries where the same conditions prevail; “unjustifiable discrimination” 
(within the same qualifier); or “disguised restriction” on international trade. The 
above-mentioned three terms have to be read “side-by-side,” and “impart meaning to 
one another.”371 
Concerning the burden of proof, it regulates that the party has to prove the 
affirmative of a particular claim or defence that it has submitted.372 Affirmative 
defence imposes the obligation to the party who invoke Article XX of general exception 
to provide the burden of proof according to domestic law, international procedures 
and GATT/WTO practice.373 The burden of proof has to be provided by the party who 
invoke Article XX of general exception in order to justify a GATT inconsistent 
measure.374  
Further, the party that is invoking an exception under Article XX has to prove 
that the inconsistent measure comes within the scope of one of the prescribed 
exceptions and also that the measure complies with the chapeau of Article XX.375 In the 
EC-Preferences Case, the panel held that the defending party had the responsibility to 
invoke it and the Appellate Body upheld this finding. Then, the question rose about the 
difference of the burden of proof in the Enabling Clause and General Exception Article 
XX. As noted by Matsushita, the developed country members are encouraged to use the 
Enabling Clause in order to participate in assisting the Developing Country and Less 
Developing Country in alleviating poverty and economic development. Hence, to 
“depart” from non-discrimination in tariffs is justified as long as this complies with the 
                                                 
370 See Charnovitz, Steve., Trade and The Environment In The WTO, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 10, Public 
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper NO. 338, Legal Studies Research Paper NO. 338, 2007, p. 24, available at : 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007028, last accessed : 10 February 2011. 
371 See Ghei, Nita., Evaluating The WTO’S Two Step Test For Environmental Measures Under Article XX, George Mason 
University Law And Economics Research Paper Series, 2006, pp. 19-20, available at : 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=946462, last accessed : 11 January 2011. 
372 See Gabiatti, Sonia., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 26. 
373 See Pauwelyn, Joost, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement : Who Bears the Burden?, Journal of 
International Economic Law 1, 1998, pp. 227-258, available at : 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2223&context=faculty_scholarship, last accessed : 27 
February 2011. 
374 See GATT Tuna I Report : 
Article XX is a limited and conditional exception from obligations under other provisions of the General Agreement, 
and not a positive rule establishing obligations in itself. Therefore, the practice of panels has been to interpret 
Article XX narrowly, to place the burden on the party invoking Article XX to justify its invocation, and not to 
examine Article XX exceptions unless invoked. 
375 See Gabiatti, Sonia., 2009, Loc. Cit., p. 26. 
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standard as regulated in the Enabling Clause. While in Article XX of the GATT of the 
General Exception cases, members are not only encouraged to use exceptions as 
incorporated in Article XX of the GATT but are also recommended to refrain from 
invoking GATT General Exception measures. Further Matsushita argues that it might 
be inappropriate to classify the Enabling Clause as an exception since developed 
country members are encouraged to make exceptions. Thus, Matsushita concluded 
that it seems more natural to characterise the Enabling Clause as a provision 
establishing a special right for developed country members to deviate from the GATT 
obligations for promoting the purpose of the WTO regime, which is the economic 
development of developing countries.376 
The harmonisation sequence of the applicability of Article XX agreed between 
the panel and the Appellate Body in the decision of the EC–Asbestos case. There are 
two steps established by the panel. During the first step, it is necessary to examine 
whether the measure falls within the scope of one of the listed exceptions in Article XX. 
Then, the second step considers whether the challenged measure satisfies the 
conditions of the chapeau of Article XX.377 
Therefore, the correct order of steps in defence of a GATT inconsistent measure 
is to verify whether the challenged measure complies with the requirement of one of 
the Article XX exceptions. Afterwards, it is needed to examine whether it also fulfils the 
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX, the introductory clause. Since the role of the 
chapeau is to examine the method in which the measures are applied, this approach is 
justified. In order for a GATT inconsistent measure to fall under one of the exceptions 
of paragraphs (b), (d) or (g) of Article XX it must comply with the requirements 
contained in those provisions.378 
As noted by Sanford, the chapeau of Article XX itself creates no independent 
“standards” or requirements. Further Sanford states that the chapeau is not a 
freestanding statement but a subordinate clause that takes its meaning from the rest of 
the sentence that follows the lettered paragraphs of Article XX. In other words, the 
chapeau contains a certain standard condition on the exercise of the rights granted in 
the separate paragraphs of the article. Essentially, it imposes a reasonableness 
standard for the possible trade discriminatory effects of national policy.379 
The WTO has to set up a jurisprudence aimed to determine which “conditions” 
are relevant and when they can be deemed “similar.” In the matter of the “peculiarity” 
of each country in the world it is impossible that all conditions might be similar even 
in any two countries. In the trade perspective, it is argued according to the premise 
that the “same conditions” never prevail between the states. An effective 
interpretation of the chapeau needs to be established, in order to decide the conditions 
to compare in justifying the application of a national measure.380 
The applicability of Article XX emphasises that the purpose of the measure must 
be identified within the policies, which are described in GATT 1994. For example, the 
measure taken must be in compliance with the requirements that fall under Article XX 
(b), which means that the elements of necessity must be fulfilled.381 The negotiating 
                                                 
376 See Matsushita, Mitsuo., A Review of Major WTO Jurisprudence, pp. 11-12, available at : 
http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/wto/pdfs/MatsushitaWorkingPaper.pdf, last accessed : 27 February 2011. 
377 See Gabiatti, Sonia., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 27. 
378 See Ibid., p. 27. 
379 See Gaines, Sanford., The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental 
Measures, p. 777, available at : http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301404, last accessed : 13 
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380 See Ibid, p. 778. 
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history of Paragraph XX (b) provides support for the view that this paragraph is aimed 
at measures to protect internal health and life, in this regard this article is aimed to 
prevent the abuse of sanitary regulations.382 
The necessity test383 defined as an approach which is developed to determine 
whether GATT-inconsistent measures may still be justified under the exception as 
prescribed in Article XX (b). This sort of method allows the necessity of the measures 
to be identified, which are otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of GATT 1994. 
The “necessity test” consists of two steps. The first step is that the policy objective 
pursued by the GATT-inconsistent measure must be the protection of life or health of 
humans, animals or plants. Thus the second step concerning the measure must be 
necessary to fulfil those policy objectives.384 
The determination of whether the measure is “necessary”385 under Article XX (b) 
also involves a weighing and balancing process386. The considerations are based on a 
series of factors such as the contribution made by the measure, the importance of the 
common interests or values protected, and the impact of the measure on trade.387 
In the EC-Preferences case, the European Communities claim that the Drug 
Arrangements are justified by Article XX (b) of GATT 1994. Three issues were raised 
by the European Union by invoking Article XX (b) of GATT 1994 as justification for its 
Drug Arrangements. First, the tariff preferences under the Drug Arrangements 
constitute a measure to protect human life or health in the European Communities. 
Second, the tariff preferences under the Drug Arrangements are "necessary" within the 
meaning of Article XX (b). Lastly, the Drug Arrangements are applied in a manner 
constituting arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in violation of the chapeau of 
Article XX.388 
In the assessment of the necessity of the measure, the European Communities 
maintain that according to Korea – Various Measures on Beef, “the more vital the 
common interests or values pursued, the easier it would be to accept as necessary 
measures designed to achieve those ends”. It argues that the protection of human life 
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and health is the most fundamental and important value, and that, accordingly, the test 
of "necessary" in such a case should be given the broadest possible meaning.389 
While, India argued on the "necessity" requirement contending that the link 
between the Drug Arrangements and Article XX (b) is far-off. In their rebuttal, India 
argues that the Drug Arrangements, as a measure, provide more favourable treatment 
to developing countries and, as a measure to protect human health in the European 
Communities, are logically contradictory. The effect of the measure, according to India, 
is dependent upon several external factors which are not in the control of the 
European Communities and which bring uncertainty. Furthermore, India challenges 
that drug production and trafficking are organised crimes, motivated by profit alone, 
and preferential tariffs would not eradicate such crimes.390 
Concerning whether the European Communities' measure complies with the 
chapeau to Article XX, the European Communities argue that the exclusion of other 
developing countries is not part of the “design and structure” of the Drug 
Arrangements, but rather of its application and, therefore, should be examined under 
the chapeau of Article XX.391 
While India in regard of the chapeau argues that the European Communities fails 
to show how the tariff preferences do not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. India contends the fact 
that the Drug Arrangements are only limited to a closed set of 12 beneficiary countries 
is clear evidence of discrimination. Moreover, India maintains that the selection 
process for the Drug Arrangements is not transparent and that there is no published 
procedure for the application and selection of beneficiaries. There is no evidence to 
show that the European Communities had in fact conducted an objective assessment 
based on objective criteria.392 
The panel on EC Tariff Preferences followed the same approach as the Panels on 
US Gasoline and EC Asbestos:393 
“[…] In EC Asbestos, the panel followed the same approach as used in US — 
Gasoline: We must first establish whether the policy in respect of the measure for 
which the provisions of Article XX(b) were invoked falls within the range of policies 
designed to protect human life or health […].”394 
Following this jurisprudence, the panel needs to examine: (i) whether the policy 
reflected in the measure falls within the range of policies designed to achieve the 
objective of or, put differently, or whether the policy objective is for the purpose of, 
‘protect[ing] human … life or health’. In other words, whether the measure is one 
designed to achieve that health policy objective; (ii) whether the measure is 
‘necessary’ to achieve the said objective; and (iii) whether the measure is applied in a 
manner consistent with the chapeau of Article XX.”395 
The panel finds that the policy reflected in the Drug Arrangements is not one 
designed for the purpose of protecting human life or health in the European 
Communities and, therefore, the Drug Arrangements are not a measure for the 
purpose of protecting human life or health under Article XX (b) of GATT 1994. 
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Nevertheless, the panel considers it would be appropriate to go on to examine whether 
the measure is "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX (b).396 
Respecting “necessity of the measure” the panel finds that the Drug Arrangements 
are not "necessary to protect human … life or health", in compliance with Article XX (b) 
of GATT 1994.397 The panel examined whether the measure was applied in a manner 
consistent with the chapeau of Article XX. Specifically, the panel looked at the inclusion 
of Pakistan, as of 2002, as a beneficiary of the Drug Arrangements preference scheme 
and the exclusion of Iran, and found that no objective criteria could be distinguished in 
the selection process. Consequently, the panel was not satisfied that conditions in the 
12 beneficiary countries were similar and they were not the same with those 
prevailing in other countries:398 The lack of evidence provided by European Union 
makes difficulties for the panel to assess the justifiability of the measure. For these 
reasons, the European Union has not established to the panel's satisfaction that the 
application of the measure does not constitute "a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail".399 
In conclusion, the panel found that the European Communities have not 
demonstrated that: (a) the Drug Arrangements are measures designed for the purpose 
of protecting human life or health in the European Communities; or that (b) the Drug 
Arrangements are "necessary" for the protection of human life or health in the 
European Communities. Consequently, the panel finds that the Drug Arrangements are 
not provisionally justifiable under Article XX (b). The panel also finds that the 
European Communities have not demonstrated that the Drug Arrangements are not 
being applied in a manner constituting arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail.400 Based on these findings the 
panel on EC Preferences concludes that the European Communities have failed to 
demonstrate that the Drug Arrangements are justified under Article XX (b) of GATT 
1994.401 
 
III. d. 2. Exception on Free-Trade Area and Customs Unions: Article XXIV of GATT 
1994. 
As noted by Hoekman, GATT allowed for exemptions to the MFN rule in the 
context of reciprocal preferential agreements and with respect to unilateral 
preferences granted to developing countries.402 Further, Ukpe, also notes 
notwithstanding the fact that agreements concluded under GATT Article XXIV are 
WTO-plus agreements and are thereby not subject to the MFN principle in Article 
1:I.403 The Article XXIV allows an exception to the obligations of GATT for certain 
regional arrangements. Jackson notes that the exception in Article XXIV applies to 
three types of arrangements: customs union; free trade areas; and “an interim 
agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free trade area.”404 
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Article XXIV of GATT allows the creation of free trade areas and customs unions 
under certain conditions. A customs union is defined as the creation of single custom 
territory such that duties and other regulations of commerce are eliminated with 
respect to the trade between the constituent territories and substantially the same 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are applied to non-members of 
the union. Then, a free trade area defined as a group of territories when duties and 
other regulation of commerce are eliminated with respect to the trade between the 
constituent territories. Free trade areas and customs unions by their very nature 
discriminate against non-members.405 In addition, in a customs union, the members 
adopt a common schedule of tariffs and a system of regulation of trade with respect to 
products from the territories of non-members.406 While Article XXIV: 4 recognises the 
desirability of such entities, it also notes that their purpose should facilitate trade 
between the constituent territories and not raise barriers to the trade of other 
contracting parties with such territories. More specifically Article XXIV: 5 requires that 
the following creation of the area or union, duties and commercial regulations applied 
to non-members must not be higher or more restrictive than those applied before 
creation.407 
The establishment of a customs union or free trade area requires departure from 
the MFN principle. If there were no such exception to the MFN principle, the 
elimination of customs duties between the participants would have been generalised 
to all GATT contracting parties.408 
According to Jackson, the policy underlying Article XXIV exception as stipulated 
is a recognition of desirability of increasing freedom of trade by development, through 
voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the country 
parties to such agreements. While GATT makes an allowance for regional 
arrangements that do not have the effect of increasing restrictions on import from 
third countries.409 As noted by Folsom, Article XXIV requires the elimination of internal 
tariffs and other restrictive regulations of commerce on “substantially all” products 
originating in a customs union or free trade area and requires that tariffs and other 
regulations of commerce shall not be “higher or more restrictive” than before creation 
of the free trade area or customs union. However, the term “regulations of commerce” 
includes rules of origin that are critically unclear. The broad purpose of Article XXIV, 
acknowledged therein, is to facilitate trade among the GATT/WTO parties and not to 
raise trade barriers.410 
According to such agreements as stipulated in Article XXIV, the custom union 
and free trade area must contain a “plan and schedule for the formation of such 
customs union or free trade area within a reasonable length of time.” According to 
Jackson, none of the arrangements notified to GATT has satisfied the definitions of a 
free trade area or a customs union contained in Paragraph 8 of Article XXIV, although 
some evolved into one of these.411 
The customs unions and free trade area are permitted under the WTO, where 
countries eliminating tariffs within the region and impose tariffs for countries outside 
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the region (non-contracting parties states). In the customs union system, the rates are 
centrally determined and common throughout the region. Recognizing this type of 
agreement and its economic values on trade creation  and trade diversion, the GATT 
member states agreed to provide an exception of the MFN clause.412 According to 
Polley, the elimination of trade barriers generate trade creation within the area, yet, 
the member countries may trade less with countries outside the region.413  
The MFN principle is also applied in numerous regional trade agreements. As 
noted by Jackson, it is important to distinguish between MFN and “multilateralism” 
which are sometimes confused with each other. Multilateralism is an approach to 
international negotiation that involves the interaction of a large number of nation-
states. MFN, instead, is a principal applied within negotiations, regardless of whether 
those negotiations are conducted multilaterally, plurilaterally or bilaterally.414 
 
III.d.3. Security Exception: Article XXI of GATT 1994. 
However, there have been many scholars who have observed international trade 
law as a concept differing from the classical idea of state sovereignty and have 
regarded national security, borders and territory as state interests. Those matters are 
difficult to reconcile with the concept of market liberalisation.415 The provision of 
Article XXI of the GATT proves that these traditional state interests continue to be a 
major concern of WTO Members.416 As noted by Emmerson, the inclusion of Article XXI 
of GATT 1994 suggests formal recognition of state sovereignty and the members’ right 
to self-protection.417 The Article XXI to GATT 1994 stipulates: 
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed : 
(a)     to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it 
considers contrary to its essential security interests; or 
(b)     to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests 
(i)     relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; 
(ii)    relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic 
in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of 
supplying a military establishment; 
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(iii)    taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or 
(c)      to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations 
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
The former Contracting Parties of the GATT 1947 (which still exists as the “GATT 
1994” among WTO Members) were unwilling to activate the institutionalised dispute 
settlement mechanisms to handle with disputes involving the interpretation of the 
national security exceptions. The WTO is not regarded as an adequate forum for 
dealing with national security issues. Under GATT 1947, only four such cases reached 
the level of formalised dispute settlement, while no panel established since the 
creation of the WTO for dealing with these kinds of disputes has succeeded in 
producing a report. 
According to the provision of security exceptions it is stipulated, that ‘nothing’ 
within the agreements can prevent WTO members from suspending their trade 
obligations to face legitimate security threats. In this regard whether the security 
exceptions are ‘self-judging’ and entirely deferential to ‘the politico-military 
community', merely based on state subjectivity and unilateral, due to that exception it 
can be the excuses to escape from basic principles of the WTO. In other words, a new 
form can be used to practise protectionism. In order to avoid the potential of tensions 
between states because of unilateral actions the security exception contains some 
restrictions and is lawful, concerning derogation from their trade obligations, subject 
to review by a dispute settlement body. Security exception provisions are enacted 
from binding rules, procedures, ‘accountability, openness and equality’, so that 
security exceptions have judicially discoverable limitations.418 
The national security exception was a part of the general exceptions of the 
chapters of commercial policy and commodity agreements. It provided in the 
International Trade Organization 1946 the first draft prepared by the Preparatory 
Committee in London in October and November of 1946, the next draft was prepared 
by a technical drafting committee in New York in January and February of 1947.419 
Only at the meeting of the Preparatory Committee in Geneva from April to October 
1947 it was decided to transfer the security exceptions from the general exceptions to 
a separate article at the end of the Charter, which was practically identical with the 
present text of GATT Article XXI.420 
The applicability of the dispute settlement mechanism to the security exceptions 
was raised at the Geneva meeting. By placing Article XXI between the general 
exceptions (Article XX) and the dispute settlement provision (Article XXIII), the 
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Contracting Parties to GATT 1947 made it clear that the dispute settlement mechanism 
would apply to the new article. Countries imposing economic sanctions on Argentina 
after the Falkland/Malvinas events were of the view that they were exercising an 
inherent right existing under general international law, which was merely reflected by 
Article XXI of GATT. This situation led Argentina to request an interpretation of such 
Article and then the Contracting Parties, although they did not interpret Article XXI, 
adopted a decision concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement.421 
According to Ackerman, Article XXI has been a factor in five GATT disputes, and 
these disputes have begun to articulate the meaning of the treaty language. This Article 
has been a factor in five GATT disputes that are beginning to establish a framework for 
interpretation.422 Four of these cases reached panels; they consist of an early post 
Second World War dispute involving trade between the United States and 
Czechoslovakia, two cases concerning US trade with Nicaragua423, and a challenge to 
trade restrictions imposed by the European Community (EC) on Yugoslavia. The fifth 
dispute, which arose out of the Falklands War, did not go to a GATT panel, but raised 
some important issues.424 
In 1949 Czechoslovakia challenged a US measure that banned the export of 
certain products to Czechoslovakia on national security grounds. The panel rejected 
Czechoslovakia’s complaint, with the panel members referring to the provisions of 
Article XXI in general terms. For example, one delegate argued, “since the question 
clearly concerned Article XXI, the US action would seem to be justified because every 
country must have the last resort relating to its own security.” Still, the specific 
provisions of the article were mentioned. Furthermore, when Czechoslovakia charged 
that the US construction of the term “war material” in Article XXI (b)(ii) was too 
expansive, the US delegate responded with a defence on the merits, arguing that the US 
export control regime was “highly selective.”425 
Czechoslovakia, in turn, chose the dispute settlement under Article XXIII and the 
US invoked, inter alia, Article XXI, not as a procedural defence but as a substantive one. 
Although the Contracting Parties “decided to reject the contention of Czechoslovakia’s 
delegation that the Government of the US had failed to carry out its obligations under 
the Agreement through its administration of the issue of export licences”,426 they did 
not altogether deny their formal Article XXIII jurisdiction over matters involving 
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Article XXI of GATT 1947.427 Thus, disputants argued whether the action of the US fell 
within the treaty clause.428 
Nicaragua vs United States (1984) (Nicaragua I) demonstrates the exclusive 
nature of the treaty language when a party claims a national security exception. In that 
case, Nicaragua challenged a Reagan Administration policy that drastically reduced US 
sugar imports from Nicaragua. The US declined to invoke Article XXI and argued 
instead that its actions were beyond the scope of GATT and hence beyond the panel’s 
jurisdiction. The panel simply held the US in violation of GATT without examining the 
applicability of Article XXI. It did not interpret the US action as a valid exception to the 
treaty.429 According to GATT panel in Nicaragua vs United States (1984) (Nicaragua I), 
the treaty’s language is a ceiling rather than a floor. The panel rejected the United 
States’ claim of an implicit national security exception that would create an exception 
broader than the explicit text.430 No GATT panel has ever held that an implicit national 
security exception prevents derogation from being a violation.431  
The Reagan Administration’s Central American policy gave rise to two cases 
relating to Article XXI. In 1983, the US decided to drastically reduce the share of sugar 
imports allocated to Nicaragua. The US did not block either the establishment of the 
panel or the adoption of its report. Neither did it invoke Article XXI or attempt to 
defend its actions in GATT terms. According to the 1984 panel report, “The United 
States stated that it was neither invoking any exceptions under the provisions of the 
General Agreement nor intending to defend its actions in GATT terms… and that the 
action of the US did of course affect trade, but was not taken for trade policy 
reasons”.432 Consequently, the panel did not examine whether the action could be 
justified under the security exception because it had not been invoked. However, this 
fact did not prevent the panel from finding that the US violated Article XIII (2).433 
The third case, Nicaragua vs United States (1985-1986) (Nicaragua II), was 
Nicaragua’s response to a complete import and export embargo imposed by the US.434 
In 1985, the US decided to impose a complete import and export embargo on 
Nicaragua, which requested the establishment of a panel again. The position of the US 
in this case was considerably different to that adopted in the first dispute with 
Nicaragua. It managed to exclude from the terms of reference of the panel the 
possibility “to examine or judge the validity of or motivation for the invocation of 
Article XXI: (b) (iii) by the US.”435 Some other GATT Contracting Parties, such as 
Canada and the European Communities agreed with the US that Article XXI issues were 
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political questions not subject to panel security. The panel nevertheless referred to the 
question in the following terms: 
“[…] If it were accepted that the interpretation of Article XXI was reserved entirely to 
the contracting party invoking it, how could the CONTRACTING PARTIES ensure that 
this general exception to all obligations under the General Agreement is not invoked 
excessively or for the purposes other than those set out in this provision? If the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES give a panel the task of examining a case involving an Article 
XXI invocation without authorising it to examine the justification of that provision, do 
they limit the adversely affected contracting party’s right to have its complaint 
investigated in accordance with Article XXIII:2 […].”436 
The panel determined that it was limited by its terms of reference not to examine 
US action, but it was made clear that, in general, panels could review invocations of 
Article XXI. By doing so, it drew on the well-established principle of national and 
international law that provisions of treaties must be interpreted in conjunction with 
other provisions in the same treaty. Hence, national security exceptions must be 
interpreted in light of other treaty provisions; they are not mere reflections of a 
general limitation on treaties that is independent of the explicit provisions in 
particular treaties. The content of a national security exception must come from the 
treaty itself, and will be subject to review according to the terms of the treaty.437 
In the fourth and most recent case, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 
1991 challenged restrictions on trade that the European Community (EC) imposed in 
response to the Yugoslav civil war. As noted by Ackerman, the EC explicitly grounded 
its action in Article XXI. Although panel proceedings were suspended in 1993 in light 
of the uncertainty surrounding the status of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro), the Council agreed to establish a panel to review the EC’s 
invocation of Article XXI, and the EC did not claim that such review was barred.438 
Following Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in April 1982, 
the EC, Australia, and Canada imposed trade restrictions on Argentina. Instead of 
bringing the issue to the dispute settlement mechanism, Argentina decided to bring it 
before the GATT Council. In a communication circulated to all contracting parties, and 
in its oral presentations to the Council, Argentina claimed that the trade sanctions 
violated fundamental provisions under GATT. Such as violation of the MFN obligation 
under Article I and the ban on import restrictions under Article XI, which were 
imposed for non-economic reasons, namely reasons of political nature, in order to 
exert political pressure on Argentina. It also pointed out that except for the United 
Kingdom, the sanctions had been imposed by contracting parties that were foreign to 
the political conflict with Argentina on the Malvinas and that the measures taken had 
not been notified to Argentina. Finally, the Argentinean delegate tried to characterise 
the situation as one of economic aggression of developed countries against a 
developing country in violation of the special rules, which the developing countries 
were entitled to enjoy under GATT and under other international conventions.439 
In a controversial GATT Council meeting, the representatives of the EC, Australia 
and Canada argued that measures were taken “on the basis of their inherent rights, of 
which Article XXI (“Security Exceptions”) of the GATT was a reflection”. They also 
recalled that the United Nations Security Council had passed Resolution 502 calling for 
                                                 
436 See United States – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 13 October 1986 (unadopted), GATT Doc. L/6053, para. 5.17. 
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438 See Ackerman, Susan Rose, and Billa, Benjamin S., 2007, Op. Cit., p. 19. 
439 See Reich, Arie., The Threat of Politicization of the World Trade Organization, Bar Ilan University, Israel, p. 12, 
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the withdrawal of Argentinean troops from the islands and the immediate cessation of 
hostilities, and therefore their actions could be seen as falling within either Article 
XXI(b)(3) or XXI(c). In any case, they reiterated this was not an issue in the relations 
between developing and developed countries.440 However, they could not obtain 
unanimous support for this interpretation of Article XXI, and many delegates were 
concerned that recognising Parties’ “inherent rights” to define national security would 
give them carte blanche to undermine the treaty. Finally, they argued that measures 
under Article XXI did not require any notification to GATT or to the affected party. 
Then, the Council issued a “Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement” 
that reads (in relevant part) as follows:441 
Considering that the exceptions envisaged in Article XXI of the General Agreement 
constitute an important element for safeguarding the rights of contracting parties when 
they consider that reasons of security are involved; 
Noting that recourse to Article XXI could constitute, in certain circumstances, an element 
of disruption and uncertainty for international trade and affect benefits accruing to 
contracting parties under the General Agreement; 
Recognizing that in taking action in terms of exceptions provided in Article XXI of the 
General Agreement, contracting parties should take into consideration the interests of 
third parties which may be affected; 
That until such time as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may decide to make a formal 
interpretation of Article XXI it is appropriate to set procedural guidelines for its 
application; 
The CONTRACTING PARTIES decide that: 
1. Subject to the exception in Article XXI:a, contracting parties should be informed to the 
fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under Article XXI. 
2. When action is taken under Article XXI, all contracting parties affected by such action 
retain their full rights under the General Agreement. . . .442 
Many other delegations spoke at the session, some supporting the Argentinean 
position and some supporting the EC position on the question of whether the trade 
sanctions amounted to a violation of GATT obligations and whether this was a 
North/South issue. However, almost all delegations expressed their concern about the 
introduction of political conflicts into GATT discourse, and questioned its ability to 
serve its purpose.443 
Schloemann, Hannes L. et al., and Ackerman et al., propose that the WTO 
regularise the process of invoking the national security exception by allowing states to 
define their essential security interests subject to review for good faith as required by 
the Vienna Convention. In their view, the WTO should require states to provide a 
substantive justification on the merits to demonstrate such good faith. This solution, 
they claim balances sovereignty concerns, which require a state to be allowed to define 
its own security interests, with the need to prevent abuse. Each of these competing 
concerns is central to the viability of the treaty system.444 
Emmerson argued that security exceptions are the necessary legal linchpins 
(backbone) to WTO Agreements, mediating political exigencies, while simultaneously 
orchestrating international economic integration. Because the security exceptions 
mediate traditional member sovereignty to assist, the WTO’s legalised ‘participatory 
vision’, facilitating an evolution of state identity. The WTO members have included 
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explicit security exceptions in WTO Agreements allowing for derogation from their 
obligations when their national security is threatened. The WTO Agreements, which 
include security exceptions, recognise that ‘security is pre-eminent because without it 
a state has no sovereignty, and its very existence is in doubt’.445  
Lindsay suggests when entering an international legal regime, security 
exceptions provide the necessary means of justifying trade protectionism without the 
need to resolve the underlying tension ‘relating to sovereignty and the nature of 
WTO’.446 For WTO members, security exceptions represent ‘an indispensable escape 
mechanism or safety valve’447 when their very existence is under threat. The doctrinal 
security exceptions therefore operate as ordering mechanisms448, allowing for limited 
derogation from trade obligations with ‘some autonomous power ‘used to shape state 
behaviour.449 
Finally, as noted by Ackerman and Billa, no GATT panel has ever declared any 
part of Article XXI to be solely under the discretion of a State Party. Although there has 
been no WTO jurisprudence and no decision by a Dispute Settlement Body of WTO 
regarding Article XXI, it is fair to assume that arguments to review national security 
have now become even stronger. When the disputes emerge, it has to be resolved 
using “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” that includes 
“good faith.”450 
 
III.d.4. Trade and Development: Enabling Clause Decision of 28 November 1979.  
In 1971, the Contracting Parties to GATT approved a waiver of MFN under 
Article XXV, Paragraph 5 of GATT, for instituting the Generalised System of 
Preferences. The waiver allows for a departure from Article I obligations for a period 
of ten years, but actions resulting from the Tokyo Round negotiation have effectively 
perpetuated this departure. The waiver of the MFN obligation extends to all developed 
countries and allows them to extend preferential tariff treatment for developing 
countries without having to generalise such treatment to other GATT contracting 
parties.451 
The schemes adopted by the individual developed country to implement GSP 
vary in their terms. The preference schemes vary in terms of the products covered, the 
countries benefiting from the schemes, the level of tariff cuts, rules of origin, and 
whether the products on which the preferences are granted are subject to non-tariff 
barriers such as quotas or tariffs quotas. In addition, all of the schemes include 
safeguard mechanisms such as escape clause provisions or quantitative limitations on 
trade under preference schemes.452 
It has been accommodated clearly about countervailing policy considerations the 
desire to aid developing countries and the desire to promote deeper trade 
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liberalisation by encouraging customs unions and free trade areas, among others. 
These countervailing considerations, plus the usual and frequent government 
motivations of expediency or special “deals”, have led over the years to substantial and 
apparently growing departures from MFN. Whether the advantages of MFN treatment 
can be retained in the face of such trends remains to be seen.453 
 
IV. The participation of developing countries in the Multilateral Trading System. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries viewed UNCTAD rather 
than GATT as the main institution through which they could promote their interests in 
international trade. Their representation in GATT described these priorities. Many 
developing countries were not members, and of those that were, a large number did 
not maintain official representatives resident in Geneva, but instead used 
representatives in other European capitals to cover GATT matters. Moreover, their 
participation in GATT negotiations prior to the Uruguay Rounds was “passive” in that 
they did not engage in a significant way in the mutual exchange of concessions on a 
reciprocal basis.454 
Many developing countries played a very active role in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations and a large number decided to become members of WTO. Developing 
countries, in general, have become more effectively integrated in the international 
trading system, and several have become major exporters of manufactures. Trade 
policies in many countries have been liberalised, favouring an outward orientation and 
lower protection. In addition, there has been a growing appreciation of the importance 
of observing international rules in the conduct of trade as well as the need to 
safeguard trading interests through effective participation in the activities of the new 
organisation.  
There are many developing countries that have significantly increased their 
capacity to participate in WTO activities in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round and 
whose representatives are playing an active role in the decisions of the organisation. 
An organisation like the WTO, and previously GATT, which works with consensus 
despite the fact that the countries represented are very different in their economic 
size, presents complex challenges in designing decision-making structures that result 
in an equitable representation of the interests of all participants. Their participation in 
formal and informal decision-making processes is substantial, although they 
frequently do not speak with one voice as their interests, depending on the issue, may 
diverge and result in the formation of different coalitions.455  
Over the past fifty years, the multilateral trading system embodied of the World 
Trade Organization has contributed significantly to economic growth, development 
and employment. A major challenge for GATT/WTO has been how to incorporate 
developing countries into the trading system in ways that bring genuine benefits to 
these countries.456 As mentioned previously, the Doha Declaration is to reaffirm the 
principles and objectives set out in the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, and pledge to reject the use of protectionism.457 It is strongly 
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believed that international trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic 
development and the alleviation of poverty.458 
Since, the majority of WTO Members are developing countries459, the Fourth 
Session of the Ministerial Conference has placed their needs of economic development 
and interests at the main core of the Work Programme adopted in the Doha 
Declaration.460 The Work Programmes designed the positive efforts to ensure that 
developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share 
in the growth of world trade equal with the needs. In this context, enhanced market 
access, balanced rules, and well-targeted, sustainable financed technical assistance and 
capacity-building programmes have important roles to play.461 
On 9-14 November 2001, trade ministers from member countries met in Doha, 
Qatar for the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference462. The Doha Declaration is also 
known as Doha Development Agenda and provides the mandate for negotiations on a 
range of subjects, and other work including issues concerning the implementation of 
the present agreements.463 At that meeting, they agreed to undertake a new round of 
                                                                                                                                          
elements that explain why certain developing countries have experienced increases in the skill premium – that is, 
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multilateral trade negotiations. Before the Doha Ministerial, negotiations had already 
been underway on trade in agriculture and trade in services. These on-going 
negotiations had been required under the last round of multilateral trade negotiations 
(the Uruguay Round, 1986-1994).464 The 2003 World Trade Report stated, “The Doha 
Declaration marked a new departure in the GATT/WTO approach to technical 
assistance and capacity building.”465 There are 21 subjects listed in the Doha 
Declaration, which includes under the implementation-related issues and concerns.466  
The Doha Declaration strongly reaffirms the commitment to the objective of 
sustainable development, as stated in the Preamble to the Marrakech Agreement. The 
Doha Declaration also encourages efforts to promote cooperation between the WTO 
and relevant international environmental and developmental organisations, especially 
in the lead-up to the World Summit on Sustainable Development to be held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, in September 2002.467 
In the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the trade ministers reaffirmed special and 
differential (S&D) treatment for developing countries and agreed that all S&D 
treatment provisions “[...] be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making 
them more precise, effective and operational.” The negotiations have been split along a 
developing country and developed country. The deadlock of negotiations because the 
differences in the respect of Special and Differential (S&D) provisions, in this point, 
developing countries proposed shorter deadlines in negotiation to Special and 
Differential (S&D) provisions. While, developed countries wanted to leave deadlines 
open. The Special and Differential (S&D) provisions for Least Developing Countries 
(LDCs), including the tariff-free and quota-free access for LDC goods described in the 
NAMA468 section were agreed by the members in the Hong Kong Ministerial December 
2005.469 
Special and Differential (S&D) treatment provisions allow countries (often on a 
best-endeavour basis) to provide more favourable treatment for developing countries 
than to the remainder of the membership. Other provisions grant beneficiary 
developing countries rights that are not available to others. S&D is based on the 
assumption that developing countries are different from advanced economies and that 
temporary exemptions from the general rules (otherwise considered economically 
beneficial) constitute an appropriate response to particular development challenges. 
Developing countries may suffer from market imperfections and distortions not found 
in more advanced economies that obstruct their diversification into non-traditional 
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activities. Resource constraints make it harder to adjust to the impact of trade 
liberalisation, to take advantage of new trading opportunities and to shoulder the 
costs associated with reform. While trade measures rarely present a first-best policy 
response, their use may be appropriate under certain circumstances and for a limited 
amount of time.470  
Under the Doha Declaration, it mentioned that all of the negotiations and the 
other aspects of the Work Programme should take fully into account the principle of 
Part IV of GATT 1994, the Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries. 
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Chapter III 
The Generalised System of Preferences 
  
 
The legal relationship between GATT/WTO and developing countries is primarily 
based on the major demand for trade preferences. Trade preferences are deemed as a 
tool to enable equality of treatment in conditions of inequality. Developing countries 
consider that GATT 1947 and the Havana Charter (ITO Charter) contained a large 
number of provisions benefitting producers from developed countries since export 
earnings are deemed as a significant factor to help developing countries improve their 
economic development. Therefore, developing countries demand that GATT should 
provide trade instruments that facilitate the increase of exports in developing 
countries. GSP is defined as a legal concept that exempts developing countries from 
applying certain legal disciplines and “asks” developed countries to recognise a series of 
unilateral obligations. Consequently, the establishment of GSP under the Enabling 
Clause does not impose a legal obligation on developed countries. In other words, GSP 
is a voluntary policy for developed countries and is placed as a national policy of the 
preference-granting country. There are various implementations of GSP; however, for 
the EU it is included under its Common Commercial Policy (CCP). GSP negotiations 
began in 1954 and were finalised by the establishment of the Enabling Clause, which 
institutionalised GSP permanently. Eventually, in 1995, it was incorporated as Part IV 
of the WTO Agreement. 
 
I. The legal relationship between developed countries and developing countries 
in trade preferences. 
According to Hudec, the legal relationship between GATT and WTO and 
developing countries is primarily based on the major demand for trade preferences. 
Due to the economic gap between developed countries and developing countries1, 
GATT contracting parties, mostly consisting of developing countries, never agreed to 
the application of all the rules in the agreement.2 Developing countries believed that 
GATT 1947 and the Havana Charter (ITO Charter) contained a large number of 
provisions benefitting producers from developed countries.3  
During GATT negotiations, the developing countries proposed an “escape clause” 
from certain “GATT disciplines”, known as “legal leniency”. Inherently, such legal 
concept granted developing countries exemption from the application of certain legal 
disciplines and “asked” developed countries to recognise a series of unilateral 
obligations.4 Therefore, the establishment of GSP under the Enabling Clause does not 
impose a legal obligation for developed countries. The nature of preferences granted to 
developing countries is deemed as a “voluntary policy” of developed countries.  
Such legal relationship was not established during “overnight” negotiations. It 
was influenced by so many factors and dynamic negotiations of GATT. The major shift 
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of such legal relationship was marked down by the recognition of “special needs” for the 
economic development of developing countries and LDCs.5 
The “Group of 77” was established on 15 June 1964. It increased the bargaining 
power of developing countries in GATT negotiations. Such “bloc” was used to unify and 
strengthen the position of developing countries so they could participate in the 
negotiations effectively.6 At the end of the first session of UNCTAD, which was held in 
Geneva, 77 developing countries participated as signatories in the “Joint Declaration”.  
The first Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 777 was held on 10 – 25 October 
1967, in Algiers, where the “Charter of Algiers” was adopted. The Group of 77 gradually 
developed into a permanent institutional structure. The aim of the Group of 77 is to 
facilitate “[…]the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective 
economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major 
international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote South-
South cooperation for development […]”.8  The Group of 77 is considered as a 
manifestation of south-to-south cooperation.  
Members of the Group of 77 currently include 131 developing countries. The 
Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organisation of developing countries in 
the United Nations. Indonesia and others ASEAN member states also joined the Group 
of 77.9 The highest political body of the Group of 77, namely “the chairmanship”, is 
rotated on a regional basis, and covers three regional groups: Africa, Asia and, Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The chairmanship tenure is for one year. The incumbent 
chairmanship of 2011 was held by the Republic of Argentina.   
The supreme decision making body of the Group of 77 is the “South Summit”. The 
First and Second South Summits were held in Havana, on 10 – 14 April 2000, and in 
Doha, on 12 – 16 June 2005, respectively. The Third South Summit was held in Africa in 
2011, the venues are determined according to geographical rotation.10 The “Doha Plan 
of Action”11 was produced during the Second South Summit, thus it was adopted in the 
“Doha Declaration”.12  
Along with the improvement of the bargaining position of developing countries in 
1964, developed countries also started to shift their foreign trade policy. Developing 
countries came to understand that the policy of import substitution, which serves as a 
trade barrier, was not an effective tool to help improve their economic development; 
                                                 
5 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 37. See McDonald, Bryan, The World Trading System : The Uruguay Round and 
Beyond, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1998, p. 49. ”[…] Developing countries succeeded in securing an 
exemption from the GATT obligations on the grounds that as developing countries they could not undertake the 
same obligations as the developed ones, but that they should nonetheless enjoy the benefits of concessions made 
and obligations undertaken by developed parties on the basis of the MFN principle. In return they would do 
their best to adhere to the GATT obligations […]”. 
6 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 42. 
7 See The Annual Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77 is convened at the beginning of the 
regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. Periodically, Sectoral Ministerial 
Meetings in preparation for UNCTAD sessions and the General Conferences of UNIDO and UNESCO are 
convened, available at : http://www.g77.org/doc/, last accessed : 3 May 2011. 
8 See The Group 77 in United Nations, available at : http://www.g77.org/doc/, last accessed : 3 May 2011. 
9 See Member States of the Group of 77, available at : http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html, last accessed : 3 May 
2011. 
10 See The Group 77 in United Nations, available at : http://www.g77.org/doc/, last accessed : 3 May 2011. 
11 See Doha Plan of Action Second South Summits, G-77/SS/2005/2, available at : 
http://www.g77.org/southsummit2/en/intro.html, last accessed : 3 May 2011. See also http://www.g77-
doha.org/general_info.htm, last accessed : 3 May 2011.  
12 See Doha Declaration, G-77/SS/2005/1, Second South Summits, G-77/SS/2005/2, available at : 
http://www.g77.org/southsummit2/en/intro.html, last accessed : 3 May 2011. See also 
http://www.2southsummit.org/, last accessed : 3 May 2011. See also http://www.dohasummit.org/, last 
accessed : 3 May 2011. 
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instead it hindered their industrialisation process. Developing countries started to 
increase their export earnings13 by expanding their market access through multilateral 
negotiations in order to obtain preferences for their products. Developing countries 
argued that one of the GATT objectives was “to create trade conditions that would 
promote growing exports for everyone”. Consequently, GATT should provide trade 
instruments that facilitate the increase of exports in developing countries.14 
The initiative to facilitate the export earnings improvement of developing 
countries started in 1954 after the GATT review session. The GATT Ministers Meeting 
in November 1957, regarding “the general state of, and the prospects for international 
trade”, identified three major problems concerning trade failures of LDCs, cited as 
follows: 
 “[…] the failure of the trade of less developed countries to develop as rapidly as that of 
developed countries, excessive short-term fluctuations in prices of primary products, 
and widespread resort to agricultural protection […]”15 
In 1958, the Ministers Meeting established a group of experts to study such 
matters, thus the Haberler Report16 was issued. It concluded, “the export earnings of 
most developing countries were unsatisfactory in terms of the resources needed for 
economic development”. Export earnings were deemed as a significant factor to help 
developing countries improve their economic development. Therefore, it was necessary 
to provide wider market access for developing countries in order to increase their 
export earnings. In another meeting of the GATT trade ministers, the Haberler Report 
was adopted into the Action Programme, where its goals were to facilitate the demand 
of market access expansion of developing countries. In order to carry out such 
objective, a “special working group” was established, namely Committee III. However, it 
was difficult to meet such demand, and “[…]it tended to take almost all the institutional 
energy allocated to developing country relations[…]. 
The Action Programme had two main strategies. First, developed countries were 
required to use their “negotiating authority to the maximum extent” in order to 
minimise reciprocity from developing countries. This strategy was considered as a 
traditional trade negotiation approach, which was applied under contractual 
preferences, as carried out under ACP trade preferences. Second, it required developed 
countries to apply unilateral trade liberalisation “without negotiation and without 
reciprocity”. The second strategy implied the GSP policy that applied non-reciprocal 
principles and autonomous rights.17 
In the Fifteenth Session, Committee III proposed a new kind of trade 
liberalisation, where it was argued that developing countries could not reach a certain 
level of trade liberalisation, including the reciprocity principle. The Committee III 
recognised that the existence of the economic gap significantly influenced the ability of 
developing countries to liberate their trade and to pay the same concessions as 
developed countries. Such proposal was approved by the Contracting Parties. 
                                                 
13 See Kemp, Murray C., International Trade Theory : A critical review, Routledge Studies in International Business and 
the World Economy, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2008, p. 133. “[…] the growing 
awareness among developing countries that economic growth is generally best promoted by a policy which 
emphasises export promotion […]”. 
14 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 43. 
15 See BISD, 6
th 
Supplement (1958), p. 18.   
16 See Gottfried Haberler et al., Trends in International Trade, Report by a Panel of Experts (Geneva: GATT Secretariat, 
1958), hereafter cited as the Haberler Report.  
17 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 43. 
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Developed countries were asked, " to examine their barriers to export from developing 
countries " in order to provide more favourable treatment to LDC exports.18  
The application of a non-reciprocity principle in international trade entered a 
new era in May 1963 when the GATT trade ministers approved the declaration of duty 
free access for tropical products. Generally, the governments of developed countries 
seemed willing to accept the “idea that there should be certain areas of trade policy 
where the requirement of reciprocity is excluded”.19  
 
II. International trade theory: controversy of GSP as a trade distortion. 
International trade is comparable to a “vast jungle”; it covers many aspects, for 
instance social and economic issues, and law, culture, and politics. All these aspects 
have their own significant role in building the multilateral trade system regime and are 
related to one another. For example, cultural aspects have been significant since 
ancient times when “long distance trade” began. Trade brought about cultural exchange 
and assimilation between nations, thus building human civilisations. Other aspects like 
natural and human resources have also played important roles in determining the 
different stages of economic development. Concerning GSP, it was established due to 
economic inequalities between trading partners, where some legal disciplines were 
considered disadvantageous to developing countries, being more advantageous to 
developed countries.  GSP is deemed as the “species” of “genus” trade preferences based 
on its special characteristics. 
The Ricardian theory, known as the comparative cost theory, is one of the 
traditional theories on international trade. The theory takes its name from the English 
economist, David Ricardo. He published this theory in 1817. The Ricardian theory 
explains “patterns of specialisation and trade by means of relative productivity 
differentials among countries”. Early Ricardian theory focused on production structure, 
thus, in later development this theory integrated the role of preferences into the 
determination of international trade equilibrium.20 According to the theory, it is 
assumed that perfect competition occurs when two countries engage in the 
international trade of goods or products.21 Additionally, every country has specialised 
production to export goods according to its comparative advantage.22  
It should be noted that economic and legal aspects are correlated and play crucial 
roles in the development of GSP. For instance, the effort to institutionalise generalised, 
non-discriminatory, and non-reciprocal preferences is considered a legal measure to 
balance economic inequality. In this regard, Hudec states that, “legal measures should 
never be taken for their own sake and should be economically beneficial”. Therefore, legal 
measures have to be effective either legally or economically. Legal effectiveness means 
that legal measures must bring the kind of conduct desired. While, economic 
effectiveness is defined as a conduct that must, in turn, achieve the economic benefit 
desired.23 
In the case of GSP, legal issues concern economic issues. Inherently, GSP is 
considered as a legal discrimination measure to create certain market distortions that 
                                                 
18 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 45. 
19 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 46. 
20 See Helpman, Elhanan., and Razin, Assaf., A Theory of International Trade under Uncertainty, Departement of 
Economics Tel-Aviv University, Tel-aviv, Israel, Academic Press Inch., A Subsidiary of Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich Publisher, London, 1978, p. 5. 
21 See Helpman, Elhanan., and Razin, Assaf., Op.Cit.,  p. 11. 
22 See Helpman, Elhanan., and Razin, Assaf., Op.Cit.,  p. 12. 
23 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 140. 
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bring about economic benefits, particularly to developing countries. However, the legal 
measures of GSP are still considered controversial. The parties opposing GSP argue that 
its economic benefits are not of great significance compared to the harmful effects 
caused by discrimination. The policies of non-reciprocity and preferences towards 
developing countries are debatable and are criticised from both legal and economic 
perspectives. 
Hudec writes that non-reciprocal treatment and preferential treatment are based 
on a “one-sided legal relationship” in GATT. It brings equality to the inequalities of 
international trade law. He states that true equality, requires legal rules to differentiate 
the needs and abilities of each individual subject. The equality principle (or non-
discrimination principle) means that equal cases should be treated equally and unequal 
cases should be treated unequally. The Appellate Body decision on the EC Preferences 
Case states, “identical treatment must be provided to similarly-situated beneficiaries”. 
“Similarly-situated” is interpreted as “the development, financial and trade needs to 
which the treatment responds”.  However, such concept goes against the traditional 
definition of equality in terms of “identical legal obligations” for all countries, conceived 
in the non-discrimination principle.24  
Furthermore, it is important to raise economic issues into the dimension of legal 
analysis, as stated by Hudec: 
“[…] it would at least expose the possibility that the pre-1995 GATT legal policy was 
quite the opposite of what it seems […]”25 
In this regard, if the “legal leniency” of trade preferences constitutes trade 
distortions it may actually be harmful to developing countries, in this case, the pre-
1995 GATT legal policy is presumed as a gross distortion of an equality principle (MFN 
principle).26   
According to Hudec, inherently, there are three economic “theories” that are 
relevant to justify the existence of GSP in the international trade system. These theories 
consist of the mercantilist doctrine, infant-industry doctrine, and preferences doctrine. 
The mercantilist theory, considered as a “common” concept in the sphere of 
international trade theory, is based on the idea that exports are economically beneficial 
while imports are economically harmful.27 The term “the mercantile system” was taken 
from Smith’s book “The Wealth of Nations”, in which he discusses “the Principles of the 
Commercial or Mercantile System”28: 
“[…] the different progress of opulence in different ages and nations has given 
occasion to two different systems of political economy, with regard to enriching the 
people. One can be referred to as the system of commerce, and the other that of 
agriculture. I shall endeavour to explain both as fully and distinctly as I can, and 
shall begin with the system of commerce. It is a modern system that is best 
understood in our own countries today […]” 
There are “two great engines” where the mercantile system is proposed to enrich 
each country with an “advantageous balance of trade”. Wherein a set of measures is 
designed to encourage exports, with another set of measures designed to discourage 
the import of manufactures and the loss of domestically produced new materials.29 In 
                                                 
24 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Loc. Cit., pp. 140-141. 
25 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 143. 
26 See Ibid., p. 143. 
27 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 144. 
28 See Wilson, Charles., Mercantilism, Historical Association by Routledge and Kegan Paul, Wyman & Sons Ltd., London, 
1958, p. 3. 
29 See Wilson, Charles., 1958, Op. Cit., p. 5. 
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mercantilism, government control is crucial to ensure the welfare and security of a 
state. 
Based on the mercantilism idea, a state could increase its income and attain its 
welfare through export expansions. Market expansion creates a larger market for a 
country’s own producers and traders, optimising its production to gain maximum 
profit, and generating more employment. Adversely, an increase in imports reduces the 
market share of a country’s own producers and traders, causing lower profits and less 
employment.30 The WTO policies have a “flavour of mercantilist” since they are 
established through mutual negotiations and balanced concessions.31 For instance, 
WTO doctrines strongly emphasise the principle of reciprocity in which it is shown that 
the reduction of trade barriers in the home country (increased imports) is matched by 
a similar reduction abroad (increased exports).32  
The second theory is “infant industry protections”, also known as “domestic 
protectionism”. According to this doctrine, government assistance needs to tackle 
various market imperfections in order to favour economic growth.33 Economic analysis 
shows that the protection of infant industries is likely to justify and improve welfare. 
Protection should be removed at the appropriate time when the industry has 
developed and is able to compete with other advanced industries.34 “Infant industry” 
protectionism at a certain economic level is acceptable, but only to a certain degree. It 
is removed when the industry is considered strong enough to compete in the 
international trade environment.35 Economists recommend the “interventionist 
solution”36 where government intervention is effectively expected to correct market 
distortions.37 
In the early period of GATT, developing countries intervened in their domestic 
market through import protections and imposed tariff barriers. During the 1970s and 
1980s, interventions were expanded, where required, by the governments of developed 
countries, in their domestic markets, granting preferential treatment to the products of 
developing country exports.38 Hudec considers such intervention as reasonable.  
Indeed, there are many imperfections in developing country markets. It is believed that 
government intervention can increase national economic welfare. Trade protections 
are deemed as the only one device aligned with government legal capacity as a market 
regulator.39  
The last theory is the “preferences theory”. This theory highlights demands for the 
preferential treatment of developing countries such as the Generalised System of 
Preferences.40 Most economists would agree that preferences could produce some 
economic benefits for developing countries.41 The trade preference system is 
considered an effective way to favour developing countries by lowering trade barriers 
unilaterally and by not imposing reciprocal concessions. A country has many 
                                                 
30 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Loc. Cit., pp. 144-145. 
31 See McDonald, Bryan., The World Trading System : The Uruguay Round and Beyond, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 
1998, p. 25. 
32 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Loc. Cit., pp. 144-145. 
33 See Ibid., pp. 144-145. 
34 See McDonald, Bryan., 1998, Op. Cit., p. 20. 
35 See McDonald, Bryan., 1998, Op. Cit., p. 6. 
36 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 145. 
37 See Ibid., p.  145. 
38 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Loc. Cit., p.  147. 
39 See Ibid., p.  147. 
40 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p.  149. 
41 See Ibid., p.  149. 
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advantages if its external trade barriers are reduced. It helps the country’s domestic 
consumers in getting various products at various prices, it also reduces inflation and 
enhances domestic industry competitiveness.42 
The establishment of the GSP seems to be a never-ending controversial story, 
both legally and economically. From a legal point of view, the GSP is considered as a 
“trade distortion” of non-discrimination principles in order to gain economic benefits. 
The “worthiness” value of such economic benefits is criticised since such distortion is 
harmful to market competitiveness. However, economists still consider the GSP policy 
to be justified under the framework of the infant industry theory and preferences 
theory.  
 
III. Generalised System of Preferences under the GATT and WTO regime. 
The demand for trade preferences by developing countries was answered 
through departure from the MFN principle.  The existence of different stages of 
economic development is fundamental for the establishment of “preferences for 
development”. Therefore, the preference-granting countries should not agree to trade 
preferences on the basis of “political, cultural, or even geographical ties”.43  
The struggle of GSP establishment started in the 1960s. Thus, it was embodied 
into the “Enabling Clause” of 1979.44 However, the special needs of developing 
countries were recognised at the very beginning of the GATT drafting negotiations. 
Developing countries “succeeded in obtaining recognition for the legitimacy of their basic 
premise” regarding special treatment to respond to their development needs. The 
special position of developing countries in GATT is recognised through some 
dispensation of the GATT legal disciplines.45 
From the 1950s to 1970s, developing countries continued to struggle to obtain a 
formal waiver to sustain the preferences policy, obviously, it would not comply with 
GATT rules. As noted by Hudec, developed countries argued that: 
“[…] the objectives of the relationship between the GATT and the country remain clear 
and the existence of the commitment to those objectives is never in question […]”. 
Abandoning GATT formalities by carrying out conduct that deviates from basic 
rules can lead contracting parties to a legal vacuum. Hudec concludes that developing 
countries and developed countries “need a legalistic approach”, where both parties 
should lay down this concept into the legal framework. However, he does not agree that 
GSP should be imposed as an obligation for developed countries.46 
The negotiations of the preferences took almost six years (from 1964 – 1970) 
before being accepted by the international community.47 Agreed Conclusions48 
                                                 
42 See McDonald, Bryan., 1998, Op. Cit., p. 23. 
43 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi, Legal Aspects of Trade Preferences for Developing States:  A Study in the Influence of Development 
Needs on the Evolution of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Netherland 1982., p. xix. 
44 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Op. Cit., p. xix. 
45 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 25. 
46 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 36-37. 
47 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Loc. Cit., p. xix. See also Panel Report on the EC-Preferences Case Paragraph 7.64 : 
“[…]The Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") has its origins in discussions that took place in the First 
Session of UNCTAD during the mid-1960s, as reflected in General Principle Eight and Recommendation A.II.1 in 
the Final Act of the First Session of UNCTAD.  During the Second Session of UNCTAD, on 26 March 1968, a 
Resolution adopted on "Expansion and Diversification of Exports of Manufactures and Semi-manufactures of 
Developing Countries" (Resolution 21(II)).  In this Resolution, UNCTAD agreed to "the early establishment of a 
mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences which would be 
beneficial to the developing countries" and established a Special Committee on Preferences as a subsidiary 
organ of the Trade and Development Board, with a mandate to settle the details of the GSP arrangements.  In 
1970, UNCTAD's Special Committee on Preferences adopted Agreed Conclusions, which set up the agreed details 
of the GSP arrangement.  UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board took note of these Agreed Conclusions on 13 
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contained detailed agreements of the preference schemes adopted by UNCTAD in 
1970.49 Status Agreed Conclusions had become a “contentious” issue in the EC-
Preferences Case between the EU and India. The EU argued that “Agreed Conclusions 
are not in the context of either the 1971 Waiver Decision or the Enabling Clause”, since it 
was not a binding agreement. It was not established in connection with the conclusion 
of the 1971 Waiver Decision or the Enabling Clause.50  
While India argued differently, stating that the “Enabling Clause incorporated the 
Agreed Conclusions through the 1971 Waiver Decision”. India regarded the Agreed 
Conclusions as part of the Enabling Clause because they were agreed by consensus at 
UNCTAD and the 1971 Waiver Decision. It referred to the mutually accepted 
arrangement drawn up at UNCTAD.51  
The Panel stated the importance of considering Agreed Conclusions status in the 
interpretation of the Enabling Clause.52 Since the Agreed Conclusions set out detailed 
and institutional arrangements of GSP, therefore, it had a significant role in the 
interpretation of the Enabling Clause.53  In fact, the Trade and Development Board did 
not adopt the Agreed Conclusions. However, it did not change their legal status as an 
instrument conceiving agreed detailed arrangements of GSP.54 The Panel considered 
that Section I of the Agreed Conclusions gave a hint to understanding the wording of " 
responding to the development needs of developing countries" stipulated in the Enabling 
Clause.55 
Institution of GSP was regarded as a “new concept” guiding the relationship 
between the world trading system framework of rich and poor nations. Establishment 
of the GSP scheme brought about reform to the trading structure, and dynamic policy 
emerged from trade and development, particularly governing relations between 
developed and developing countries.56 
Secretary General Raúl Prebisch’s report, entitled “Towards a New Trade Policy 
for Development”, strongly points out the demands and proposals from developing 
countries to restructure international economic relations.  The developing countries’ 
disappointment of the trade regimes at that time was expressed in the report.57 
                                                                                                                                          
October 1970.  In accordance with the Agreed Conclusions, certain developed GATT contracting parties sought a 
waiver for the GSP from the GATT Council.  The GATT granted a 10-year waiver on 25 June 1971.  Before the 
expiry of this waiver, the CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted a decision on "Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries" (the "Enabling Clause") on 28 November 
1979[…]”. 
48 See UNCTAD , Official Records of the Trade and Development Board, Fourth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 
(TD/B/322) , p . 1. See also Commentaries on the ILC’s Draft Articles 1978, p. 60 : “[…] The Special Committee on 
Preferences, established by resolution 21 (II) as a subsidiary organ of the Trade and Development Board, 
succeeded in reaching "agreed conclusions" on a generalized system of preferences which were annexed to 
decision 75 (S-IV) adopted by the Trade and Development Board at its fourth special session held at Geneva on 
12 and 13 October 1970 […].” 
49 See also Commentaries on the ILC’s Draft Articles 1978, p. 59-60: “[…] the opening sentence of General Principle Eight 
lays down that, international trade should be conducted to mutual advantage on the basis of the MFN treatment. 
The recognition of the trade and development needs of developing countries requires that, for a certain period, 
the MFN clause will not apply to certain types of international trade relations. Developed countries should grant 
concessions t o all developing countries and should not, in granting these or other concessions, require a 
concessions in return from developing countries […].”  
50 See Panel Report on EC-Preferences Case paragraph 7.76. 
51 See Panel Report on EC-Preferences Case paragraph 7.69. 
52 See Panel Report on EC-Preferences Case paragraph 7.80. 
53 See Panel Report on EC-Preferences Case paragraph 7.81. 
54 See Panel Report on EC-Preferences Case paragraph 7.84. 
55 See Panel Report on EC-Preferences Case paragraph 7.89 
56 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Op. Cit., p. xix; See also Statement by the Reppresentative of India Speaking on Behalf of 
the Members of the Group of 77”, UNTAC, Doc. TD/B/330, Annex II, p.8. 
57 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Op. Cit., p.17. 
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Therefore, “the Prebisch Report” presented three approaches to solve development 
problems, consisting of58: 
(a) International commodity agreements to give less developed producers of 
primary products the same price support and price stabilisation assistance as 
enjoyed by farmers from developed countries; 
(b) Preferential access for manufacturers and semi-manufacturers from developing 
countries to the markets of developed countries, to enable them to compete on 
equal terms with the manufacturers of those countries with the manufacturers 
compensating them for the competitive disadvantages of underdevelopment; 
(c) Preferential arrangements among developing countries, falling short of the 
GATT requirements for customs union and free trade areas, to permit them to 
gain the advantages of specialisation in a larger market. 
 The Prebisch Report was answered by accommodating such demand into 
international trade policy. Where it was expected to help poor countries increase their 
trade volume, export diversifications, and give assurance to their main commodities 
through fair and remunerative export prices.59 
During ITO negotiations, developing countries requested exemption from certain 
GATT general principles. Developing countries wanted ITO law to allow such 
“exemption” in order to establish the preferences system. Developing countries needed 
to protect their infant industries through tariff preferences and receive benefits from 
developed country tariff concessions without being obliged to offer equivalent tariff 
concessions of their own. Conversely, developing countries never proposed any 
demand for such preferences to be imposed as a legal obligation for developed 
countries.60 
The rules and principles set out in the Havana Charter and partly encapsulated in 
GATT 1947 “do not reflect a positive conception of the economic policy” without taking 
into account inequalities in the economic development of member states. In this regard, 
Abdulqawi notes as follows: 
“[…] These rules and principles are also based on an abstract notion of economic 
homogeneity which conceals the great structural differences between industrial 
centres and peripheral countries with all their important implications. Hence, GATT 
has not served the developing countries as it has the developed ones. In short, GATT 
has not helped to create the new order which must meet the needs of development, 
nor has it been able to fulfil the impossible task of restoring the old order […]”.61 
“[…] Thus, it was considered that preferential reductions of tariffs on imports from 
developing countries would be beneficial because they would bring them closer to 
achieving equality of treatment with producers inside the national or multinational 
markets. The implementation of such preferences would also constitute a 
recognition of the necessity for asymmetry in the regulation of trade relations 
between developing and developed countries; and would bring about a differential 
treatment aimed to obtain effective equalisation in the end […]”.62 
Therefore, trade preferences granted to developing countries and LDCs are 
justified in order to overcome inequalities of economic development that exist between 
developed and underdeveloped economies. Such provisions on preferences were not 
accommodated in the early GATT provisions.  
                                                 
58 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Loc. Cit., p.17. See also Nguyen, Josephine., The Generalized System of Preferences, The 
George Washington University, December 2008, available at : 
http://internationalecon.com/students/JNguyen.pdf, last accessed : 23 March 2010. 
59 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Loc. Cit. ,p.17. 
60 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 22. 
61 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Loc. Cit., p.17. 
62 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Op. Cit., p.20. 
 89 
Furthermore, developing countries argued, “if protection for infant industries is 
acceptable in domestic markets, then preferences for infant industries should be 
acceptable on export markets”. Infant industry growth in developing countries requires 
a protected market to increase production efficiency. It is also important to improve the 
competitiveness of their products in order to compete with products from developed 
countries. Large market shares were not available in most LDCs because their low 
income influenced levels of consumption. Developing countries believed that tariff 
preferences could provide greater market access and favour their infant industry 
growth gradually. Tariff preferences have long been recognised as a justifiable 
instrument to develop industrialisation and economic growth.63 
Trade preferences are considered as a tool to enable equality of treatment in 
conditions of inequality. From a legal point of view, the Committee on Legal Aspects of 
the New International Economic Order states that “the equality principle (or non-
discrimination principle) defines that equal cases should be treated equally and unequal 
cases unequall.”.64 It is analogous to preferential tax treatment that the rich would help 
the poor. Bulajic considers that preferential treatment for developing countries is “a 
must”. The MFN clauses seem difficult to apply in unequal relations between 
industrialised developed countries and developing countries.65 It is believed that the 
economic gap could greatly affect the ability of market absorption.  
The MFN clauses do not imply the guarantee of equality treatment. As written by 
Abdulqawi, “however valid the MFN principle may be in regulating trade relations among 
equals, it is not a suitable concept for trade involving countries of vastly unequal 
economic strength”. Furthermore, he also argues that “application of the MFN principle 
to trade relations between developed and developing countries was considered identical 
to discrimination; to treat equally countries that are economically unequal constitutes 
equality of treatment only from a formal point of view but amounts actually to inequality 
of treatment”.66 There were several proposals presented in the Geneva Conference in 
1964, which included reservations on the establishment of general preferences for 
developing country exports of manufactures and semi manufactures.67 
At that time, some developed countries responded positively to the launch of the 
general preferences principle, however, they had different views on the form and 
nature of the preferences. It is noted as follows:  
“[…] the United Kingdom, supported by Holland, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Denmark, held that there should be a single preferential scheme applied to all 
developing countries by all developed countries[…]”.68  
The United Kingdom, Holland, Germany and Denmark proposed uniformity of the 
GSP scheme granted to all developing countries without taking into account the 
difference of “development needs in developing countries”. The EU saw the preferential 
tariff treatment as a suitable instrument for assisting developing countries, but in fact 
at that time it applied selected preferences for selected developing countries.69 This 
preferences system might lead to deviation from the actual objective of GSP, aimed to 
                                                 
63 See Ibid., p.20. 
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66 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Loc. Cit., p.20. 
67 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Loc. Cit.,  p.21. 
68 See Ibid., p.21. 
69 See Statement of the European Community’s policy at the GATT Ministerial meeting in May 1963, see GATT, BISD, 
12th Supplement (1964), pp. 39-40. See also Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 50. 
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encourage the economic growth of underdeveloped economic countries. Therefore 
some countries that proposed a “selective system of preferences”, noted as follows: 
“[…] France and Belgium, on the other hand, expressed their support for a selective 
system of preferences, the terms of which would be negotiated either bilaterally by 
an industrial country and a developing country or by a joint committee of exporting 
and importing countries, and not ruling out reciprocal preferences to be granted by 
the developing countries. The French proposal was apparently aimed at the 
preservation of the EEC links with Associated African Countries, but it met a lot of 
criticism for it was believed that it should lead to the division of the developing 
countries into preferential compartments, and would also intensify their economic 
dependence on the developed countries […].”70 
A selective system of preferences, proposed by France and Belgium, is not 
justified under non-discriminatory and generalised principles. In fact, under bilateral 
agreement negotiations the “different favour treatment” might occur within one or 
another beneficiary country.  
Diversity of economic development stages and existence of special preferences 
between newly independent states of Africa and former colonial powers have caused 
internal disagreements among developing countries, with LDCs demanding special 
treatment, such as part of the market should be reserved for them. This develops as an 
embryo of differential treatment for the LDCs in the GSP. On the other hand, developed 
countries emphasised that no distinction should be made among beneficiaries.71 
However, GSP has in fact evolved along with the dynamic change of the international 
economic situation. Moreover, developed countries created differentiation under their 
GSP scheme arrangement. For example, the EU GSP scheme provides three 
arrangements within the scheme, wherein two of the arrangements are dedicated to 
LDCs, and the third prescribes certain conditions (such as the approval of all 
conventions related to sustainable development and good governance). 
The agreement of preference remained an unfinished issue within the Geneva 
Conference. Thus, a request was made to the UN General Secretary to establish a special 
committee consisting of governmental secretaries from developed and developing 
countries to find out the best method to implement such non-reciprocity preferences. 
“[…] international trade should be conducted to mutual advantage on the basis of 
the MFN treatment and should be free from measures unfavourable to the trading 
interest of other countries. The developed countries should gain concessions to all 
developing countries and extend to developing countries all concessions they 
grant to one another, and should not, in granting these or other concessions, 
require any concessions in return from developing countries. New preferential 
concessions, both tariff and non-tariff, should be made to developing countries as 
a whole and such preferences should not be extended to developed countries 
[…]”72 
Resolution 21(II) 1968 established “the Special Committee on Preferences as a 
permanent machinery within UNCTAD with terms of reference as described in Section VIII 
of the agreed Conclusions”, and was adopted in the Third UNCTAD session held in 
Santiago (Chile). This resolution was considered as a solution to solve differences 
between developing countries and developed countries with respect to the 
institutionalised arrangements of GSP in the UNCTAD body.73  
                                                 
70 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Loc. Cit.,  p.21. 
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72 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Op. Cit.,  p.22. 
73 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Op. Cit.,  p.143. 
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According to the “Agreed Conclusion”, the function of the Special Committee on 
Preferences is “to review the operation and effects of the GSP on exports and export 
earnings, industrialisation and the rate of economic growth of the beneficiary 
countries”74, which consists as follows:75 
a) An annual review and analysis of the functioning of the GSP+; 
b) A triennial review to assess the benefits of the GSP for beneficiary countries and 
the possibilities of improving the system and its operation; 
c) A comprehensive review towards the end of the initial period of the GSP, to 
determine, in light of the UNCTAD Resolution 21 (II) objectives, whether the 
preferential system should be continued beyond that period. 
According to Howse, the Special Committee has issued numerous detailed reports 
on GSP implementations, often with detailed recommendations. Many reports and 
resolutions recommend UNCTAD to be a leading institution in supervising the 
implementation of the GSP.76   
The Special Committee on Preferences sets out non-reciprocal, generalised, and 
non-discriminatory principles, which were incorporated into the waiver of GSP 1971 
and Footnote 3 of Paragraph 2 (a) of the Enabling Clause. These principles were 
opposed by most developed countries; however, they were supported by developing 
and socialist countries.77 At that time, many trade preferences arrangements were 
given by developed countries based on colonial ties or “vertical preferences”, 
practically discriminating other developing countries that were not former colonies.  
Trade preferences based on colonies or ex-colonial ties existed before 1947 and were 
mostly practised by European countries. Such preferences were legally authorised by 
express exceptions under Article I of GATT. 78  
The European Union (European Community) is the first initiator to grant trade 
preferences to developing countries and LDCs. On the other hand, the US rejects trade 
preferences without any reciprocity. The developed countries’ vote on the MFN 
obligation was essentially divided into two groups. Improvement of developing 
countries bargaining powers in the GATT negotiations placed the issue of trade 
preferences as the main item on the negotiating table. The EU became the starter that 
successfully granted preferences to developing countries and was followed by some 
developed countries.79 
After several years, the US accepted such trade preferences system, in terms of 
the GSP. Its acceptance contained political interests in order to put pressure on the EU 
to eliminate its selective preferences policy, especially to particular Mediterranean and 
African countries. The EU issued policies and established a special system of 
preferences in order to replace “selective preferences”, which is currently known as the 
Economic Partnership Agreements.80 
At the beginning of 1965, the Soviet Union was the first country to implement “a 
unilateral system of duty-free imports from developing countries, and it applies to all 
products”. It was followed by Australia in 1966 that applied a more restricted unilateral 
system. Thus, Hungary established the “Hungarian Preferential scheme”, in 1968, which 
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covered a wide range of products, including agricultural and industrial products. The 
US Generalised System of Preferences was established under title V of its Trade Act of 
1974.81 
The EU was the first “initiator” to institutionalise the GSP scheme that was 
applicable to all developing countries. The EU launched its first GSP scheme in 1971 
permitting the duty-free entry of manufactured and semi-manufactured products from 
a number of developing states. However, certain sensitive items such as textiles and 
shoes were given less generous treatment.82 
The establishment of trade preferences aiming to help developing countries 
improve their economic development, in some way, greatly influenced the application 
of basic rules in international trade relations.83 Another rule that was affected by the 
implementation of the GSP regime was the reciprocity principle. The reciprocity 
principle is one of the basic rules in international trade relations. In the GSP, the non-
reciprocity principle was applied to govern trade relations between preference-
granting countries and beneficiary countries.84 Derogation from that basic principle 
aimed to ensure GSP functioned properly and should not be impeded by the operation 
of the MFN clause.85 
Since there was “conflict of interest” between developed countries and developing 
countries as to whether the GSP should be included as a new legal obligation under 
GATT, the GSP was eventually settled in the UNCTAD and not under GATT. The 
governments of developed countries principally agreed to grant preferences, but that 
agreement was never embodied into a contractual obligation, neither in UNCTAD nor in 
GATT.86 UNCTAD carried out tasks to ensure that the general non-reciprocal system of 
preferences delivered benefits to all developing countries; it did not favour the so-
called selected or vertical preferences (preferences of colonial ties).87  
In 1971, GATT adopted two waivers allowing two types of preference schemes. 
First, a ten-year waiver that set out the MFN obligations in Article I, to the extent 
necessary, and authorised the institutionalism of GSP.  This waiver governed 
preferences granted by developed countries to developing countries. Second, a waiver 
permitting developing countries to exchange tariff preferences among themselves, 
under the terms of a Protocol stating that participation was open to all GATT 
developing countries.88 This second waiver was considered as the embryo of what is 
now known as the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries 
(GSTP).89 The waivers were subject to review after ten years.  Both waivers had the 
common goal of favouring the economic development of countries through 
international trade. 
However, two years before the waivers of general preferences were to expire, 
both were transferred into a permanent legal framework under the Enabling Clause 
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decision in 1979, and were then incorporated as Part IV of GATT in 1995. The 
establishment of the Enabling Clause in 1979 is considered as the embodiment of 
Article 15 of the Havana (ITO) Charter. Part IV of GATT 1995 is considered as the only 
legal instrument of GSP allowing governments to introduce preferences based on their 
national policy.90  
The GSP regime has some weaknesses that arise from its notion. Legally it does 
not impose compulsory obligations for developed countries to grant preferences to 
developing countries. The criteria set up by the preference-granting countries in the 
GSP scheme, for instance the rules of origin and product coverage in the GSP scheme, 
was criticised as being ambiguous and rigid and hindering its use.91 Based on this 
notion, developed countries have the right to withdraw, at any time, the preferences 
granted to developing countries when a violation towards its conditions occurs. In 
order to avoid misuse of the GSP an international organisation was needed to supervise 
and ensure that the GSP was working properly. Therefore UNCTAD and WTO were 
given the tasks of supervising and monitoring GSP implementation.92  
The UNCTAD Secretariat’s task is to review and evaluate GSP implementation, 
which includes the preparation of studies and reports, factual material and other 
documentation necessary for the periodic review of the operations and effects of GSP.93 
The consultation session aimed to help beneficiary countries and preference-giving 
countries to maintain and develop further improvement of GSP.94 The other tasks of the 
UNCTAD Secretariat include collecting factual documentation on the various aspects of 
GSP. This covers operation, use, information on the administration of ceilings, 
maximum amounts, and competitive exclusion, which are constantly published. The 
periodic reviews are used for the improvement of GSP and are based on the description 
and analysis of the real effects of GSP that are granted to the beneficiary countries.95  
Public consultation programmes on the GSP improvement programme are 
currently held by certain preference-granting countries that involve beneficiary 
countries or regional economic groupings.96 The rapid development in the area of 
information technology has changed the methods of consultation from formal meetings 
to media consultation. A mid-term evaluation of the EU GSP scheme contains 
qualitative and quantitative assessment of the implementation.97 The EU GSP scheme 
has recently launched online public consultation.98 The EU is eager to cover the 
aspirations, opinions, suggestions and criticism of its GSP scheme as much as possible, 
in order to “respond positively” to the development need of developing countries.  
The Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission is the institution 
responsible for the organisation of public consultation regarding the revision and 
updating of the GSP scheme. The consultation involves all parties with interest, 
including stakeholders in the EU and in third countries, together with the business 
community. The objective of the consultation is to gather opinions from all parties 
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concerned to aid the “Commission's work to set out a future proposal” to the Council and 
Parliament on a successor regulation.99 
Regional economic consultations held by the EU with ASEAN include the forum of 
Consultations between ASEAN Economic Ministers and the European Union Trade 
Commissioner (AEM-EU). In the sixth meeting of AEM-EU100, the Commissioner 
Mandelson discussed regional cumulation, since ASEAN is included as Group I of the 
cumulation of origin under the GSP scheme. The discussion emphasised the general 
rules of origin, and how to make them more development-friendly to the individual 
needs of developing countries.101 
Appraisal carried out by preference-granting countries takes into account all 
aspects of evaluation to enhance the GSP scheme and to ensure benefits are properly 
used by beneficiary countries.  Assessments must be made proportionally by 
considering whether all developing countries derive similar benefits from the GSP.102  
This assessment system aims to control misuse of GSP utilisation by certain beneficiary 
countries. It should be considered that not all developing countries are granted similar 
product coverage under the GSP. In addition, not all beneficiary countries (developing 
countries) have equal economic powers and resources. Currently, GSP utilisation 
demands beneficiary countries to provide macro and micro infrastructures including 
“modern trade administration”. However, not all beneficiary countries are prepared for 
this, thus, sometimes monitoring and technical assistance are needed.  
Abdulqawi agrees that the “specified conditions” set out in trade preferences for 
developing countries do not breach the non-discrimination principle under the MFN 
clauses. He deems that trade preference is directed at poor countries while MFN is 
directed at rich countries. Therefore MFN and trade preference are two different 
instruments designed to cope with two different problems. Those conditions are 
addressed to ensure that the “instruments of preferences” are able to create a path for 
poor countries to have full participation in the multilateral trading system. 
“[…] preferences for developing countries under specified conditions are 
complementary, and not contradictory to the principle of non-discrimination in trade. 
In fact, MFN for the rich and preferences for the poor countries – two instruments 
designed to deal with two different problems – would appear to be an optimal 
combination of policies […]”.103  
Currently there are 13 national GSP schemes listed in the UNCTAD Secretariat, 
they consist of: Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, the EU, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey and the US.104 It should 
be underlined that the legal status of the GSP programme is permissive and not 
mandatory. It was established under the national system of preference-granting 
countries.105  
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Since details of the implementation of the GSP are not legally controlled, 
different kinds of GSP policy are created among preference-granting countries. Where 
each government of the preference-granting countries has its own policies in the 
determining of product coverage, margin of preference, the scheme of preferences, 
conditionality and other limits to be imposed on preference benefits. In the words of 
Grossman et al., the Enabling Clause “text is otherwise silent on  the  range  of  goods  to  
be  covered  by  preferences”,  on  the  permissibility  of  other  forms  of “discrimination” 
among  beneficiaries,  and  on  the  acceptability  of  attaching  conditions (“reciprocity”) 
to preferential benefits.106 
For instance, US legislation has a number of conditions that could be used to 
disqualify unworthy recipient countries, as well as other quantitative limits to make 
sure that preferences are only applied when “needed”.107 While, the EU designed its 
GSP scheme under certain conditions such as economic criteria, special incentives of 
sustainable development and good governance and arrangement for LDCs under EBA 
(everything but arms). Currently the EU has focused its new GSP scheme on the 
countries most in need. Therefore Grossmanet al., consider that “GSP  benefits  are  a 
kind of  gift ,  and  preference-granting countries  may  well  have  been  unwilling  to 
confer  them  if  constrained  by  tight  non-discrimination  (and  other)  requirements.108 
In this perspective, the Enabling Clause is as a meeting of the minds between two 
parties with different interests, with developed countries on the one side and 
developed countries on the other. 
 
IV. Panel Reports and the Appellate Body decisions of the WTO on the EC-
Preferences Case. 
There have been legal disputes between developed and developing countries 
under GATT for four decades. With regard to the legal complaints submitted by 
developing countries, there has been a limited number of cases. From 1977 to 1985, 
there was an increase in the number of cases. There was a smaller number of legal 
complaints due to awareness and fear of developing countries to bring the developed 
countries before the international dispute settlement system. It is important to note 
that most developing countries that joined GATT are the former colonies of the so-
called developed countries. Some developing countries entered GATT through 
succession based on colonial ties. As noted by Hudec, between 1977 and 1985, GATT 
received sixty-one formal legal complaints. They included twelve legal complaints from 
developing countries versus developed countries. This number was twice as high as the 
legal complaints rate pre-1960. There was significant progress when seven of these 
twelve legal complaints led to formal proceedings before a GATT Panel.109 Apparently, 
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developed countries always seem to have behaved “correctly”. The GATT Panel handled 
each case “promptly and respectfully”. Each new case at that time was set as a 
precedent, to help solve future cases of a similar nature.110 
Conversely, there were some legal complaints in GATT submitted by developed 
countries against the breach of rules committed by developing countries. The revival of 
the GATT “adjudication mechanism” in the 1970s raised the number of complaints. 
There were approximately 80 complaints submitted between 1970 and 1985. It has 
been noted that eight of those cases were submitted by developed countries (most of 
them filed by the US). These complaints were submitted against the practice of 
developing countries or against unlawful discrimination favouring developing 
countries through selective trade preferences. Four of these cases became formal 
decisions by the GATT Panel.111  
For example there was a case that involved a legal claim against Spain, where the 
Panel decided upon some “reasonably unsound legal rulings” that were seen as an effort 
to give a poor country some extra flexibility regarding the rules. There were two cases 
filed by the US against another developed country for illegal discriminatory conduct 
that granted favourable treatment to selected developing countries. The first case was 
submitted in 1972 about a complaint concerning British discrimination in favour of 
certain Caribbean countries. The second case was submitted in 1982 concerning 
discrimination carried out by the European Community in favour of certain 
Mediterranean countries.112 
Part IV of GATT is placed as the “legal base”, supporting the position of developing 
countries in trade preferences. It is also used by developed countries as an excuse to 
issue government policy deviations from the GATT disciplines. Hudec argues that Part 
IV does not contain any specific exemption from the GATT rules (exclusion), thus, it is 
in line with the Appellate Body decision on the EC Preferences Case that upholds the 
findings of the Panel, where the Enabling Clause "does not exclude the applicability" of 
Article I:1 of GATT 1994. Developing countries consider Part IV of GATT 1994 as the 
recognition of their special development needs. The basic idea of Part IV is “market 
distortion” favouring developing countries to accelerate their economic development. 
The Enabling Clause gives permanent legal authorisation for developed countries to 
design GSP schemes under their national policy.113 
 
IV. a. Panel Reports on the Drugs Arrangement Case. 
On 25 March 2002 consultation on DSB was held as requested by India regarding 
the EU GSP scheme laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001.114 India 
submitted a complaint related to the Special Arrangements under the EU GSP scheme, 
namely the "Drugs Arrangement". The consultation session did not achieve any 
“mutually satisfactory resolution” between the parties. Therefore, the Dispute of 
Settlement Body established a Panel on 27 January 2003, as requested by India.115 The 
Drugs Arrangement under Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001 was effective from 1 
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January 2002 to 31 December 2004.116 The Drugs Arrangement was only granted to a 
certain group of countries in compliance with criteria set out by the EU.117  
According to Column I Annex I of the EU GSP regulation, there were twelve 
beneficiary countries granted with special arrangements to combat drug production 
and trafficking, consisting of Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Pakistan.  Most of these beneficiary 
countries are Central/South American countries except for Pakistan.  
The beneficiary countries listed in the Drugs Arrangement enjoyed more 
incentives of tariff reductions than other developing countries. The other developing 
countries excluded from the Drugs Arrangement had to pay the “full duties applicable 
under the Common Customs Tariff”. Duty free access to the EU market was only granted 
to the twelve beneficiary countries covering the products listed in the Drugs 
Arrangement. The twelve beneficiary countries of the Drugs Arrangement enjoyed 
duty-free access of the sensitive products listed in column G of Annex IV. While all other 
developing countries were only granted “reductions in the duties applicable under the 
Common Customs Tariff”.118 
India, as an applicant, submitted complaints concerning Article 10 of Council 
Regulation No. 2501/2001. India states that the provision is inconsistent with Article 
I:1 of GATT 1994 and is not justified by the Enabling Clause under Paragraphs 2(a), 
3(a) and 3(c).119 India also argues that the EU has not demonstrated that the Drugs 
Arrangement is justified under Article XX (b) of the General Exception of GATT 1994.120  
While on its written submission, the EU argues that the Enabling Clause excludes 
the application of Article I of GATT 1994.121 The EU also argues that the EU GSP is an 
“autonomous right not an affirmative right”, in this regard, it has implied that the 
Enabling Clause gives autonomy to the preference-granting country to set out criteria 
under its arrangement.122  
With respect to autonomous rights, the EU argues that the GSP is not an 
obligation for developed countries “whether or not to apply” including the freedom to 
decide “whether or not to grant preferences” to certain products.123 India has rebutted 
the EU argument of autonomous rights. India considers the Enabling Clause as 
derogation from Article I:1 of GATT 1994.124 Further, India maintains its argument that 
Paragraph 2 (a) is characterised as an affirmative defence because it has a legal 
function.125 In this matter, India considers that the Enabling Clause is the successor of 
the 1971 Waiver Decision.126 While, the EU argues that the Enabling Clause is a sui 
generis decision. In this regard, the Enabling Clause has been taken into consideration 
as the tool to achieve the main objectives and purposes of the WTO.127 
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Regarding submission Paragraphs 3 (c)128 of the Enabling Clause, the EU argues 
that the term “non-discriminatory”, set out in Footnote 3, “contextually” supports the 
interpretation of the objectives to respond positively to the development needs of 
developing countries. The EU argues that the preference-granting country can set 
arrangement criteria under the framework, to respond positively to the development 
needs of developing countries. Moreover, the EU argues that developed countries could 
apply horizontal graduation criteria and/or determine beneficiary countries based on a 
set of objectives and non-discriminatory criteria.129 In contrast with the EU, India has 
submitted its argument by interpreting the “general” needs of all developing countries, 
not referring to the country’s individual interests.130 
As regards the term “non-discriminatory” set out in Footnote 3, the EU argues that 
it must be interpreted in the specific framework of the Enabling Clause, as to seek “to 
create unequal competitive conditions in order to respond to the special needs of 
developing countries”.131 Regarding Paragraph 2 (a) the EU argues that the 
interpretation of India to take developing countries in terms of “all developing 
countries” would go against the objective of Paragraph 3 (c) in order to respond 
positively to the development needs of developing countries.132 
The Panel has examined the consistency of the Drugs Arrangement with Article 
I:1 of GATT 1994 and with the Enabling Clause. The first examination addresses 
whether Article I:1 of GATT 1994 applies to the measures falling under the Enabling 
Clause. The second whether India’s claim that the Drugs Arrangement has violated 
Article I:1 of GATT 1994 is sufficient. The third examination relates to the burden of 
proof, stating which party would be responsible for the establishment of the burden of 
proof regarding the inconsistency of the Drugs Arrangement with the Enabling 
Clause.133 
 
IV. a. 1. The nature of the Enabling Clause. 
The EU argues that the Enabling Clause is not a waiver regulation but a sui generis 
decision. The Enabling Clause is the main tool to achieve the basic objectives and 
purposes of the WTO Agreement, namely special and differential treatment. The EU 
maintains that the Enabling Clause exists, “side-by-side”, with Article I:1 of GATT. The 
word "notwithstanding" in Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause completely excludes the 
application of Article I:1 of GATT.134 
Relating to the origin of the Enabling Clause, the Panel considers that the 
Enabling Clause is the essential instrument provided by GATT and WTO in order to 
encourage special and more favourable treatment for developing countries.135 The 
Panel interprets the wording of "notwithstanding" in the Enabling Clause according to 
the dictionary136 meaning, and concludes that the Enabling Clause provides permission 
to deviate from certain legal rules establishing obligations. According to this 
interpretation, the substance of the Enabling Clause is not different from other 
                                                 
128Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause: “[…] shall in the case of such treatment 
accorded by developed contracting parties to developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to 
respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries […]”. 
129 See Panel Report EC-Preferences Case para. 6.7 
130 See Panel Report EC-Preferences Case para. 6.7 
131 See Panel Report EC-Preferences Case para. 6.10 
132 See Panel Report EC-Preferences Case para. 6.13 
133 See Panel Report EC-Preferences Case para. 7.23 
134 See Panel Report EC-Preferences Case para. 7.29. 
135 See Panel Report EC-Preferences Case para. 7.31. 
136 See Panel Report EC-Preferences Case para. 7.44. 
 99 
exceptions under Article I:1 (Articles XX, XXI and XXIV).137 The Panel understands that 
the operation of the Enabling Clause is not prevented by Article I:1138 and finds that 
Article I:1 of GATT 1994 is evidently a "positive rule establishing obligations",139 
pursuant to the stipulation of the provision, where “the obligations are for Members to 
accord to the like products of all Members, immediately and unconditionally, any 
advantage relating to, inter alia, custom duties accorded to products originating in any 
country.”140 
The Panel has analysed the absence of the “legal obligation characteristic” in the 
Enabling Clause, which means that the preference-granting countries are not obliged to 
undertake these measures.141 There is no binding legal obligation in the Enabling 
Clause that obliges developed countries to grant GSP to developing countries.142 In 
respect of Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause that stipulates “contracting parties may 
accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries”, the Panel 
has interpreted the word “may” as an optional measure. The Panel considers that GSP 
has to be "generalised, non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal" because of its limited 
authorisation of derogation.143 The Panel defines the legal function of the Enabling 
Clause as “to authorise derogation from Article I:1” or as a “positive rule establishing 
obligations” in order to allow developed countries to provide GSP to developing 
countries.144 Finally, the Panel finds that the Enabling Clause is “in the nature of an 
exception to Article I:1 of GATT 1994” 145, but it does not exclude the applicability of 
Article I:1 and that both apply concurrently.146 
In interpreting the term “unconditionally” as stipulated in the Article I:1 of GATT, 
the Panel’s findings are different from the interpretation made by the EU. The EU 
interprets “unconditionally” to mean “not requiring any compensation”. Therefore, 
according to this interpretation, the EU justifies that the Drugs Arrangement “is not a 
condition”. India argues that the term “unconditionally” should be interpreted so that 
such “advantage” provided in the Drugs Arrangement “must be accorded to the like 
products of all other Members regardless of their situation or conduct”. The Panel finds 
that the granting of a special tariff under the Drugs Arrangement is based on the 
condition that the beneficiary countries must have experienced a certain extent of drug 
problems, and for this reason, the Panel considers that such arrangements are 
inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994.147 
 
IV. a. 2. The Panel’s interpretation of Paragraph 3 (c) of the Enabling Clause. 
The term “non-discrimination” in Footnote 3 should be interpreted 
simultaneously with the meaning of Paragraph 3 (c) because the two interpretations 
affect each other.148 India’s argument is correlated with Paragraph 3 (c), in order to 
“respond positively” it must be applied to developing countries as a whole.149 Further, 
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India argues that Paragraph 3 (c) must be interpreted in a “comprehensive manner” 
since this Paragraph does not permit discrimination between developing countries.150 
This is in line with India’s previous argument that “there is nothing in the Enabling 
Clause which gives authorisation to developed countries unilaterally to modify its scheme 
addressed for individual developing countries”.151 
In its rebuttal, the EU insists upon the “objective criteria” in terms of Paragraph 3 
(c). The EU claims that the Drugs Arrangement has satisfied the “objective criteria” as 
defined by them. The “objective criteria” consist of two elements in order to respond to 
the interpretation of “non-discriminatory development needs”.  First, the different 
treatment must conform to reasonable aims. Second, the differences must be 
reasonable as a tool to attain such objective.152 
The EU argues that the interpretation submitted by India regarding “non-
discrimination for all developing countries” is unacceptable. According to the EU, this 
makes Paragraph 3 (c) impossible to apply. The EU has seen that there is nothing in 
Paragraph 3 (c) that implies that the special needs of each and every developing 
country should be taken into account. The EU defines Paragraph 3 (c) as “a purposive 
provision” since it does not imply any legal obligation. Further, the EU considers that 
the Enabling Clause is an optional policy for developed countries.153 With respect to 
Paragraph 3(c), the US as a third party has argued that GSP schemes need not be 
extended to "one size fits all" because differentiation was made based on the unequal 
development of developing countries.154 
In respect of the different opinions of the parties on the status of the Agreed 
Conclusions to the Enabling Clause, the Panel has examined Resolution 21(II), the 
history record of the Agreed Conclusions and the result of negotiations on the GSP 
arrangements. The Panel has come to the conclusion that the Agreed Conclusions 
consist of a preparatory work155 for both the 1971 Waiver Decision and the Enabling 
Clause under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.156 
 
IV. a. 3. Interpretation to respond positively to development needs. 
According to the Panel’s findings, Paragraph 3 (c) of the Enabling Clause allows 
for the design and modification of the GSP schemes. The Panel interprets the phrase “to 
respond positively” as an encouragement, to improve levels of GSP product coverage 
and depth tariff cuts, which commensurate with development needs of developing 
countries.157 
 
IV. a. 4. Whether a GSP scheme can be accorded to less than all developing 
countries. 
The Panel has considered embracing the development needs of “each and every” 
developing country in the GSP scheme.158 The Panel has concluded that the design and 
modification of the GSP scheme should not cause differentiation in the treatment of 
preferences, unless, in the case of special treatment to the least-developed countries, 
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pursuant to Paragraph 2(d). There should be no other differentiation among 
developing countries.159 
 
IV. a. 5. "Non-discriminatory" interpretation in Footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause. 
From the EU’s perspective, discrimination exists when “the equal situation is 
treated unequally” or if “unequal situations are treated equally”. The EU has interpreted 
the term “non-discriminatory” in Paragraph 2 (a) to mean that it does not prevent 
preference-granting countries from treating developing countries with different 
“development needs” differently, based on the “objective criteria”.160 Relating to “non-
discriminatory” in Footnote 3, the Panel has considered that “identical tariff preferences 
under the GSP scheme” should be provided to all developing countries without any 
differentiation, “except for the implementation of a priori limitation”, such as LDCs.161  
India maintains the argument that there is no reference in the General Principle 
Eight of the First UNCTAD Session and the Agreed Conclusion, which expresses the 
notion that preference-granting countries are allowed to distinguish between 
developing countries.162 Under the framework of the Agreed Conclusion, the Panel 
considers the existence of “a priori limitations” where a legal basis is not provided to 
differentiate among developing countries other than the implementation of a priori 
limitations.163 The EU interprets the word “discriminate” with a neutral meaning and 
negative meaning.164 The Panel has taken into account “the intention of the negotiators” 
within Resolution 21 (II) and all others relevant to the preparatory works in order to 
provide the GSP scheme equally to all developing countries and to eliminate all 
differentiation in granting preferential treatment, with the exception of a priori 
limitations to LDCs.165   
With respect to the interpretation of the term “developing countries” stipulated in 
Paragraph 2 (a), the Panel considers that Paragraph 3 (c) provides an additional 
context to that paragraph. It means “all developing countries”, with the exception 
referred to in Paragraph 2 (d).166 The Panel interprets “developing countries” in terms of 
all developing countries, with the exception of the implementation of a priori 
limitations or it may mean less than all developing countries.167 The Panel considers 
Paragraph 2(d) as an exception to Paragraph 2(a) that allows developed countries to 
provide special treatment to least-developed countries.168 The Panel report concludes 
that the Drugs Arrangement is inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994 and it is not 
justified by Article 2(a) of the Enabling Clause or Article XX(b) of GATT 1994.169 
 
IV.b. Appellate Body decisions of the Drugs Arrangement Case. 
The EU was not satisfied with the Panel’s findings and conclusions on the Drugs 
Arrangement case relating to some specific issues and legal interpretations. Thus, the 
EU notified the DSU regarding its intention to appeal on 8 January 2004. The issues 
raised by the EU before the Appellate Body concerned the relationship between Article 
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I:1 of GATT 1994170, legal interpretation of the words “notwithstanding” and 
“developing countries” in Paragraph 2 (a) and the term “non-discriminatory” in Footnote 
3 of the Enabling Clause.171 
The EU considers that the Panel “erred” in finding the relationship between 
Article I:1 of GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause. According to the EU, the Panel “erred” 
when it concluded that the Enabling Clause is an “exception” to Article I:1 of GATT 1994 
and that it applies to measures covered under the Enabling Clause.172 The Panel 
concluded that the Enabling Clause does not provide “rules establishing obligations in 
themselves”. The Panel’s findings considered the Enabling Clause as an exception of 
Article I:1 of GATT 1994, however, the EU argues that it must be characterised by 
stipulation after the article or stipulation in such article.173   
According to the EU, the Enabling Clause cannot be “a mere exception” to GATT 
1994. It constitutes a “special regime” for developing countries to address inequalities 
among the members of WTO.174 The EU considers the Enabling Clause as lex specialis 
applying to the exclusion of more general WTO rules on the same subject matter. 
Therefore, the EU deems that the Panel has “disregarded” such principle.175 The EU 
argues that the Enabling Clause evidently distinguishes from the General Exception 
Article XX GATT 1994. General Exception allowing members to adopt "legitimate policy 
objectives" that are separated and distinguished from the objectives of the WTO 
Agreement, while the Enabling Clause is considered as a crucial tool to achieve the 
fundamental objectives of the WTO Agreement.176 Thus, the EU considers the Enabling 
Clause to impose “positive obligation”.177  
The Enabling Clause constitutes the special and differential treatment of 
developing countries where its provisions are aimed to provide unequal competitive 
opportunities to respond to the needs of such countries. Hence, the EU has concluded 
that providing additional preferences to countries with particular development needs 
is not a discriminatory treatment under the framework of the Enabling Clause.178 
India maintains its argument that the Enabling Clause is an “exception” by 
asserting "conditional rights" contained in Paragraphs 2(a) and 3. India disagrees with 
the application of the lex specialis derogate legi generali principle to the Enabling 
Clause. It considers that both rules should be applied “cumulatively”.179 
The EU disagrees with the Panel that interprets “developing countries“ to mean 
“all” developing countries. The EU also disagrees with the Panel’s interpretation of the 
term “non-discriminatory”, which requires preference-granting countries to provide 
"identical" preferences to "all developing countries without differentiation”, except when 
respecting a priori limitations.180  The EU maintains its argument that the wording 
“non-discriminatory” gives authorisation to preference-granting countries to accord 
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differential tariff treatment under the GSP scheme to developing countries that have 
different development needs pursuant to the "objective criteria".181  
The EU has argued that tariff differentiation under the GSP scheme is designed 
"adequately" in order to respond to different development needs.182 The terms 
stipulated in Footnote 3, consist of “non-discriminatory, generalised, and non-
reciprocal”, and should be interpreted comprehensively.183  Furthermore, the EU argues 
that categorisation of developing countries is considered as the “best achieved” tool to 
attain the objective described in Paragraph 3 (c).184 
“Generalised” should be interpreted in accordance with the negotiating history of 
the GSP clauses, which intend to eliminate tariff preferences based on colonial ties. The 
EU interprets “generalised” in Footnote 3 so as to differentiate these preferences from 
the “special” preferences, which were formerly provided by most developed countries 
to selective developing countries based on political, historical, or geographical 
reasons.185 
With regard to “non-reciprocal”, the EU considers this term as only to disallow 
reciprocity conditions.186 The EU argues that the conditions established under the GSP 
scheme were aimed to attain the objective of the Enabling Clause, that is “to respond 
positively to development needs” without requiring any compensation from beneficiary 
countries.  
The EU has identified three different scopes covered by Paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 
(d). First, Paragraph 2 (a) covers preferences granted by all developed countries, 
whereas Paragraph 2 (d) is devoted to preferences granted by any WTO member. In 
terms of Paragraph 2 (a), it is solely addressed to encourage developed countries to 
provide trade preferences. Second, Paragraph 2 (a) only governs preferences in the 
framework of GSP, while Paragraph 2 (d) relates to any measure favouring developing 
countries. Third, Paragraph 2 (a) only covers tariff measures, but Paragraph 2 (d) 
applies to any kind of “special treatment”.187 
Panama, as a third party in the EC Preferences Case, defines "non-discrimination" 
to not mean equal treatment. Panama considers that Paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling 
Clause contains “flexibility” allowing preference-granting countries to design a 
preferential treatment that "effectively helps generalised needs". Panama maintains the 
argument that the Drugs Arrangement satisfies the requirement of "specific growth 
needs" in Paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause.188 
While the Andean Community189 asserts a concept of “a self-standing regime” to 
justify the existence of the Enabling Clause in GATT.  The Andean Community considers 
that Article I:1 of GATT 1994 does not apply to the GSP scheme.190 In respect of the 
term “non-discriminatory”, it considers that the “Enabling Clause does not require that 
identical treatment be granted to all developing countries”. In other words, the 
prohibition of discrimination is considered as an order not to treat equal situations 
differently or different situations equally.191 The arguments presented by the Andean 
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Community are very similar to the EU arguments where discrimination only exists 
when equal situations are treated unequally or unequal situations treated equally.   
The US considers the Enabling Clause as a " positive rule establishing obligations in 
itself”, it is unrelated to Article I:1. Further, the US argues that the Enabling Clause is not 
similar to Article XX of GATT 1994. According to the US, the Enabling Clause is 
considered as a set of tools to “encourage” developed country members to grant tariff 
preferences to developing countries.192 At the same time, Paraguay considers the 
Enabling Clause as a substitution of the “special preferences”. Therefore, it is deemed as 
a grant from developed countries to deliver benefits to all developing countries.193 
 
IV.b.1. Interpretation of “Non-Discriminatory” in Footnote 3. 
The Appellate Body defines “non-discriminatory” as identical tariff preferences 
that must be granted to all similarly-situated beneficiary countries. Nevertheless, the 
disputing parties disagree on how to determine “similarly-situated” beneficiaries.194 The 
Appellate Body refutes the Panel’s finding, which considers that the Drugs 
Arrangement under EU GSP would lead to the collapse of the whole GSP System and the 
re-emergence of special preferences favouring certain developing countries. The Panel 
considers that the Drugs Arrangement does not comply with the objective Enabling 
Clause to grant “generalised preferences” to all developing countries. The Appellate 
Body disagrees with India’s submission about “formally equal treatment” of non-
discrimination in the sense of Footnote 3 to Paragraph 2(a).195 
The term non-discriminatory in Footnote 3 is linked to the indistinct definition of 
developing countries. Neither GATT nor WTO gives a definition or sets out any 
standard for a country defined as a developing country. Therefore, developing 
countries have the freedom to declare themselves as a developing country. With 
respect to such matters, the Comprehensive Review of the GSP, issued by the UNCTAD 
Secretariat, in April 9 1979, stated that due to various reasons some preference-
granting countries have not recognised all developing countries that claim developing 
status as GSP beneficiaries.196  
“[…] Furthermore, in the administration of its schemes, certain preference-granting 
countries differentiate among beneficiaries with regard to the product coverage, the 
depth of tariff cut and/or the level of preferential imports admitted. Strictly 
speaking, such differentiation and selectivity contravenes the principle of non-
discrimination […]”.  
“[…] The principles on which generalised, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory 
preferences should be based need to be reaffirmed, and the preference-giving 
countries should agree to take appropriate measures for the full observance of 
these principles.  To this effect, they should extend generalised tariff preferences to 
all developing countries without discrimination, reciprocity or any other conditions 
[…].” 
Referring to this report, Howse interprets the wording “should agree” as the 
absence of legal obligation or binding rules to oblige preference-granting countries to 
implement such principle. Non-discrimination and reciprocity are essential principles 
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of the GSP that need to be adhered to. Developed countries need to agree in the future 
to take measures that will result in “full observance” of both principles. 
 
IV.b.2. To “respond positively”.  
According to the Appellate Body the word “shall” in Paragraph 3 (c), obliges the 
preference-granting countries to design the GSP scheme in order to “respond positively” 
to the “needs of developing countries”. The preference-granting countries have to grasp 
the meaning of “respond positively” in order to cover the "needs" of developing 
countries collectively.197 
According to the Panel’s findings, Paragraph 3(c) does not allow preference-
granting countries to provide preferential tariff treatment exclusively to a sub-category 
of developing countries based on the needs that are only shared among those selected 
developing countries. While, the Appellate Body interprets that nothing in Paragraph 
3(c) states whether it is required to respond to the needs of "all" developing countries 
or to the needs of "each and every" developing country.198 
The Appellate Body considers that the "development, financial and trade needs” of 
developing countries are subjects to change. Therefore, the Appellate Body recognises 
specific development needs that are only common to a certain number of developing 
countries.199 The Appellate Body interprets the word “commensurate” in the Preamble 
of the Agreement Establishing WTO, to imply open recognition of different needs in 
different development stages and particular economic circumstances of developing 
countries”.200  
Under Paragraph 3 (c), modification of the GSP scheme is allowed in order to 
"respond positively" to the development needs of beneficiary countries.201 With the 
purpose of responding to the "needs of developing countries" that are not necessarily 
common, preference-granting countries may grant different treatment to their 
beneficiary countries.202 The Appellate Body finds that the Enabling Clause contains 
sufficient restrictions on the permissible bases for discrimination. Thus, in order to be 
permissible, discrimination must “respond positively” to the “needs of developing 
countries.”203 
 
IV.b.3. “Objective standard”. 
According to the Appellate Body, the existence of "development, financial or trade 
needs" must be assessed based on an “objective standard”. Such objective standard 
should be provided with recognition of a particular need, as stipulated in the WTO 
Agreement or in the multilateral instruments adopted by international organisations.204 
With regard to the sets of “objective standards”, Bartels comments that the Appellate 
Body is likely to have been referring to such instruments as “evidence of a standard”. 
There is a great difference between the ratification of an international instrument and 
its adoption into national law.  The implementation or adoption of such international 
instrument could be used as the “instrument” to achieve the preference facilities. For 
instance, in the GSP Plus scheme, beneficiary countries are required to ratify and 
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implement 27 international conventions in their national law. The Commission 
monitors and assesses their implementation in the beneficiary countries concerned. In 
fact, Bartels argues that “a country that has not ratified a convention might have 
precisely the same development needs as one that has”.205 
The Appellate Body has emphasised that “the particular need at issue must, by its 
nature, be such that it can be effectively addressed through tariff preferences”. 
Consequently, the requirement of Paragraph 3(c) will be fulfilled when a preference-
granting country performs GSP in the "positive" manner as recommended, to respond 
to widely-recognised "development, financial or trade needs".206  
International trade scholars characterise GSP as a grant from rich countries to 
poor countries that imposes non-trade conditionality. There is criticism concerning the 
“objective standard” set out by the preference-granting countries. For instance, in the 
“Report of the Consultative  Board  to  the  Director-General  Supachai  Panitchpakdi”, 
entitled “The Future of The WTO: Addressing  institutional  challenges  in  the  new  
millennium”, issued in 2005, it was stated that:207  
“[…]the major arguments of the critics include concerns that developing countries 
have been  burdened with conditions unrelated to trade imposed by the preference-
granting countries, that  the product coverage and preference margins in GSP 
schemes are determined by the preference giving countries rather than by the 
needs of developing countries, that empirical studies have shown little benefits 
have in fact accrued to developing countries under the GSP, and that GSP 
beneficiaries tend to become over-reliant on preferences or trapped by the nature  
of  the  system  at  the  expense  of  industrial  and  agricultural  diversification […]” 
This report clearly points out the burden conditions unrelated to trade imposed by 
preference-granting countries. The objective standard should be endeavoured to 
respond positively to the development needs of developing countries. Instead, it has 
been seen as a burden that does not support positive correlation between trade and 
development. The objective standard set out by preference-granting countries is 
apparently to be based on political considerations rather than dealing with economic 
development problems of the beneficiary countries.  
Declaration UNCTAD IX in 1996 stated that, “there is concern among the 
beneficiaries that the enlargement of the scope of the GSP by linking eligibility to non-
trade considerations may detract value from its original principles, namely non-
discrimination, universality, burden sharing, and non-reciprocity.”208 Howse notes that 
developed countries could not be fully sincere in the implement of the GSP scheme, 
which is unconditional and non-selective.209 Bartels also notes, “neither the Panel nor 
the Appellate Body mentioned the obligation of non-reciprocity” in order to facilitate and 
accommodate the interest of both parties. Developed countries are prohibited from 
requiring reciprocal trade concessions as conditions of granting GSP, however it does 
not prohibit them from requiring compliance with non-trade conditions.210 The 
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applicability of conditions is justified with the purpose of controlling implementation of 
the GSP scheme to the target beneficiary or the country most in need. 
 
IV.b.4. Development needs and similarly-situated. 
The Appellate Body apprehends that the “needs of developing countries” are 
diverse and heterogeneous. Paragraph 3 (c) implies that preference-granting countries 
may not accord "identical" tariff treatment to "all" GSP beneficiaries211. As it is governed 
by the Enabling Clause that such differentiation has to be performed under certain 
circumstances as determined in the regulation.212 In addition, Paragraph 2(a) does not 
prohibit “per se” the granting of different tariff preferences to beneficiary countries.213 
Preferential policies should be directed towards the interests developing countries 
have in common, and to those interests shared by sub-categories of developing 
countries based on their special needs.214 
According to the Appellate Body, the term "developing countries" in 
Paragraph 2(a) must not be interpreted as "all" developing countries. Paragraphs 2(a) 
does not prohibit preference-granting countries from according different tariff 
preferences to different sub-categories of GSP beneficiaries.215 
The Appellate Body considers the Drugs Arrangement to be consistent with the 
term “non-discriminatory” in Footnote 3, as long as the “European Communities prove” 
at a minimum, that the preferences granted under the Drugs Arrangement are available 
to all GSP beneficiaries “similarly affected” by drug problems. 
“[…] We found above that the term "non-discriminatory" in Footnote 3 to 
Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause does not prohibit the granting of 
different tariffs to products originating in different sub-categories of GSP 
beneficiaries, but that identical tariff treatment must be available to all GSP 
beneficiaries with the "development, financial [or] trade need" to which the 
differential treatment is intended to respond.  The need alleged to be addressed 
by the European Communities' differential tariff treatment is the problem of 
illicit drug production and trafficking in certain GSP beneficiaries. In the context 
of this case, therefore, the Drugs Arrangement may be found consistent with the 
"non-discriminatory" requirement in Footnote 3 only if the European 
Communities prove, at a minimum, that the preferences granted under the 
Drugs Arrangement are available to all GSP beneficiaries that are similarly 
affected by the drug problem. We do not believe this to be the case […].”216 
The Appellate Body considers that the Drugs Arrangement fails to meet the 
requirement of "non-discriminatory" in Footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause, which 
requires that identical tariff treatment be available to all similarly-situated GSP 
beneficiaries. According to the Appellate Body there are at least 2 reasons to judge such 
arrangement as “failing to meet the requirement”, i.e. there is a “closed list” of 
beneficiaries and the regulation does not provide criteria or standards in order to 
differentiate beneficiaries under the Drugs Arrangement.  
a. “[…] We recall our conclusion that the term "non-discriminatory" in Footnote 3 
of the Enabling Clause requires that identical tariff treatment be available to all 
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similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries. We find that the measure at issue fails to 
meet this requirement for the following reasons.  First, as the European 
Community itself acknowledges, according benefits under the Drugs 
Arrangement to countries other than the 12 identified beneficiaries would 
require an amendment to the Regulation.  Such a "closed list" of beneficiaries 
cannot ensure that the preferences under the Drugs Arrangement are available 
to all GSP beneficiaries suffering from illicit drug production and trafficking 
[…].”217 
b. “[…] Secondly, the Regulation contains no criteria or standards to provide a 
basis for distinguishing beneficiaries under the Drugs Arrangement from other 
GSP beneficiaries.  Nor did the European Communities point to any such criteria 
or standards anywhere else, despite the Panel's request to do so. As such, the 
European Community cannot justify the Regulation under Paragraph 2(a), 
because it does not provide a basis for establishing whether a developing 
country qualifies for preferences under the Drugs Arrangement.  The European 
Community claims that the Drugs Arrangement is available to all developing 
countries that are "similarly affected by the drug problem".  In this matter they 
argued the Regulation does not define the criteria or standards that a 
developing country must meet to qualify for preferences under the Drugs 
Arrangement, there is no basis to determine whether those criteria or 
standards are discriminatory or not […]”.218 
The Appellate Body concludes that the EU has failed to demonstrate proof in 
which their Drugs Arrangement scheme is not fulfilling the requirements of the “non-
discriminatory” principle as stipulated in Footnote 3.219 
The Appellate Body has laid down its decisions on the EU appeal submissions. 
The Appellate Body has upheld two decisions on the Panel reports, stating that the 
Enabling Clause is an “exception" and "does not exclude the applicability” to Article I:1 of 
GATT 1994. With regards to the term “non-discriminatory”, the Panel’s findings 
stipulate that identical tariffs must be provided to “all developing countries without 
differentiation, except for the implementation of a priori limitations”, while, conversely, 
the Appellate Body states that “identical tariff preferences” must be granted to “all 
similarly-situated beneficiaries”. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body has established 
different reasons from the Panel and considers that the EU " failed to demonstrate that 
the Drugs Arrangement is justified under Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause".220 
However, the Appellate Body seems to avoid answering the question “what does it 
mean to be similarly situated?”221  
Grossmanet al. and Hudec indeed consider that the texts of the Enabling Clause 
are vague or ambiguous. For instance Footnote 3, it is assumed, was intended to create 
a binding non-discrimination obligation, but in fact, it is the lack of any definition that 
leads to a wide range of interpretations.  In addition, Grossman et al., consider that the 
term “discrimination” has extremely elastic notion. This means naturally that the “term” 
is indeterminate. Concerning the term “developing countries” in Paragraphs 2(a) and 
3(c) of Enabling Clause, it obviously seems to be difficult to make precise definitions 
since the WTO itself does not provide a precise standard or parameter to define 
developing countries. On the other hand, the EU GSP differentiates the beneficiaries of 
general arrangements and LDCs according to economic criteria (state income standard 
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as issued by the World Bank).  The Appellate  Body  assumes that  the  drafters could  
have  said  “all  developing  countries,”  but  did  not. Conversely, the drafters might  have  
said  “particular”  or “selected”  developing  countries, or  used some  other  phrasing  to 
signify  the  “adequacy”  of  differential  treatment,  but  did  not. Therefore, the texts of 
the Enabling Clause are open for multi-interpretation.222 
 
V. EU Economic integrations.  
V.a. Early stage of integrations. 
The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 terminated thirty years of war in Europe, and 
shaped the EU of today. After the rise and fall of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna, held 
in 1814, endeavoured to reinstate balance of power among the European states. 
Followed by the Paris Peace Conference, which was held in 1919 after the First World 
War.223  
In May 1950, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister at the time, gave a 
speech known as the “Schuman Declaration”. The speech was greatly inspired by Jean 
Monnet. It brought immense political implication after the Second World War by the 
establishment of a new world order. It was followed by the emergence of a new alliance 
between three powerful states consisting of France, Germany and the US.224  
From a political perspective, it was the strategy to assure the security of France 
from Germany. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, on behalf of Germany, acknowledged the 
Schuman Declaration, thus, followed by Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the 
Netherlands. On 18 April 1951, those six countries signed the Treaty of Paris and 
established The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Treaty of Paris was 
the foundation of Common European Tax among the six contracting states.225 
The ECSC covered two important aspects including politics and, security and 
economics. Due to the dynamic change in politics, the treaties had to be developed 
further. Followed by the failures of the European Defence Community project in 1954, 
due to refusal from the French assembly. Despite this, economics had to be further 
developed, which led to a new agreement. On 25 March 1957, the treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), known as the Treaty of Rome, were signed. 
The Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) was maintained as the 
legislative basis of the EU. TEC provided four fundamental freedoms consisting of the 
free circulation of people, services, capital, and goods.226 
The next stage of integration development was the unification of the three 
treaties (ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM) on 1 July 1967, the so-called Merger Treaty. The 
Merger Treaty established a single Commission, a single Council of Ministers, and a 
European Parliament. The single Commission was established as an independent body 
representing the general interest of the Community, with the single Council of Ministers 
representing the member states and the European Parliament representing the 
European citizens.227 
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The EEC customs union entered into force on 1 July 1968. It introduced the so-
called CCT  to govern the Union’s trade relations with third countries. The Treaty of 
Luxemburg introduced the system of “own resources”. According to the system of “own 
resources” the Union obtained “[…] all customs duties on products imported from non-
member countries, all levies on agricultural imports and part of the financial receipts 
deriving from each country’s value added taxes (VAT) […]”.228 
The Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1986 by twelve member states and 
was established in order to amend the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC), aiming to restructure the decision-making mechanism. The SEA introduced “the 
principle of majority voting” in the Council.229 
The 1990 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), held by the European Council in 
Dublin, was successful in delivering the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). It gave 
contributed critically to the integration process. The Treaty on the European Union was 
signed in December 1991, in Maastricht, The Netherlands, and is known as The Treaty 
of Maastricht. TEU amended provisions relating to monetary union of TEC. The most 
important aspect of the TEU was the establishment of the two pillars of the EU, namely 
the “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)” and “Justice and Home Affairs”. 
These two pillars carry out intergovernmental ways by unanimity. The Maastricht 
Treaty entered into force on November 1993.230 
In June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council established the Copenhagen 
Criteria. The Copenhagen Criteria sets requirements for countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEECs) who wants to joint the European Union. During accession 
process, the special Directorate General of the Commission entitled tasks to review and 
monitor the progress of the candidate’s states in fulfilling such criteria.231 Those criteria 
consists of : 232   
a) Political Criterion : Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 
b) Economic Criterion : The existence of a functioning market economy as well as 
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union; 
c) Legislative Criterion or Acquis Communautaire : The ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic 
& monetary union. 
The amended TEU provides the European Council to set conditions of eligibility 
for states candidates to become members of the EU and codified existing practice under 
current “Copenhagen criteria”. Treaty of Lisbon inserting to the Treaty a provision 
concerning “the right of a member state to withdraw from the Union, and sets out the 
procedure that could be used to negotiate a withdrawal”.233 
Treaty of Lisbon acknowledges member states’ right to withdraw from the Union 
for the first time (Article 50, amended TEU). Member states have the right to decide 
leave the Union “in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”. Member states 
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concerned have to notifying the European Council about its intention to withdraw from 
the Union. The withdrawal approval concluded on behalf of the Union’s by the Council, 
based on a qualified majority vote. The consent of the European Parliament is needed 
before decision made by the Council. The decision of withdrawal enter into force two 
years after the notification of its intention to withdraw, except the European Council 
and the member state in concerned agreed to extend the negotiation. Any withdrawing 
state intending to apply for “re-admittance” must carry out the same mechanism as any 
other acceding country did. 234 
 
V.b. Market integration. 
After the Second World War, some countries began “quasi-liberalisation”, where 
they partially liberalised their trade (particularly goods) with certain partner countries. 
Such policy led to the creation of what is now known as the Regional Integration 
Agreements, or RIAs. One of the important Regional Integration Agreements is the EU. 
Inherently, there are two instruments of agreement used to reduce trade barriers with 
trade partners. These instruments are called the Free Trade Areas (FTA) Agreement 
and Customs Union (CU) Agreement. In the FTA Agreement, the contracting parties 
eliminate their trade barriers in the trade relationship with other contracting parties of 
the agreement, but they still preserve their “independent restriction non-member 
states”. While in the customs union  the state parties are obliged to remove their trade 
barriers to establish the internal market. The member states under the CU are subject 
to Common Customs Tariff (CCT), implemented by the member states to all non-
member states. Therefore, the customs union is a Free Trade Area Agreement involving 
the harmonisation of the participating countries’ trade policies.235 The TEC 
accommodates the provisions established by the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
allowing six founding member states of the EU to apply the CCT. The CCT entered into 
force on 1 July 1968.236 
The integration of the EU can be considered as “multinational integration”. 
Moussis defines the “multinational integration” process as “the voluntary establishment 
by the treaties, concluded between independent states, of common institutions and the 
gradual development by them of common policies pursuing common goals and serving 
common interests”. Borrowing the words of Jean Monnet that:237 
“[…] the intellectual father of European integration, is union between individuals or 
communities is not natural; it can only be the result of an intellectual process […] 
having as a starting point the observation of the need to change. Its driving force must 
be common interest between individuals or communities[…]”. 
The common interest of the member states should be the foundation to establish 
common policies in the multinational integration process. The common policies must 
be established by common institutions in order to address common needs, to pursue 
common goals and to serve interest. This is in line with Articles 2 and 3 of the TEU.238 
There are four phases in the “continuously multinational integration process” 
consisting of the customs union, common market, economic and monetary union and 
political union. The customs union is the first phase of “multinational integration” 
where it is placed as the fundamental foundation to develop further the integration 
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progress. In the customs union, contracting parties agree, by means of the treaty, to 
remove any custom duties, charges having equivalent effect or quantitative restraints 
on each other and to adopt an external “CCT and common foreign trade policy” in their 
relations with third states. There are two important components in establishing the 
customs union, that is, “intra-community trade and external trade relations” with non-
member states. Intra-community trade covers measures of abolition of customs 
barriers, elimination of internal borders, veterinary and plant health legislation, and 
customs cooperation. External trade relations with non-member countries includes 
Common Customs Tariffs and a Community Customs Code.239 
The second phase of the multinational integration process is the common market. 
The common market is used synonymously with the single market and internal market. 
The primary goal of the Treaty of Rome was to create a single European economic area 
by means of a common market.240 The common market proposed to eliminate all the 
barriers to intra-community trade with the aim of unifying the national markets into 
one single market.241 The milestone of the EU common market was the creation of the 
single market in 1992, which was preceded by the adoption of the Single European Act 
in 1986.242 The Single European Act codified a number of major economic 
preconditions for fair competition and long-term stability within the internal market. It 
introduced a new article (Article 102a) into the EEC Treaty concerning EMU and co-
operation between member states.243 There are five important elements in the 
establishment of the common market consisting of the free movement of goods, free 
movement of workers, freedom of establishment, freedom of services movement, and 
free movement of capital.  
The advanced phase of the multinational integration process was Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). The EMU in the EU started back in the 1970s when the original 
six members of the EU failed to establish EMU. The failures were caused by internal (in 
this regard the non-completion of a common market) and external (the collapse of the 
international monetary system) factors.244 Therefore, the common monetary policy and 
strong coordinated economic policies among member states was indispensable for 
establishing EMU. EMU was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991245. It sets 
out convergent criteria (Maastricht Criteria) that must be fulfilled by member states 
covering areas of inflation rates, government finance, exchange rates and long term 
interest.246 The Treaty of Maastricht also introduced the single monetary policy based 
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on a single currency managed by a single and independent central bank. EMU was 
established to support the general economic policy of the union, relying on the open 
market economy and free competition.247 
According to the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU) EMU should be achieved in three 
stages.248 The first stage was the completion of liberalisation through capital movement 
in 1990. The main goal of this stage was deeper convergence of economic policies and 
closer cooperation between central banks, incorporating deeper reliability between 
monetary practices in the framework of the European Monetary System (EMS). The 
second stage of EMU began on the 1 January 1994 and was completed by 31 December 
1998. During this stage, the TEU obliged each member state to avoid excessive public 
deficits and initiate steps leading to independence of its central bank. The convergent 
criteria were created in order to prepare the third stage of EMU. The third stage of EMU 
started by 1 January 1999 with the application of the single monetary policy and the 
single currency the Euro.249  
The last phase of multinational integration is the establishment of political union. 
It includes justice and home affairs and common foreign and security policy as the main 
component. The members states need to agree in order to establish common 
institutions to implement common home and foreign policies. In addition, to monitor 
such implementation a common institution is required. Therefore, the phase of political 
union is the most difficult part of multinational integration since it requires heavy 
transfers of national competence to the common institutions.250  
The terms of “economic integration” interpreted into dynamic and static senses. In 
dynamic sense it is defined as the process where economic borders between member 
states gradually remove, or national discrimination between integration partners is 
being eliminated. Its followed gradually by emerging separate national economic 
entities into single larger entity. In static sense it is defined as situation in which 
national components of a larger economic zone function together as one entity. 251 
Economic intergration could bring some benefits, such as welfare, security, democracy 
and adherence of human right. Economic welfare attained when the prosperity of 
participating countries increased by eliminating inefficiencies and promoting 
specialization of production and policymaking cooperation. 252 The free exchange of 
goods promises a positive effect on the prosperity of all concerned. The consumers 
would have more choice of goods with competitive prices and qualities. Free movement 
of production factors permits optimum allocation of labour and capital. The market 
enlargement favouring new production possibilities that generate more employments. 
253 Economic integration can reduce tension between states to create peace and 
stability of the region. Implementation of democracy values is necessary in governing 
economic development. Human right safeguarded because its set out as the pre-
condition to participate in the economic integration. 254 Yet economic integration is not 
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the ultimate goals, but an instrument to attain higher objective economic and 
politicalinterest. 255 
Market integration defined as a situation where the flows of the products, 
services, and factors between countries on the same terms and conditions as within 
countries. The market integration led into the creation of “single market” where the 
price of the goods traded between the states members has the same price with the 
domestic one.256 Internal market is one of the major elements in the economic 
integrations.  Internal market is gradual elimination of economic borders between 
independent states in order to establish to “single entity of economic”. 257 
It is important to ensure Union’s common policies are not injuring the national 
interest of the member states. 258 Any independent states that intended to joint the 
Union have to accept and conform (acquis communitaires) all of the criteria and 
procedures laid down by the “union”. Members states must deemed common policies 
developed based on the common interest of the group. The common policies supposed 
promote both political and economic integration of member states.259  
 
VI. The EU external policies of international trade and development in respect of 
GSP. 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is considered as the 
“‘implementation part” in order to carry out the Union’s functions.260 The TFEU 
comprises categories and areas of competences. Exclusive competences are defined as 
decision-making responsibility in particular policy fields. It covers exclusive, shared, 
and supportive competences.261 Treaty of Lisbon endeavoured codification of 
competences distributed between the Union and member states.262  The exclusive 
competences of the Union in the area of the CCP are clearly governed under Article 2 B 
of the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 3 Paragraph 1 (e) of the TFEU). It codifies the ECJ case 
law263, where member states do not have the power to enter into international 
agreements or legislate on matters of CCP.264 
Before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force exclusive competences of the EU 
included in the Part One-Title I (Categories and Areas of Union Competence) of the 
TFEU. Thus, it is amended by Article 2 B of the Treaty of Lisbon. The CCP is included 
under EU exclusive competences, which elaborated as follows: 
1. The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: 
a) customs union; 
b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market; 
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c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro; 
d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries 
policy; 
e) common commercial policy. 
2. The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an 
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of 
the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, 
or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope. 
In the customs union, member states are obliged to adopt CCT respecting their 
relations with all non-members states or third countries. It is stipulated in the Article 
28 of TFEU (ex Article 23 TEC) as follows: 
1. The Union shall comprise a customs union which shall cover all trade in goods 
and which shall involve the prohibition between member States of customs duties 
on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect, and the 
adoption of a common customs tariff in their relations with third countries. 
2. The provisions of Article 30 and of Chapter 2 of this Title shall apply to products 
originating in member States and to products coming from third countries which 
are in free circulation in member States. 
Article 29 of TFEU (ex Article 24 TEC) regulates import formalities of customs 
duties or charges that has to be complied by the third countries for the purposes of free 
circulation within member states market. Yet such kind of customs duties or charges 
only imposed to the third countries that have not benefitted from a total or partial 
drawback of such duties or charges.  
“[…]Products coming from a third country, shall be considered to be in free 
circulation in a member state, if the import formalities have been complied with and 
any customs duties or charges having equivalent effect which are payable have been 
levied in that member state, and if they have not benefited from a total or partial 
drawback of such duties or charges […]” 
TFEU accommodates provisions related to customs union. For instance, Article 30 
(ex Article 25 TEC), Article 31 (ex Article 26 TEC), and Article 32 (ex Article 27 TEC) 
where these articles substantially are not being changed or modified in the Treaty of 
Lisbon.  In the custom union “customs duties on imports and exports” between member 
states are removed. Moreover, it is also applied prohibitions of “charges have equivalent 
effect” and “customs duties of a fiscal nature”, which regulated by Article 30 of TFEU:  
“[…] Customs duties on imports and exports and charges having equivalent effect 
shall be prohibited between member states. This prohibition shall also apply to 
customs duties of a fiscal nature […]” 
As governed by Article 31 TFEU, the CCT proposed by the Commission would 
need to be approved by the Council. While Article 32 paragraph (a) of TFEU, stipulated 
that the Commission given task to promote trade between member states and third 
countries. The EU GSP established under “the umbrella” of the CCP provisions.  Before 
Treaty of Lisbon came into effect, CCP regulated under Article 207 of TFEU (ex Article 
133 of TEC).  This article amended by Article 188C of the Treaty of Lisbon. It is 
comprised six sub-articles (paragraph), as follows: 
1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly 
with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade 
agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of 
intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in 
measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade such as 
those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial 
policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the 
Union's external action. 
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2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures 
defining the framework for implementing the common commercial policy. 
3. Where agreements with one or more third countries or international 
organizations need to be negotiated and concluded, Article 188 N shall apply, 
subject to the special provisions of this Article. The Commission shall make 
recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise it to open the necessary 
negotiations. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring 
that the agreements negotiated are compatible with internal Union policies and 
rules.  
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special 
committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and 
within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. The 
Commission shall report regularly to the special committee and to the European 
Parliament on the progress of negotiations. 
4. For the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in paragraph 3, 
the Council shall act by a qualified majority. 
For the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services 
and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, as well as foreign direct 
investment, the Council shall act unanimously where such agreements include 
provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules. 
The Council shall also act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements: 
a) in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these 
agreements risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity; 
b) in the field of trade in social, education and health services, where these 
agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organization of such 
services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them. 
5. The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of 
transport shall be subject to Title V of Part Three and to Article 188 N. 
6. The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in the field of the 
common commercial policy shall not affect the delimitation of competences 
between the Union and the Member States, and shall not lead to harmonization of 
legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States insofar as the Treaties 
exclude such harmonization.’ 
The qualified majority in the CCP was introduced for the first time by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and has been maintained under the current treaty. With respect to 
negotiation and conclusion of the agreements in the area of the CCP with one or more 
third countries, the Council act was based on the qualified majority except in certain 
areas determined by the treaty to act unanimity. The application of the qualified 
majority considered enhancing the efficiency of passing legislation more easily. As 
argued by Duff, “the new Treaty will much enhance the Union’s capacity to act by 
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the institutions and decision-making 
mechanisms”. Neil O’Brien also argues that the qualified majority as the new voting 
system “makes it considerably easier to pass legislation”.265 
The crucial improvement of the Treaty of Lisbon is the significant increase of 
European Parliament roles in the area of the CCP.266 Treaty of Lisbon Paragraph 2 
                                                 
265 See House Of Lords, The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, European Union Committee 10th Report of Session 
2007–08, p. 54, available at: http://www.parliament.the-stationery 
office.co.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf, last accessed : 21 March 2011. 
266 See S Woolcock, The potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union External Trade Policy, SIEPS European 
Policy Analysis 8-2008, p. 1; Krajewski, Markus., Op. Cit., p. 26.  
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Article 188C clearly stipulates the European Parliament's functioned as a “co-legislator 
(co-decision mechanism)” relating to the implementation of agreements and the 
adoption of internal autonomous trade policy measures.267 Therefore, the European 
Parliament also has the right to make amendments and veto power in internal 
measures. The European Parliament is supposed to play an active role in external trade 
policies.268 The European Parliament’s approval is also required for the conclusion of 
all international agreements in respect of the CCP.269 In this regard, Duff considers that, 
“the new Treaty will much enhance the Union’s capacity to act by increasing the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the institutions and decision-making mechanisms”.270 Co-decision 
procedures are governed by Article 294 of the TFEU and contain the principle of parity 
and the means that neither institution (European Parliament nor Council) may adopt 
legislation without the other's assent.271 
 
Figure 1. Diagram Co-Decision Procedures272 
 
 
 
                                                 
267 See M Cremona, A Constitutional Basis for Effective External Action? An Assessment of the Provisions on EU External 
Action in the Constitutional Treaty, EUI Working Papers LAW No. 2006/30, p. 31; Krajewski, Markus., Op. Cit., p. 
26. 
268 See Krajewski, Markus., Op. Cit., p. 26. 
269 See Paragraph 2 Article 188C Treaty of Lisbon. J-M Grave, The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on Customs Matters: A Legal 
Analysis, Global Trade and Customs Journal 108, 2010; J Wouters, D Coppens and B De Meester, External 
Relations after the Lisbon Treaty, in S Griller and J Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty – EU Constitutionalism without a 
Constitutional Treaty? (2008), 185; M Cremona, Op. Cit., p. 15 ; Krajewski, Markus., Op. Cit., p. 28. 
270 See House Of Lords, The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, European Union Committee 10th Report of Session 
2007–08, p. 54, available at : http://www.parliament.the-stationery 
office.co.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf, last accessed : 21 March 2011. 
271 See The Co-Decision or Ordinary Legislative Procedure, available at : 
http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/procedure/index_en.htm, last accessed : 9 August 2011. 
272 Cited from the Co-Decision or Ordinary Legislative Procedure, available at : 
http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/stepbystep/ diagram_en.htm, last accessed : 9 August 2011. 
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The last sentence of Paragraph 1 article 188C of the Treaty of Lisbon implied the 
Principle of Consistency that should be applied in the CCP.273 It is pursuant with Article 
188 A Treaty of Lisbon (Article 205 of TFUE) that stipulates : 
“The Union's action on the international scene, pursuant to this Part, shall be guided 
by the principles, pursue the objectives and be conducted in accordance with the 
general provisions laid down in Chapter 1 of Title V of the Treaty on European 
Union.” 
It is clearly stated that all of Union external action must conform to the principles 
written in the Chapter 1 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union.  The TFEU also 
provide chapter related to the development cooperation with the third countries 
addressed for poverty reduction and eradication.  
“[…] Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within 
the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. The 
Union's development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement 
and reinforce each other. Union development cooperation policy shall have as its 
primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. 
The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the 
policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries […]”.274 
Therefore, in the framework of development cooperation the Unions have to 
design policy favouring developing countries reducing and eradicating poverty, 
wherein it has been implemented through establishing GSP Scheme.275 
 
VII. Common Commercial Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The EU is the biggest “trading bloc” and the second biggest importer of goods in 
the world. In 2006, the EU had 18.1 % of world imports in goods.276 The 
implementation of the CCP had to rely on uniform principles. During the 1960s and 
1970s the CCP mainly consisted of the CCT and other border measures. After the 
Second World War, tariffs served as the main instrument of trade protection.277 
According to Krajewski, the EU CCP has two layers of principles and objectives, 
namely inner and outer layers. The specific trade policy objectives are contained in 
Article 206 of the TFEU (Article 188B Treaty of Lisbon), which is also considered an 
inner layer. The outer layer is reflected in Article 205 of the TFEU and Article 21 of the 
TEU (Article 10 A of the Treaty of Lisbon), where the CCP must comply with the general 
objectives and principles of the Union's external policy.278 The inner layer is addressed 
to establish harmonious development of world trade, and progressive elimination of 
barriers to trade. While the outer layer is aimed to facilitate trade liberalisation.279 
Therefore, Article 206 of the TFEU is pursuant to the objectives of the world trading 
system.280 
                                                 
273 See Balan, George-Dian., The Common Commercial Policy Under The Treaty of Lisbon : Re-thinking the European 
Constitution in an Enlarged European Union, Advanced Issues of European Law, Jean Monnet seminar, 6th 
session, 20-27 April 2008, Dubrovnik, p. 3, available at : 
http://www.pravo.hr/_download/repository/GDB_JM_CCP.pdf, last accessed : 21 March 2011. 
274 See Article 188 D of the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 208 TFEU/ex Article 177 TEC). 
275 See Balan, George-Dian., 2008, Op. Cit.,  p. 3. 
276 See Conconi, Paola, The EU Common Commercial Policy and Global/Regional Trade Regulation, available at : 
http://www.ecares.org/ecare/personal/conconi$/web/EUtrade.pdf, last accessed : 23 March 2011. 
277 See Conconi, Paola. 
278 See Krajewski, Markus., Op. Cit., p. 4. 
279 See A Dimopoulos, The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and Objectives of the Common Commercial Policy, 
EFARev 15, 155-157, 2010; Krajewski, Markus., Op. Cit., p. 4. 
280 See Krajewski, Markus., Op. Cit., pp. 4-5. 
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The CCP considered as the most dynamic area of EU external policies. It is 
covering new development in the area of international trade such as intellectual 
property rights. Common policy is the “heart” of the multilateral integration process. 
Common policy established from intensive negotiations among the member states of 
the Union. In order to be accepted by all member states, the common policies should 
satisfy or at least, not injuring the national interests of the member states. For that 
reason the governments of member states must took apart in the decision making 
process. Theirs involvement carried out direct or indirect. Decision on the essential 
common policies needs transfers of national law sovereignty to supranational 
sovereignty.281 Therefore, the member states national policy that falling under CCP 
must conform to the common policy. In the regard to the CCP European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) elaborate in the Opinion 1/75,, Understanding on a Local Cost Standard (1975) ECR 
1355 282, as follows283 :  
“[…] It cannot therefore be accepted that, in a field such as that governed by the 
understanding in question, which is covered by export policy and more generally by 
the common commercial policy, the Member States should exercise a power 
concurrent to that of the Community, in the Community sphere and in the 
international sphere. The provisions of Articles 113 and 114 concerning the 
conditions under which, according to the Treaty, agreements on commercial policy 
must be concluded show clearly that the exercise of concurrent powers by the 
Member States and the Community in this matter is impossible […]” 
The court considers CCP (Article 133 TEC) serving the operation of common 
market and safeguarding common interests of the Union’s.284 In brief, the Court’s 
analysis in the Opinion 1/75 contained various arguments to support the exclusive 
nature of the Union’s trade policy powers. The Court’s argues that defending the 
Union’s common interests requires exclusivity. Trade policy is essential element of 
economic interest. It would be very difficult to establish common policy if the member 
states are allowed to pursue their own trade interest.285 
The EU GSP was established under Article 133 TEC that was amended by Article 
207 of the TFEU, subsequently it was amended by the Treaty of Lisbon by Article 188 
C.286 EU external actions were accommodated in TEU and/or of the TFEU. External 
actions covering areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), CCP, development cooperation and economic, 
financial, and technical cooperation with third countries.287 With respect to the 
conception of trade liberalisation, the Opinion 1/78 stated that the Treaty nevertheless 
did not form barriers to the Union to develop a commercial policy that aimed to 
                                                 
281 See Moussis, Nicholas., 2005,  Op. Cit., p. 38. 
282 See Opinion 1/1975 concerned a draft “Understanding on a Local Standard” which had been drawn up under the 
auspices of the OECD. This understanding concerned export credits. The participating government essentially 
agreed not to finance or covers credit, in respect of local costs related to export transactions (in effect, payment 
of the purchase price), for more than 100 percent of the value of the goods and services exported. The 
Commission asked whether the Union had the power to conclude the “Understanding” and, if so, whether that 
power was exclusive. Thus phrased, the question identified the two vital components in EU external powers 
calims: the scope of those powers and whether or not they are exclusive of the powers of member states. (A 
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284 See Eeckhout, Piet., 2004, Op. Cit.,  p. 13. 
285 See Eeckhout, Piet., 2004, Op. Cit.,  p. 14. 
286 See The EU and the Generalised System of Preferences, available at : 
http://europedia.moussis.eu/books/Book_2/7/24/05/index.tkl?all=1&pos=349, last accessed : 4  April 2011 
287 See Balan, George-Dian., 2008, Op. Cit.,  p. 2. 
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regulate the world market for certain products rather than at mere trade liberalisation. 
Therefore, the CCP measures must take into account the national interest of member 
states. It might have been thought that at the time of the Treaty drafting the trade 
liberalisation was the main idea.288 The establishment of the CCP is very important to 
secure the common market (internal market) from trade deflection and distortions of 
competition that potentially occur in trade liberalisation. 
Common policy is needed to regulate and protect the common market from fraud 
and abuse. To implement common policy it requires common institutions that have 
supranational authority. Such supranational authority must have exclusive competency 
to ensure the common policies “implemented” properly. 289  
The Commission has plays crucial roles in the implementation of the CCP. The 
Commission authorized to propose new trade initiatives, managing tariffs and other 
trade policy instruments, and conducting trade negotiations.290 In the field of trade 
negotiations, the Commission has responsibility to ensure the agreements that 
negotiated comply with internal policies and rules of the Union.291 The Opinion 1/78 
interprets Article 133 of the TEC, which empowered the Union to formulate a 
commercial policy based on uniform principles. In addition, the Opinion 1/75 explained 
to the link between the unity of the common market (now internal market) and a 
uniform CCP. 292 
According to Opinion 1/78, Article 133 TEC is the “adequate” legal basis for the 
GSP adoption.293 The modern commercial policy needs to provide trade measures that 
facilitate achievement of development goals. Therefore, the Court considered 
development goals as an integral part of modern commercial policy. The reform of EU 
GSP system is reflecting of a new concept of international trade relations where 
sustainable development placed as the main goal.294   
The Commission authorized to represent the EU and its member states in 
international organizations, such as WTO. In international trade negotiations, the EU 
member states is represented under “single voice”. The EU member states entitled 
rights to attend WTO meetings, however, only the European Commission that has 
competency to represents the entire of EU.295 
Union’s single voice on CCP increases its political bargaining in the international 
trade negotiation.296 The CCP covering areas trade in goods and services297, commercial 
                                                 
288 See Eeckhout, Piet, 2004, Op. Cit.,  p. 17. 
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1. The Community has sole competence, pursuant to Article 113 of the EC Treaty to conclude the multilateral 
agreement on trade in goods. 
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aspects of intellectual property and foreign direct investment. The ECJ Opinion 1/94. 
rules that all the WTO agreements on trade in goods fall under the Union’s commercial 
policy competence.298 
The ECJ Opinion 1/75 stated the Union’s competence in trade matters has 
“exclusive” characteristic. The Union’s competences are covering adoption of essential 
rules on external trade and governs regime for export and import. The application of  
uniformity principle designed to operate internal market and create single market 
under custom unions. Yet export-import regime contains provisions allowing member 
states to adopt measures on non-economic reasons299 such as public safety, public 
policy and public health.300  
TEU introduced co-decision procedure that provide the “equal and joint 
responsibility” exercise by the European Council and the European Parliament. Treaty 
of Lisbon constitutes significant increase of co-decision procedure, its covering forty 
new policy areas301. Under the article 188 C paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
European Parliament has given the important role in the decision making of EU CCP, its 
called as “ordinary legislative procedure”.302 It enhanced the function of the European 
Parliament in the legislative mechanism.  
Traditionally, CCP encompass international policy dimension. The Article 188C of 
the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 207 of the TFEU) contains external and internal 
competence. The external competence regulates under paragraph 3 Article 188C of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. While, the internal competence regulates under paragraph 2 Article 
188C of the Treaty of Lisbon, concerning implementation of CCP by “ordinary legislative 
procedure” or “co-decision mechanism”. 303 
According to Krajewski, “the classical trade policy objectives” conceived in the 
Articles 3(5) and 21 of the TEU. The objective of “free and fair” trade accommodated in 
the article 3(5) of TFEU. Article 21 of the TFEU designed to promote liberalization 
under the framework of multilateral trading system. Article 21 of the TFEU, elaborated 
inter alia- as the means to integrate all countries into the world economy by “the 
progressive elimination of restrictions on international trade”.304 The CCP Union should 
also consider non-economic policy objectives, such as human rights, equality and 
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3. The Community and its Member States are jointly competent to conclude TRIPS. 
298 See Eeckhout, Piet, 2004, Op. Cit.,  pp. 26-27. 
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solidarity, sustainable development and the preservation and improvement of the 
quality of the environment, instead of liberalization of trade.305 Thus, Articles 205 and 
207(1) of the TFEU, require CCP to comply with these objectives not only focussing on 
the reduction of barriers to trade.306 
 
VIII. The driving force of the New Comitology to improve EU external trade 
governance within the framework of the Generalised System of Preferences. 
Based on the ideas of Jean Monnet, the High Authority of the former ECSC 
(European Coal and Steel Community) had to be a permanent international secretariat 
of experts, working for the common good. This was in line with the so-called 
“technocratic approach” to policy-making, where government action follows the advice 
(and sometimes decision-making) of experts and technocrats. Therefore, the 
Commission should also be composed of independent experts in order to propose 
solutions to policy problems, to negotiate deals, to act as the “engine” of European 
integration, and to be the “guardian” of common European interest.  From the very 
beginning, the Commission has been designed as a central decision- and policy-making 
institution with a multitude of tasks. Thus, the role of the Commission has become 
more crucial as an “executive institution” when dealing with the implementation of 
legislation and delegated rule making. As mandated by the treaties, the Commission 
also has a prominent role in external economic relations. Specifically, the Commission 
has the responsibility to prepare the Union budget, which is needed to implement 
Union regulations. The scope of direct administration carried out by the Commission is 
very limited. Therefore, service delivery and implementation of regulations depends 
largely on the national administrations of member states. The current Comitology was 
born from EU praxis, it was then formally recognised and disciplined by EU law, and 
finally – after the Lisbon Treaty – it was evolved to enhance the implementation of 
legislative acts. There are four procedures in the old Comitology discipline that consist 
of the advisory procedure, management procedure, regulatory procedure, and 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny. While the new Comitology has been simplified into 
two procedures, namely the advisory procedure and examination procedure. The 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny has been replaced by a delegated acts process. The 
new examination procedure combines the management procedure and regulatory 
procedure.  In the implementation measures of the GSP scheme, the Commission should 
be assisted by a Generalised Preferences Committee.  The main task of the Generalised 
Preferences Committee is to examine any matter relating to the implementation of GSP 
regulation, raised by the Commission or at the request of a member state.  The 
Generalised Preferences Committee also has the task of assessing the effects of the 
current GSP scheme. Generally, the Comitology procedures that apply to GSP matters 
are linked to technical issues.  The implementation measures of the current GSP 
regulation are based on the old Comitology decision, while the new Comitology 
Regulation applies to the new and upcoming GSP regulation. In this paper, we would 
like to examine the “driving force of the New Comitology to improve EU external trade 
governance within the framework of the Generalised System of Preferences”. 
 
 
 
                                                 
305 See Dimopoulos., 2010, Op. Cit., p. 169; Krajewski, Markus., p. 8. 
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VIII.a. Executive power in the European Union. 
The legal origin of the EU derives from the exceptions of the GATT principles, 
prominently the MFN Principle. These exceptions create possibilities to establish a free 
trade agreement or customs union based on a preferential trade agreement among its 
members. The EU choose to form a customs union as its embryo to develop the 
skeleton of the Union. The EU is characterised as the distinguished international 
organisation or sui generis. The uniqueness of the EU system has evolved over the years 
particularly as an autonomous and new “executive order”. Concerning the legal nature of 
the EU, in 1962, the European Court of Justice set up a decision considering the EU as “a 
new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their 
sovereign rights”.307  
The European Commission is considered as a “novelty and idiosyncratic” executive 
nucleus of the EU, even though there are particular organs that also “attribute” an 
executive function.308 The Commission extraordinarily portrays essential executive 
tasks in the political system of the Union. The Commission has been given the task to 
initiate legislations, thus, it becomes the “agenda setter” within the EU framework. In 
the area of trade and development policy, especially related to the GSP, the 
Commission’s task includes conducting public consultation, publishing a working 
paper, and drafting a proposal for the next scheme of the GSP proposal. In addition, the 
Commission also publishes a green paper, which is described as a discussion document 
aimed to stimulate debate and launch the process of consultation, at a European level 
and on a particular topic. The green paper generally provides a wide range of ideas. The 
green paper309 is used as a tool to invite interested individuals or organisations to 
contribute views and information. The white paper310 is issued as the follow up of the 
green paper. It functions as a vehicle to develop the proposal into legislation.  
The role of the Commission becomes more crucial as an “executive institution” 
when dealing with the implementation of legislation and delegated rule making.311 As 
mandated by the treaties, the Commission has a prominent role in external economic 
relations. Specifically, the Commission has the responsibility to design the Union 
budget in order to implement Union regulations.312 In the GSP proposal, the 
Commission has estimated the budget affecting EU revenues.313 
According to Peterson, “the European Commission is one of the most unusual 
administrations ever created. It was born as a body that would perform both mundane 
administrative and overtly political tasks. It has always found it difficult to perform then 
simultaneously and well”.314 In the context of its executive function, the Commission is 
not “business service delivery”, which has been distinguished from national 
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administration. The scope of direct administration carried out by the Commission is 
very limited. For example in the area of competition policy, there is more focus on 
policymaking and regulation. Therefore, service delivery and implementation of 
regulation extremely depend on the national administrations of member states.315 
The development of the Commission’s tasks has influenced its autonomous 
powers where it “cannot readily be regarded as involving a delegated function from the 
member states subject to control mechanisms”.316 In the implementation regulations of 
common policies, the Commission is controlled by the member states by means of 
“certain procedures”. The control mechanisms are also considered as one of the reasons 
for the creation of the Comitology procedures. Autonomous power is an intrinsic part 
of the distinctive Union method of adopting decisions at Union Level.317 
Along with Union development, powers are shared across several (governance) 
levels with their own rule making authority, thus causing “fragmented authority”. This 
creates overlapping and conflicting powers between the authorities in the Union.318 
Mansfield defines executive power as literally meaning “a power that is not autonomous 
but that is exercised on behalf of someone else or something else, for instance the people 
or the law”.319 Curtin further describes that, “the executive is considered as the 
subordinate to the will of others, for instance the legislatures, and ultimately the people”. 
Therefore, the executive is an agent given executive power by the people in a 
democratic political system.320  
Executive power in the Union is considered as the “delegation form”. In this 
regard, Curtin defines delegation as “involving an actor, called a principal, relying on 
another actor, called an agent, to act on the principal’s behalf”. The process of EU 
integration is understood as a series of vertical delegations of powers from the political 
member states to the Commission as a supranational (administrative executive 
actor).321 Therefore, Curtin notes that, “on a principal, agent reading, a seemingly 
supranational actor such as the Commission is constructed as being in fact driven by the 
political will of member states in a dependent relationship”.322  
In the American legal perspective, the power exercised at the EU level is 
characterised as non-political (non-majoritarian) and with administrative 
characteristics.  In this regard, the Union member states, as the political principals, limit 
the normative autonomy of their “agents”, the institutions of the EU, to the 
administrative level.323  The Commission is considered as the agent of the member 
states to carry out tasks that are limited to the administrative level. 
In the perspective of the “delegation relationship principle”, policymaking powers 
and executive functions are carried out on a conjecture of separation rather than 
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“complementarity” of politics and administration. In this regard, administrative power 
is separated from executive power in the political sense and is subordinate to it.324  
According to Rutgers, the Europeans are likely to employ politics and 
administration as an internal subdivision of the executive.325 In the European 
perspective, the executive has two powers.  First, political power is regarded as the 
leadership of society through the proposal of policy and legislation (agenda setting and 
the initiative and adoption of measures). Second, administrative power, is functioned in 
the implementation of law, distribution of public revenues, and passing of secondary 
and tertiary rules and regulations.326  
Another scholar argues that political and administrative bureaucracy can be 
combined together. Joerges states that “the oxymoron political administration refers to 
the tension between the adoption and the implementation of the purely technical 
decisions based on expertise (administration) and decisions involving the balancing of 
certain values (politics)”. The legal theorist Rudolf Wiethölter develops the term 
“politische Verwaltung” that is considered as the founding concept of political 
administration.327 Joerges, combines the concept of administration by Max Weber with 
the concepts of social state administration and Wietholter’s notion of politics as a good 
order (gute Ordnung).328 Joerges uses the amalgamated certain concept of political 
administration to characterise the Comitology phenomenon. The adoption of technical 
regulation of certain (delegated) legislative measures commonly needs to address 
politically sensitive issues. Further, with respect to the implementation of regulations, 
this often requires integrating expert knowledge (technocrats) and certain additional 
considerations in increasingly complex decisions.329 
According to General Lagrange, “the Treaty is based upon delegation, with the 
consent of the member states, of sovereignty, to supranational institutions for a strictly 
defined purpose”. This can be traced back to the establishment of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, where powers were delegated to institutions that 
could only function within the scope of those powers and within the policy framework 
set out in the treaty itself. In this regard, the Commission, as a supranational institution, 
should act independently of the member states with its main mission to protect and 
serve the general interest of the EU.330 
The vertical delegation level is carried out by the principal concept. While, the 
horizontal delegation level is exercised where the Commission (and the Council), in 
particular, delegates de facto some of its own administrative executive power to other 
actors. The horizontal delegation is designed to improve the Commission and Council’s 
tasks to focus on their own works such as political tasks, which cover policy initiation, 
policymaking, and external representation. In the context of horizontal delegation, 
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those institutions delegate the non-political tasks of management and administration to 
a “satellite actor”, such as executive agencies. Therefore, the institution of the 
Comitology Committees falls under the framework of horizontal delegation. Such 
practice gives a significant contribution of fragmentation to certain aspects of executive 
power within the Union’s institutional system in general. It influences the notion of 
development of the Commission as an executive institution.331 
 
VIII.b. The European Commission. 
The High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and its 
successors are unique compared to the institutions in other international 
organisations.  The supranational High Authority has the responsibility to determine 
the direction of two key industries throughout the member states. The High Authority 
is intended to be the main organ of decision-making.332 When the Schuman Plan was 
presented in 1950, the central element of the High Authority consisted of independent 
experts authorised by the governments of the prospective member states. The High 
Authority was designed to regulate the market for coal and steel by making decisions 
that legally bound the member states.333 
In the conceptions of Jean Monnet, the High Authority had to be a permanent 
international secretariat of experts working for the common good. In this way, he used 
a “technocratic approach” to policymaking where government action follows the advice 
of experts and technocrats. Moreover, Monnet emphasised that the High Authority had 
to be independent from the governments. The Commission can be taken as an example 
of an EU institution that was established to be a technocratic body. Therefore, the 
Commission should be composed of independent experts in order to propose solutions 
to policy problems, to negotiate deals, to constitute the motor of integration, and to be 
the guardian of common European interest.334 This is in line with Anchrit Willie, 
regarding “the integration and mediating function of the Commission”, he states as 
follow: 335 
“[…] was to be guided by the judgement of a technocratic elite rather than by 
political judgment since politicians are bound to be short-sighted and self-seeking, 
as they are subject to electoral mechanism. It would make for better governance to 
take the impartial, overall and long term view of the technocrat as a guardian of the 
European interest. The Commission’s role would hence depend on its expertise and 
its credibility as an impartial mediator between political views, conflicting national 
interests and interest group pressures […]”.336 
Therefore, from the very beginning the Commission has had the vital role of 
ensuring that the balance of power between the large and small member states carries 
out competences conferred by the treaties. The balance of power between large and 
small member states implemented in the EU is intended to make sure that the Union is 
functioning effectively. The system of the qualified majority vote is one of the factual 
proofs of such implementation (explicitly not only based on the size of the 
population).337 
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In recent years, the essential roles of the Commission have been significantly 
recognised as a part of the executive power in the EU institutional configuration. 
Previously, the Commission acquired powers that could only be described as executive 
in nature. In such concept, the executive power tended to be administrative and heavily 
executive rather than political. However, exclusive power to initiate legislation in the 
legislative process, off course, was as an exception. The European Commission also 
acquired judicial and supervisory power. Therefore, in the past, the European 
Commission was only regarded as the “administration of the Union, its civil service with 
limited and defined powers, nothing more than an administrative executive”.338 
Egeberg identifies the “unique characteristic” possessed by the European 
Commission as “the only multipurpose executive body at the international level” and 
organised separately from the Council of Ministers. Due to this separation, the 
European Commission can act relatively independently as an executive institution. The 
European Commission is also considered as “the executive branch and higher layer of 
executive organisation” to which the EU member states are related.339 The European 
Parliament appointed the Committee of Independent Experts a decade ago. It stated in 
the report that “the Commission plays the part of the executive branch and holds sole 
power of legislative initiative". Hence, it developed the responsibility and accountability 
of the other participants in the political structure, that is, the Parliament and Council, 
and, above all, the citizens of Europe”.340 
Curtin attempts to compare the similarity of the Commission, as the core of the 
Union’s Executive, with the executive at the national level. The Commission is 
composed of a series of executive politicians who are responsible for various 
administrative services. The common tasks of the Commission, in this regard, to initiate 
and formulate policy proposals, to implement policies, and to monitor its enforcement, 
are generally similar to the executive body at the national level.341 The Commission’s 
executive core342 covers political and purely administrative matters, rather than 
managerial tasks.343 The Commission is embodied in organisational and behavioural 
patterns that are extremely typical of executives, as similar to national settings.344 
Therefore, it is concluded that the bureaucratic divisions of the Commission are 
comparable to ministries in national administrations and the role of Commissioners to 
those of Ministers.345 
The Treaty of Lisbon provides the election of the Commission President by the 
European Parliament.346 This procedure aimed to enhance the democratic legitimacy of 
the Commission and to avoid the “democratic deficit” of the Union, which is due to the 
increasing “politisation” of the Commission.347 Such change influences the “appointed 
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mechanism” of the president and the other members of the Commission. Before the 
Treaty of Nice entered into force, governments of the member states appointed the 
President of the Commission by common accord. Previously, the Treaty of Nice 
introduced “qualified majority decision making”, which was considered as significant 
progress, by effectively removing the veto right of any single member state. Practically, 
it mandates discussions that are more cooperative. The new post-Treaty of Nice 
procedures, as described in Article 214 (2) of TEC, provided that the Council meetings 
by the Composition of Heads of State of Government are acting by a qualified majority, 
nominate the person who is intended to be appointed as president of the Commission. 
The next procedure is the approval of the nomination by the European Parliament.348  
The EU’s political system has its own unique structure, which develops along with 
political dynamics. In fact, according to Curtin, since the executive power is fragmented 
and dispersed across an increasing number of institutions and actors “there is no 
equivalent of a national government at the level of the EU Political system”. From the 
beginning the Commission was designed as a central decision making institution with 
multitask jobs.349 
 
VIII.c. Comitology. 
VIII.c.1. Definition of Comitology. 
Piotr, defined Comitology “as the existence and activity of special committees 
supervising the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission”.350 In this 
regard, Comitology has a “supervisory” function to supervise powers that have been 
conferred to the Commission to implement legislative acts. Through its special 
committees, the member states of the EU are able to supervise the implementing power 
performed by the Commission. The Comitology Committees participate in the creation 
of tertiary law. The Comitology Committees act is based on legal norms found both in 
primary and secondary law. The Comitology procedures are regulated under the 
Comitology decision.351  
The existence of Comitology has evolved in order to enhance the implementation 
of legislative acts. There are four procedures in the old Comitology regulation that 
consists of the advisory procedure, management procedure, regulatory procedure, and 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny. While the new Comitology has been simplified into 
two procedures, namely the advisory procedure and examination procedure. The 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny has been replaced by a delegated acts process. The 
new examination procedure combines the management procedure and regulatory 
procedure.352 
Following contemporary development, Curtin describes the EU as a political 
union that constantly and gradually evolves. In political union, all areas of national 
policymaking are connected to policymaking at Union level. Most policies decided at 
Union level are implemented by non-legislative acts. In fact, non-legislative acts have 
played a crucial role in the “Union overall output”. Non-legislative acts refer to the 
executive action to operate a legislative decision. It should be noted that both European 
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and national actors consist of politicians and bureaucrats,353 however, borrowing 
Curtin words, “some of them may be wearing two hats and some others not”.354 On the 
other hand, the existence of “secretive and hidden committees”355, known as “Comitology 
Committees”, increases the important role in the Union’s institutional system. 
Moreover, the Comitology procedure has faced many problems relating to delegation of 
powers, boundaries between various categories of legal acts, interinstitutional 
tensions356, and, unfortunately, the best formulation to solve this has not yet been 
found. Currently, Comitology is considered as a democratic intergovernmental element 
of the EU decision-making system.357 
 
VIII.c.2. The existence of Comitology Committees in the EU executive framework. 
According to Curtin, the existence of Comitology Committees in the EU 
institutional system can be analysed using a residual approach. The residual approach 
is considered as the appropriate approach to “map out" the EU institutional system that 
has been applied in practice. Moreover, it can be used to “capture” certain areas of 
executive power that have not been exercised by any of the institutions, or described as 
“the power that is left over within the system”. The Treaty of Lisbon categorises the 
powers left over after the determination of the legislative acts. They are defined as non-
legislative acts. Non-legislative powers conferred to the Commission and the 
Comitology Committees are known as the “delegated legislation procedure”.  Therefore, 
the Comitology Committees were established with the objective to exercise the left over 
non-legislative power in the EU institutional system.358 
The existence of EU Committees, for instance the Comitology Committees, are 
considered as a response to the functional demands of the EU institutions related to 
technical information and (scientific) expertise throughout the formal decision-making 
process. However, there are still some questions concerning the existence of the EU 
Committees, such as: ‘What role do they play in EU policymaking?’ and ‘On which EU 
institutions do they rely?’ However, due to the dynamic process developments of the 
institutions those questions remain unanswered. The various forms of the EU 
Committees that spread across the policy areas are considered as the reason for such 
question being raised. The EU Committees are actively involved throughout the EU 
decision-making process, for instance in the expert groups of the Commission and the 
working groups of the Council, in the Comitology Committees at the implementation 
phase.359  
Among the existing EU Committees, the Comitology Committees are considered 
as particular “genus”360 committees, which totally change the image of closed 
bureaucracy and unclear procedures into open bureaucracy and transparent 
procedures. For instance, in the implementation of the Generalised System of 
Preference, the Comitology Committees have a significant role in the determination of 
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the list of beneficiary countries, in the granting of special incentives, in graduation 
mechanisms, in safeguard measures, and in temporary withdrawals. In addition, the 
reports and reviews carried out by the GSP Committee are presented in the drafting of 
the new regulations of the GSP. The Comitology Committees control and balance the 
implementation of EU regulations. To sum up, the task of the Comitology Committees is 
to assist the Commission by advising or deciding the substance of implementation 
measures.361 
Over the decades the existence and function of the Comitology Committees has 
been considered as an “unseen hand of European integration” covered by “mists of 
mystery”. This term refers to the activities of the Comitology Committees that cover a 
wide range of policy areas. The term “unseen hand” is reflected in the report of the 
Select Committee of the House of Lords. It states that “no list of them is publicly 
available nor is there an authoritative account of what each does”. The new era of the 
Comitology world began in 1999 with the issuing of the Comitology decision. According 
to the Comitology decision that began in 2000, the Commission is obliged to publish 
annual reports on the working of the committees. Such reports significantly increase 
public transparency by providing a public window relating to the committees’ work, 
the types of procedures followed, the number of meetings held, and other related 
information.362  
It has been 11 years since the Commission systematically provided such report 
and source of general information that can be tracked on an annual basis. Usually, such 
information is used to analyse previous policies and is used as reference for the 
drafting of new policies.363 In respect of GSP implementation, the Commission has 
implemented such obligation to provide and publish reports. Therefore, the 
information about the GSP reviews and reports can be accessed by internal EU 
institutions, beneficiary countries, traders, public societies and interested stakeholders. 
In this regard, Trondal states that the Comitology Committees “represent underused 
laboratories for studying what happens when contrasting decision-making dynamics 
meet because such committees embody civil servants from different layers of 
government”.364 
As previously explained, the Comitology Committees established by the Council 
are made up of national civil servants and, in certain cases, scientific experts. Their task 
is to assist the Commission in exercising “executive making tasks”. Formally, the task of 
the Comitology Committees is merely to deliver opinions on draft decisions made by 
the Commission. Then the Commission formally adopts the successive instruments, for 
instance legal acts and administrative decisions. Therefore, “the Comitology Committees 
do not act independently with unqualified discretion as they only advise on a decision of 
another actor”.  The Comitology Committees do not have delegated powers like the 
Commission. However, Curtin also notes as follows: 
“[…] in fact, they take the process of discussion and debate as to precise provisions 
of its final draft implementing measures with the committee in order to ensure that 
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the Commission can adopt the draft implementing measures. This informal process 
gives a committee member more power than they might formally appear to have. In 
practice, it appears that the Commission almost never differs from the opinion of 
the committees. Moreover the issue is also whether they are in a position to 
substitute the opinions reached by expert scientists in highly technical policy areas 
[...]”.365 
The Comitology Committees have shifted from their original function as a “control 
device on behalf of member states” into “supervisory Committees over the executive tasks” 
that are carried out by the Commission. Autonomous entities are created with a 
consensual style of decision making rather than diplomatic negotiations among 
member state representatives. A political scientist, Brandma, deems that “Comitology 
Committee members tend to be fully autonomous in organising their own work in 
Brussels”.366 
Eventually, it should be admitted that Comitology has played a significant role in 
the EU executive process, especially in the delegated legislative process. The nature of 
Comitology is associated as arms of member states to control the implementation of 
regulation exercised by the Commission. Generally, in the EU system the Comitology 
Committees include experts employed by national or local governments, non-
governmental research organisations, private enterprises, universities, and national 
civil servants. In 2006, about 64% of all delegated rule legislations adopted by the 
Commission passed through the Comitology Committees.367 
 
VIII.c.3. Comitology from the legal history perspective. 
From an historical perspective, the Comitology was established four years after 
the Treaty of Rome. However, the delegation of power to the Commission was not 
clearly regulated by the Treaty of Rome 1957. In 1961, the first Comitology Committee 
had begun with its work taking place in Brussels. According to Hardache and Kaeding, 
the establishment of the first Comitology Committee was rooted in the demand to build 
a control system because the Commission was given powers to implement legislation at 
the Union level.368 While Töller and Piotr only saw creation of the first Comitology 
Committees as an expression of intergovernmental thinking.369 
The history of the Comitology procedure can be traced back to the very beginning 
of European Integration. Traditionally in the EU system, the Council of Ministers was 
considered as the “primary lawmaker” devised with a number of procedural strategies 
to “rein-in” (control) the Commission in the exercise (delegation) of executive power. 
Within the “plural executive system” of the EU, the Council of Ministers was crowned as 
the “original” executive power. The Commission was placed in the position as the 
“implementer” to carry out executive tasks delegated by the Council. Therefore, in the 
executive context, the Commission was considered as the agent of the Council.370  
Since 1962, the Council has delegated some of its executive power in the area of 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to the Commission. There has been an increasing 
number of executive tasks given to the Commission over the last two decades. Although 
the Commission is responsible for the implementation of general rules, the Council 
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considers that such powers should be controlled and the freedom of exercise of such 
powers should be limited. Therefore, the Commission proposes to establish purely 
advisory committees. Nevertheless, member states in the Council have turned the 
initial proposal of the Commission into something that is “quite unknown”, which differs 
from their own national legal and political systems. Under the Council powers, the 
management committees have established what has been described as a system that is 
more binding (non-parliamentary) to control over the Commission. This Committee is 
composed of representatives of the member states that are empowered to give detailed 
advice in the implementation of specific proposals made by the Commission.371 The 
management committees still exist today, namely the management procedure. It is 
mainly used in managing EU funds and the Common Agricultural Policy.372  
Until the end of the 1980s, Comitology was placed as the very background of the 
main decision-making processes. It was a large political phenomenon. In 1987, the 
Single European Act introduced “The Constitutionalisation of Comitology”, which 
brought Comitology into the area of politics.373 The roles of Comitology significantly 
increased along with the Union legislation development where it was necessary to 
delegate powers to the Commission to implement some rules at European level. 
Initially, the Comitology dealt with purely technical implementing measures, mostly in 
Common Agricultural Policy. With regard to the establishment of the Comitology 
Committees, the Council demanded the necessity to form a supervisory function.374 
The legal base of Comitology can be found in Article 202 of the TEU. Along with 
the organisational development, the Comitology procedures experienced an excessive 
use within the implementation of regulations at Union level.375 The Comitology 
procedures applied were based on the demand to supervise and monitor the interest of 
the member states in the Union. Member states need to control the implementing 
power conferred to the Commission. The increase of the Comitology application in the 
area of legislation led to the establishment of the Comitology Decision 1999/468/EC of 
28 June 1999, thus, amended by Council Decision 2006/512/EC of 18 July 2006. Article 
202 of TEC has been replaced by Articles 290 and 291 of the TFEU. Both of those 
                                                 
371 See Curtin, Deirdre., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 117. 
372 See Curtin, Deirdre., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 117-118. 
373 See Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
374 See Hardacre, Alan., and Damen, Mario., The European Parliament and Comitology: PRAC in Practice, available at : 
http://aei.pitt.edu/12375/1/20090709111448_Art2_Eipascoop2009_01.pdf, last accessed : 8 July 2011. 
375 “[…] Since its birth the Union has delivered lots legislations which dynamic, means that the law development within 
Union’s has changing very fast needs a good engine to accelerate its implementation. One of the engines of 
legislative acts to be implemented is the Commission […]. We can take a look on a data which presented by 
Curtin regarding Legislative Acts which adopted by EU in 2005 – 2008 : 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EP+Council Regulation 19 44 21 48 
EP+Council Directives 26 39 18 53 
EP+Council Decisions 14 19 18 30 
     
Council Regulations 118 164 129 137 
Council Directives 10 26 5 14 
Council Decisions 252 245 272 244 
     
Commission Regulations 675 610 628 574 
Commission Directives 54 75 53 53 
Commission Decisions 645 698 644 609 
     
Total 1813 1920 1788 1762 
 
According to Alan and Kaeding in 2009 there were 266 comitology committees, 894 comitology committee 
meetings and 1808 implementing measures. This data has shown the significant role comitology in the EU. 
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articles have significant roles in the new Comitology procedures by providing two 
methods of delegation power to the Commissions.376  
Article 290 of the TFEU stipulates, “a legislative act may delegate to the 
Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement 
or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act”, this constitutes the 
delegated acts. The European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke such 
delegation power.  The delegated act may enter into force only if the European 
Parliament or the Council has expressed no objection within a certain period set out in 
the legislative act. 377 
Since the European project and activities on governance have developed 
dynamically, the need for the Comitology Committees has also increased. Therefore, the 
Comitology becomes the essential element in the EU legislation system.378 The 
Comitology overrated spread across policy areas including CCP. Most EU activities 
apply Comitology procedures.379  
The EU sources of law have been reformed, due to its significant role in the Union 
decision-making practice. Article 289 of the TFEU laid down the formal differentiation 
between legislative and non-legislative acts. Furthermore, the differentiation of 
legislative acts, delegated acts, and implementing acts from the formal procedures will 
be explained.380 
A legislative act characterised in the “formal context”, consists of regulations, 
directives, and decisions. Article 289 provides three types of formalities to adopt the 
legislative acts, e.g. ordinary legislative procedure, special legislative procedure or 
specific procedure.381 
A delegated act can be defined both formally and materially, which covers 
substance and procedures. The last sentence of Article 290 of the TFEU, remarks that 
the delegated act “may not relate to individual matters but at the same time may not 
refer to essential elements of legislative acts”.382 
An implementing act is mainly characterised formally where the implementing 
powers are transferred to the member states. The powers would be conferred to the 
Commission or to the Council when uniformity is needed in the implementation of the 
acts. Article 291 of the TFEU prescribes that the member states should supervise the 
implementing body (the Commission). Since the European Parliament and the Council, 
as institutions that adopt the legislation and are conferred implementing powers, may 
not perform such control mechanism. The European Parliament is also not allowed to 
control the Council that acts as an implementing body. Moreover, both the European 
Parliament and the Council are obliged to adopt regulations laying down the rules and 
general principles concerning mechanisms for control exercised by member states.383 
 
VIII.d. Comitology and control function. 
There are three stages of implementation delegation of power, consisting of the 
co-decision procedure stage, commission stage and legislator stage.384 During the first 
                                                 
376 See Hardacre, Alan., and Kaeding, Michael. 
377 See Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
378 See Hardacre, Alan., and Damen, Mario. 
379 See Hardacre, Alan., and Kaeding, Michael. 
380 See Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
381 See Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
382 See Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
383 See Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
384 See Hardacre, Alan., and Kaeding, Michael.. 
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stage, known as the co-decision procedure, the Commission formulates a legislative 
proposal to the Council and Parliament. Such proposal is used to delegate tasks back to 
the Commissions in order to implement concerned regulations. In this stage, the 
Parliament and Council decide together about the scope of delegation and the levels of 
control relating to the power of delegation, which they confer to the Commission. 
Thereafter, the legislators decide on the power delegation and the procedure to control 
such power.  
In the second stage, the Commission has to draft implementing measures. It will 
be implemented under the delegated power conferred to them. The Commission has 
options to ask assistance from the Comitology Committee, experts group, or an agency 
(among others) in respect of drafting implementing measures. In the final procedure of 
this mechanism, the Commission has to take responsibility for the draft measures to be 
submitted to the committee for a vote or submitted directly to the legislators to ensure 
there is no objection. 
The final stage relates to the control function of the legislator over the task 
delegated to the Commission. The control function over the Commission is delegated 
powers and is considered as a control balance over executives at Union level. There are 
five principles that must be applied in exercising the delegated power, consisting of 
“speed, efficiency, flexibility, technical decision, and control”.385 
According to Article 202 TEC and Comitology Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 
1999, amended by Council Decision 2006/512/EC of 18 July 2006, there are five 
different Comitology procedures, which consist of advisory, management, regulatory, 
regulatory with scrutiny and the safeguard procedure.386 Theoretically, as explained by 
Larsson and Maurer, there are “five main concepts of integration” related to Comitology. 
These five main concepts highlight the role of the Comitology Committees in the Union 
from different perception approaches.  
The first concept called as “intergovernmental vision”. This concept divided into 
four models. The first model combines between traditional realistic and a neo-realistic 
school. It is emphasizing control function of the Comitology Committees over the 
Commission. In this point, the Comitology Committees positioned as an addition of 
national institutions. The second model is an “administrative diplomacy” or “the liberal 
intergovernmentalist variant of neo-realism”. In this second model the Comitology 
Committees considered as a diplomatic instrument used by governments over EU 
administration. The third model is an “intergovernmental monitoring” in which the 
Comitology Committees considered as bodies where governments coordinate their 
                                                 
385 “[…] Speed:   Making  adjustments  to,  or  implementing,  legislation  through  comitology can  take  a  few  months  
(only  a  few  days  in  exceptional  cases)  –  much  faster  than  the  legislative  procedures.  In  this  way  
legislation  can  be  updated  quickly  and  in  keeping with events, science or markets; Flexibility : The 
comitology system is more flexible than the legislative procedures in  terms  of  time -lines,  obligations  etc.  This  
makes  it  easier  to  deal  with  technical legislation; Technical Decisions:  Comitology concers technical aspects 
of legislation, and as such  represents  a  more  appropriate  level  at  which  these  decisions  can  be  taken. The  
Commission  will  draft  the  measures  but  will  be  assisted  by  Member  States  and other sources of expertise 
(expert groups, EU agencies); Control:    The  comitology  system  is  also  about  control  over  the  Commission. 
The  Commission  is  delegated  the  power  to  initiate  technical  implementing  measures  but  all  measures  are  
subject  to  control  by  the  Council  and  Parliament. The more sensitive the measures are deemed to be the 
more control the legislators will have; Efficiency, Comitology  allows  the  legislators  to  concentrate on  their  
core legislative  work  and  moves  technical  work  to  the  level  of  technical  experts which is a more efficient 
allocation of tasks and work […]”. Hardacre, Alan., and Kaeding, Michael. 
386 See Hardacre, Alan., and Kaeding, Michael. 
 135 
political and administrative positions. The fourth model named “functional 
cooperation”, its smiliar to to supranational visions.387 
The second concept is a “federalist vision”. According to Larsson and Maurer; Piotr 
this concept is defined as follow : 
“[…] the perception of committees is similar to the realistic one, but evaluation of 
such is of course completely different. Committees are tools of influence wielded by 
member states upon the supranational body, and as such they create significant 
obstacles to building the federal union and to effective problem solving. A better 
solution would be a strict division of powers between the state and the Union, 
which is connected to the autonomy of the decision-making process at these two 
levels based upon principle of subsidiarity […] “388 
In the federalist vision, the Comitology Committees considered as tools of 
member states and preventing practice of a federal union. This concept is emphasizing 
“division of power” between member states and Union (intergovernmental and 
supranational function).   
The third concept is “neofunctionalism and supranational technocracy” related to 
the Comitology Committees tasks in the “technical” area: 
“[…] Comitology committees are essential elements of the system aimed at technical 
problem solving. They are composed of experts who come from different states. 
Interactions among them improve their professional level and make finding the best 
solution possible. The most important role is played by representatives of the 
Commission […]”. 389 
The fourth concept known as “erosion and European megabureaucracy”, its placed 
the Comitology committees as decision maker: 
“[…] Comitology committees are perceived as decision makers that express the 
tendency to replace political decisions with administrative ones. Committee system 
is not effectively controlled by parliaments and courts, which is their main 
distinction from member states’ administrative systems. National civil servants 
forget that they represent both governments and societies. There is a place for the 
creation of a new independent bureaucratic and political space that is reluctant to 
open the decision-making process. Representation of various interests is lacking 
and the efficiency of committees is low […]”390 
The fifth concept is a mixed concept of “governance, fusion theory, models of 
horizontal and vertical fusion”, and also “mixed administration”. These elements are 
interdependent, it is described further as follow : 
“[…] Comitology committees are seen as status quo defenders, and thus may not be 
linked with any vision of integration. They constitute a part of broad decision-
making networks. In fusion theory the most important element of the decision-
making process is the mixing of public instruments from many member states as 
well as Europeanization of supranational, national, regional and de-nationalized 
actors and institutions. Actors at all levels must adapt to a new situation and 
compete. Committees are specialized bodies for joint action. Horizontal (inside the 
committee system) and vertical (outside the committee system) interactions reflect 
the need for constructive problem solving in a good atmosphere […]”. 391 
                                                 
387 See T. Larsson, A. Maurer, Subproject 4: the Committee System, Legitimacy, Citizen’s Perceptions and Acceptance of the 
EU-System of Governance [in:] Governance by Committee: the Role of Committees in European Policy- Making and 
Policy Implementation, State of the Art Report, European Institute of Public Administration, Project No. SERD-
1999-00128, May 2000, pp. 79-81; Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
388 See T. Larsson, A. Maurer, 2000, Op. Cit., pp. 81-82; Tosiek, Piotr., 2010.  
389 See T. Larsson, A. Maurer, 2000, Op. Cit., pp. 82-83 Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
390 See T. Larsson, A. Maurer, 2000, Op. Cit., pp. 83-84; Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
391 See T. Larsson, A. Maurer, 2000, Op. Cit., pp. 84-87; Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
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From those five concepts concluded that the Comitology Committees played two 
vital roles, that is, the control tools of member states over the Union and the decision 
maker. In daily practices the Comitology Committees tasks mostly dealing with the 
technical areas.  
In its early development, the Comitology mainly dealt with technical agricultural 
measures. Nowadays, the Comitology has developed rapidly across the policy areas of 
the EU. With respect to dynamicisation in the implementation of EU legislations, some 
issues have been raised relating to transparency, efficiency, and accountability.  The 
establishment of the Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny (RPS)392, which is provided 
under Article 5a of Comitology Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999,  was amended  
by  Council  Decision  2006/512/EC of 18 July 2006. The RPS procedure grants the 
European Parliament an important new power to the existing Comitology procedures. 
It has to be noted that, previously, the Parliament tried to increase its limited powers in 
this domain. Such powers increase the role of the European Parliament in co-decision 
procedures and effectively improve democratic control over Comitology decisions. The 
RPS procedures were established as a response to a number of the Parliament’s 
demands regarding its involvement in the delegation of powers to the Commission.393 
The RPS has given Parliament the power of veto in the area of so-called “quasi-
legislative measures”. Such measures are considered as “near-legislative measures”, but 
remain non-essential. Therefore, this can be delegated to the Commission. The 
objective of such procedure is to improve the democracy in the process of Comitology. 
Further, as explained by Alan and Damen, “whenever the co-legislators give up 
legislative powers in the interest of greater flexibility, speed of decision-making and need 
for technical expertise, they do so in the knowledge that they retain a power of veto over 
what is being adopted by the Commission”.394 
Some scholars395 have analysed Comitology from democratic perspectives using 
two approaches. First, Comitology is seen as the “defect” of the EU since it considers 
lack of transparency and the limitation of the participation of the European Parliament 
in the decision-making process. However, since the Treaty of Lisbon the role of the 
European Parliament has increased. Second, Comitology is seen from a “non-
majoritarian doctrine approach”. This approach refers to the nature of the Comitology 
Committee tasks that deal with the technical and non-political sphere. In this regard, 
the Comitology Committees are considered as a “non-majoritarian agency” due to its 
functional expertise and are excluded from politics and the electoral cycle.396 The term 
non-majoritarian agencies is used by political scientists to refer to all those bodies and 
organs that are “unelected” in the national political process.397 
The Comitology from the “democratic character” perspective includes 
“accountability of decision-makers, balance of the system, efficiency and effectiveness, and 
openness and transparency”. Therefore, since their existence the Comitology 
                                                 
392 “[…] In 2006 the basic comitology decision was amended so as to add a new procedure, known as the regulatory 
procedure, known as the Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny (also known by its French acronym PRAC). The 
main of this new procedure was to give the European Parliament, for the first time, a significant role in the 
supervision of the content of what might be called quasi-legislative acts […]”. See Curtin, Deirdre., 2009, Op. Cit., 
pp. 118-119. 
393 See Hardacre, Alan., and Damen, Mario. 
394 See Hardacre, Alan., and Damen, Mario.. 
395 See Curtin, 2009, Op. Cit., p. 45; Piotr, 2010: 
396 See Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
397 See F. Vibert, 2007; Curtin, 2009, Op. Cit., p. 51. 
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Committees seem to be “invisible” within the Union’s system. This causes many citizens 
not to be aware of the existence of Comitology decision-making.398 
 
VIII.e. Trade legislation and the Comitology procedures in respect of GSP. 
As explained above, after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force the competence 
of the European Parliament in the international trade agreement increased. Article 188 
C of the Treaty of Lisbon was established as the umbrella of CCP.  The significant 
increase of European Parliament power was applied in the co-legislator procedures 
with the Council concerning trade legislations and agreements.  
 
VIII.e.1. Comitology current GSP regulation399.  
Implementation measures of the current GSP regulation are based on the old 
Comitology decision.400 This is laid down in Recitals 25 of the regulation. In 
undertaking implementation measures of the GSP scheme the Commission should be 
assisted with a Generalised Preferences Committee.401 The main task of the Generalised 
Preferences Committee is to examine any matter relating to the implementation of the 
GSP regulation, raised by the Commission or at the request of a member state.402 The 
Generalised Preferences Committee also has the task to assess the effect of the current 
GSP scheme. Assessment based on the Commission reports, and the result will be used 
in the discussion for the next regulation. There are two Comitology procedures used in 
the current GSP, i.e. the regulatory procedure403 and advisory procedure404. 
Generally, the Comitology procedures applied in the GSP measures are connected 
to technical areas.  The Comitology procedures are applied in the measures of 
graduation mechanism, special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and 
good governance, special arrangement for the least-developed countries, temporary 
withdrawal, and the safeguard clause. With respect to temporary withdrawal or 
suspension of the preferential arrangements, the Commission is obliged to notify such 
measures to the Generalised Preferences Committee before the decision comes into 
effect.405 
The regulatory procedure of Comitology is applied in deciding whether to grant 
the preferences request from developing countries to obtain facility of the special 
incentive arrangements for sustainable development and good governance.406 The 
regulatory procedures are also applied in the special arrangement for LDCs, in terms of 
measures concerning country withdrawal from the list of beneficiary countries. Such 
withdrawal is based on the exclusion of a concerned country from the LDCs list by the 
United Nations.407 
                                                 
398 See Tosiek, Piotr., 2010. 
399 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011 applying a scheme of 
generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011. 
400 See Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 as amended by Decision 2006/512/EC of 22 July 2006 laying down the 
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. 
401 See Paragraph 1 Article 27 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. 
402 See Paragraph 2 Article 27 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. 
403 See Paragraph 4 Article 27 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. See 
also Article 5 of Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 as amended by Decision 2006/512/EC of 22 July 2006 
laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. 
404 See Paragraph 5 Article 27 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. See 
also Article 3 Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 as amended by Decision 2006/512/EC of 22 July 2006. 
405 See Paragraph 3 Article 16 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. 
406 See Paragraph 2 Article 10 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. 
407 See Paragraph 8 Article 11 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. 
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The advisory procedure of Comitology is also applied to initiate the investigation 
in respect of sufficient grounds to impose the temporary withdrawal.408 In the old 
Comitology decision, the advisory procedure was considered as the “quickest” 
procedure because the Committee can deliver its opinion, “if it is indispensable by taking 
a vote”, by using “simple majority” towards draft measures presented by the 
Commission. Then, the Commission has to take the “utmost account of the opinion 
delivered” and inform the committee that the opinion has been taken into account. 
However, the committee’s opinion does not have to be followed by the Commission. 
The advisory procedure of Comitology is also applied in the safeguard measures of 
GSP.409 
The advisory procedures are also applied to adopt amendments of the Annexes of 
the current GSP regulation.410 The amendments relate to the Combined Nomenclature, 
changes in the international status or classification of countries or territories, changes 
to the list of beneficiary countries under general arrangement due to graduation411 or 
removal412 and arrangement of lists of special incentives in sustainable development 
and good governance.413  
 
VIII.e.2. Comitology on the GSP proposal. 
First, it should be noted that the examination procedures in the new Comitology 
decision are a merger of the management and regulatory procedures of the old 
Comitology. Overall, the implementation measures of the GSP proposal are very similar 
to the current GSP regulation. The simplification procedures in the new Comitology 
decision change the application of Comitology procedures in the GSP proposal, but to a 
limited extent. Let us take for instance the replacement of the regulatory procedure by 
the examination procedure.  
Draft Article 38 of the GSP proposal stipulates that the new Comitology procedure 
under Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011 will soon be applied following the 
implementation of GSP. It will cover advisory procedures, examination procedures, and 
immediately applicable implementing acts. It also stipulates that the Generalised 
Preferences Committee has the task of assisting the Commission. Practically, the task of 
the Preferences Committee has not changed and is similar to the current GSP regulation 
to examine any matter relating to the application of this Regulation, raised by the 
Commission or at the request of a member state.  
The new Comitology decision clearly stipulates implementations of legally 
binding Union acts requiring uniform conditions.414 Consistently, the proposal of the 
GSP regulation states that uniform conditions are required for the implementation of 
the regulation. This uniformity requirement derives from the CPP legal basis. Thereof 
the implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. The GSP proposal 
                                                 
408 See Article 17, 18, and 19 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. 
409 See Article 20 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. 
410 See Article 25 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. 
411 See Paragraph 1 Article 3 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. 
412 See Paragraph 2 Article 3 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. 
413 See Article 10 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by EU Regulation No. 512/2011. 
414 See Recitals 1 Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011 : “[…] Where uniform conditions for the implementation of legally 
binding Union acts are needed, those acts (here-inafter ‘basic acts’) are to confer implementing powers on  the 
Commission, or, in duly justified specific cases and in  the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty  
on European Union, on the Council […]”.  See also Article 1 Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011 : “[…] This Regulation 
lays down the rules and general principles governing the mechanisms which apply where a legally binding 
Union act (hereinafter a ‘basic act’) identifies the need for uniform conditions of implementation and requires 
that the adoption of implementing acts by the Commission be subject to the control of Member States […]”. 
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elaborates the application of the Comitology of each procedure in the implementation 
of its regulation.415  
First, the advisory procedure will be applied to the adoption of decisions on 
suspension from the tariff preferences of certain GSP sections and the initiation of a 
temporary withdrawal procedure.416 The application of the advisory procedure in the 
proposal of the GSP regulation is almost unchanged from the current one. It is applied 
in the general arrangement417 and the measures under special incentive arrangements 
for sustainable development and good governance.418 
Second, the examination procedure will be used for the adoption of decisions on 
safeguard investigations and suspension of the preferential arrangements where 
imports may cause serious disturbance to EU markets.419 This procedure will be 
applied to general safeguard measures.420 Where products originating in a beneficiary 
country, under the GSP arrangements, imported in volumes and/or at prices, which 
cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to EU producers of like or directly 
competing products, normal CCT duties on that product may be reintroduced under 
certain conditions. Therefore, once the conditions of such circumstances are fulfilled, 
the Commission has to adopt an implementing act to reintroduce the CCT duties in 
compliance with the examination procedure. Third, the Commission can adopt 
immediately applicable implementing acts or urgency procedures towards certain 
cases according to the regulation.421  
In respect of general temporary withdrawal, the adoption of decisions to initiate 
the procedure for or to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure, must comply 
with the advisory procedure. The immediately applicable implementing acts applied for 
the temporarily withdrawal in the case of trade fraud, for example, fail to comply with 
the rules of origin of the products. The sufficient evidence of such conducts could be the 
justification for temporarily withdrawal in respect of all or of certain products 
originating in a beneficiary country.   
Only immediately applicable implementing acts will be applied under strict 
justification of urgent need. Under this procedure, the Commission is allowed to 
implement an act without its prior submission to a Comitology Committee. This 
procedure should remain in force for a period not exceeding 6 months unless the basic 
act provides otherwise.422 The proposal of the GSP regulation stipulates that the 
application of the immediately applicable implementing acts procedure must be 
                                                 
415 See Recitals 26  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of  the Council 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences, {SEC(2011) 536 final},{SEC(2011) 537 final}, Brussels, 
10.5.2011, COM(2011) 241 final, 2011/0117 (COD), available : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147893.pdf, last accessed : 12 May 2011. See also 
Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down 
the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for the control by the Member States of the 
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers. 
416 See Recitals 26 of the European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences. See also Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
417 See Paragraph 2 and 3 Article 8 of the European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences. 
418 See Paragraph 3 and 8 Article 15 of the European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of  the Council applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences. 
419 See Recitals 26 of the European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of  the 
Council applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences. See also Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
420 See Article 25, 26 and 27 of the European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of  
the Council applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences. 
421 See Recitals 26 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of  the Council 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences. See also Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
422 See Paragraph 2 Article 8 Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011. 
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applied in conjunction with the examination procedure. In the application of the 
examination procedure, if the Committee delivers a negative opinion, the Commission 
shall immediately revoke the implementing act adopted in compliance with the 
regulations in Paragraph 2 Article 8 of the new Comitology decision.423 
 
VIII.f. Delegated and implementing powers in the GSP regulation after the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
The existence of the non-legislative act has caused complexity in understanding 
the existing EU legal system. As regulated under Article 288 of the TFEU (Ex 249 
TEC)424, there are three types of legal instruments in the Union, consisting of 
“regulation, directives, and decisions”. This provision remains unchanged under the 
Treaty of Lisbon. In the new Comitology decisions, there are two procedures 
concerning “acts adoption”, which are known as the “delegated act” (previously called 
RPS or PRAC) and the “implementing act” (normal Comitology procedures).425 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the delegated act and implementing act are included 
as “non-legislative executive measures”. The terms “delegated act and implementing act” 
seem to have a “confusing use”. However, the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon attempt 
to distinguish both terms by defined “delegated acts” as acts “that expand on elements of 
the legislative act within the framework worked out latter”. Further Curtin describes that 
“delegated legislative acts, working out the detail of legislation the idea presumably being 
that this will ensure that the legislature does not have to spend valuable time on the 
specifics of legislation but can delegate that task to the executive (the Commission) with 
more time and resources at its disposition”. The powers delegated cover a range of areas 
from rules (on the technical and detailed elements that develop a legislative act) to the 
subsequent amendments of certain aspects of the legislative act. In any adoption of the 
legislative acts, the legislator has the power to determine the scope of the essential 
elements or degree of details required for the essential elements in a specific area and 
to what extent those elements should be expanded on by the delegated acts.426 
There is a four-level hierarchy of legal acts in the EU laid down under Articles 
288-292 of the TFEU. The first level of hierarchy of legal acts is treaty provisions. The 
second level of hierarchy of legal acts is legislative acts, adopted under the co-decision 
procedure and special legislative procedures.427 The third level of hierarchy of legal 
acts is delegated acts.428 The fourth level of hierarchy of legal acts is implementing 
acts.429 
The distinction between “legislative acts” and “non-legislative acts” in the EU 
System is set out under the Treaty of Lisbon. Under the legislation framework, the 
European Parliament and the Council enact legislative acts. Legislative acts are adopted 
under ordinary or special legislative procedures. Non-legislative acts are implemented 
by the Commission and are divided into delegated acts and implementing acts. 
Therefore, there are two types of delegation of power. First, delegation of powers 
conferred to the Commission to adopt “delegated acts”. Second, delegation of powers 
conferred to the Commission to adopt “implementing acts” known as Comitology 
                                                 
423 See Paragraph 3 Article 8 Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011. 
424 To exercise the Union’s competences, the institutions shall adopt regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, 
and opinions. 
425 See Curtin, Deirdre., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 121. 
426 See Curtin, Deirdre., 2009, Op. Cit., pp. 122-123. 
427 See Article 289 of the TFEU. 
428 See Article 290 of the TFEU. 
429 See Article 291 of the TFEU. 
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procedures. Non-legislative acts adopted by the Commission, ought to be applied in 
general and may amend or supplement non-essential elements of a legislative act.430 
According to Lenaerts, it is important to make a clear distinction between the 
legislative and executive acts of the Union. The distinction has to be based on the type 
of procedures and its adoption. In his opinion “the autonomous regulations of a more 
technical nature would not justify a direct intervention of the legislator” and take the 
form either of “delegated legislation”, or of “executive acts”.431  
Further, Lenaerts make the distinction between the application of “heavy” 
Comitology procedures and “light” Comitology procedures. Heavy Comitology 
procedures involve intervention of a regulatory committee or management committee 
and a strict control by the European Parliament, which includes a right of call back for 
the legislator in certain cases. Heavy Comitology procedures are applied in the 
delegated acts, since it “would include the legislation adopted by the Council or, more 
frequently, by the Commission on the basis of a power granted either in a precise Treaty 
provision or in a legislative act (first category)”.432 
Light Comitology procedures are characterised as a consultative committee, 
finalised by the Commission under the control of the European Parliament. In this 
regard, light Comitology should be applied as “executive acts”, wherein, it includes acts 
adopted at the Union level or at the national level. The adoptions would be based on 
“legislative” provisions of the Treaties, a legislative act (adopted in compliance with the 
co-decision procedure) or a “delegated act”.433 
Delegated acts are classified as “ex ante” control or subject to revocation. Article 
291 Paragraph 3 of the TFEU provides the rules that govern the Comitology procedures 
of implementing acts. Where it is adopted under ordinary legislative procedures, 
known as a co-decision legislation procedure, the EP and the Council jointly enact the 
acts.434 
There are two procedures used in the adoption of legislative acts, as laid down in 
Article 289 of the TFEU. Legal acts are adopted under these legislative procedures 
classified as “legislative acts”. First, they are known as co-decision procedures or 
ordinary legislative procedures and are defined as a standard procedure where the 
European Parliament and the Council jointly adopt a Commission proposal.435 Second, 
the so-called “special legislative procedures” are applied to specific cases436 provided by 
the Treaties.437 
Non-legislative acts438 are the legal basis of the Comitology. Before the Treaty of 
Lisbon entered into force non-legislative acts were governed under Article 202 of the 
EC Treaty, thus, they were replaced by Articles 290 and 291 of the TFEU. Under the 
                                                 
430 See Brans, Hilde., The Treaty of Lisbon - EU Decision Making Procedures, available at : 
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/The%20Treaty%20of%20Lisbon%20%20EU%20D
ecision%20Making%20Procedures_Brussels%20USEU_EU-27_2-19-2010.pdf, last accessed : 8 July 2011. 
431 See Georgiev, Vihar., Commission on the Loose? Delegated Lawmaking and Comitology after Lisbon, Paper prepared for 
the EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference, Boston, Massachusetts, 3-5 March 2011, Hyatt Regency 
Boston, available at : http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/5g_georgiev.pdf, last accessed : 8 July 2011. 
432 See Georgiev, Vihar., 2011. 
433 See Georgiev, Vihar., 2011. 
434 See Georgiev, Vihar., 2011. 
435 See Article 294 of the TFEU. 
436 For instance approval of the European Union budget. 
437 See Brans, Hilde., 2010. 
438 For instance the Generalized System of Preferences Rules of Origin laid down by Commission Regulation (EU) No 
1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code.  
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new Comitology system, non-legislative acts are divided into delegated acts439 and 
implementing acts440. The new Comitology act entered into force on 1 March 2011.441 
 
VIII.g. Delegated act. 
VIII.g.1. Historical review. 
Delegated acts are considered as the successor of the Regulatory Procedure with 
Scrutiny (RPS) due to some identical similarities. Therefore, as described by Curtin, the 
delegated act procedure is not a new invention, it covers the same scope of application 
covered by the pre-existing PRAC. However, the differences lie in the conditions to 
which the delegated acts are applied.442 The delegated acts and RPS were established 
based on the power conferred by the legislator to the Commission with the aim of 
efficiency.443 However, in the implementation they are supervised and controlled by the 
legislator. Through delegated acts the Commission is given a power to supplement or 
amend the non-essential elements of the basic act.444  The European Parliament has the 
veto right in the adoption of delegated acts, which means the legislator can raise 
objection to anything that it disagrees with.445 
The wording of the definition of delegated acts stipulated in Paragraph 1 Article 
290446 of the TFEU sounds similar to that of the RPS as laid down in Decision 
1999/468/EC and amended by Decision 2006/512/EC. In December 2009, the 
Commission issued communication, informing the European Parliament and the 
Council,447 concerning the implementation of delegated acts.  The Communication 
contained the scope of delegated acts, a framework for the delegation of power, the 
procedure for adopting delegated acts, scrutiny of delegated acts and the “model 
template to provide standard wording for the legislators to define the scope of the 
delegation of power in future legislative acts”.448 The Commission concluded that the 
scope of the delegated acts is not exactly identical with RPS, even though, both the 
delegated acts and RPS are generally applied to amend or supplement certain non-
essential elements of the legislative instrument. The Commission focused on the 
interpretation of the verbs “amend” and “supplement” in Article 290 of the TFEU.  Vihar 
elaborates the distinction of designation and the purpose of the wording “amend” and 
“supplement”, as follows: 
“[...] the Commission believes that by using the verb "amend" the authors of the new 
Treaty wanted to cover theoretical cases, where the Commission is empowered 
formally to amend a basic instrument, irrespective of whether the annex contains 
purely technical measures. With respect to the verb “supplement”, the Commission 
believes that the legislator should assess whether the future measure specifically adds 
                                                 
439 See Article 290 of the TFEU. 
440 See Article 291 of the TFEU. 
441 See Article 16 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
442 See Curtin, Deirdre., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 123. 
443 For instance to amend basic act. 
444 See Hardacre, Alan., and Kaeding, Michael. 
445 See Hardacre, Alan., and Kaeding, Michael. 
446 “[…] A legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application 
to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act. The objectives, content, scope and 
duration of the delegation of power shall be explicitly defined in the legislative acts. The essential elements of an 
area shall be reserved for the legislative act and accordingly shall not be the subject of a delegation of power 
[…]”. 
447 See European Commission Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and The Council 
concerning Implementation of Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, COM(2009) 
673 final, Brussels, 9.12.2009, available at : http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0673:FIN:EN:PDF, last accessed : 11 April 2011. 
448 See Brans, Hilde., 2010- 
 143 
new non-essential rules which change the framework of the legislative act, leaving a 
margin of discretion to the Commission […]”.449 
It is concluded that the scope of the implementation of the delegated acts is 
provided under the Treaty, while the details of the conditions for the implementation of 
the delegated powers is specified in every individual legislative act. 
On the 11 April 2011, the Council issued a note from the Presidency about the 
delegations concerning the common understanding of delegated acts. The note 
contained practical arrangements and agreed clarifications, and preferences applicable 
to delegations of legislative power. It was regulated under Article 290 of the TFEU. It 
must be in accordance with the objectives, contents, scopes, and duration of delegation, 
and expressly defined in each “basic act”. The three main institutions of the Union, i.e. 
the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission, shall cooperate in 
exercising their powers in accordance with the procedures laid down in the TFEU. The 
effective controls over the delegated power are carried out by the European Parliament 
and the Council. Therefore, it is necessary to establish appropriate contacts at an 
administrative level. It is also stressed that the Commission should carry out 
appropriate and transparent consultations, including those at an expert level.450 
In respect of the technical implementations of the duration of the delegation of a 
basic act, the Commission may adopt delegated acts for an undetermined or 
determined period. However, when a determined period is provided, the basic act 
should provide the time duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council 
oppose to an extension not later than three months before the end of each period. 
However, it does not affect the revocation rights of the European Parliament or the 
Council.451 
 
VIII.g.2. How do delegated acts work in GSP? 
Delegated acts are adopted to supplement or amend non-essential elements of 
legal acts. This refers to “non-legislative acts of general application”, which are aimed to 
“supplement or amend laws” on its “non-essential elements”.452 In exercising the 
delegation of power, the Commission is controlled by the Council and the European 
Parliament under “shared competent procedures”. In such control mechanism, the 
Council and the European Parliament have the veto rights to refuse Commission 
measures and/or withdraw the delegation mandate that is given to the Commission.453  
The Council and the European Parliament have to clearly set out the objectives, 
contents, scope, and duration of the delegation of power to the Commission in every 
establishment of a legislative act. If the European Parliament or the Council expresses 
                                                 
449 See Georgiev, Vihar., 2011.  See  also Curtin, Deirdre., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 118 . “[…] According to the Court, delegated 
regulations discussed in such “comitology committees”, as they became known generically, may only amend or 
supplement certain non-essential elements of the law or framework law not covering essential elements of an 
area. This is an attempt to limit the remit of the tasks they carry out and to ensure the underlying legislation 
(framework law) will guide the exercise of delegated power by the Commission and the comitology committees 
[…]”. 
450 See Council of European Union, Note from Presidency to Delegations Subject:  Common Understanding - Delegated Act, 
Brussels, 10 April 2011, 8753/11, PE 164, INST 195, available at : 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st08/st08753.en11.pdf, last accessed : 18 May 2011. 
451 See Council of European Union, Note from Presidency to Delegations Subject:  Common Understanding - Delegated Act, 
Brussels, 10 April 2011. 
452 See Stratulat, Corina., and Molino, Elisa., Implementing Lisbon: what’s new in comitology?, Policy brief, European Policy 
Center, April 2011, available at : http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1258_implementing_lisbon_-
_what_s_new_in_comitology.pdf, last accessed : 8 July 2011. 
453 See Deutsche Bank AG, DB Research, Comitology reloaded: On delegated acts and implementing acts, January 14, 2011, 
available at : http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000268456.pdf, 
last accessed : 8 July 2011. 
 144 
no objection within the time limit set by the legislative act, a delegated act may enter 
into force. The European Parliament votes on a majority of its members, while the 
Council uses a qualified majority.454 To sum up, the delegated powers are granted to the 
Commission to supplement or amend legislation, on the other hand the Council or the 
Parliament may use the veto right upon its adoption. 
 
VIII.h. Implementing Act 
It should be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon has brought some changes to trade 
legislations. In this regard, it also affects GSP legislation and its implementation as it is 
established under CCP. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the CCP is subject to455 ordinary 
legislative procedures provided under Article 294 of the TFUE (Ex Article 251 TEC). 
Ordinary legislative procedures are defined as the joint adoption by the European 
Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive, or decision on a proposal 
submitted by the Commission.456 Ordinary legislative procedures  are also called “co-
decision procedures” since they are jointly adopted by legislative institutions of the 
EU.457 
The legal history of the new Comitology started in March 2010 when the 
Commission proposed a “draft regulation on the mechanisms for control by member 
states of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers”. In the proposed draft 
regulations, the Commission outlines two main principles for the new regulation of the 
Comitology procedures. First, the member states are unilaterally responsible for 
controlling the Commission's exercise of implementing powers. Second, the procedural 
requirements should be proportionate to the nature of implementing acts.458 The new 
Comitology decision requires “the European Parliament and the Council to lay down the 
rules and general principles” concerning mechanisms for control by member states over 
the Commission’s in exercising implementing powers.459 
The implementing act is recognised in the Union Legal System as a “rule making 
measure” that implements the legislative or delegated act in the sense of adopting the 
necessary rules to apply it (or rules that correspond to the level of regulations at a 
national level) or actually applying it to specific cases (individual decisions). The 
implementing acts are carried out by the Commission based on standard Comitology 
procedures.460 The implementing is applied where “uniform conditions for implementing 
legally binding Union acts are needed”. Therefore, the legislator confers the appropriate 
implementing powers to the Commission to be implemented under the control of the 
member states.461 
On 16 February 2011 the new Comitology decision was issued under EU 
Regulation No. 182/2011, concerning “mechanisms for control by member states of the 
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers”.462 After the new Comitology decision 
                                                 
454 See Brans, Hilde., 2010. 
455 See Article 188 C Paragraph 2 (TFEU) Treaty of Lisbon  : “[…] The European Parliament and the Council, acting by 
means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures defining 
the framework for implementing the common commercial policy […]”. 
456 See Article 289 Paragraph 1 of the TFUE. 
457 See The Co-Decision or Ordinary Legislative Procedure, available at : 
http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/procedure/index_en.htm, last accessed : 18 July 2011. 
458 See Georgiev, Vihar., 2011. 
459 See Recital 4 Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011. 
460 See Curtin, Deirdre., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 123. 
461 See Brans, Hilde., 2010. 
462 See Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
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entered into force, the Commission issued Proposals called Omnibus I463 and Omnibus 
II464. Both proposals contain updates of the decisions in various ranges of trade 
legislations adopted in the EU. These proposals do not propose to amend the substance 
of the regulation, or, “do not touch” the essential core of the regulation established 
under the co-decisions procedure. The Omnibus Proposals are based on the existence 
of “delegated power” that is granted to the Commission to set out technical 
requirements, and to adjust existing legislation related to decision-making 
procedures.465  
However, both of those proposals distinguish whether the regulation concerned 
is based on 1999 Comitology decisions or not. The Proposal of Omnibus I focuses on the 
procedures that are not based on the 1999 Comitology decision. The Omnibus I reviews 
whether such procedures are necessarily converted into implementing powers or 
delegated acts. While Proposal Omnibus II concerns the procedures that are based on 
the 1999 Comitology decision, where it is considered whether they should be 
converted into delegated powers or not.466 
The Omnibus I covers 24 regulations from across the area, which includes all 
trade defence instruments, the regulation establishing the EU’s GSP, the EPA’s Market 
Access Regulation, the Trade Barriers Regulation, the Blocking statute responding to 
legislation with extra-territorial effect, and, a number of regulations implementing 
safeguard clauses and managing the implementation of bilateral agreements. The EU's 
GSP is covered under Omnibus I, which means that all procedures under this regulation 
that are not based on the 1999 Comitology decision will be converted into 
implementing powers or delegated acts.467 
The Omnibus II covers 10 regulations in various areas. It consists of instruments 
governing textile and steel trade, the regulation establishing the EU's GSP, the EPA’s 
Market Access Regulation, the regulation preventing trade diversion of certain key 
medicines, a number of regulations managing bilateral agreements, and a regulation 
managing trade sanctions imposed against the US. The procedures under the EU's 
current GSP that are based on the 1999 Comitology decision will be converted into 
delegated powers.468 Apparently, the new Comitology decision has brought significant 
impact to both the EU’s current GSP and the EU's New Proposal of the GSP regulation.     
The Proposal of Omnibus II addresses legislations relating to textiles and steel, 
certain elements of the EU's GSP and the EPA’s Market Access Regulation. The Omnibus 
II is designed to review all legislations that contain Comitology after the Treaty of 
Lisbon entered into force. While the proposal of Omnibus I concerns trade policy and 
competition policy. Since most EU policy areas are subject to Comitology, especially 
trade policy. However, this has been excluded from the existing Comitology decision. 
Therefore, the EU GSP is excluded from Comitology, and converted into delegated 
acts.469 
                                                 
463 See Updating trade legislation procedures: the Omnibus I proposal, Brussels, 7 March 2011, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147618.pdf, , last accessed : 28 March 2011. 
464 See The Commission proposes to update trade legislation procedures: the Omnibus II proposal, Brussels, 15 June 
2011, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/june/tradoc_147978.pdf, last accessed : 1 July 
2011. 
465 See Article 290 Paragraph 1. 
466 See The Commission proposes to update trade legislation procedures: the Omnibus II proposal, Brussels, 15 June 
2011. 
467 See Updating trade legislation procedures: the Omnibus I proposal, Brussels, 7 March 2011. 
468 See The Commission proposes to update trade legislation procedures: the Omnibus II proposal. 
469 See Updating trade legislation procedures: the Omnibus I proposal, Brussels, 7 March 2011. 
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Paragraph 2 Article 291 of the TFEU, stipulates that: “[…] uniform conditions 
are required for the implementation of binding acts, implementing powers may be 
delegated to the Commission, but principally the member states are responsible for the 
implementation of legal acts […]”.470 
Each legislative act that was enacted after 1 March 2011 has to be based on the 
new Comitology decision.471 As explained, the new Comitology decision simplifies the 
Comitology procedures from five types of procedures472 to two types of procedures, 
consisting of “advisory” and “examination” procedures. In both procedures, the 
committees are formed by representatives of member states and are chaired by the 
Commission in which they have the task of scrutinising the proposed implementing 
acts.473 The new Comitology decision provides two committee procedures, i.e., the 
advisory procedure, mirroring the previous advisory procedure as regulated under 
Article 3 of Decision 1999/468/EC, and a new “examination procedure”, replacing the 
“preceding management”474 and “regulatory475 procedure”.  
The examination procedure is applied in the implementing act, covering areas of 
common agricultural and the Common Fisheries Policy, environment, security, safety, 
and protection of health or safety of humans, animals or plants, and CCP. Further, the 
examination procedure is used for implementing measures of “general scope” and 
“programmes with substantial implications”, and regarding taxes. The advisory 
procedure should be used for all other measures.476  
In the new Comitology procedures, all the mechanism is initiated by presentation 
of the Commission regarding the drafting of the implementing act. The committee gives 
its opinion regarding the draft. The validity of the opinion is determined by the specific 
procedure.477 In the advisory procedure, the Comitology Committee delivers its 
opinion, and if it is necessary this is done through voting. The Comitology Committee 
adopts the opinion by simple majority of its component members.478 The Commission 
takes the utmost account of the conclusions drawn from the discussions within the 
committee and of the opinion delivered.479  However, the Commission is not obliged to 
follow this opinion.480 
While, in the examination procedures, the Comitology Committee must deliver its 
opinion upon draft measures using the Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) system for acts 
to be adopted on a proposal from the Commission. Such mechanism is regulated by 
Articles 16(4)481 and (5)482 of the TEU and Article 238(3)483 of the TFEU. The 
                                                 
470 See Deutsche Bank AG, DB Research, Comitology reloaded: On delegated acts and implementing acts. 
471 See Brans, Hilde., 2010. 
472 Advisory, management, regulatory, regulatory with scrutiny and the safeguard procedure. 
473 See Stratulat, Corina., and Molino, Elisa., 2011.  
474 “[…] The management procedure considered as the oldest comitology procedur which established in 1962 in the area 
of CAP. The management procedure considered restricts the Commission the least.  In this procedure if a 
comitology committee objects to a Commission proposal by means of qualified majority vote, the matter is 
forwarded to the Council. In the absence of such a qualified majority against its proposal the Commission can go 
ahead with implementation […]”. See Curtin, Deirdre., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 117-118. 
475 Curtin noted that “[…] the regulatory procedure is much more restricting. The comitology committee has to first 
approve the draft measure by a qualified majority of its members before the Commission can go ahead. If a 
qualified majority of the committee is not in favour, then the matter must be forwarded to the Council as well 
[…]”. See Curtin, Deirdre., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 117-118. 
476 See Georgiev, Vihar., 2011. See also Stratulat, Corina., and Molino, Elisa., 2011. See also Hardacre, Alan., and Kaeding, 
Michael.  
477 See Tosiek, Piotr.. 
478 See Paragraph 1 Article 4 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
479 See Paragraph 2 Article 4 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
480 See Hardacre, Alan., and Kaeding, Michael.. 
481 “[…] As from 1 November 2014, a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the members of the Council, 
comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population 
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Comitology Committee can issue three different opinions, i.e., “negative opinion, positive 
opinion and no opinion”.484  
First, the Commission adopts the draft implementing act when positive opinion is 
issued by the Comitology Committee.485 Second, if negative opinion is issued, then the 
Commission is not allowed to adopt the draft implementing act. However, when 
negative opinion is issued the Commission has two options. First, it can submit an 
amended version of the draft implementing act or a new version of the draft 
implementing act to the same committee within 2 months of issuance of the negative 
opinion. Second, it can submit the draft implementing act within 1 month of such 
issuance to the appeal committee for further consideration.486  
Third, if no opinion is issued, the Commission can adopt the draft implementing 
act with referral to the Comitology Committee.487 The examination procedure in the 
area of CCP has been changed; the Commission cannot adopt the draft of the 
implementing act when no opinion has been issued by the Comitology Committee. With 
respect to the adoption of the draft anti-dumping or countervailing measures, where no 
opinion is delivered by the committee and the “simple majority of its component 
members opposes the draft implementing act”,488 the Commission should conduct 
consultations with the member states. Thus, within 14 days to 1 month later the 
Commission has to submit the draft measures to the Appeals Committee. Then, the 
Appeals Committee has to meet 14 days to 1 month later to make a final decision.489 
The other procedure for the new Comitology decision is “immediately applicable to the 
implementing act”. In the old Comitology decision, this procedure was known as the 
safeguard procedure. 
                                                                                                                                          
of the Union. A blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified 
majority shall be deemed attained. The other arrangements governing the qualified majority are laid down in 
Artic le 238(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union […]”. 
482 “[…] The transitional provisions relating to the definition of the qualified majority which shall be applicable until 31 
October 2014 and those which shall be applicable from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017 are laid down in the 
Protocol on transitional provisions […]“. 
483 “[…] As from 1 November 2014 and subject to the provisions laid down in the Protocol on transitional provisions, in 
cases where , under the Treaties, not all the members of the Council participate in voting, a qualified majority 
shall be defined as follows: 
(a)   A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the member s of the Council representing the 
participating Member States, comprising at least 65 % of the population of these States. A blocking 
minority must include at least the minimum number of Council members representing more than 35 % of 
the population of the participating Member States, plus one member , failing which the qualified majority 
shall be deemed attained; 
(b)   By way of derogation from point (a), where the Council does not act on a proposal from the Commission or 
from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the qualified majority 
shall be define d as at least 72 % of the members of the Council representing the participating Member 
States, comprising at least 65 % of the population of these States […]”. 
484 “[…] In the examination procedure the role of the Council is very significant. It noted by Curtine that the involvement 
of the Council has been obligatory under specific circumstances since comitology  committees were established. 
In the old comitology decision, the management and regulatory procedure are two different procedures not 
being merged. In the previous management committee procedure state that, if a comitology committee gives a 
negative opinion, qualified majority can pass on the proposal to the Council that can then take a decision. In the 
previous regulatory procedure, the committees have three possibilities of opinion, i.e., negative opinion, positive 
opinion and no opinion. In the regard of no opinion or negative opinion, the proposal has to be referred to the 
Council that will then take a decision by qualified majority […]”. See Curtin, Deirdre., Executive Power of the 
European Union : Law, Practices, and the Living Constitution, Volume XII/4, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 
118. 
485 See Paragraph 2 Article 5 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
486 See Paragraph 3 Article 5 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
487 See Paragraph 4 Article 5 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
488 See Subparagraph 1 Paragraph 5 Article 5 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
489 See Subparagraph 2 Paragraph 5 Article 5 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 
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Finally, it has been noted that the Comitology procedure in the current GSP is 
carried out by the Generalised Preferences Committee and is maintained for the coming 
GSP. The Generalised Preferences Committee was established as a part of the control 
mechanism in order to ensure that a transparent and fair system is implemented by the 
Commission. The new Comitology decision that replaced the old Comitology decision 
has created greater differences in the application of the Comitology procedure because 
of the simplification of the procedure. 
 
IX. The EU GSP as derogation from the Common Customs Tariffs. 
The Common Customs Tariffs (CCT) is the main characteristic of the customs 
union. The CCT plays an important role in the import duties from third countries. Since 
1968, the member states have not been allowed to unilaterally carry out customs 
policies, for instance, to suspend customs duties or change CCT. The normal application 
of CCT can only be waived by the Council through the adoption of various tariff 
measure regulations.490 The CCT is regulated under Council Regulation 2658/87, and 
has been established to allow the tariff developments negotiated in the World Customs 
Organization (WCO) to be adopted into the Community system.491 The Commission 
operates the CCT based on the principle laid down in Article 27 of the EC Treaty.492 The 
establishment of CCT is based on Articles 23, 26, and 27 of the EC Treaty.493 Under 
certain conditions the Council or the Commission are able to authorise tariff quotas at 
reduced duty or duty free. Article 26 of the EC Treaty regulates a general power to 
adjust (the power to alter or suspend) duties in the CCT.494 The CCT establishment and 
operation by the Commission must be based on some principles that are set out as 
follows:495 
(a) The need to promote trade between member states and third countries; 
(b) Development in conditions of competition within the Community insofar as they 
lead to an improvement in the competitive capacity of undertakings; 
(c) The requirements of the Community as regards the supply of raw materials and 
semi-finished goods; in this connection the Commission must take care to avoid 
distorting conditions of competition between member states in respect of 
finished goods; and 
(d) The need to avoid serious disturbances in the economies of member states and to 
ensure rational development of production and expansion of consumption within 
the Community. 
The CCT envisages general rules for the interpretation of nomenclature. It’s 
compiled with general rules concerning nomenclature and duties. The Customs Code 
Committee also provide information on the interpretation of the tariffs. 496 The CCT is 
consisting of twenty-one sections and conceiving ninety-nine Chapters. The first 
twenty-four of this Chapter regulate concerning “agricultural products and products of 
the food industry”. All industrial products regulated in the rest of seventy-five 
Chapters.497 Products regulated by Euratom Treaty covered by special rules, thus, it 
included in the CCT annexed to Council Regulation 2658/87. The EU GSP accords tariff 
                                                 
490 See See Moussis, Nicholas., 2005, Op. Cit. p. 69. 
491 See Gormley, Laurence W., EU Law of Free Movement of Goods and Customs Union, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2009, paragraph 2.01. 
492 See Ibid., paragraph 2.02. 
493 See Ibid., paragraph 2.03. 
494 See Ibid., paragraph 2.04. 
495 See Ibid., paragraph 2.05. 
496 See Ibid.,paragraph 2.10. 
497 See Ibid, paragraph 2.06. 
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preferences to all developing countries (beneficiary countries). Quotas and other types 
of modifications to the CCT applied under Article 26 of the EC Treaty. Member states 
not allowed modifying the level of charges imposed under the CCT (or other 
Community legislation) by unilaterally applying additional national duties and/or 
increasing the tariff.498 
According to Article XXIV of WTO, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), for 
example customs unions,  must fulfil two criteria : (i) they should not lead to an 
increase in average trade barriers against third parties; and (ii) they should lead to the 
lowering of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on “substantially all” trade between member 
countries.499 In the custom union, CCT applied to the goods originating from non-
member states. 500 
The membership of Unions is the maximum preferential treatment of the EU. In 
other words, when a state entitled EU membership, they automatically entitled the 
privilege provided by the Union’s. The main characteristic of the Unions is integration 
through establishment common policies such as CCP, CAP, and competition policy, and 
common basic rules. These common rules and policies regulate the movement of goods, 
services, capital, and persons.501 
The “association agreements” defined as the agreement between the EU and the 
third states to establish of Custom Unions or Free Trade Area (FTA). This agreement 
also covers common rules on “non-trade issues” such as mobility of citizens, industrial 
standards, financial aid, and development. For example, the agreement between the EU, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, called as European Economic Association (EEA).502 
Scheme of FTA, defined as the agreement establish between EU and third states. 
For example, Economic-Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated between the EU 
and its former colonies from African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions.503 Under the 
scheme of non-reciprocal preferences, EU established the GSP under the Enabling 
Clause 1979.504 
De facto the EU establish a ranking of their preferential relationship with third 
states, as visualised in the “pyramid of preferences”. These structure of pyramid figure 
out the preferences degree. The lower rank of the preferential treatment granted by EU 
moving to the downward of pyramid, respectively. The left side indicated the legal 
instruments granting the preferential treatment such EU Memberships, Association 
Agreement, Cooperation Agreement, GSP, and CCP. While, on the right side indicated 
the general content of the treatment. 505 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
498 See Ibid, paragraph 2.09. 
499 See Conconi, Paola. 
500 See International Center for Economic Growth, Near East Program, Free Trade Agreements and Rules of Origin, Policy 
Brief, Economic Policy Initiative Consortium Project, Brief#0012, Retreived from : 
http://www.atdforum.org/IMG/pdf/Policy_Brief_RoO.pdf, Last Accessed : 9 April 2011.  
501 See Conconi, Paola. 
502 See Conconi, Paola. 
503 See Conconi, Paola. 
504 See Conconi, Paola. 
505 See Altomonte, Carlo., Nava, Mario., 2005, Op. Cit., p. 358. 
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Figure 2.  The Europe Union Pyramid of Preferences 
 
The “maximum preferential treatment” granted by EU membership placed in the 
top of pyramid. The “association agreement” is the preferential treatment granted by EU 
in the form of custom union. It is requiring unanimous approval by the Council and the 
European Parliament. The third rank from the top pyramid is “cooperation agreement”. 
It is involving free trade provisions and some other forms of technical cooperation. The 
GSP placed in the second step upper the bottom of pyramid that grant reduction of 
common external tariffs countries or specific product as set out under the scheme. In 
the base of the EU pyramid of preferences placed the CCP, wherein no specific 
preferences granted except for the preferences ruled under WTO Agreement.506  In the 
bottom line of the pyramid, provide MFN Treatment scheme, which granted to the 
countries that excludes from trade preferences. Approximately three quarter of EU 
imports are covered by non-preferential (MFN) tariffs.507 
The CCT established based on uniform character, and its purposed to secure 
common market from trade deflections. There are some derogations of CCT, for 
instance, elimination of customs between the member states under FTA or custom 
unions, elimination of tariff under contractual preferential agreement (Cotonou 
Covention) and partial of full suspension of customs duties on imports under GSP 
scheme. The CCT “was intended to achieve an equalization of customs charges levies at 
the frontiers of the union on imports from non member states, in order to prevent any 
trade deflection and distortion of free internal circulation or competitive conditions”.508  
 
X. European Union Generalised System of Preferences scheme. 
The basic concept of the GSP is “offering” developing countries and LDCs a 
reduction in customs duties for “some”509 of their products when entering the EU 
market. Its purpose is to accelerate beneficiary countries to the “fullest participation 
and integration in global trade”. It encourages the improvement of state revenue, GDP, 
and economic development of beneficiary countries, so that they are able to compete in 
trade liberalisation. This preference is “offered” to developing countries and LDCs 
under some eligibilities and criteria or conditions. It must be fulfilled before acquiring 
                                                 
506 See Altomonte, Carlo., Nava, Mario., 2005, Op. Cit., pp. 361-362. 
507 See WTO (2007) : Conconi, Paola,. 
508 See Eeckhout, Piet., 2004, Op. Cit.,  pp. 358-359. 
509 See A scheme of generalised tariff preferences 2009-2011, available at : 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_trade/cx0003_en.htm, last accessed : 26 June 2011. 
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such facility. The criteria or conditions should be established and are solely intended 
“to respond positively” to the development needs of the beneficiary country and not 
contrary to the generalised, non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal principles of the 
Enabling Clause. Since, the notion of GSP is voluntary for the developed country, the 
preference-granting country holds the right to determine a list of products of the 
beneficiary country that are granted a reduction in customs duties.  
The EU GSP was first introduced in 1971. Thus, the GSP was reformed in 1994 to 
become more “development-oriented” and to focus on the poorest countries (countries 
most in need). It should correspond to the GATT instruments. The GSP should be able 
to promote the integration of the developing country into the world economy and 
multilateral trading system.510 
 
X.a. General Arrangement. 
X.a. 1. Conditions and Eligibility.  
General arrangement is granted to all beneficiary countries excludes LDCs. Since 
there is no “precise” definition of developing countries, EU set out the eligibility for 
developing countries to obtain such preferences based on country income classification 
issued by the World Bank. The World Bank classifies country income into three 
categories, i.e., low income, lower middle, and upper middle-income countries, 
depending on GDP per capita. The conditions set out in Article 3 of the current GSP 
regulation merely based on economic criteria. 511    
First, the beneficiary country should not classified by the World Bank as a high-
income country during three consecutive years.512 Second, when the value of imports 
for the five largest sections of its imports covered by the GSP into the Community 
represents less than 75 % of the total GSP-covered imports from that beneficiary 
country into the Community, the beneficiary country excluded from the grantees.513 
The second condition used to control “valume of imports”. Its avoiding to exclude a 
beneficiary country that do not have export diversifications and its export highly 
depend on the GSP scheme. This conditions essentially addressed to ensure the 
beneficiary countries gain the real benefit from the GSP scheme. 
Third, beneficiary country will be removed from the list of beneficiary countries 
when benefited from a preferential trade agreement with the Community that covers 
all the preferences provided by the GSP scheme.514 This conditions established in order 
to avoid overlap of preferences with the same benefits to beneficiary country. This 
circumstance might occur since EU has various range schemes of trade preferences 
granted to the developing countries.515 
 
X.a. 2. Facilities and Benefits. 
Some facilities and benefits are granted under current the general arrangement. 
There are 6350 products covered under current general arrangement listed in annex II 
                                                 
510 See Eeckhout, Piet., 2004, Op. Cit.,  pp. 359-360. 
511 See Paragraph 1 Article 3 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011. 
512 See Paragraph 1 Article 3 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011. 
513 See Paragraph 1 Article 3 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011 . 
514 See Paragraph 2 Article 3 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011. 
515 See Conconi, Paola. See also Altomonte, Carlo., Nava, Mario., 2005, Op. Cit., p. 362. “[…] Whereas both this scholars 
explained about European Union preferential relationship with third states under Common Commercial Policy, 
known as pyramid of preferences […]”. See also Candau, Fabien, Fontagne, Lionel and Jean, Sébastien, The 
utilisation rate of preferences in the EU, Presented at the 7th Global Economic Analysis Conference, Washington 
D.C., 17-19 June 2004, available at : https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/1838.pdf, last 
accessed : 11 March 2011. 
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Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008516. In the previous GSP regulation the products coverage 
are divided into three category, i.e., “very sensitive, sensitive and semi-sensitive 
products”. The current GSP regulation simplified it into one single category, that is, 
“sensitive products”. Access of duties-free granted to non-sensitive products except for 
agricultural components, as stipulated in the Paragraph 1 Article 6 Council Regulation 
(EC) No 732/2008: 
“[…] Common Customs Tariff duties on products listed in Annex II as non-sensitive 
products shall be suspended entirely, except for agricultural components […]”. 
The sensitive products listed in Annex II of the current GSP regulation, its CCT ad 
valorem duties reduced by 3.5 percentage points.517 Products of Sections XI (a) and XI 
(b), textile products, and clothing materials given 20% tariff reduction.518 The general 
arrangement provides specific provisions for sensitive products under CCT specific 
duties with 30% tariff reduction. 519 This facility revoked when the products graduated 
(section graduation) or removed from the list of preference.520 General arrangement 
GSP rates for sensitive products calculated in the following methods: 
a. A flat-rate reduction of 3.5 percentage points to the MFN duty, which applicable 
to the ad valorem duties. 
b. A 30% reduction in the MFN duty where only specific duties apply. 
c. In the case duties are composed of both ad valorem and specific duties, a flat-rate 
reduction of 3.5 percentage points applicable to the ad valorem duties only. 
d. Limited exceptions apply for textiles and clothing (products of sections XI (a) and 
XI (b)), whose MFN duties shall be reduced by 20%. 
 
X.b. Special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good 
governance. 
X.b. 1. Conditions and Eligibility.  
The Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance, known as GSP+, introduced in 2006. The GSP+ scheme established to 
promote the implementation of human rights, environment and internationally labour 
standard, good governance and combating corruption, and combating drugs trafficking. 
Tariff treatment of GSP+ granted based on “economic vulnerability and the sustainable 
development criteria”. This criteria set out the standard instrument of 27 international 
conventions, as listed in Annnex III. Beneficiary country obliged to ratify and 
implement effectively such instrument under their national legislation. In 2006 to 
                                                 
516 See United Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences: Handbook on The Scheme of The 
European Community, pp. 21 - 34, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2008, available at : 
http://193.194.138.235/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc25rev3_en.pdf, last accessed : August 2010. 
517 See Paragraph 2 Article 6 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008. See also Paragraph 3 Article 6 Council 
Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, stipulated : “[…] Where preferential duty-rates, calculated in accordance with 
Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 980/2005, on the Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties applicable on 25 
August 2008, provide for a tariff reduction, for the products referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, of more 
than 3,5 percentage points, those preferential duty-rates shall apply […].” 
518 See Paragraph 2 Article 6 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011. 
519 See Paragraph 4 Article 6 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011, 
stipulated : “[…] Common Customs Tariff specific duties, other than minimum or maximum duties, on products 
listed in Annex II as sensitive products shall be reduced by 30 % […]”. For the application of the paragraphs 2 
and 4 Article 6  Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, it should referred to paragraphs 5 and 6 as well of the 
same article, stipulated : “[…] Where Common Customs Tariff duties on products listed in Annex II as sensitive 
products include ad valorem duties and specific duties, the specific duties shall not be reduced. “Where duties 
reduced in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 4 specify a maximum duty, that maximum duty shall not be 
reduced. Where such duties specify a minimum duty, that minimum duty shall not apply […].” 
520 See Paragraph 7 Article 6 Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011, 
stipulated : “[…] The tariff preferences referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall not apply to products from 
sections in respect of which those tariff preferences have been removed, for the country of origin concerned, in 
accordance with Article 13 and Article 20(8) as listed in column C of Annex I […]”. 
 153 
2008, there are 14 developing countries granted GSP+ arrangement. The GSP+ deemed 
as the effective and efficient tool to promote sustainable development and good 
governance through trade. This scheme still maintained and unchanged until 31 
December 2013521. 
The criteria of economic vulnerability on GSP+ set out in the Paragraph 2 Article 
8. A beneficiary country qualified as vulnerable country based on categories, as follows: 
(a) A developing country, which is not classified by the World Bank as a high-
income country during three consecutive years. 
(b) Whereas the five largest sections of its GSP covered imports into the Community 
represent more than 75 % in value of its total GSP covered imports, or in other 
words, it has a non-diversified economy.522 
(c) A developing country of which the GSP covered imports into the Community 
represent less than 1 % in value of the total GSP covered imports into the 
Community.523 
Paragraph 1 Article 8 of the GSP regulation laid down requirement for beneficiary 
countries to obtain facilities of GSP+. Beneficiary countries has to meet this 
requirement before submitting a request of GSP+ facilities and benefits. These 
requirements obliges the candidate beneficiary country of GSP+ to : 
(a)  It has ratified and effectively implemented 27 international conventions listed 
in Annex III in the current GSP regulation. 
(b)  It has to give an undertaking to maintain the ratification of the international 
conventions and their implementing legislation and measures, and accepts 
regular monitoring and review of its implementation record in accordance with 
the implementation provisions of the conventions it has ratified. 
(c)  It has to meet economic vulnerability criteria. 
The Commission will keep reviewing and assessing the status of ratification and 
enforcement of the instrument in the beneficiary countries by examining available 
information from relevant monitoring bodies. The Commission submitting to the 
Council the summary report on the status of ratification and available 
recommendations provided by relevant monitoring bodies.524 It will be used as a 
discussion reference for the next regulation. This mechanism is aimed to ensure the 
GSP+ utilized by the beneficiary countries appropriately.  
Only beneficiary country that meets the conditions set out by the regulation able 
to propose a request to obtain facilities of theGSP+ scheme. 525  Therefore, beneficiary 
country needs to investigate their possibility of obtaining additional preferences under 
GSP scheme.526 Beneficiary country has to submit the writing request to the 
Commission accompanied with comprehensive information concerning the ratification 
of the related conventions. Beneficiary countries have to submit evidence of the 
adoption and implementation of those conventions in their national legislation.527 The 
Commission examining the request from the beneficiary country or territory on the 
                                                 
521 See Paragraph 5 Article 1 Regulation (EU) No 512/2011 of  the European Parliament and of The Council. 
522 “[…] Non diversified economy is measured according to the fact that its five largest sections of GSP-covered imports 
represent more than 75% in value of its total GSP-covered imports to the EU […]”. See EU GSP Handbook.  
523 Bartels noted that this criterion is not defined in terms of the country at issue, but in terms of EU imports, an entirely 
independent factor. As such, by definition it cannot be a relevant criterion for discriminating between 
developing countries. 
524 See Paragraph 3 Article 8 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011. 
525 See United Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences: Handbook on The Scheme of The 
European Community,  p. 13, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2008, available at : 
http://193.194.138.235/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc25rev3_en.pdf, last accessed : August 2010. 
526 See Ibid., 
527 See Paragraph 2 Article 9 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011. 
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eligibility to obtains GSP+.528  The formalities and procedures to obtain GSP+ facility 
seen as obstacle for beneficiary countries, on the other hand, EU needs to ensure that 
GSP+ granted appropriately. In this point, Lorand Bartels criticizing GSP+ as follows: 
“[…] a further difficulty with the EU’s GSP+ arrangement concerns the sequencing of 
the grant of preferences and the conditions to be met. Here the EU seems to have 
created a paradox. If one accepts the stated rationale for this arrangement, the GSP+ 
preferences are designed to enable countries to meet the cost of ratifying and 
implementing certain conventions. The problem is that the preferences are also 
only made available once this has been done. As there is a lead time before the 
benefits begin to flow, this means that the GSP+ beneficiaries are required to bear 
an immediate cost, which, in theory, will be compensated later […]”.529 
On this point of view, the conditions set out under GSP+ will burden extra cost to 
beneficiary countries. This extra cost is non-trade conditions, which probably not all 
the beneficiary countries could afford it. In addition, Bartels also noted, “a country that 
has not ratified a convention may have precisely the same development needs as one that 
has”.530 
Moreover, the conditions of GSP+ seems do not taking into account existence of 
the territories as the GSP beneficiary, where they have the same right to obtain those 
facilities and benefits. The special territory, for instance Macao531, lacks of the 
international legal personality required to ratify the conventions, consequently ipso 
facto ineligible for GSP+ preferences. Based on such reason Bartels criticized the GSP+ 
to comply with the condition set out by the Appellate Body regarding “similarly 
situated” interpretation on the same preferences. 532 
 
X.b.2. Facilities and Benefits. 
Facilities and benefits of the GSP+ is designed to promote implementation of 
sustainable development and good governance in the beneficiary country. The GSP+ 
established as the response of specific needs of developing country to reduce poverty, 
increasing people welfare, recognition, and protection of human right, eliminating 
discrimination between man and woman, and improving economic development.. For 
instance, the international convention labor standard and environment deemed give 
directly influence toward industrialization in developing countries. As a matter of fact, 
many developing countries do not put enough concerns to social problems that 
indirectly resulted from the industrialization process. Such as standard minimum age 
of labor, wages standard, worker insurance protection, wages equality between man 
and woman, environmentally sounds waste management of industries, and corruption 
in the public services. In the end, the people welfare significantly contributes the 
economic growth of a country.  
There are 6400 products coverage in the GSP+, listed in the Annex II of the 
current GSP regulation. The facilities and benefits provide under GSP+ scheme govern 
by Article 7 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008.533  Non-sensitive products 
                                                 
528 See Paragraph 1 (b) Article 9 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 
512/2011. 
529 See Bartels, Lorand., The WTO legality of the EU’s GSP+ arrangement, available at : 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=986525&rec=1&srcabs=667283, last accessed : 10 
December 2010. 
530 See Bartels, Lorand. 
531 See Annex I Beneficiary countries and territories of the Community’s scheme of generalised tariff preferences of the 
Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011. 
532 See Bartels, Lorand. 
533 See United Conference on Trade and Development, 2008. The calculation of GSP+ rate :  
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maintained duty-free entry, where “CCT ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex 
II which originates in a country included in the special incentive arrangement for 
sustainable development and good governance shall be suspended.”534 In respect of 
sensitive product, duty free entry is applied, but when duty composed of both ad 
valorem and specific duties.535  
 
X.c. EBA. 
X.c. 1. Conditions and Eligibility.  
The legal basis of special arrangement for LDC is paragraph 2 (d), paragraph 6, 
paragraph 7 and paragraph 8 of the Enabling Clause 1979.536 The policy to provide 
special arrangement for LDC due to consideration regarding special economic 
difficulties and particular development, financial and trade needs537 of LDC. Developed 
countries are required to design particular policy to “respond positively” such needs.538 
According to the rules laid down in the Paragraph 8 Article 11 of the Council 
Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, the requirement to grant the special arrangement, the 
beneficiary country must includes in the UN list of the LDC. Means if the beneficiary 
country excluded from the UN list of the LDC, accordingly, the beneficiary country in 
should be withdrawn from the list of the special arrangement for the LDCs. After the 
beneficiary country removed from the list of grantees special arrangement for the LDC, 
according to the GSP regulation, it should be established a transitional period at least 
three years. Since the tariffs reduction for LDC under EBA regime almost zero percent, 
therefore, such transitions period is very crucial to provide opportunity for 
government and traders re-adjust their trade policies to compete in the market. 
 
X.c. 2. Facilities and Benefits. 
The beneficiary countries that included into the list of grantees special 
arrangement for the LDC entitled benefits for their products as follows: 
                                                                                                                                          
1. Total suspension of duty for all eligible products, whether sensitive or non sensitive, whose duty is 
composed of ad valorem duty only. 
2. Total suspension of duty for all eligible products, whether sensitive or non sensitive, whose duty is 
composed of specific duty only. 
3. When the duty rate of an eligible product is composed of both ad valorem and specific duty, only the ad 
valorem duty is totally suspended, for instance the total payable tariff is the specific duty component only. 
If the tariff is composed of 10% (ad valorem duty) and 50 euros per 1,000 kg (specific duty), the total 
suspension of duty applies to the 10% part only, meaning that the full amount of the specific duty 
component continues to apply (in this case, 50 euros per 1,000 g). 
534 See Paragraph 1 Article 7 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011. 
535 See Paragraph 2 Article 7 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011, 
stipulate : “[…] Common Customs Tariff specific duties on products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be 
suspended entirely, except for products for which the Common Customs Tariff duties include ad valorem duties. 
For products with CN code 1704 10 90, the specific duty shall be limited to 16 % of the customs value […]”. 
536 See Waiver Decision on the Generalized System of Preferences, GATT Document L/3545, 25 June 1971, BISD 18S/24 
(attached as Annex D-2 to the Panel Report). See also Waiver Decision on Preferential Tariff Treatment for 
Least-Developed Countries, WT/L/304, 15 June 1999. 
537 See Paragraph 6 of the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation 
of Developing Countries (Enabling Clause), GATT Document L/4903, 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/203. 
538 This refers to the paragraph 3 (c) of the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (Enabling Clause), GATT Document L/4903, 28 November 1979, 
BISD 26S/203. See also Paragraph 6.7 Panel Reports in EC-Preferences Case : “[…] India overlooks that Paragraph 
3(c) applies also with respect to the preferences for LDCs envisaged under Paragraph 2(d). It is obvious that 
such preferences must respond to the specific needs of the LDCs, and not to those of all developing countries. 
Moreover, India'sinterpretation would have the result that any GSP would have to be administered on a 'lowest 
common denominator basis […]”. 
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(a) The product coverage under this arrangement includes the entire product 
except arms.539 
(b) The Common Customs Tariff duties on all products from Chapters 1 to 97 of the 
Harmonised System totally suspended except those from Chapter 93.540 
(c) The Common Customs Tariff duties on the products under tariff heading 
1006541 reduced by 80 % until 31 August 2009, and suspended entirely with 
effect from 1 September 2009.542 
(d) The Common Customs Tariff duties on the products under tariff heading 
1701543 reduced by 80 % until 30 September 2009, and suspended entirely 
with effect from 1 October 2009.544 
Paragraph 6 Article 11 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 laid down 
that the rule about import licence. Whereas, the imports of products under tariff 
heading 1701 under special arrangement for the LDCs required import licence. This 
rule is effective from 1 October 2009 to 30 September 2015. 545 
 
XI. Graduation and de-graduation system in the EU Generalised System of 
Preferences. 
XI.a. The graduation doctrine   
The “graduation” doctrine in the GSP was developed by the US, and was then 
adopted by the EU and Japan. Hudec defines the graduation doctrine as “an advanced 
developing countries and the market access they get depends on their reciprocal 
concessions”. Literally, graduation is defined as the condition when the non-reciprocity 
policy is no longer “viable”. Hudec stresses that the “graduation” principle demands 
reciprocity only from the “more advanced developing countries”. In this regard, Hudec 
does not directly mention developed countries but prefers to use the word “advanced” 
to classify developing countries to which the demands of reciprocity are applied.546 
According to Hudec, the graduation mechanism is practically used in trade 
liberalisation, in the safeguard mechanism and in removing benefits from the GSP 
scheme. 
The basic concept of graduation is defined when the “advanced developing 
country” has to offer reciprocity or developed countries will not grant any further trade 
liberalisation on their products.547  According to this basic idea, the word “advanced” 
removes the inequalities position that is used to justify legal “leniency” under the non-
                                                 
539 It should be noted that “Everything but Arms” (EBA) initiative which established under Regulation (EC) No. 
416/2001 amending Regulation (EC) No. 2802/98, has been incorporated into  special arrangement for the 
LDCs under Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011 of The 
European Parliament and of The Council. 
540 See Paragraph 1 Article 11 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 
512/2011. 
541 HS Codes of Heading 1006 is Rice.  
542 See Paragraph 2 Article 11 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 
512/2011. 
543 HS Codes of Heading 1701 is Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose, in solid form Raw sugar not containing 
added flavouring or colouring matter. 
544 See Paragraph 3 Article 11 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011 
of The European Parliament and of The Council.  See also Paragraph 4 Article 11 of the Council Regulation (EC) 
No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011.  Following this regulation, “[…] by the period 1 
October 2009 to 30 September 2012 the importer of products under tariff heading 1701 must undertake to 
purchase such products at a minimum price not lower than 90 % of the reference price (on a cif basis) set in 
Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 of 20 February 2006 on the common organisation of the 
markets in the sugar sector (1) for the relevant marketing year […]”. 
545 See Paragraph 5 Article 11 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011 
of The European Parliament and of The Council. 
546 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 179. 
547 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 180. 
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reciprocal principle.548 The basic concept of graduation also places the “advanced 
developing country” and developed country as equal trading partners, where trade 
concessions can be applied. As Hudec describes, “the graduation doctrine merely carries 
the idea to declare that advanced developing countries are rich enough to pay concessions 
like everyone else”. 
The trade liberalisation framework applies the principle of fair competition and 
market economy. Under the trade liberalisation system, products and services enter 
global competition with a free price mechanism, where supply and demand has a 
significant role in the influence of the price.  
Graduation is also applied in emergency safeguard measures that are imposed 
when imports of a particular product cause injury to a domestic industry.549 For 
instance in the GSP, normal CCT duties are applied to the product benefitting from GSP 
when the importation of the product originating in a beneficiary country “causes or 
threatens to cause, serious difficulties to a Union producer of like or directly competing 
products”. Graduation in this context safeguards measures that are not considered the 
standard definition of “advanced developing country”, since such graduation is classified 
as necessary conduct. Such graduation is usually applied to a certain kind of product 
and for valid periods, which means that the preferences tariff can be re-applied again to 
the product of concern. 
The application of the graduation mechanism in the EU GSP is divided into two: 
“total” graduation, and “section” graduation. “Total graduation” is based on the concept 
that the benefits of the GSP are unilateral concessions that are granted to help 
developing countries. The GSP must lose its justification when countries reach a certain 
level of economic development. At that point, GSP treatment should be withdrawn 
entirely.550 
As explained above, the graduation doctrine is defined as the condition when 
“advanced developing countries” may have to offer some degree of reciprocity if they 
wish to avoid a corrosion of their trade position. The limited concessions that are 
presently developed could cause exit from the “graduation game”, however, there is 
need for overall change in the trade policies of developing countries.551 
Noted by Hudec, the US continues to insist on making its own decisions about 
who is poor enough to be worthy of discrimination. It also claims the unilateral right to 
graduate most prosperous developing countries and to revoke preferences in 
individual product categories when they are no longer “needed” (in the EU GSP system 
it is known as section graduation).552 Further, the US also points out that poverty is not 
the only criterion of moral desert.553 This means that poverty no longer becomes the 
only justification to consider whether a developing country deserves or does not 
deserve to receive GSP facilities. 
Current US GSP legislation applies the “moral worth” of developing countries 
according to whether they are cooperating to help prevent the traffic of narcotics, the 
                                                 
548 Japan also used term “advanced” beneficiaries on their GSP graduation. 
549 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 180. 
550 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 181. 
551 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 183. 
552 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 191. 
553. “[…] Desert is sometimes proposed as a fundamental principle of morality or justice: The good things in life should 
accrue to people in proportion to their moral desert or means as the condition of being deserving of something. 
This principle can be regarded as a regulatory ideal a standard for designing, assessing, and reforming 
institutions, laws, and social practices […]”. See Arneson, Richard J., The Smart Theory of Moral Responsibility 
and Desert, version 8/23/02, available at : 
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/smarttheory2.pdf, last accessed : 12 September 2011. 
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counterfeiting of goods and the theft of intellectual property.  The EU GSP scheme also 
uses “non-trade conditionality”, in the previous arrangement known as the Drugs 
Arrangement. Thus, it is replaced by a special incentive arrangement on sustainable 
development and good governance in which the requirements of ratifying and 
implementing 27 international conventions are imposed. Since the “conditions 
unrelated to trade554 or non-trade considerations555 are imposed”, anything can become a 
condition of moral worthiness.556  
The Graduation mechanism is considered as an important “modification” of GSP 
implementation reform. However, for the beneficiary country that graduated from the 
scheme, the value of what the market access created under GSP is extremely reduced. 
The Graduation mechanism apparently proves that the GSP system is an unstable 
investment for developing countries, due to the notion of a “grant” from the preference-
granting country.557 Graduation from the GSP list could affect the state income of the 
beneficiary country (export earnings) and traders (exporter in beneficiary country and 
importer in preference-granting country). Hudec argues that the GSP and other 
preference schemes are a bad investment for developing countries. It has been 
identified that market access is the main problem for developing countries where they 
lack the function of economic power.558 
Graduation potentially worsens the trade conditions for the individual 
beneficiary countries that are excluded by the preference-granting country. Wherein, 
after graduation, the developing countries have to compete with other developing 
countries, which still receive GSP facilities. In other words, the beneficiary country 
excluded from the GSP list has a “discriminatory advantage” that did not exist before.559 
The graduation mechanism could apparently be the most powerful “weapon” of the 
preference-granting countries to increase their position bargaining under the Enabling 
Clause to accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries.560 
With respect to such clause, the principle of stability and predictability should be 
applied when preference market access is facilitated under the GSP scheme that has 
been removed. It is also important to induce new investment or to collect the value of 
investments already made.561 
According to Hudec, although GSP is a bad investment, it is not easy to erase such 
system from the world trading system. Graduation is considered as a good instrument 
to control the implementation of GSP for the countries in most need. However, it is not 
a good solution to invite discrimination in trade. Let us assume that the competitors 
still enjoy preferential facilities, this would disadvantage or maybe worsen the position 
of graduated countries. It should be noted, that discrimination still exists in trade and in 
this matter, graduation puts a country vis-à-vis with its competitor under 
discriminatory circumstances. Even though, “advanced developing countries” are able to 
endure such change and are maybe compelled to do so if they reach an income-export 
level where welfare claims become politically unacceptable.  Nevertheless, it will never 
be possible to persuade them that graduation from GSP is for the sake of their economic 
                                                 
554 See Julia  Ya  Qin, Defining  Non-discrimination  Under  The Law  Of  The  World  Trade  Organization, available at : 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/qinnondiscrimination.pdf, p. 289.  
555 See also Robert, Howse.,, 2003., Op. Cit., p. 394. 
556 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 191. 
557 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., pp. 191-193. 
558 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., pp. 192-194. 
559 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 195. 
560 “[…] developed countries have never accepted that they are only able to operate a GSP scheme where the scheme is 
completely unconditional and non-selective […]”. See Robert, Howse., 2003, Op. Cit., p. 395. 
561 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., pp. 191-193. 
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benefit.562 In addition, Özden and Reinhardt have studied that when GSP preferences 
are removed by graduation, developing countries become less protectionist, and more 
competitive.563   
 
XI.b. Graduation mechanism under EU GSP. 
 The graduation system under trade preferences is considered as a “counter-
reaction”, wherein the advance developing country is revoked from trade preference 
beneficiary status. Since the 1970s, the graduation system has obtained some formal 
recognition under trade preferences. Nowadays, it has been adopted into the EU GSP. 
The graduation system was established in order to face the strong demands of 
enlargement of trade preferences that continue today.564 The graduation system is 
maintained for the New EU GSP scheme. The Graduation system is applied to all 
products in a section of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) code.565  
The graduation system is also defined as the withdrawal of the beneficiary 
country when entire sections of products originating from the concerned country meet 
the standards of the graduation section.566 In this regard, graduation of the beneficiary 
country from the GSP scheme must be based on certain conditions referred to in 
sections of the CCT. The withdrawal of preferences would not be taken immediately but 
during the three consecutive years, the beneficiary country has to meet the standard of 
graduation. The evaluation of three consecutive years aims to apply principles of 
predictability and fairness in the graduation system. Such principles are used to 
minimise the “effect of large and exceptional variations in import statistics”. The most 
important standard of “three consecutive years” is also aimed to provide an “early-
warning system” for traders in beneficiary countries before any graduation is 
executed.567 
The beneficiary country graduates from the GSP if its export products are able to 
compete on the EU market. In other words, if the beneficiary country’s market 
performance reaches a certain standard as determined by the EU, the concerned 
beneficiary country will be assessed in the graduation mechanism. The standard of 
market performance for the beneficiary country can be interpreted when the level of 
competitiveness and import penetration are secured for further growth, even without 
preferential access to the EU market.568 Such graduation might lead to the suspension 
of preferences because it is considered that the concerned beneficiary country does not 
need the GSP scheme to increase its export earnings. The Commission argues that, 
“given the high level of competitiveness, there is no further justification for a continuation 
of preferential tariff treatment”.569  
Therefore, the graduation mechanism should not be interpreted as a sort of 
penalty but as a parameter to measure the “fruitfulness” of GSP scheme implementation 
                                                 
562 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 195. 
563 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 163. 
564 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., pp. 16-17. 
565 See United Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences : Handbook on The Scheme of 
The European Community, 2008, Op. Cit., pp. 21 - 34, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2008, available at : 
http://193.194.138.235/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc25rev3_en.pdf, last accessed : August 2010.. 
566 See Article 13 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
567 See Recitals 20 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
568 See available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/march/tradoc_142662.pdf, last accessed : 04 May 
2011. 
569 See Stevens,Christopher., Kennan, Jane., GSP Reform: a longer-term strategy (with special reference to the ACP), Report 
prepared for the Department for International Development, Institute of Development Studies, February, 2005,  
p. 6, available at : http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/Stevens-Christopher-and-Kennan-
Jane_EN_022005_IDS_GSP-reform-a-longer-term-strategy.pdf, last accessed : 04 May 2011. 
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in the beneficiary country concerned. Graduation is an indication of export boost in the 
beneficiary country. The graduation mechanism is designed to ensure that benefits 
from the scheme go to the targeted country that is most in need.570 In short, graduation 
is the crucial mechanism in “focusing the GSP goals”.571 
As mentioned above, there are two kinds of graduation mechanism under EU 
GSP.572 The first mechanism is “total exclusion”, “revocation” or “country graduation” 
from the GSP scheme list.573 A beneficiary country is totally excluded from the GSP 
scheme when it meets two conditions. First, the beneficiary country has been classified 
by the World Bank as a high-income country over three consecutive years. Second, 
when the value of imports for the five largest sections of its imports covered by the GSP 
into the Union, represents less than 75 % of the total GSP covered imports from that 
beneficiary country into the Union.  
The requirements of total exclusion set out in the previous GSP scheme574 were 
based on “development index”575, “market share” 576 and “specialisation index”577. 
Panagariya defines the development index as a parameter measuring the “country’s 
industrial development and participation in international trade relative to EU”.578 The 
specialisation index refers to the importance of a sector in Community imports from a 
beneficiary country. It is based on the ratio between that country's share in all imports 
                                                 
570 See Customs duties and procedures, EU GSP 2009-2011 European Union agrees to maintain trade preferences for 
developing countries, available at : 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/documents/eu_india/022_06_tariff_preferences_en.pdf, last accessed : 
4 May 2011. See also : A simpler mechanism for graduation, available at : http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/fr/article_4337_fr.htm, last accessed : 4 May 2011. See also Stevens, Christopher., Kennan, Jane., 
2005, Op. Cit., p. 6. 
571 See Stevens, Christopher., Kennan, Jane., 2005, Op. Cit., p. 5. 
572 See Panagariya, 
 
Arvind, EU Preferential Trade Policies and Developing Countries, 27 August, p. 13, available at : 
http://129.3.20.41/eps/it/papers/0308/0308014.pdf, last accessed : 04 May 2011. 
573 See Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
574 See Article 12 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of generalised 
tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 (Official Journal, L 211/1, 6.8.2008, 
EN), available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/may/tradoc_113021.pdf, last accessed : May 
2011. The tariff preferences shall be removed in respect of products originating in a beneficiary country, of a 
sector which has met, during three consecutive years, either of the following criteria: 
(a) the country's development index as defined in Annex II, is higher than -2 :  Community imports from that 
country of all products of the sector concerned and included in the arrangements enjoyed by that country 
exceed 25 % of Community imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex 
I; 
(b) the country's development index as defined in Annex II, is higher than -2 : the specialisation index of the 
sector concerned is higher than the threshold corresponding to that country's development index, as 
defined in Annex II, and. Community imports from that country of all products of the sector concerned and 
included in the arrangements enjoyed by that country exceed 2 % of Community imports of the same 
products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I. 
 
Development index 
= or > - 1,00 
< - 1,00 and = or > - 1,23 
< - 1,23 and = or > - 1,70 
< - 1,70 and = or > - 2,00 
Threshold for the Specialisation index 
100 % 
150 % 
500 % 
700 % 
 
575 See Annex II Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Generalized System of Preferences, UNCTAD GSP Newsletter,  Number 8, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/Misc/2005/7/, 
December 2005, available at : http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncdmisc20057_en.pdf, last accessed : May 
2011. Panagariya, 
 
Arvind, 2002, Op. Cit., p. 13. Stevens,Christopher., Kennan, Jane., 2005, Op. Cit., p. 6. 
576 See Stevens,Christopher., Kennan, Jane., 2005, Op. Cit., p. 6. 
577 See Paragraph (b) Article 12 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme 
of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004. 
578 See Panagariya, 
 
Arvind, 2002, Op. Cit., p. 13. 
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from all countries, and all products of the sector concerned, whether included in the 
preferential arrangements or not, and its share in all imports from all countries.579  
The new conditions of total exclusion are addressed to ensure that a country, 
even if it is classified as a high-income country, is not excluded from the scheme if the 
country remains dependent on a few products for a large proportion of its exports to 
the EU.580 This indicates the high dependency and lack of diversification of export 
products from the beneficiary country.  
There is another reason for total exclusion related to the Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs). When a beneficiary country benefits from a preferential trade 
agreement with the Union that covers all the preferences provided by the present 
scheme to that country, it should be removed from the list of beneficiary countries.581  
The second mechanism is “graduated section” or “product-specific graduation”. 
This section is defined as any of the sections of the CCT as laid down by Regulation 
(EEC) No. 2658/87.582 The graduated section was introduced in 1995 under Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 3281/94. The graduation mechanism came into effect on 1 January 
1998 and is maintained under the present GSP regulation by simplification of its 
criteria.583 
The previous mechanism in the “graduated section” was based on the 
combination of several criteria including: “share of GSP imports”, “development index”, 
and “export-specialisation index”.584 The current GSP system uses single 
“straightforward” conditions, where the share of the country’s imports under the GSP in 
the sector concerned reach a certain threshold. 
As noted by Panagariya, under this mechanism the beneficiary country can be 
graduated or excluded from certain sectors of the GSP. The graduated section is 
regulated in Paragraph 1 Article 13, under the GSP regulation, and stipulates as follows: 
“[...] when the average value of Community imports from that country of products 
included in the section concerned and covered by the arrangement enjoyed by that 
country exceeds 15 % of the value of Community imports of the same products from 
all beneficiary countries and territories over three consecutive years, on the basis of 
the most recent data available on 1 September 2007. For each of the Sections 
XI(a)585 and XI(b)586, the threshold shall be 12.5 % […]” 
Once export products from the beneficiary country achieve a certain level of 
competitiveness in a particular section, thus the section will be excluded from the GSP 
beneficiary. The graduated section is applied for general arrangement587 and special 
                                                 
579 See Annex II of the Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of generalised 
tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004. 
580 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,  Generalized System of Preferences, UNCTAD GSP 
Newsletter,  Number 8, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/Misc/2005/7/, December 2005. 
581 See Article 3 paragraph 2 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. See also United Conference on Trade and 
Development, Generalized System of Preferences : Handbook on The Scheme of The European Community, 
2008, Op. Cit., pp. 21 – 34, stipulates :  
“[…] if a beneficiary country is covered by another free trade agreement with the EU that provides at least the 
same preferences provided by this GSP scheme, it too shall be removed from the GSP beneficiary country list 
[…]” 
582 See Article 2 paragraph b of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
583 See also United Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences : Handbook on The 
Scheme of The European Community, 2008, Op. Cit., pp. 21 – 34. 
584 See Article 12 and Annex II of the Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Generalized System of Preferences, UNCTAD GSP Newsletter,  Number 8, 
UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/Misc/2005/7/, December 2005, available at : 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncdmisc20057_en.pdf, last accessed : May 2011. 
585 Textiles.  
586 Clothing.  
587 See Article 6 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
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incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance588. 
Nevertheless, the graduated section set out in Paragraph 1 of Article 13 cannot be 
applied to a beneficiary country in respect of any section that represents more than 50 
% of the value of all GSP covered imports into the Union originating from that 
country.589 This indicates that the degree of dependency of the beneficiary country on 
export earnings of that section is very high, so that section is exempted from 
graduation.590 The LDCs cannot be graduated under the EBA arrangement because the 
graduation mechanism is only applied to the general arrangement and special incentive 
arrangement for sustainable development and good governance.591  
With regard to the graduation mechanism, either total removal or graduated 
section, the Commission is obliged to give notification to the beneficiary country 
concerned.592 This procedure is part of the implementation of the transparency and 
predictability principle in order to give assurance in doing business towards traders 
especially in the beneficiary country. The graduated section is applied for the whole 
period of GSP regulation. Wherein, the recent regulation was applied from 1 January 
2009 to 31 December 2011.593 
 
XI.c. Function of trade statistic in graduation and de-graduation. 
The calculation of the graduated section is based on the Harmonized System (HS) 
Commodity Codes Section594 and statistical sources, which are taken from Eurostat’s595 
external trade statistics.596 Intra- and Extra-EU Trade Data (COMEXT) statistics serve as 
the basis to calculate the share of imports to check whether the graduation threshold 
has been reached. COMEXT597 is a database with statistics representing the commercial 
interchanges between the member states of the EU and between EU member states and 
their commercial partners.598 
The main sources of statistical data on international trade are customs records. 
Following the adoption of the Single Market on 1 January 1993, customs formalities 
between member states were removed, and so there was a new data collection system. 
Intra-statistic (Intrastat) was set up for intra-EU trade. In the Intrastat599 system, intra-
                                                 
588 See Article 7 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
589 See Article 13 paragraph 4 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
590 See European Union Delegation of the European Commission to Malaysia, The new EU Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) and what it offers to Malaysia : Overview of the new EU-GSP scheme. 
591 See available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/march/tradoc_142662.pdf, last accessed : 04 May 
2011. 
592 See Article 3 paragraph 3 and Article 13 paragraph 3 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
593 See Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 
1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007. 
594 See available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/march/tradoc_142662.pdf, last accessed : 04 May 
2011. 
595 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1172/95 of 22 May 1995 on the statistics relating to the trading of goods by the 
Community and its Member States with non-member countries (OJ L 118, 25.5.1995, p. 10). Regulation as last 
amended by Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 284, 
31.10.2003, p. 1). 
596 See Article Article 13 paragraph 5 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
597 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/external_trade/data/database  
598 See United Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences : Handbook on The Scheme of 
The European Community, 2008, Op. Cit., pp. 21 – 34.. See also Graduation from the Generalised System of 
Preference Scheme of the European Union (EU - GSP Scheme), TDB RU 33 99 02, Vol 3, 12 January 1998, 
available at :  http://www.customs.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/2EBF119F-2F7B-4B88-A558-
75760993103E/12772/98GraduationFromThe Generalised1.pdf, last accessed : 5 January 2011. 
599 “[…] Intrastat System is statistics related to the trading goods between Member States, which is regulates by 
Paragraph (1) Article 5 of Council Regulation 638/2004 (OJ L102/1). Intrastat data is collected by the national 
authorities and the relevant natural or legal persons registered for Value Added Tax are responsible for 
providing the information for the intrastat system to their national authority; failure by any party responsible 
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EU trade data is collected directly from trade operators and monthly declarations are 
sent to the relevant national statistics administration. Information of extra-EU and 
intra-EU trade is collected by member states every month. External trade data are 
subject to frequent revisions, due to errors, omissions. When data for the latest period 
is released, thus, revised data for previous periods are also available. 
External trade is trade statistics that track the value and quantity of goods traded 
between EU member states (intra-EU trade) and between member states and non-EU 
countries (extra-EU trade). It is the official source of information on imports, exports, 
and trade balance of the EU, its member states and the euro area. External trade 
statistics is an important data source for many public and private sector decision-
makers at an international, EU and national level. The external trade statistics are used 
for several benefits, especially to support the Union’s planning strategy on trade policy.  
For example: “to inform multilateral and bilateral negotiations within the framework of 
the common trade policy; define and implement anti-dumping policy; evaluate the 
progress of the Single Market or the integration of EU economies; carry out market 
research by businesses and define their commercial strategy; and compile balance of 
payments statistics and national accounts”.600 
Council Regulation (EC) 1172/95 governs statistics collection in external trade 
between the EU and its member states with third countries.601 Such statistics are 
compiled from all the goods that enter or leave the statistical territory of the Union. 
Those goods are subject to approval from customs procedures. Specifically, they are 
related to external trade, transit, customs warehouses, free zones, and free warehouses. 
Statistics are to be compiled on:602 
(i) those goods which, having entered the statistical territory of the Community 
are placed there under the customs procedure of release for free circulation, 
inward processing or processing under customs control. 
(ii) Those goods which, being due to leave the statistical territory of the 
Community: 
(a) are placed there under customs export or outward processing 
arrangements; 
(b) have as their customs destination re-exportation following inward 
processing or, where appropriate, processing under customs control. 
The Union and its member states compile external trade statistics, however, the 
members states have an option not to collect data statistic relating to imports or 
exports exceeding 1,000 euros in value or 1,000 kg in net mass. The statistics that are 
transmitted to the Commission do not cover the goods that are released in free 
circulation after being subject to inward processing or processing, neither under 
customs control, nor goods contained in the list of exemptions. Specific movements of 
the goods are subject to special provisions.603 
                                                                                                                                          
for providing information to fulfil his/her obligations renders him/her liable to the penalties which Member 
States must lay down. Simplification is provided for, so that parties whose annual value of intra-Union trade is 
bellow the thresholds prescribed are exempted from providing any Interstat information or may provide 
simplified information […]”. See Gormley, Laurence W., 2009, Op. Cit., pp. 161-162, paragraph 5.59-560. 
600 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/external_trade/introduction 
601 See Council Regulation (EC) 1172/95, OJ L118/14, as amended : Council Regulation 1172/95 is repeated and 
replaced by European Parliament and Council Regulation 471/2009 (OJ L152/23, 2009) as from 1 January 2010. 
See Regulation 471/2009, Article 12 Regulation 1172/95 has been implemented by Commission Regulation 
1917/2000 (OJ 229/14, 2000), as corr Oj L3/28, 2011 and as amended by Commission Regulation 2001/669 (OJ 
L224/3, 2001), 2005/1949 (OJ L312/10, 2005). As to Nomenclature of countries and territories for the puposes 
of external trade statistics, see Commission Regulation 1833/2006 (OJ L354/19). 
602 See Gormley, Laurence W., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 163, paragraph 5.61. 
603 See Gormley, Laurence W., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 164, paragraph 5.62. 
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Eurostat is the statistical office of the EU, which is based in Luxembourg. It 
publishes official, harmonised statistics on the EU and the euro area. It also offers a 
comparable, reliable, and objective description of Europe's society and economy. Most 
of the data and information are available for the EU, member states, candidate 
countries, EFTA member countries, and other European countries. Thus, it is also used 
by the regions and cities of the EU.604 While, Eurostat's COMEXT is an enormous 
external trade database for the EU. It contains monetary and physical data for intra and 
extra-EU. It consists of 15,000 products, 250 partner countries, and various time series. 
In other words, COMEXT is a statistics database that represents commercial 
interchanges between the member states of the EU and between EU member states and 
their commercial partners.605 The factsheet (description of a dataset) is part of the sub-
section sources of macro-economic data in the Environmental Data Centre on Natural 
Resources and Products (EDCNRP).606 
Statistical information is important when recalculating whether a beneficiary 
country that has graduated from a certain section can be granted re-inclusion or "de-
graduation". In this regard, a certain product that has graduated from a section could 
be listed again and receive benefits under the GSP scheme. 
 
XI.d. Graduation and de-graduation Indonesia and other ASEAN countries. 
Along with the improvement of economic development, some countries and 
territories attain advanced development, thus, the EU has “graduated” them from the 
GSP beneficiaries list. On 19 December 1997, the EU informed the beneficiary countries 
concerned of such graduation. According to Article 3 of EC Council Regulation No. 
2623/97607 Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea had to graduate from the GSP 
scheme by 1 May 1998. Those countries and territory could no longer enjoy GSP 
benefits for any of their products as soon as graduation came into effect. Since then, no 
countries have been excluded from the later EU GSP schemes except for the graduated 
section.608 
 
                                                 
604 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Eurostat 
605 See United Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences : Handbook on The Scheme of 
The European Community, 2008, Op. Cit., pp. 21 – 34. 
606 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/EDCNRP_-_Eurostat_COMEXT 
607 See Official Journal L 354, 30.12.1997, p. 9 
608 See United Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences : Handbook on The Scheme of 
The European Community, 2008, Op. Cit., pp. 21 – 34. See also Graduation from the Generalised System of 
Preference Scheme of the European Union (EU - GSP Scheme), 1998. 
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Table 1. ASEAN Countries Status in the European Union GSP609 
 
Graduation No. Countries GSP Arrangement 
Graduated Section 
 
Total 
Exclusion 
1. Indonesia General arrangement S-III Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage 
products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes. 
 
2. Brunei Darussalam General arrangement   
3. Malaysia  General arrangement S-III Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage 
products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes. 
 
4. Philippines General arrangement   
5. Thailand General arrangement S-XIV Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious 
stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, 
and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coins. 
 
6. Singapore    Graduated 
7. Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic 
EBA   
8. Vietnam General arrangement S-XII Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sun umbrellas, 
walking sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding crops and parts 
thereof; prepared feathers and articles made therewith; 
artificial flowers; articles of human hair. 
 
9. Cambodia EBA   
10. Myanmar EBA   
 
In 2005 Indonesia graduated in two sections, that is, Sections III610 and Sections 
IX.611 612 While, in 2002 Indonesia graduated from 3 sections, i.e., Sections X, XIX, and 
XXIII.613 In 1998 Indonesia graduated in Chapter 15,614 Chapters 44 to 46,615 and 
Chapters 64 to 67.616 617 
The recalculation of 2004-2006 trade data led to re-inclusion ("degraduation") of 
certain product sections for six beneficiaries under the 2009-2011 schemes. These 
included Algeria (for Section V "Mineral products"); India (for Section XIV "Jewellery, 
pearls, precious metals and stones"); Indonesia (for Section IX "Wood and articles of 
wood"); Russian Federation (for Section VI "Products of the chemical or allied industries" 
and Section XV "Base metals"); South Africa (for Section XII "Transport equipment"), 
                                                 
609 See Annex I Beneficiary countries (1) and territories of the Community’s scheme of generalised tariff preferences to 
the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 
1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (Official Journal L 211/1, 
6.8.2008, EN).  
610 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes. 
611 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal; cork and articles of cork; manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other 
plaiting materials; basket ware and wickerwork. 
612See Annex I Beneficiary countries and territories of the Community's scheme of generalised tariff preferences Council 
Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences (Official 
Journal, L 169/1, 30.6.2005, EN). 
613 See Annex I Beneficiary countries and territories of the Community's scheme of generalised tariff preferences Council 
Regulation  (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the 
period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 (Official Journal, L 211/1, 6.8.2008, EN). 
614 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes. 
615 Wood products. 
616 Footwear products. 
617 See Annex  II Part I List of sectors and countries referred to in Articles 3 and 4 (a) Council Regulation (EC) No 
2820/98 of 21 December 1998 applying a multiannual scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 
July 1999 to 31 December 2001 (Official Journal, L 357, 30.12.1998, p. 1). 
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and; Thailand (for Section XVII "Transport equipment"). The GSP preferences 
suspended Vietnam for Section XII "Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sun umbrellas, and 
artificial flowers".618 
 
XI.e. Graduation mechanism in US GSP. 
The US defines the graduation mechanism as removal of GSP eligibility since the 
country is considered to have sufficiently developed or reached a certain level of 
competitiveness. It is considered to no longer need GSP benefits, either as a whole or 
with respect to one or more products.619 In the US GSP graduation system, beneficiary 
graduation is decided by the President. A beneficiary country graduates when it has 
become a “high income” country. The President terminates the designation of such 
country as a beneficiary developing country. The standard to determine that a 
beneficiary country has transformed into a “high income”620 country is based on the 
official statistics of the World Bank. Graduation is effective as of 1 January of the second 
year following the year in which such determination was decided.621  
In addition, graduation considerations are not merely based on GDP criteria but 
they also take into account some other factors. The GSP Sub-committee has the task to 
review such related factors. Those factors include the country’s general level of 
development; its competitiveness in regard to the particular product; the country’s 
practices relating to trade, investment, and workers’ rights; the overall economic 
interests of the US, including the effect continued GSP treatment would have on the 
relevant U.S. producers, workers and consumers; and any other relevant 
information.622 
 
XI.f. Graduation mechanism in Japan. 
In Japan the GSP graduation mechanism of advanced beneficiaries is excluded 
from the list of GSP beneficiaries under the annual review. Japan applies the 
"graduation" process starting with "partial graduation", if applicable, in order to 
mitigate its impact on "graduating" economies. In this regard, a beneficiary country will 
not directly get total graduation. In "partial graduation", a product of a beneficiary 
country or territory is excluded from the product coverage under three requirements. 
First, if the country or territory in question is classified as a high-income economy in 
the previous year’s World Bank Atlas. Second, if it is not in the World Bank Atlas, the 
country in question needs to have the same level of GNP (gross national product) per 
capita. Third, if exports of the product to Japan exceed 25% of the world's exports of 
the product to Japan, and more than one billion yen.623 
                                                 
618 See Column C of annex I to the regulation No. 732/2008 (Official Journal L 211, 6.8.2008) against column C of annex I 
to Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 (Official Journal L 139/1,30.6.2005). See also United Conference on Trade and 
Development, Generalized System of Preferences : Handbook on The Scheme of The European Community, 
2008, Op. Cit., pp. 21 - 34. See also Graduation from the Generalised System of Preference Scheme of the 
European Union (EU - GSP Scheme), 1998. 
619 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences, Handbook on the 
Scheme of the United States of America, , UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.58/Rev.2, United Nations, New York and 
Geneva, 2010, p. 122, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/july/tradoc_143993.pdf. 
620 The per capita GNP limit is set at the lower bound of the World Bank’s definition of a “high income” country (which 
was $11,906 in 2009). 
621 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences, Handbook on the 
Scheme of the United States of America, 2010, Op. Cit.,  p. 64. 
622 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences, Handbook on the 
Scheme of the United States of America, 2010, Op. Cit., p. 123. 
623 See Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences, Handbook on the Scheme of 
the Japan,  UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.42/Rev.3, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2010, Op. Cit., p. 11. 
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Under Japan’s GSP scheme, each country or territory and product are reviewed 
each year. With respect to the sets of requirements above, if any of those requirements 
are not met, preferential tariff treatment is granted. The de-graduation system is also 
recognised in Japan’s GSP scheme. The de-graduation system is defined when a 
developing country has graduated from the GSP; it has the opportunity to re-apply GSP 
beneficiary status as long as it is not classified as a high-income economy for three 
consecutive years.  In this regard, a developing country submits a written request.624 
                                                 
624 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences, Handbook on the 
Scheme of the Japan,  UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.42/Rev.3, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2010, Op. Cit.,  
p. 11. 
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Tabel 2.  ASEAN Countries Graduation from EU GSP. 
  
Covered imports into EU (Value) Covered imports into EU (% share) Product 
Section 
Description of the Product Section Alphabetical 
code 
Name of the Country or 
Territory concerned (ranked by 
descending order of covered 
imports) 
2004 2005 2006 Average 2004-2006 2004 2005 2006 Average 2004 -2006 
Graduation 
Threshold for 
the Product 
Section 
Removal/re-
establishment 
of preferences 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Section III Animal  or Vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products; prepared edible fats; 
animal or vegetable waxes. 
ID Indonesia 759,310 729,683 763,493 750,829 31,8  % 27,0 % 23,6 % 27.5 % 15 % Removal 
  MY Malaysia 610,393 603,447 641,894 618,578 25,6 % 22,3% 19,8 % 22.6 % 15 % Removal 
  Total Covered Imports 2,384,348 2,706,040 3,241,889 2,777,426       
Section IV Prepared foodstuffs; beverages, 
spirits and vinegar; tobacco and 
manufactured tobacco substitutes 
BR Brazil 1,068,291 1,179,631 1,133,692 1,127,205 21,0 % 20,3 % 15,4 % 18.9 % 15 % Removal 
  Total Covered Impoerts 5,087,100 5,810,990 7,361,636 6,086,576       
Section V Mineral Products DZ Algeria 1,070,223 1,167,347 1,333,438 1,190,336 15,4 % 10,8 % 11,1 % 12.4 % 15 % Re-established 
  Total Covered Imports 6,949,500 10,808,769 12,012,955 9,923,741       
Section VI Products of the chemical or allied 
Industries 
CN China 2,532,612 3,345,805 4,115,547 3,331,321 26,8  % 28,5 % 30,9 % 28.7 % 15 % Removal 
  RU Russia 1,443,984 1,837,003 1,578,687 1,619,891 15,3 % 15,7 % 11,9 % 14.3 % 15 % Re-established 
  Total Covered Imports 9,437,804 11,700,656 13,266,277 11,468,246       
Section VII Plastics and articles thereof; rubber 
and articles thereof 
CN China 3,490,568 4,381,823 4,998,478 4,290,290 47,1 % 46,9 % 45,3 % 46,4 % 15 % Removal 
  Total Covered Imports 7,410,972 9,342,906 11,034,168 9,262,682       
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Section VIII Raw hides and skins, leather, 
furskins and articles thereof; 
saddlery and harness; travel goods, 
handbags and similar containers; 
articles of animal gut (other than 
silkworm gut) 
CN China 3,943,968 4,571,861 5,112,914 4,542,914 65,0 % 67,7 % 67,6 % 66,8 % 15 % Removal 
  Total Covered Imports 6,067,643 6,753,118 7,563,482 6,794,748       
Section IX Wood and articles of wood; wood 
charcoal; cork and articles of cork; 
manufactures of straw, of esparto or 
of other plaiting materials; 
basketware and wickerwork 
CN China 454,129 608,738 744,878 602,582 22,4 % 27,7 % 31,0 % 27,0 % 15 % Removal 
  BR Brazil 390,559 339,312 338,248 356,040 19,3 % 15,4 % 14,1 % 16,3 % 15 %  
  ID Indonesia 246,754 272,874 184,706 234,778 12,2 % 12,4 % 7,7 % 10,8 % 15 % Re-establishment 
  Total  Covered Imports 2,023,622 2,203,325 2,398,922 2,208,623       
Section XI a Textiles CN China 1,700,092 2,184,156 2,546,024 2,143,424 28,9 % 35,3 % 36,9 % 33,7 % 12,5 % Removal 
  IN India 1,225,105 1,263,732 1,411,293 1,300,043 20,8 % 20,4%  20,6 % 20,6 % 12,5 % Removal 
  Total Covered Imports 5,882,671 6,187,411 6,899,794 6,323,292       
Section Xib Clothings CN China 12,617,678 18,574,973 20,792,231 17,328,294 36,0 % 46,1 % 45,6 % 42,6 % 12,5 % Removal 
  Total Covered Imports 35,049,106 40,292,783 45,596,998 40,312,962       
Section XII Footwear; headgear; umbrellas, sun 
umbrellas, walking sticks, seatsticks, 
whips, riding-crops and part 
thereof; prepared feathers and 
articles made therewith; artificial 
flowers; articles of human air 
CN China 3,957,011 6,047,463 6,750,759 5,585,078 42,7 % 54,5 % 55,0%  50,7 % 15 % Removal 
  VT Vietnam 2,178,945 2,119,691 2,111,055 2,136,564 23,5 % 19,1 % 17,2 % 19,9 % 15 % Removal 
  Total Covered Imports 9,272,106 11,097,859 12,273,576 10,881,180       
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Section XIII Articles of stone, plaster, cement, 
asbestos, mica or similar materials; 
ceramic products; glass and 
glassware 
CN China 1,502,377 2,328,612 2,756,017 2,195,669 52,5 % 63,6 % 66,5 % 60,9 % 15 % Removal 
  Total Covered Imports 2,861,670 3,661,340 4,144,386 3,555,799       
Section XIV Natural or cultured pearls, precious 
or semi-precious stones, precious 
metals, metals clad with precious 
metal and articles thereof; imitation 
jewellery; coin 
CN  China 880,281 998,339 1,096,704 991,775 38,1 % 35,7 % 34,5 % 36,1 % 15 % Removal 
  TH Thailand 568,143 629,385 702,600 633,376 24,6 % 22,5 % 22,1 % 23,1 % 15 % Removal 
  IN India 307,488 360,170 394,250 353,969 13,3 % 12,9 % 12,4 % 12,9 % 15 % Re-establishment 
  Total Covered Imports 2,309,524 2,797,267 3,179,186 2,761,992       
Section XV Base metals and articles of base 
metal 
CN China 5,376,876 6,790,728 8,447,153 6,871,586 53,5 % 53,7 % 56,9 % 54,7 % 15 % Removal 
  RU Russia 935,056 1,400,386 1,309,542 1,214,995 9,3 % 11,1 % 8,8 % 9,7 % 15 % Re-establishment 
  Total Covered Imports 10,050,236 12,645,676 14,845,612 12,513,841       
Section XVI Machinery and mechanical 
appliances; electrical equipment; 
parts thereof; sound recorders and 
reproducers, television image and 
sound recorders and reproducers, 
and parts and accessories of such 
articles 
CN China 20,887,766 25,446,133 31,226,371 25,853,423 59,6 % 63,1 % 64,6 % 62,4 % 15 % Removal 
  Total Covered Imports 35,046,587 40,326,677 48,338,036 41,237,100       
Section XVII Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and 
associated transport equipment 
CN China 1,437,466 2,103,882 2,578,315 2,039,888 23,4 % 27,0 % 23,7 % 24,7 % 15 % Removal 
  TH Thailand 824,096 1,064,522 1,138,887 1,009,168 13,4 % 13,6 % 10,5 % 12,5 % 15 % Re-establishment 
  ZA South Africa 674,317 687,455 793,566 718,446 11,0 % 8,8 % 7,3 % 9,0 % 15 % Re-establishment 
  Total Covered Imports 6,143,017 7,792,156 10,878,966 8,271,380       
 171 
Section XVIII Optical,photographic, 
cinematographic, measuring, 
checking, precision, medical or 
surgical, instruments and apparatus; 
clocks and watches; musical 
instruments; parts and accessories 
thereof 
CN China 3,448,636 3,907,951 4,609,288 3,988,625 69,2 % 70,2 % 71,2 % 70,2 % 15 %  
  Total Covered Imports 4,983,578 5,566,882 6,473,719 5,674,726       
Section XX Miscellaneous manufactured 
Articles 
CN China 8,626,214 9,877,054 10,523,969 9,675,746 80,6 % 82,9 % 83,1 % 82,2 % 15 % Removal 
  Total Covered Imports 10,702,499 11,914,420 12,664,223 11,760,380       
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XII. Withdrawal mechanism in the EU Generalised System of Preferences. 
XII.a. Withdrawal mechanism. 
As regards the nature of the GSP scheme as the “gift”,625 “optional”, “not obligatory”,626 
or “unilateral grant”627 from the developed country to the developing country. The 
preference-granting country has its right to determine the eligibility of a developing 
country in the GSP scheme.628 As noted by Abdulqawi, the rules of origin are considered as 
criteria or conditions that are designed as subject to change by the preference-granting 
country. According to Harris, conditions of the GSP are “not necessarily subject to any kind 
of negotiation with the beneficiary countries”. It is explained that conditions in the GSP 
established unilaterally by the preference-granting country, could be “modified” or 
“withdrawn” at any moment. Those scholars justify this nature as the weakness of GSP and 
may cause instability in the system of preferences. However, such nature is obviously 
reflected in the GSP, which is implied in the possibilities of temporary withdrawal in 
respect of all or certain products originating in a beneficiary country, on the grounds of 
certain reasons.629 However, the “unilateral” conditions are unpredictable and restrictive 
possibly creating a negative effect. This can also create obstacles and difficulties for 
developing countries to use GSP benefits. The preferential rules of origin are potentially 
misused, for instance they might serve as the non-barrier of trade.630 
“[…]it also took account of the fact that the countries establishing their own 
preferential scheme were free to withdraw their grants in whole or in part and that 
those grants were conditional upon the necessary waiver or waivers in cases where, as 
in the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, it was so prescribed 
[…]”. 631 
The withdrawal system of EU GSP is regulated in Chapter III Section 1 Article 15-19 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 and amended by Regulation (EU) No. 512/2011. 
The temporary withdrawal in the EU GSP is divided into three different functions. First, 
temporary withdrawal relates to international law violation under the conventions listed 
in Part A of Annex III,632 due to the use of “prison labour” in processing exported goods,633 
                                                 
625 See Grossman, Gene M, and Sykes, Alan O., 2005. 
626 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi, 1982., Op. Cit., p.115. 
627 See Harris, Jeremy T, Rules of Origin for Development: From GSP to Globla Free Trade, IDB, Working Paper Series #IDB 
WP-135, November 2009, p. 5 , available at: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1801797, 
last accessed : 14 February 2011. 
628 See Miguel Izam, Rules of Origin and Trade Facilitation in Preferential Trade Agreement in Latin America, Serie, 
Commercio Internacional, Division of International Trade and Integration, Santiago, Chile, August, 2003, available at: 
http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/13420/lcl1945i.pdf, last accessed : 22 March 2011. 
629 “[…] The preferential arrangements provided for in this Regulation may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of 
certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons […]” 
630 See Stocker, Walter, WCO Seminar On The Harmonization Of Non-Preferential Rules Of Origin, Technical Officer, Origin Sub-
Directorate, World Customs Organization, p. 4, available at: 
http://www.dga.gov.do/dgagov.net/uploads/file/seminario_regional_oma/01rules-of-origin-english.pdf, last 
accessed : 8 March 2011. International Center for Economic Growth, Op. Cit., p. 1, available at: 
http://www.atdforum.org/IMG/pdf/Policy_Brief_RoO.pdf, last accessed : 9 April 2011 
631 See Commentaries on the ILC’s Draft Articles; see also Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Thirtieth session , 8 May – 28 July 1978, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third session, Supplement 
No. 10, Doc. A/33/10 ILC Report), 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1978), p. 65. 
632 See Subparagraph (a) Paragraph 1 Article 15 Section 1 Chapter III Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008.  
633 See Subparagraph (b) Paragraph 1 Article 15 Section 1 Chapter III Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
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illicit drug trafficking and money laundering,634 unfair trading practices635 and 
infringement of “conservation and management of fishery resources”.636 
With respect to the unfair trading practices regulated under WTO agreements in 
which the effect of such conduct, at first, has to be determined by the competent body of 
the WTO. Furthermore, the products subject to anti-dumping or countervailing measures 
under Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96 of 22 December 1995637 and Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 2026/97 of 6 October 1997638, are excluded from Paragraph 1(d) Article 15 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008.639  
Second, temporary withdrawal is related to the granting of the special incentive 
arrangement on sustainable development and good governance. Temporary withdrawal is 
applied to all or certain products originating from beneficiary countries under the 
conditions when national legislation no longer incorporates those conventions referred to 
in Annex III or if that legislation is not effectively implemented.640  
Third, temporary withdrawal is related to the failure or non-compliance to the rules 
of origin. This type of temporary withdrawal is due to “the fraud case; irregularities or 
systematic failure to comply with or to ensure compliance with the rules concerning the 
origin of the products and the procedures related thereto; or failure to provide the 
administrative cooperation as required for the implementation; and policing of the 
arrangements under the EU GSP scheme”.641 
                                                 
634 See Subparagraph (c) Paragraph 1 Article 15 Section 1 Chapter III Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
635 See Subparagraph (d) Paragraph 1 Article 15 Section 1 Chapter III Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
636 See Subparagraph (e) Paragraph 1 Article 15 Section 1 Chapter III Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
637 See Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not 
members of the European Community (OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 
2117/2005 (OJ L 340, 23.12.2005, p. 17). 
638 See Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not 
members of the European Community (OJ L 288, 21.10.1997, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 
461/2004 (OJ L 77, 13.3.2004, p. 12). 
639 See Paragraph 3 Article 15 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
640 See Paragraph 2 Article 15 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. See also EU temporarily 
withdraws GSP+ trade benefits from Sri Lanka, Brussels, 15 February 2010, available at 
:http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/february/tradoc_145799.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. See also 
The Council of European Union, Implementing Regulation of the Council temporarily withdrawing the special 
incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for under Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008 with respect to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Legislative Acts And Other Instruments, 
Interinstitutional File: 2009/0179 (NLE), 5470/10, WTO 14, SPG 3, RELEX 63, COASI 12, paragraph 3 and 4, available 
at : http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05470.en10.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. 
“[…] It’s indicated that the national legislation of Sri Lanka incorporating the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, was not being effectively implemented. The three conventions 
mentioned are listed as core human rights conventions respectively in points 1, 5 and 6 of Annex III, Part A, to 
Regulation (EC) No 732/2008… Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 provides for the temporary 
withdrawal of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance granted pursuant 
to that Regulation, in particular if the national legislation incorporating the conventions referred to in Annex III to 
that Regulation, which have been ratified in fulfilment of the requirements of Article 8(1) and (2) of that Regulation, 
is not effectively implemented […]”. See also Notice on the GSP+/Sri Lanka issue, 19 October 2009, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145154.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. See also 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145154.pdf. “[…] The Commission's findings are that 
the national legislation of Sri Lanka incorporating international human rights conventions, in particular the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, is not being effectively 
implemented […]”. 
641 See Paragraph 1 Article 16 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
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Administrative cooperation must be provided by the beneficiary country in order to 
implement the EU GSP scheme.642 The beneficiary country should keep communications 
and send updates of the indispensable information regarding the implementation and 
policing of the rules of origin. The beneficiary country can assist the Union, based on a 
request from the customs authorities of the member states, to verify the origin of the goods 
and communicate the results in the required time. The beneficiary country can also assist 
the Union by allowing the Commission to coordinate and closely cooperate with the 
competent authorities of the member states, in order to verify the authenticity of 
documents or the accuracy of information relevant to obtaining the GSP scheme facilities. 
The beneficiary country should undertake appropriate enquiries to identify and 
prevent infringement of the rules of origin. The beneficiary country must ensure 
compliance of the rules of origin in respect of regional cumulation. The beneficiary country 
must assist the Union in the verification of processes, in terms of the presumption of origin 
relating to fraud. The basic presumption of fraud is determined when massive exports 
from the beneficiary country occur, exceeding its usual level. 
Non-compliance with rules of origin, and/or failure to provide administrative 
cooperation is the sufficient evidence for temporary withdrawal. It might lead to the 
suspension of the preferential arrangements.643 In the suspension mechanism, the 
Commission has to inform the Generalised Preferences Committee644. Thus, the 
Commission called the member states to take precautionary measures as necessary action 
in order to “safe” the Union’s financial interests. To carry out transparency principle, the 
Commission published a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. The notice 
contains justifications for reasonable doubt about the implementation of the preferential 
arrangements and/or compliance by the beneficiary country with its obligations.645  
The Commission should notify the beneficiary country concerned and the Generalised 
Preferences Committee of any decision taken before it come into effect. Any member states 
may refer the decision taken by the Commission to the Council within one month. The 
Council acting by a qualified majority and may take different decision within one month. 
According to the Paragraph 5 Article 16, the period of suspension shall not exceed six 
months. 646 
                                                 
642 See Paragraph 2  Article 16 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
643 See Paragraph  3  Article 16 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
644 As Stipulated by Paragraph 1 Article 27 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008, “[…] the Commission shall be 
assisted by a Generalised Preferences Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) […]”. Paragraph 2 “[…] 
governs the competence of the Committee, which may examine any matter relating to the application of this 
Regulation, raised by the Commission or at the request of a Member State […]”. Further, paragraph 3 stipulated “[…] 
the Committee shall examine the effects of the scheme, on the basis of a report from the Commission covering the 
period since 1 January 2006. This report shall cover all of the preferential arrangements, and the result will be 
presented in time for the discussion on the next Regulation […]”. 
645 See Paragraph  3 (c)  Article 16 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. See also Current 
developments in Sri Lanka and the question of future trade preferences granted by the European Union to Sri Lanka,  
Brussels, 10 July 2008, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/july/tradoc_139594.pdf, last 
accessed : 19 June 2011. “[…] The serious concerns about the human rights situation in this country and the alleged 
lack of compliance with Human Rights Conventions are raised regularly […].” 
646 See The Council of European Union, Implementing Regulation of the Council temporarily withdrawing the special 
incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for under Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008 with respect to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Legislative Acts And Other Instruments, 
Interinstitutional File: 2009/0179 (NLE), 5470/10, WTO 14, SPG 3, RELEX 63, COASI 12, available at : 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05470.en10.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011.   
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After the suspension period is depleted, the Commission should decide either to 
terminate the suspension or to extend the period of suspension in accordance with the 
procedure regulated by Paragraph 3 Article 16 of the regulation.  To provide valid 
evidence, the member states shall communicate to the Commission all relevant 
information that justify the suspension of preferences or its extension. 
Article 17 of the regulation stipulated the procedure to initiate investigation. In the 
case, the Commission or a member state receives information647 that justify temporary 
withdrawal and if it is considered as sufficient justifications for an investigation, they 
should inform the Committee and request for consultations.648 The consultations will take 
place within one month. The Commission can initiate an investigation within one month.  
Paragraph 1 Article 18 stipulated that the Commission should publish a notification 
in the Official Journal of the European Union and inform the beneficiary country 
concerned.649 The notification provides a summary of the information received. 
Investigation carry out by cooperate with the beneficiary country concerned. In this point, 
the Commission should provide opportunity for the beneficiary country concerned to 
cooperate in the investigation.650 
To provide sufficient evidence for justification the Commission has to collect all 
information that necessary. Such information includes the assessments, comments, 
decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant supervisory bodies of the UN, 
the ILO and other competent international organizations. Assesment is used to justify the 
infringement committed under Article 15 Paragraph 1 (a) of the EU GSP regulation.651 
In addition, the Commission verifies the information received from economic 
operators of beneficiary country.  The findings established based on the available facts. The 
information requested by the Commission must be provided within the period specified in 
the notice of investigation. The investigation period must be completed within one year. 
However, the Commission could extend this period in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 27(5). 
Based on Article 27, the Commission should submit the report findings to the 
Generalised Preferences Committee.652 The investigation terminated if the findings not 
                                                 
647 See EU Generalised System of Preferences: Commission initiates investigation on the effective implementation of certain 
human rights conventions in Sri Lanka, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_141139.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. “[…] The 
Commission has received information, including reports and statements of the United Nations, as well as from other 
relevant publicly available sources, including non-governmental organisations, that indicate that the national 
legislation of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka incorporating international human rights conventions, in 
particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, is not being 
effectively implemented […]” 
648 See Paragraph  1  Article 17 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
649 See EU Generalised System of Preferences: Commission initiates investigation on the effective implementation of certain 
human rights conventions in Sri Lanka, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_141139.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. 
“[…] The investigation is considered to be launched on the date of publication of the "Notice pursuant to Article 19(1) 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of the initiation of an investigation with respect to the effective 
implementation of certain human rights conventions in Sri Lanka. Any interested party is invited to submit comments 
on the matter under investigation within four months of the launching of the investigation […]” 
650 See Paragraph  1  Article 18 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
651 See Paragraph  3  Article 18 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
652 See Paragraph 1 Article 19 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. See also Commission Of The 
European Communities, Report on the findings of the investigation with respect to the effective implementation of 
certain human rights conventions in Sri Lanka, C(2009) 7999, Brussels, 19 October 2009, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145152.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. See also 
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sufficient to justify temporary withdrawal.653 The termination of investigation and it main 
conclusion announced in the Official Journal of the European Union.654 In the case the 
Commission findings meet sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal in respect 
of serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Part 
A of Annex III, referred to Article 15 Paragraph 1 (a), the situation in beneficiary country 
will be monitored and evaluated during six months.655 The Commission will notify the 
decision to beneficiary country and publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European 
Union.656 Unless, before the end of the period, the beneficiary country make a commitment 
to take necessary measures to conform, “in a reasonable period of time”, with the 
conventions referred to in Part A of Annex III. If the Commission considers temporary 
withdrawal necessary, they will submit an appropriate proposal to the Council. The 
temporary withdrawal decided by the Council within two months by means of a qualified 
majority657.658 The temporary withdrawal will enter into force six months659 after it 
decided. 660 
                                                                                                                                                
Commission of the European Communities, Report Investigation pursuant to Article 18(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 980/2005 with respect to the protection of the freedom of association and the right to organise in El Salvador, 
Brussels, C(2009) 7934, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145210.pdf, last 
accessed : 19 June 2011. 
653 See Paragraph 2 Article 19 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. See also Commission Of The 
European Communities, Commission Decision of 20 October 2009 concerning providing for the termination pursuant 
to Article 19(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of the investigation initiated by Commission Decision 
2008/316/EC with respect to the protection of the freedom of association and the right to organise in El Salvador, 
Brussels, C(2009) 7936, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145209.pdf, last 
accessed : 19 June 2011. 
654 See Notice pursuant to Article 19(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/20081 of the termination of an investigation with 
respect to the protection of the freedom of association and the right to organise in the Republic of El Salvador, 
available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145208.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. 
655 See Paragraph 3 Article 19 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. The Council of European 
Union, Implementing Regulation of the Council temporarily withdrawing the special incentive arrangement for 
sustainable development and good governance provided for under Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 with respect to the 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Legislative Acts And Other Instruments, Interinstitutional File: 
2009/0179 (NLE), 5470/10, WTO 14, SPG 3, RELEX 63, COASI 12, available at : 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05470.en10.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. 
656 See Paragraph 3 Article 19 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. See also Notice on the 
GSP+/Sri Lanka issue, 19 October 2009, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145154.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. 
“[…] The Commission's findings are that the national legislation of Sri Lanka incorporating international human 
rights conventions, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, is not being effectively implemented. In the light of these findings, the Commission will now consider whether a 
temporary withdrawal of some or all of Sri Lanka's GSP+ benefits is called for and make a suitable proposal to EU 
Member States in the Council. If such a proposal is made and subsequently adopted by the Council, it would enter into 
force six months after the date of adoption […]”. 
657 See Paragraph 4  Article 16 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. See also The Council of 
European Union, Implementing Regulation of the Council temporarily withdrawing the special incentive arrangement 
for sustainable development and good governance provided for under Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 with respect to 
the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Legislative Acts And Other Instruments, Interinstitutional File: 
2009/0179 (NLE), 5470/10, WTO 14, SPG 3, RELEX 63, COASI 12, available at : 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05470.en10.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011.  Article 2 : 
“[…] With respect to the period of application of Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, the Council, acting by qualified 
majority, on a proposal from the Commission, shall re-establish the special incentive arrangement for products 
originating in Sri Lanka, if the reasons justifying the temporary withdrawal no longer prevail […]”. 
658 See Paragraph 4  Article 19 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
659 See The Council of European Union, Implementing Regulation of the Council temporarily withdrawing the special 
incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for under Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008 with respect to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Legislative Acts And Other Instruments, 
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XII.b. Case Study: Temporary withdrawal and suspension from GSP+ of Sri Lanka. 
The following case study concerns the mechanism of temporary withdrawal from the 
special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) 
towards the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.  
The GSP+ facilities granted to Sri Lanka661 are conditional. Sri Lanka, as the 
beneficiary country, must fulfil the requirements of eligibility as established under the GSP 
regulation. When national legislation no longer incorporates the relevant international 
conventions or if legislation is not effectively implemented, therefore, the regulation 
provides provisions for the temporary withdrawal of certain products or all GSP+ benefits. 
The EU maintains the objective of GSP+ as an incentive to strengthen improvements to the 
condition of human rights in Sri Lanka. The Commission is undertaking an investigation to 
clarify the situation and propose appropriate action towards information accepted that 
“allegedly” justifies such temporary withdrawal. Such information was submitted by 
interested parties in “response to a public notice, available reports, statements and 
information of the United Nations as well as other publicly available reports and information 
from relevant sources, including nongovernmental organisations”. Under the framework of 
parallel political dialogue, the Commission also considers the information provided by Sri 
Lanka. In the case of Sri Lanka’s GSP+, the Commission’s investigation was launched in 
October 2008,662 thus its investigation completed and approved a report on its findings on 
19 October 2009.663  
Under Commission Decision 2008/938/EC664 Sri Lanka was included in the list of 
beneficiary countries that were granted special incentive arrangements for sustainable 
development and good governance for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 
2011. However, in 2005 the investigation was initiated in respect of non-compliance 
relating to human rights conventions.665 This investigation was launched under Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 of 27 June 2005, applying a scheme of generalised tariff 
preferences.666 In its findings, the Commission found indications that Sri Lanka did not 
                                                                                                                                                
Interinstitutional File: 2009/0179 (NLE), 5470/10, WTO 14, SPG 3, RELEX 63, COASI 12, available at : 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05470.en10.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011.  Article 3 : 
“[…] This Regulation shall enter into force six months after its adoption, unless the Council before then, on a proposal 
from the Commission pursuant to Article 19(5) of Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, decides otherwise […]”. 
660 See Paragraph 5 Article 19 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
661 See Article 8 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008.  
662 See EU temporarily withdraws GSP+ trade benefits from Sri Lanka, Brussels, 15 February 2010, available at 
:http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/february/tradoc_145799.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. 
663 See Notice on the GSP+/Sri Lanka issue, 19 October 2009, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145154.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. See also 
Press release, Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), EU temporarily withdraws GSP+ trade benefits from Sri 
Lanka, Brussels, 15 February 2010, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=515&serie=316&langId=en, last accessed  17 June 2011. 
664 See Commission Decision 2008/938/EC of 9 December 2008 on the list of the beneficiary countries which qualify for the 
special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, provided for in Council Regulation 
(EC) No 732/2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 
December 2011 (OJ L 334, 12.12.2008, p. 90).  
665 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. These three International 
Coventions is listed in the Part A, Annex III, Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
666 See The Council of European Union, Implementing Regulation of the Council temporarily withdrawing the special 
incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for under Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008 with respect to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Legislative Acts And Other Instruments, 
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effectively implement the three conventions mentioned, which are listed as core human 
rights conventions respectively in points 1, 5 and 6 of Annex III, Part A of Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008.667 
Sri Lanka’s temporary withdrawal from GSP+ was based on Article 15(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008, where it provides the temporary withdrawal of the special 
incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance.668 In order to 
assess,  "whether the national legislation of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 
incorporated and implemented effectively the conventions related to human rights”669, 
therefore, the Commission Decision 2008/803/EC670 was issued to initiate investigation671. 
The investigation focused on reports and statements by UN Special Rapporteurs and 
Representatives, other UN bodies and reputable human rights NGOs.672 
According to Paragraph 2 Article 18 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008673, 
“during the whole period of investigation the Commission provided Sri Lanka with every 
opportunity to cooperate in the investigation”. Sri Lanka had given opportunity to submit 
their commentary on the comprehensive findings of the experts. These experts groups 
appointed by the Commission to provide an independent legal assessment related to the 
investigation674. However, Sri Lanka took the decision “not to cooperate with, or participate 
in the investigation”.675 On 19 October 2009, the Commission delivered the  findings report, 
as follows : 
“[…] that the national legislation of Sri Lanka incorporating international human rights 
conventions, specifically the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, is not effectively 
implemented […]”.676 
In accordance with Article 19(1) of Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, on 17 November 
2009 the Commission submitted the findings report to the Generalised Preferences 
Committee.677 On 15 February 2010, EU decided to withdraw Sri Lanka from GSP+ scheme. 
The suspension applied for six months.678 After the period of suspension ended, the 
                                                                                                                                                
Interinstitutional File: 2009/0179 (NLE), 5470/10, WTO 14, SPG 3, RELEX 63, COASI 12, paragraph 2, available at : 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05470.en10.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. 
667 See Ibid.,  paragraph 3. 
668 See Ibid., paragraph 4. 
669 See The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
670 See Commission Decision 2008/803/EC of 14 October 2008 providing for the initiation of an investigation pursuant to 
Article 18(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 with respect to the effective implementation of certain human 
rights conventions in Sri Lanka (OJ L 277, 18.10.2008, p. 34). 
671 See Paragraph 1, Paragraph 3 Article Article 18 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
672 See The Council of European Union, Implementing Regulation of the Council temporarily withdrawing the special 
incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for under Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008 with respect to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, paragraph 5. 
673 The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate in the investigation. 
674 See also Françoise Hampson, Leif Sevón and Roman Wieruszewski, The Implementation of certain Human Rights 
Conventions in Sri Lanka : Final Report, 30 September 2009, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145153.pdf, last accessed : 17 June 2011. 
675 See The Council of European Union, Implementing Regulation of the Council temporarily withdrawing the special 
incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for under Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008 with respect to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, paragraph 6. 
676 See Ibid.,  paragraph 7. 
677 See Ibid.,  paragraph 10. 
678 See EU temporarily withdraws GSP+ trade benefits from Sri Lanka, Brussels, 15 February 2010, available at 
:http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/february/tradoc_145799.pdf, last accessed : 19 June 2011. See also 
Article 3 The Council of European Union, Implementing Regulation of the Council temporarily withdrawing the 
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Commission submits a proposal to the Council to re-establish the special incentive 
arrangement for Sri Lanka.679 
 
XII.c. General overview temporary withdrawal provisions in the proposal of the GSP 
Proposal. 
On 10 May 2011, the Commission proposed a regulation applying to a GSP scheme. 
This proposal encompassed the draft of the GSP proposal. It was formulated to enhance the 
GSP scheme, making it  more predictable, transparent, and stable for traders either from 
the EU or the beneficiary country. Therefore, some changes and revisions were made to the 
GSP proposal. The revision aimed to ensure that the GSP scheme focused on the country 
most in need and responded positively to the development needs of the beneficiary 
country. 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 applied a scheme of GSP that expired on 31 
December 2011. Therefore, in order to ensure the operation of the scheme, on 11 May 
2011 Regulation (EU) No. 512/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council was 
issued, amending the previous regulation. Under Regulation (EU) No. 512/2011, the 
scheme provided under Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 is applicable until 31 
December 2013.680 The new regime of the GSP scheme is expected to be implemented by 1 
January 2014. 
Temporary withdrawal is one of the subjects to be revised. In the proposal of the GSP 
regulation, temporary withdrawal provisions are regulated in Chapter V Articles 19 – 21. 
Practically, this has been reduced from five681 provisions to three provisions. In general, 
Article 19 of the draft GSP regulation regulates temporary withdrawal in the three schemes 
(general arrangement, special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and 
good governance, and special arrangement for the least-developed countries). There are 
two paragraphs under draft Article 19, which have been changed by the addition of some 
words, for instance: 
Paragraphs 1 (c) and (d): 
(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit 
substances or precursors), or failure to comply with international conventions on 
anti-terrorism and money laundering; 
(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply 
of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which 
have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading 
practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the 
application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect 
by the competent WTO body; 
Draft Article 19 Paragraph 1 (c) added “compliance to the international conventions 
on anti-terrorism” in which this condition does not exist under current provisions. The EU 
set out this condition as its serious concern to encourage the beneficiary country to fight 
                                                                                                                                                
special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for under Regulation (EC) 
No 732/2008 with respect to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. 
679 See also Article 2 The Council of European Union, Implementing Regulation of the Council temporarily withdrawing the 
special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for under Regulation (EC) 
No 732/2008 with respect to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. 
680 See Paragraph 5 Article 1 Regulation (EU) No 512/2011 of The European Parliament and of The Council  of 11 May 2011  
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008. 
681 In the Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 the temporary withdrawal provisions are accommodated under Articles 15 to 
Article 19. 
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terrorism. The international convention on anti-terrorism is considered as a non-trade 
aspect, where its implementation could occur some burdens to the beneficiary country. 
However, the significance of the policy to fight terrorism and trade are still questioned. 
Draft Article 19 Paragraph 1 (d) considers the serious and systematic unfair trading 
practices affecting the supply of raw materials, wherein, this wording is not included under 
current provisions. It seems that the EU puts a high concern in order to minimise domestic 
injury from unfair trading practices. 
In order to ensure that the GSP scheme is not being abused and/or to minimise trade 
deflection by controlling and monitoring that the preferential rules of origins comply with 
the regulations, the proposal of the GSP regulation maintains this provision under draft 
Article 21. This provision also provides administrative cooperation in order to ensure the 
compliance implementation of the preferential rules of origin under the GSP regime. 
As a consequence of temporarily withdrawal from the tariff preferences, draft Article 
19 Paragraph 10682 of the proposal of the GSP regulation provided an adoption of the 
“delegated acts” in order to amend Annex II,683 Annex III,684 and Annex IV685 of the 
regulation. The adoption of the delegated acts in the proposal of the GSP regulation were 
stipulated under draft Article 37686, due to the legal consequences of an “open ended 
system” GSP scheme. According to Article 290 of the TFEU that the EU co-legislator687, that 
is, the Commission will be conferred delegation power to “to amend or supplement certain 
non-essential elements of the legislative acts”.688 The delegated acts do not touch the core of 
the regulation solely aimed for the implementation of the regulation to be operated 
properly.  
 
XIII. Safeguard measure under EU GSP. 
XIII.a. General overview of the current and future safeguard clauses under the GSP 
scheme. 
The application of the safeguard clause in the GSP scheme seems to be contradictory 
with the basic philosophy of GSP that aims to “increase” export earnings and generate 
revenue of developing countries and LDCs. A safeguard measure is commonly understood 
as the “escape clause” or “emergency exit”. This means that it would only be imposed under 
certain circumstances. Such presumed and assessed circumstances will threaten or lead to 
                                                 
682 “[…] Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in 
paragraph 1, it shall be empowered, in accordance with Article 36, to adopt delegated acts to amend Annex II, III, IV, 
whichever is applicable, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences referred to in Article 1(2) […]”. 
683  See Lists of Beneficiaries Countries of the General Arrangement. 
684 See Lists of Beneficiaries Countries of the Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance. 
685 See Lists of Beneficiaries Countries of the Special Incentive Arrangement for the Least Developed Countries. 
686 “[…] Delegated acts adopted under this Article shall enter into force without delay and shall apply as long as no objection 
is expressed in accordance with paragraph 2. The notification of a delegated act adopted under this Article to the 
European Parliament and to the Council shall state the reasons for the use of the urgency procedure. (2) Either the 
European Parliament or the Council may object to a delegated act in accordance with the procedure referred to in 
Article 36(4). In such a case, the Commission shall repeal the act without delay following the notification of the 
decision to object by the European Parliament or the Council […].” 
687 The Council and The European Parliament. 
688 See Council Of The European Union, Factsheet : Entry into force of new comitology rules, PRESSE 42, 7070/11, Brussels, 28 
February 2011, available at : 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu//uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/119516.pdf, last accessed : 20 June 
2011. 
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“serious injury” to the domestic business of actors or producers.689 The application of the 
safeguard measure must be based on the evidence resulting from investigation, where such 
harmful injury may exist or has existed.  
According to Adam Smith in the “Wealth of Nations”, “relaxing trade barriers generally 
raises the wealth of the nations involved”.690 Economically speaking the inclusion of 
safeguard clauses in the EU GSP regulation can be understood logically. In order to attract 
traders or producers from beneficiary countries to export their goods into the EU, the GSP 
scheme grants a reduction of tariffs and removes trade barriers. In addition, such tariff 
reductions aim to help the goods and products from the beneficiary country to be able to 
compete in the EU market. However, the preference-granting countries have an obligation 
to secure their internal market and domestic producers from “serious injury” of such policy. 
Since then the safeguard clause has been called the “remedies clause”.691 
Trade barriers significantly reduced after the establishment of GATT 1947. The 
enabling clause also contributed to the elimination of trade barriers for developing 
countries under generalised, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory principles. The main 
objective of trade barrier reduction is to promote trade liberalisation and to open more 
market access for developing countries.   
As explained above, the GSP grant benefits through tariff reductions to the 
beneficiary country goods in order to support its product in its competition within the EU 
markets. According to Adam Smith, "if a foreign country can supply us with a commodity 
cheaper than we ourselves can make, better buy it off them with some part of the produce of 
our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage". Fair competition is 
only present when the consumer has a wide choice of goods. In this regard, the availability 
of a “like product” with the competitive prices and range of quality has driven product 
competitiveness. When the tariff duties are imposed on the “like product” imported from 
developing countries and LDCs, instead of increasing the cost of production, the final price 
of the product on the market is affected. Higher tariffs could discourage a “like product” 
from the developing countries and LDCs from competing on the market. Developing 
countries and LDCs needs to increase their export revenues for their economic 
development, for instance combating poverty, generates employment, to support the 
development of infant industries and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Economists 
believe there is a “positive domino effect” between export boosts, employment availability, 
poverty alleviation, and that an increase in GDP will accelerate developing countries and 
LDCs into trade liberalisation. As acknowledged, trade liberalisation reflects the spirit of 
the WTO. 
Under current GSP regulation, safeguard clauses accommodated under Section 2 
Article 20-22. The GSP proposal692 provides 13 provisions on safeguard, accommodated in 
                                                 
689 See General Principles Safeguard Measures: Technical Information on Safeguard Measures, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safeg_e/safeg_info_e.htm, last accessed : 21 June 2011. 
690 See Irwin, Douglas A. Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996; 
Wilson, Garret., The Safeguards Clause : The Rational, Operations, and Prospects of GATT Article XIX, International 
Economics, Essay 1, University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, MA International Studies and 
Diplomacy 1998/9, 8 December, 1998, available at : 
http://www.garretwilson.com/essays/economics/gattarticlexix.html#Irwin, last accessed : 21 June 2011. 
691 See Wilson, Garret., The Safeguards Clause : The Rational, Operations, and Prospects of GATT Article XIX, available at : 
http://www.garretwilson.com/essays/economics/gattarticlexix.html, last accessed : 21 December 2011. 
692 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council applying a scheme of 
generalised tariff preferences, {SEC(2011) 536 final},{SEC(2011) 537 final}, Brussels, 10.5.2011, COM(2011) 241 
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the Article 19-31. The GSP proposal regulate safeguard in the two different sections, i.e., 
General Safeguards and Safeguards in the Textile, Agriculture and Fisheries Sectors and 
Safeguards in the Textile, Agriculture, and Fisheries Sectors.693  Safeguards measures can be 
applied when imported products “on terms which cause, or threaten to cause, serious 
difficulties to a Community producer of like or directly competing products”. Article 22 
paragraph 1 and 2 of the GSP proposal elaborated definition of the“like product” and “like 
or directly competing products”, as follows : 
“[…] For the purpose of this Chapter, ‘like product’ means a product which is identical, 
i.e. alike in all respects, to the product under consideration, or, in the absence of such a 
product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics 
closely resembling those of the product under consideration […]”. 
 “[…] Where a product originating in a beneficiary country of any of the three 
arrangements referred to in Article 1(2), is imported in volumes and/or at prices which 
cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to European Union producers of like or 
directly competing products, normal Common Customs Tariff duties on that product 
may be reintroduced in accordance with the following provisions […]” 
Article 22 paragraph 3 of the GSP proposal provides definition of “interested parties” 
as “those parties involved in the production, distribution and/or sale of the imports 
mentioned in paragraph 1 and of like or directly competing products”. Safeguard measures is 
necessary when its occurs extreme increases volumes and/or at prices of imported 
products under GSP scheme, which cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to 
European Union producers of like or directly competing products is present in the EU 
markets.  
The definition of “interested parties” elaborated further in the Article 24 paragraph 2 
the GSP proposal stipulated as follows : 
“[…] an investigation shall be initiated upon request by a Member State, by any legal 
person or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of Union 
producers, or on the Commission’s own initiative if it is apparent to the Commission 
that there is sufficient prima facie evidence, as determined on the basis of factors 
referred to in Article 23, to justify such initiation. The request to initiate an 
investigation shall contain evidence that the conditions for imposing the safeguards 
measure set out in Article 22(1) are met. The request shall be submitted to the 
Commission. The Commission shall, as far as possible, examine the accuracy and 
adequacy of the evidence provided in the request to determine whether there is 
sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation […]” 
The terms of “interested parties” describes as public entities (member states, the 
Commission), or private entities (any legal person or any association not having legal 
personality, acting on behalf of Union producers). These parties allowed to submit a request 
of safeguards investigation against the allegations under “certain circumstances as referred 
by Article 22 paragraph 1” of the GSP proposal. If “sufficient prima facie evidence” available, 
                                                                                                                                                
final, 2011/0117 (COD), available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147893.pdf, last 
accessed : 12 May 2011. (The Proposal of the new GSP Regulation, 2011.) 
693 See Article 30 : “[…] Without prejudice to the provisions of Section I of this Chapter, where imports of products included in 
Annex I to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union cause, or threaten to cause, serious disturbance to 
European Union markets, in particular to one or more of the outermost regions, or these markets’ regulatory 
mechanisms, the Commission, on its own initiative or at the request of a Member State, after consulting the 
committee for the relevant agriculture or fisheries common market organisation, shall suspend the preferential 
arrangements in respect of the products concerned in accordance with examination procedure referred to in Article 
38(3) […].” 
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the Commission on its own initiative can initiate an investigation. The terms of “prima facie 
evidence” referring to the “factors” used to measure “deterioration in economic and/or 
financial situation suffered by European Union producers”. These factors are defined in the 
Paragraph 4 Article 20 of the current GSP regulation and Article 23 of the GSP proposal. 
According to Article XIX of GATT and Agreement on Safeguard the investigation 
procedures is necessary before the safeguards measure applied. 
The terms of prima facie evidence ”and“ suffer deterioration in their economic 
and/or financial situation, gives clear legal interpretation of safeguards measures 
procedures.694  The wording of “deterioration” literally interpreted as the “ongoing 
situation” according to “prima facie evident” presumed “threaten to cause” serious injury in 
economic and/or financial situation. The measurement of “deterioration” have to consider 
some factors, such as market share, production, stocks, production capacity, bankruptcies, 
profitability, capacity utilization, employment, imports, and prices. Article 25 of the GSP 
proposal, emphasize that safeguard measures only taken based on justification of “the 
necessity” when deterioration of the economic and/or financial situation of European 
Union producers takes a place and difficult to be remedied.695 When negative 
“deterioration” found in the end of investigation, it means that conditions to apply 
safeguards measures are not fulfilled. Therefore, the Commission must adopt a decision 
terminating the investigation and proceeding.696 The implementation of safeguards 
regulation in the new GSP regulation referred to the Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of The 
European Parliament and of The Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and 
general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the 
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers.697 
 
XIII.b. Compliance with the WTO law on the safeguard measures 
Safeguard clauses in the GSP in line with the paragraph 1 (a) and (b) Article XIX of 
the GATT concerning “Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products”, stipulates as 
follows: 
(a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations 
incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, 
any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious 
injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive 
products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the 
extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to 
suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession. 
                                                 
694 See Article 23 The Proposal of the new GSP Regulation, 2011.  
695 “[…] On duly justified grounds of urgency relating to deterioration of the economic and/or financial situation of European 
Union producers which would be difficult to repair, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt immediately 
applicable implementing acts in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 38(4) to reintroduce 
normal Common Customs Tariff duties for a period of up to 12 months […]”. 
696 See Article 27 The Proposal of the new GSP Regulation, 2011. “[…] Where the facts as finally established show that the 
conditions set out in Article 22(1) are not met, the Commission shall adopt a decision terminating the investigation 
and proceeding in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 38(3). Such a decision shall be 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The investigation shall be deemed terminated, if no decision 
is published within the period referred to in Article 24(4) and any urgent preventive measures shall automatically 
lapse […]”. 
697 See Paragraph 3 Article 38 of The Proposal of the new GSP Regulation, 2011. “[…] Where reference is made to this 
paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply […]” 
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The sub-paragraph (b) governs the application of safeguards measure under preference 
trade agreement: 
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a preference, is 
being imported into the territory of a contracting party in the circumstances set 
forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious 
injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the 
territory of a contracting party which receives or received such preference, the 
importing contracting party shall be free, if that other contracting party so requests, 
to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the 
concession in respect of the product, to the extent and for such time as may be 
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury. 
In general, Article XIX of the GATT allows member states to take a “safeguards” 
measures in order to protect a specific domestic industry from unpredicted imports boost 
of any product that “causing, or which is likely to cause, serious injury to the industry”.698 
Sub-Paragraph (b) has implied that the preference granting country allowed applying 
safeguards measures in order “to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate 
adjustment”.699  
Article 20 Paragraph 1 of the current GSP regulation stipulates the safeguard 
measures that can be applied, under the requirement “where a product originating in a 
beneficiary country is imported on terms which cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties 
to a Community producer of like or directly competing products”. Safeguard measures are 
performed by “reintroducing, at any time, at the request of a Member State or on the 
Commission’s initiative normal CCT duties on that product”. According to this provision, the 
safeguard measures apply under GSP regulation adopting the essential conditions of GATT 
safeguard measures, for instance “cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties”. This 
means that the measures will only be applied under such circumstances. The term 
“domestic producer” under the GSP regulation refers to the community producer that is 
presumed to be injured from such circumstances. The GSP is established under the 
derogation of CCT,700 which means that the beneficiary country will be excluded from the 
application of such rules. The safeguard measures taken by the EU “reintroduce” CCT duties 
on the product concerned. Article 20 Paragraph 2701 of the GSP regulation governs  
investigation in order to justify such measures.  
The formal decisions to initiate the investigation are carried out by the Commission. 
The investigation is announced in the Official Journal of the European Union. It contains the 
“summary of the information received, and any relevant information sent to the Commission”. 
The Commission has to verify all of the information received with the beneficiary country 
concerned and any other relevant sources.702 During such investigations, the Commission 
                                                 
698 See Agreement on Safeguard, available at : http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#lAgreement, last 
accessed : 20 May 2011. 
699 See Paragraph 1 Article 5  concerning Application of Safeguard Measures of the Agreement on Safeguard. 
700 See Gormley, Laurence W., 2009, Op. Cit., paragraph 2.09. See also Altomonte, Carlo., Nava, Mario., 2005. 
701 “[…] The Commission shall take a formal decision, within a reasonable period of time, to initiate an investigation. Where 
the Commission decides to initiate an investigation, it shall publish a notice, in the Official Journal of the European 
Union, announcing the investigation. The notice shall provide a summary of the information received, and state any 
relevant information to be sent to the Commission. It shall specify the period, which shall not exceed four months 
from the date of publication of the notice, within which interested parties may make their views known in writing 
[…]”. 
702 See Paragraph 3 Article 20 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011 : “[…] The 
Commission shall seek all information which it deems necessary, and may verify the information received with the 
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collects the information related to the Union producers, which covers ten factors: market 
share, production, stocks, production capacity, bankruptcies, profitability, capacity 
utilisation, employment, imports, and prices. These factors are examined to determine 
whether there are serious injuries to the Community producers. The periods of 
investigation must be completed within six months from the date the notification is 
published. The Commission could extend the periods of investigation after carrying out 
consultation with the Generalised Preferences Committee.703 There are certain products 
from Section XI (b) must be removed from the preferences, referred to article 13(1)704 of 
GSP regulation, where imports of those products :  
(a) increase by at least 20 % in quantity (by volume), as compared with the previous 
calendar year; or 
(b) exceed 12,5 % of the value of Community imports of products from Section XI(b) 
from all countries and territories listed in Annex I during any period of twelve 
months. 
This provision only applies to general arrangement and special incentive arrangement for 
sustainable development and good governance. The special arrangement for LDC is 
excluded from the application of such provisions.705 The Commission should make 
notification to beneficiary country about safeguard measure decision. The notification also 
sent to the Council and the member states.706 The notification given to the beneficiary 
country before the safeguards decision come into effect is complying with Paragraph 2 
Article XIX of the GATT707. 
 
XIV. Preferential rules of origin. 
XIV.a. Rules of origin under the international trade system. 
XIV.a.1. Definition of rules of origin. 
The OECD defines rules of origin as a law, regulation, and administrative procedure 
that determine a product’s country of origin. It is used as an instrument for customs 
                                                                                                                                                
beneficiary country concerned and any other relevant source. It may be assisted by officials of the Member State on 
whose territory verification might be sought, if that Member State so requests […]”. 
703 See Paragraph 4, 5, 6, and 7 Article 20 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 
512/2011 
704 “[…] The tariff preferences referred to in Articles 6 and 7 shall be removed, in respect of products originating in a 
beneficiary country of a section, when the average value of Community imports from that country of products 
included in the section concerned and covered by the arrangement enjoyed by that country exceeds 15 % of the value 
of Community imports of the same products from all beneficiary countries and territories over three consecutive 
years, on the basis of the most recent data available on 1 September 2007. For each of the Sections XI(a) and XI(b), 
the threshold shall be 12,5 % […]”. 
705 See Paragraph 8 Article 20 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011.  “[…] This 
provision shall not apply to countries benefiting from the special arrangement for the least-developed countries 
referred to in Article 11, nor to countries with a share of imports into the Community, as defined in Article 13(1), not 
exceeding 8 %. The removal of the preferences shall take effect two months after the date of publication of the 
Commission’s decision to this effect in the Official Journal of the European Union […]” 
706 See Paragraph 1 and 2, Article 22 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011. 
707 “[…] Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, it shall give 
notice in writing to the contracting parties as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford the contracting 
parties and those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an 
opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a concession 
with respect to a preference, the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the action. in critical 
circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of 
this article may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected 
immediately after taking such action […]” 
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authorities to take measures in order to determine the necessary treatment to be given to 
imported goods such as quota limitation, tariff preferences, or anti-dumping duty.708  
The Kyoto Convention (International Convention on the Simplification and 
Harmonisation of Customs Procedures) defines rules of origin as “specific provisions, 
developed from principles established by national legislation or international agreements 
applied by a country to determine the origin of goods”.709 
Paragraph 1 Article I Part I of the Agreement on Rules of Origin stipulates rules of 
origin “as those laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general application 
applied by any Member to determine the country of origin of goods provided such rules of 
origin are not related to contractual or autonomous trade regimes leading to the granting of 
tariff preferences going beyond the application of Paragraph 1 of Article I of GATT 1994”.710  
According to the customs union, rules of origin serve to identify the origin of the 
product with the purpose of determining the applicable customs regime. For instance, 
imported goods or products subject to GSP tariff preferences are granted derogation from 
CCT based on their originating countries. According to Article 24 of the Community 
Customs Code, “goods whose production involved more than one country shall be deemed to 
originate in the country where they underwent their last, substantial, economically justified 
processing and working in an undertaking equipped for that purpose and resulting in the 
manufacture of a new product or representing an important stage of manufacture”.711 
To sum up, rules of origin are the criteria to determine the national source of 
goods.712 In other words, rules of origin are defined as sets of requirements to determine 
“originating” goods traded between preferential trading partners.713 
 
XIV.a.2. Rules of origin from a legal and historical perspective. 
The legal history of the “origin” of imported goods started when the World Customs 
Organization (WCO) was established. The embryo of the WCO stems from the Study Group, 
which was created by the Committee for European Economic Co-operation. This 
Committee consists of thirteen European government representatives. The objective of this 
Study Group is to examine “the possibility of establishing one or more inter-European 
customs union” under the legal framework of GATT. This Study Group consists of two 
Committees: the Economic Committee and the Customs Committee.  
The Economic Committee is considered as the “seed” of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Customs Committee led to the 
establishment of the Customs Co-operation Council (CCC), which came into force in 1952.  
The CCC was governed by the Council Body. The “First Council Session” held on 26 January 
1953, took place in Brussels and was attended by seventeen representatives from various 
                                                 
708 See Glossary statictical terms, available at : http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4992, last accessed : 21 March 
2011. 
709 See Annex K The Revised Kyoto Convention, See also Stocker, Walter, Op. Cit., p. 2. 
710 See Paragraph 1 Article I Part I of the Agreement on Rules of Origin stipulate, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/22-roo.pdf, last accessed : 8 April 2011. 
711 See EC Regulation 2913/1992. See also See Eeckhout, Piet., 2004, Op. Cit.,  p. 361. 
712 See Technical Information on Rules of Origin, available at : http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm, 
last accessed : 21 March 2011. 
713 See Naumann, Eckart., Rules of Origin under EPAs: Key Issues and New Directions, Paper for Tralac Conference October 
2005, p. 4, available at : http://www.tralac.org/unique/tralac/pdf/20051018_ROO_paper.pdf, last accessed : 9  April 
2011. 
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European countries.714 On 18 May 1978, the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC) concluded 
the “International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs 
Procedures”, known as the “Kyoto Convention”. This Convention is recognised as the first 
international agreement regulating the rules of origin, and entered into force on 25 
September 1974. The Kyoto Convention is not a binding agreement. However, the Kyoto 
Convention lays down the important criteria in defining the rules of origin, consisting of 
“wholly produced or wholly obtained” and “substantial transformation”.715 The wholly 
produced or wholly obtained goods automatically have an “originating” status. The origin 
of goods manufactured in two or more countries are determined by where the last 
“substantial transformation” took place.716 There are three methods to determine 
“substantial transformation”, i.e, Change of Tariff Classification (CTC) or Change in Tariff 
Heading, Value Added (VA), and Technical Requirement or Specific Processing.717  
On 18 March 1975, the EU adopted Council Decision 75/199/EEC concerning the 
“international convention on the simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures 
and accepting the Annex thereto concerning customs warehouse”. This council decision 
entered into force on 26 September 1974.718 
The “WCO” was officially launched in 1994. 719 Afterwards in Brussels, on 26 June 
1999, the Protocol of amendment to the International Convention on the Simplification and 
Harmonisation of Customs Procedures was signed.  The EU adopted the Protocol 
amendment by Council Decision 2003/231/EC concerning “the accession of the European 
Community to the Protocol of Amendment to the International Convention on the 
simplification and harmonization of customs procedures”. Such council decision entered into 
force on 3 February 2006. The legal base of its adoption is the CCP. 720 
The establishment of the WTO brought rules of origin into the table of multilateral 
trade negotiations. The Agreement on Rules of Origin was concluded in Marrakech as part 
of the Uruguay Round. It entered into force on 1 January 1995. The objective of this 
agreement is to provide “harmonisation and clarify rules of origin” in international trade. It 
                                                 
714 See Treaties Office Database, Protocol of amendment to the International Convention on the simplification and 
harmonisation of customs procedures (Revised Kyoto Convention), available at : 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect
=true&treatyId=7181, last accessed : 08 April 2011. 
715 See Gibbon, 2008 : “[…] frequently within preferential rules of origin, exporters from beneficiary country are expected to 
conform to more than one method of proving ‘substantial transformation”. However, the prevalence of the use of 
multiple methods does not seem to have been measured in the literature […]”. See also Cadot, Olivier., de Melo, Jaime., 
and Pérez, Alberto Portugal., Rules of Origin for Preferential Trading Arrangements: Implications for AFTA of EU and US 
Regimes, CREA-Institut de macroèconomie appliqué, Universitè de Lausanne, Juni 2006, available at : 
http://www.hec.unil.ch/crea/publications/autrespub/china.pdf, last accessed : 11 February 2011. 
716 See Falvey., Rod and Reed, Geoff., Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments, Research Paper 2000/18, Centre for 
Research on Globalisation and Labour Markets, School of Economics, University of Nottingham, available at : 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_levpublications/Research_Papers/2000/ 00_18.pdf, last accessed : 9 
April 2011. 
717 See Izam, Miguel, 2003. See also Gibbon, Peter, 2008. See also Naumann, Eckart., 2005. See also Falvey., Rod and Reed, 
Geoff., 2000. 
718 See Treaties Office Database, International convention on the simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures 
(Kyoto Convention), 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step= 
0&redirect=true&treatyId=483 
719 See Treaties Office Database, Protocol of amendment to the International Convention on the simplification and 
harmonisation of customs procedures. 
720 See Ibid. 
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has to be noted that this Agreement only regulates non-preferential trade.721 However, in 
the customs union, non-preferential and preferential of origin are applied in its 
international trade relations.722 
 
XIV.a.3. Scope of rules of origin. 
The concept of origin is defined as the “economic” nationality of goods in 
international trade.723 In practice, there are two types of origins, non-preferential and 
preferential origin. The non-preferential rules of origin are used under general commercial 
policy measures, for instance, as anti-dumping measures, quantitative restrictions, or tariff 
quotas.724 Non-preferential rules of origin are used for the purposes of trade statistics; 
application of labelling and marking requirements; and for government procurement.725 
The source of imports (origin of goods) determines the import duties and restrictions.726 
The rules of origin are also used as an instrument of import prohibitions and trade 
embargoes. Non-preferential rules of origin are used to attain different policy objectives 
established under national acts, regulations, or administrative procedures. In the customs 
union, a single set of rules of origin is applied to all member states.727 Therefore, rules of 
origin serve as a discretionary trade policy instrument.728 
The preferential origin is given to imported goods by the beneficiary country under 
special arrangements, such as GSP. In other words, preferential origin is “granted only to 
the certain countries subject to the conditions of trade preferences” due to its nature in the 
selective trade arrangement.729 By certificate preferential rules of origin the goods are 
allowed to enter preference-granting country markets at a reduced rate or zero rate of 
duties.730 The Agreement on Rules of Origin in Paragraph 2 Annex II defines rules of origin: 
 “as those laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general 
application that are applied by any Member to determine, whether goods qualify 
for preferential treatment under contractual or autonomous trade regimes 
leading to the granting of tariff preferences going beyond the application of 
Paragraph 1 of Article I of GATT 1994”.731  
According to UNCTAD, there are various types of preferential rules of origin 
depending on the agreement of the contracting parties under the Regional Trading 
                                                 
721 See Background Note, The Agreement on Rules of Origin of the WTO, June 1998, available at : 
http://www.acici.org/aitic/documents/notes/download/note14_eng.pdf, p. 1, last accessed : 11 April 2011; See also 
Izam, Miguel, 2003, Op. Cit., p. 11. Also see the review documents : UN (2001); UN (2002a) and UN (2002b), all of 
which refer to the most recent contributions of UN/CEFACT on the question of rules of origin. 
722 See Gibbon, Peter., 2008. 
723 See Naumann, Eckart., 2005, Op. Cit., p. 4. 
724 See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/index_en.htm. See also Paragraph 2 
Article I Part I of the Agreement on Rules of Origin stipulate, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/22-roo.pdf, last accessed : 8 April 2011. 
725 See http://www.unctadindiaroo.org/. See also Paragraph 2 Article I Part I of the Agreement on Rules of Origin stipulate, 
available at : http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/22-roo.pdf, last accessed : 8 April 2011. See also Falvey., 
Rod and Reed, Geoff., 2000. 
726 See Technical Information on Rules of Origin, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm, 
last accessed : 8 March 2011. 
727 See Stocker, Walter, Op. Cit., p. 4. 
728 See Naumann, Eckart., 2005. 
729 See Miguel Izam, 2003. 
730 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/index_en.htm 
731 See Agreement on Rules of Origin, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/roi_01_e.htm, last accessed : 9 April 2011. 
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Arrangements (RTAs).732 Since there is “no binding agreement or international standard 
governing preferential rules of origin”733, the rules of origin can be different from country to 
country.734 The term “contractual” refers to the Economic Integration Agreement, whereas 
“autonomous” is interpreted as preferential, and is granted under the international legal 
framework, such as GSP.735 When based on its legal basis, the establishment of GSP is 
considered as an autonomous preferential arrangement.736 
The rules of origin plays an important role in the implementation of GSP in order to 
determine whether imported goods receive preferential treatment or MFN treatment.737 
The movement of goods within the customs union has to fulfil “the import formalities” or 
“comply with provisions on free circulation”, which are not based on the origin status.738 The 
regulation on free circulation is covered under Article 29 of TFUE (ex Article 24 TEC). The 
EU preferential rules of origin specifically regulate the procedures and administration 
requirements for goods released into free circulation on the market. 
 
XIV.a.4. Concept of origin and trade deflection. 
The basic concept of the rules of origin is to identify the “nationality” of goods. In this 
regard, the “nationality” of goods imposes the legal consequence of trade policy 
instruments that are applied to the goods. In order to determine such “nationality”, there 
are legal or administrative requirements that must be fulfilled by the traders, known as 
origin criteria.739  
The definition of “wholly obtained goods” always involves two words “when on 
where”. For instance, when on where goods naturally occur; live animals are born and 
raised; plants harvested; or minerals extracted or taken in a single country. The waste 
resulted from manufacturing or processing operations or from consumption, which is 
produced from the wholly obtained goods. This is also included in the definitions of “wholly 
obtained goods”.740  
Preferential rules of origin require two essential components, “criteria of origin” and 
“documentary evidence”.741 Documentary evidence is used as a legal support declaring the 
“origin” of goods. An adequate and authenticate certificate of origin is required. Based on 
such documents, the customs officers can determine what type of trade policy measure to 
apply to the goods. Documentary evidence has created fragmentation in the 
implementation of the rules of origin. However, the customs union administration rules of 
                                                 
732 See UNCTAD-ROO Database, available at : http://www.unctadindiaroo.org/, last accessed : 9 April 2011. 
733 See Naumann, Eckart., 2005. 
734 See Glossary statictical terms, available at: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4992, last accessed : 21 March 
2011. 
735 See Miguel Izam, 2003. 
736 See Commission of the European Communities, The Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements; Orientations for 
the future, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, Brussel, 16.3.2005, COM (2005) 100 final, available at : 
http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/13420/lcl1945i.pdf, last accessed : 11 February 2011. See also Enabling 
Clause 1979. See also Appellate Body Decision on EC Preferences Case; See Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
737 See Technical Information on Rules of Origin, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm, 
last accessed : 8 March 2011. 
738 See Taxation and Customs Union, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/ index_en.htm, last accessed : 8 March 
2011. 
739 See Stocker, Walter, Op. Cit., p. 2. 
740 See Stocker, Walter, Op. Cit., p. 3. 
741 See Stocker, Walter, Op. Cit., p. 4. 
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origin are established based on uniformity and simplicity.742 New barriers in trade should 
not be created.  
Trade deflections take place in preferential rules of origin when the producer from 
the non-beneficiary country places their production in the beneficiary country in order to 
receive benefits from preferential rules of origin. The preference-granting country tends to 
establish restrictive requirements regarding transformation. This policy aims to ensure 
that the goods originated from the beneficiary country and the benefit of such preferences 
is truly enjoyed and utilised to achieve its objective. Therefore, in order to prevent trade 
deflection, rules of origin are necessary in all trade preferences.743 
However, restrictive regulation of preferential rules of origin has caused difficulties 
either administratively or technically for the producer of the beneficiary country. This 
could be considered as the new “non-tariff barrier to trade”. As a matter of fact, the 
producer from the beneficiary country has to fulfil such restrictive requirements, 
otherwise the preference-granting country may withdraw the benefits of such 
preference.744 Therefore, the rules of origin have a discriminatory nature since they may be 
used as an “exclusion mechanism”745. It could become a hidden tool for protectionism, 
leading to discrimination”.746 The rules of origin also have some positive impact on the area 
of intellectual property rights, such as geographic indication and state of the art.747  
The standard consignment document plays a crucial role in preventing 
transhipment.748 Transhipment is considered as a form of trade deflection in preferential 
trade. Such conduct is identified as potentially hampering realisation of GSP. In this regard, 
real benefits from trade preferences will not be enjoyed and utilised directly by the 
beneficiary country but are taken by a third state. Hence, trade deflections are defined as 
abuse by a third state to take the advantages given by preference-granting country through 
the GSP scheme. 
The consignment standard is included as a requirement in the rules of origin. The 
consignment standard requires direct shipment. The goods must be shipped directly from 
the beneficiary countries to the preference-granting country. The consignment document 
is used to avoid the “manipulation or fraud” of the origin of products.  
 
XIV.a.5. Basic principles of rules of origin. 
Three basic principles are applied in the rules of origin, that is, simplicity, 
predictability, and efficiency. These principles are in line with the principles applied in the 
GSP.749 The principle of simplicity emphasises that rules of origin must be comprehensible 
                                                 
742 See International Center for Economic Growth, Op. Cit.,  p. 1. 
743 See Cadot, Olivier., de Melo, Jaime., and Pérez, Alberto Portugal., 2006. 
744 See International Center for Economic Growth, Op. Cit.,  p. 1. 
745 See Izam, Miguel, 2003, Op. Cit., p. 13. See also the review documents : UN (2001); UN (2002a) and UN (2002b), all of 
which refer to the most recent contributions of UN/CEFACT on the question of rules of origin. 
746 See Izam, Miguel, 2003, Op.Cit., p. 14. See also the review documents : UN (2001); UN (2002a) and UN (2002b), all of which 
refer to the most recent contributions of UN/CEFACT on the question of rules of origin. 
747 See Izam, Miguel, 2003, Op. Cit., p. 12. See also the review documents : UN (2001); UN (2002a) and UN (2002b), all of 
which refer to the most recent contributions of UN/CEFACT on the question of rules of origin. 
748 See Gibbon, 2008 : “[…] includes transhipment as part of trade deflection when non beneficiary country via beneficiary 
country commit fraud in order to obtain the margin of preference available under the scheme under autonomous 
preferential trade […]”. See also Naumann, Eckart., 2005. 
749 See Communication From The Commission To The Council, The European Parliament and The European Economic and 
Social Committee Developing countries, international trade and sustainable development: the function of the 
Community’s generalised system of preferences (GSP) for the ten-year period from 2006 to 2015. “[…] The EU’s 
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and transparent. The principle of simplicity is applied in order to avoid “ambiguous 
interpretation” or “fraudulence” in the application of rules of origin. The principle of 
predictability emphasises the aspect of “consistency”. In this regard, rules of origin must 
guarantee that the stability of its implementation gives traders or producers in the 
beneficiary country the opportunity to anticipate the “unpredictable” situation in 
international trade. The principle of efficiency covers efficient, speedy, and simple 
administrative procedures in the application of the rules of origin. Relating to 
administrative cooperation procedures, the EU preferential rules of origin require the 
beneficiary country to apply the modern public administrative system. The EU rules of 
origin are established under Union legislation. This is based on the principle of fairness, 
transparency, predictability, consistency, and neutrality.750 
 
XIV.a.6. The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin. 
The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin was adopted in Marrakech. It entered into 
force on 1 January 1995. This Agreement consists of four parts751, nine articles, and 2 
Annexes. The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin lays down crucial principles that have to 
be applied by the member states in the establishment of their national rules of origin. In 
the preamble of the agreement, it is mentioned that the member states must apply the 
transparency principle when establishing laws, regulations, and practices relating to rules 
of origin. These principles have  also been adopted by Article 3 Paragraph (d) and (e) of the 
WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin that stipulates as follows: 
“[…] (d) the rules of origin are administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial 
and reasonable manner; (e) their laws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings of general application relating to rules of origin are 
published as if they were subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of 
Paragraph 1 of Article X of GATT 1994; […]” 
These principles are applied in order to "create further liberalisation and expansion of 
world trade" and "strengthen the role of GATT”. Article 3 Paragraph (e) elaborates on the 
implementation of transparency principle. It is clearly stipulated that member states must 
publish “their laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings of general 
application relating to rules of origin”.   
Annex II “Common Declaration with regard to Preferential Rules of Origin” aimed to 
response the existence of trade preferences granted by developed country.752 Paragraph c 
Article 3 of the Common Declaration used to enhance implementation of transparency in 
the rules of origin procedures.753 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Generalized System of Preference must be stable, predictable, objective and simple. It must be made more accessible 
to traders […]”. 
750 See Jones, Vivian C., and Martin, Michael F., International Trade: Rules of Origin, RL34524, CRS Report for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, January 11, 2011, available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34524.pdf, last 
accessed : 11 February 2011. 
751 Part I (Definitions And Coverage); Part II (Disciplines to Govern the Application of Rules of Origin); Part III (Procedural 
Arrangements on Notification, Review, Consultation and Dispute Settlement); Part IV (Harmonization of Rules of 
Origin). 
752 See Appellate Body Decision in EC-Preferences Case para. 190. 
753 “[…] their laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application relating to preferential 
rules of origin are published as if they were subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of paragraph 1 of 
Article X of GATT 1994 […]” 
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XIV.b. Rules of origin in the EU Generalised System of Preferences. 
In the implementation of GSP, rules of origin function to prevent “fraud” and “trade 
deflection”. The violation of the rules of origin can be used as justification to withdraw the 
beneficiary country from the GSP list.754 Compared to MFN, the rules of origin that are 
applied to preferential trade are more restrictive.755 One of the most crucial elements of the 
rules of origin is the allocation or limitation of non-originating materials or external 
contents of imported goods from the beneficiary country.  
The “fraud” that potentially occurs could reduce or eliminate the benefits provided 
by GSP. For instance, the goods and products from the beneficiary country are granted 
tariff reductions under the GSP scheme, on the other hand, the beneficiary country may 
lack the production resources such as technology and materials. This circumstance may be 
misused by other parties in order to take the benefits by “counterfeiting” the origin of 
goods.756 The requirement of the minimum local and regional value content aims to 
generate growth in the small-scale business sector in developing countries. This 
requirement is indirectly addressed to achieve one of the objectives of GSP to eradicate 
poverty in developing countries. The regulation of domestic or regional contents and the 
specified processing requirement aim to generate employment and help economic 
development through trade.757 On the other hand, the strict restriction on external 
contents also increases the cost of production. The strict restriction on the external content 
will limit producers from the beneficiary country to having less choice in efficient 
complementary materials. Under such circumstances, the production continuity of the 
beneficiary countries can be injured by high cost production. 
The EU GSP seriously treats “trade deflection” with respect to cases of fraud, 
irregularities, or systematic failure to comply with the rules of origin.758 Therefore, the EU 
as the preference-granting country could impose “temporarily withdrawal in respect of all 
or of certain goods originating in a beneficiary country” when such fraud or failure occurs. 
This withdrawal policy is categorised  as a unilateral sanction since the legal nature of the 
GSP is an optional policy. However, Paragraph 2 Article 16 Council Regulation (EC) No. 
732/2008 requires “administrative cooperation”, inter alia, for instance, Sub-paragraph (d) 
stipulates “appropriate inquiries to identify and prevent contravention of the rules of origin”. 
In this regard, the EU exercises its right as preference-granting country by holding the 
confidentiality principle in giving justification on such fraud conduct or trade deflection.  
Paragraph 1 Article 17 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 stipulates that the 
Commission or a member state has to inform the Generalised Preferences Committee759 
when there is sufficient justification to initiate an investigation of such conduct. According 
to Paragraph 2 Article 27 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 the Generalised 
Preference Committee has the task “to examine any matter relating to the application of this 
                                                 
754 See Harris, Jeremy T, 2009, Op. Cit., pp. 7-9. See also International Center for Economic Growth, Near East Program, Free 
Trade Agreements and Rules of Origin, p. 1. 
755 See Gibbon, Peter, 2008. 
756 See Cadot, Olivier., de Melo, Jaime., and Pérez, Alberto Portugal., 2006. 
757 See Harris, Jeremy T., 2009, Op. Cit., pp. 7-9. See also International Center for Economic Growth, Op. Cit., p. 1. 
758 See Paragraph 1 Article 16 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 :  
“[…] The preferential arrangements provided for in this Regulation may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all 
or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, in cases of fraud, irregularities or systematic failure to 
comply with or to ensure compliance with the rules concerning the origin of the products and with the procedures 
related thereto, or failure to provide the administrative cooperation as required for the implementation and policing 
of the arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) […]”. 
759 See Paragraph 1 Article 27 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
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Regulation, raised by the Commission or at the request of a member state”. The mechanism 
of withdrawal and suspension in the GSP is discussed in separate sections in this study. 
The rules of origin have a crucial role in the implementation of the EU GSP scheme in 
order to prevent trade deflection. Recitals 21,760 Paragraphs 1761 and 2762 Article 5 Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008, stipulates that rules of origin are used to ensure that the 
benefit of GSP is enjoyed and utilised properly by the beneficiary countries to fulfil their 
“development needs”. The Commission emphasises that the rules of origin must comply 
with the objectives of the GSP scheme.763 The preferential rules of origin of the EU are 
regulated by Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down 
provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 establishing 
the Community Customs Code, whereas, now this regulation was amended by Commission 
Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 on 18 November 2010. This new regulation was applied 
by 1 January 2011. The Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 is established under 
Article 290 of the TFEU as “non-legislative acts”.  
The gap and inequalities of economic development between states creates an 
obstacle in implementing equal treatment of concession. In this regard, the international 
trade community has responded through the establishment of some preferences directed 
to developing countries. However, as noted above, this preferential system also has its own 
weakness in its implementation. It is needed to ensure that the actual benefits of GSP are 
enjoyed and utilised directly by the beneficiary countries. This objective is in compliance 
with the WTO legal framework, such as the Enabling Clause and the Doha Development 
Agenda, in order to improve market access for developing countries to developed 
countries.764  In this way, the beneficiary countries are encouraged to accelerate their 
integration in the world trading system.  
Trade is still considered as an effective tool to encourage developing countries to 
integrate into the world economy, especially through enhancing market access. Controlling 
and monitoring the implementation of the rules of origin can maximise the utilisation of 
the Generalised System of Preferences by market improvement.765 Therefore, it is deemed 
that revision of the rules of origin will deliver its concrete advantages directly, to which the 
Generalised System of Preferences is directed. In the Communication from the Commission 
                                                 
760 “[…] The rules of origin concerning the definition of the concept of originating products, the procedures and the methods 
of administrative cooperation related thereto, laid down in Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 
laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community 
Customs Code, applied to the tariff preferences provide by this Regulation, in order to ensure the benefit of this 
scheme goes only to those beneficiary countries which the scheme is intended to benefit […]”. 
761 “[…] The tariff preferences provided shall apply to imports of products included in the arrangement enjoyed by the 
beneficiary country in which they originate […]”. 
762 “[…] For the purposes of the arrangements referred to in Article 1(2), the rules of origin concerning the definition of the 
concept of originating products, the procedures and the methods of administrative cooperation related thereto, shall 
be those laid down in Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 […]”. 
763 See European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Trade policy the EU’s relations with the rest of the world, Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2006, available at :  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october /tradoc_128505.pdf, last accessed : 23 September 2010. 
764 See Recitals 3, Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010. 
765 See Cadot et al (2005a, 2005b, 2006); Gibbon (2008) : “[…] having demonstrate an relationships between rules of origin 
restrictiveness at product level and preference under-utilisation […]”; “[…]a growing consensus amongst trade 
economists is evident to the effect that there is clear link between restrictiveness and under-utilisation, since tariff 
lines with the highest preference margins are normally subject to the most restrictive rules of origin […].” 
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to the Council concerning “The Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements; 
Orientations for the future”, it was stated that: 766 
“[…] The rules of origin are an essential component of Community trade policy, 
especially where tariff preferences have to be granted to goods only originating in given 
countries or groups of countries. Therefore, they must be consistent with the overall 
objective of those preferences of strengthening economic integration between the 
partners and in particular of facilitating the full insertion of developing countries into 
the world economy and supporting their economic and social development […]. The 
Commission intends to target GSP "on the countries that most need it and must 
encourage regional cooperation between developing countries by various means. The GSP 
should assist these countries to attain a level of competitiveness which could make them 
self-supporting economically and full partners in international trade […]" 
The revision of the GSP rules of origin aims to create more “relaxed” and “simplified” 
procedures.767 As noted by the European Commission, such simplification is designed to 
“guarantee easier access to the community market” under GSP. Further, the new revision of 
the EU GSP rules of origin aims to enhance the implementation of the transparency 
principle.768 
Revisions of the preferential rules of origin are deemed as a crucial issue within 
international trade liberalisation. Therefore, on 18 December 2003 the Commission 
responded to such demand through discussion and the publication of a consultation paper 
on “the future of rules of origin in preferential trade arrangements” the so-called “Green 
Paper”.769 The Green Paper was “adopted” by the Commission on 16 March 2005.770 The 
Green Paper mapped out some crucial problems related to the implementation of 
preferential rules of origin. To gather the opinions and consultations, the Commission 
involved third states, such as the beneficiary countries of the GSP. The new approach to the 
preferential rules of origin, particularly in the GSP, was changed into a “development-
orientated arrangement”. In this regard, the EU intended to apply the preferential rules of 
origin for the sake of development.771  
As mentioned above, the urgency of the simplification of the preferential rules of 
origin772 was based on considerations where the previous rules of origin were considered 
“too complex and too restrictive”. According to the Commission’s impact assessment, the 
                                                 
766 Commission of the European Communities, The Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements; Orientations for the 
future, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, Brussel, 16.3.2005, COM (2005) 100 final, available at : 
http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/13420/lcl1945i.pdf, last accessed : 11 February 2011. 
767 See The Future of Rules of Origin, available at : 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_777_en.htm, last 
accessed : 13 April 2011. See also Miguel Izam, 2003. Izam (2003) noted that “[…] rules of origin has implication to 
the trade facilitation and efficiency, which covered both private and public sector […]”. Izam, has put a highlight on 
the “simplicity and clarity administrative procedure which applies on the certification of origin”. However, the system 
establishment of such system cannot be separated from the institutions concerned such as trade institution and 
customs office. 
768 Commission of the European Communities, The Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements; Orientations for the 
future, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee. 
769 See The European Commission, Green Paper The Future of Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements, A 
summary report of the results of the consultation process, COM(2003)787, 18 December 2003, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/origin_consultation_final.pdf, last accessed : 14 April 
2011. 
770 European Union Communication, The rules of origin in preferential trade arrangements: Orientations for the future. 
771 See Recitals 2 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
772 See Recitals 3 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
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rules of origin was identified as one of the “reasons” for low utilisation of certain goods that 
benefited under the trade preferences.773  The Commission’s impact assessment concluded 
that the rules of origin should be applied on “a sector-by-sector rather than a product-by-
product basis”. Such assessment also emphasises the “development-friendly principle” as 
part of the purpose of the GSP.  
In the GSP rules of origin, the “single criterion”774 is used to determine the 
“nationality” of goods. Value-added775 criterion is applied to goods that are “not wholly 
obtained in a beneficiary country”. The adequate processing “threshold value” must be 
respected.776 During the revision process of the rules of origin, the value-added threshold is 
a crucial issue between internal and external stakeholders.777 
In order to determine “real added-value” it is important to consider production 
capacity of the beneficiary country and sufficient processing operations778. The percentage 
of added-value should not exceed the production capabilities of developing countries. The 
sufficient processing evaluation can be measured using a method “value added test”.779  
Based on the “value added test”, a product is considered as originating only if the contents 
of the non-originating materials in the imported product, after the working process, do not 
exceed the threshold value (referred to as the minimum Local Value Content or Regional 
Value Content), which is “expressed as a percentage of the net production cost of the final 
product”. The percentage of value added content should be based on economic analysis and 
GSP objectives. The value added criterion is applied to prevent any misapplication or 
circumvention of the preferences. However, the value added criterion should not hamper 
efficiency and competitiveness by increasing production costs.780 
With respect to LDCs, Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 provides 
“maximum content of non-originating781 materials up to 70 %”. Such regulation is based on 
the consideration to generate industrialisation in LDCs. It reflects the divergent of 
industrial capabilities of beneficiary countries.782 Furthermore, the “criteria of origin” and 
                                                 
773 See Recitals 5 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
774 See ODI (2006); Cadot et.al (2005); Gibbon (2008). “[…] in the Generalized  System of Preferences “VA” was the sole test in 
10-13% of tariff lines […]”. 
775 Describe by Gibbon (2008), that preferential trade “[…] may require an exported good of beneficiary country to embody a 
minimum local VA, have specified originating parts comprising a specific share of final value, or embody a maximum 
import content measured in value terms […]”. VA should be calculated on the base price (for instance : Ex-works, Net 
Production Cost, FOB, CIF, etc). Where VA rules are applied EU Generalized System of Preference (refer to 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010).  The level of local VA required has usually fallen 
in a range of 25-60%. 
776 See Recitals 6 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010. 
777 See Naumann, Eckart., 2005. 
778 See also Gibbon (2008) : “[…] sufficient processing operations or used to called as technical requirement”, in this regard, 
preference granting country may require that “one or more specified manufacturing operation must take place on the 
good in the beneficiary country for it to be classified as originating […]”. 
779 Commission of the European Communities, The Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements; Orientations for the 
future, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, Brussel. See also Gibbon, Peter, 2008 : “[…] importing country considers the amount of value 
added in a good in a given exporting country sufficient for it to be counted as an export from that country […]”. 
780 Commission of the European Communities, The Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements; Orientations for the 
future, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee. 
781 See Paragraph 1 (o) Article 67 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010, defined “[…] maximum content of non-
originating materials as the maximum content of non-originating materials which is permitted in order to consider a 
manufacture as working or processing sufficient to confer originating status on the product. It may be expressed as a 
percentage of the ex-works price of the product or as a percentage of the net weight of these materials used falling 
under a specified group of chapters, chapter, heading or sub-heading […]”. 
782 See Recitals 7 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
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“economic justification” are linked with the real economic benefit going to the beneficiary 
countries concerned. In order to ensure the process of production carried out in the 
beneficiary country, the regulation provides “a list of insufficient working or processing 
operations that can never confer origin”. However, there are limited changes of this list in 
the revised version.783 The list of sufficient working or processing operations and wholly 
obtained goods are adopted as “unilateral arrangements” that are in line with the 
preferential origin of GSP.784 
Since, the certificate of origin is issued by the beneficiary, importers do not have the 
burden to pay any duty, when the declaration of origin is found to be “incorrect”. Importers 
are considered to act in good faith. Therefore, the authorities in the beneficiary country 
must apply prudential principles when issuing such certificates because the loss will not go 
to the “EU’s own resources”, but to their traders and producers.785  
As regards “free circulation” within the EU, it is required to check whether the 
supplier is a registered exporter in the beneficiary country concerned or not. The 
beneficiary country has to set up “an electronic record of registered exporters”, therefore, 
the application of e-Trade is needed to support such service.786 The principle of 
transparency is carried out by the publication of “non-confidential registration data of 
exporters”.787  
Article 67 distinguishes between “exporter and registered exporter”.  Paragraph 1 (t) 
Article 67 defines the exporter as “a person exporting the goods to the EU or to a beneficiary 
country who is able to prove the origin of the goods, whether or not he is the manufacturer 
and whether or not he himself carries out the export formalities”. Then, Paragraph 1 (u) 
Article 67 defines the registered exporter as “an exporter who is registered with the 
competent authorities of the beneficiary country concerned for the purpose of making out 
statements on origin for the purpose of exporting under the scheme”.  
It is clearly regulated that in order to receive facilities under the GSP scheme, the 
concerned exporter from the beneficiary country has to be registered at the competent 
authorities of that beneficiary country. In addition to ensuring the GSP facilities are utilised 
properly, such registration is also used for trade statistics and analysis. For instance, the 
data can be used by the beneficiary country to provide trade statistics related to the 
utilisation of the GSP scheme by the domestic exporter. Paragraph 3 Article 69 Commission 
Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 stipulates that the information about the “registered 
exporter” must be provided by governmental authorities of the beneficiary country and the 
customs authorities of member states in the form of an electronic database.  
Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 amends Articles 66 to 97 Part I, Title IV, 
Chapter 2 of Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93. This revision of the regulation covers the 
“definition of the concept of originating goods”, the procedures, and the methods of 
administrative cooperation designed for the application of the GSP scheme.788 The revision 
makes a distinction between the definitions of a “product” and “goods”. A product is 
defined as a manufactured product, even if it is intended for later use in another 
                                                 
783 See Recitals 8 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
784 See Recitals 25 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
785 See Recitals 17 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
786 See Recitals 18 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
787 See Recitals 19 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
788 See Article 66 Sub Section 1 Section 1 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
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manufacturing operation.789 While, goods are defined as both materials and goods.790 
Materials refer to any ingredient, raw material, component, or part, used in the 
manufacture of the product.791 Manufacture is defined as any kind of working or 
processing included in assembly.792 
 
XIV.b.1. Role of e-trade in administrative cooperation rules of origin. 
Paragraph 1 (a) Article 68 stipulates that the beneficiary country is required to 
provide “administrative structures and systems” in order to be able to implement the rules 
and procedures determined by the regulation. This provision is also related to the 
importance of building an integrated system to support the implementation of the 
“accumulation of origin”. It is needed to setup administrative cooperation between the 
authorities concerned in the beneficiary country, with the Commission and the customs 
authorities of the member states. Further, Paragraph 1 (b) Article 68 regulates such 
cooperation. 
To carry out such cooperation, the beneficiary countries are obliged to inform the 
names and addresses of the authorities within their jurisdiction, which have the 
authorisation to register and to withdraw exporters from the “record of registered 
exporters”. The authorities of the beneficiary country are defined as “part of the 
governmental authorities of the country concerned, or act under the authority of the 
government”. In addition, any change relating to such cooperation must be informed 
immediately to the Commission.793 Article 71 clearly stipulates that failure of the 
competent authorities of a beneficiary country to comply with Articles 68(1), 69(2), 91, 92, 
93 or 97g or systematic failure to comply with Article 97h (2), could lead to temporary 
withdrawal from preferences under the scheme for that country. With the purpose of 
performing the transparency principle, the Commission should publish such data and any 
updates in the Official Journal of the European Union (C series) as stipulated by Article 70. 
Article 72 of the preferential rules of origin describes the concept of originating 
goods as stipulated in the Article 75 and 76. Paragraph 1 Article 75 provided lists of the 
“wholly obtained” products, as follows :  
(a) Mineral products extracted from its soil or from its seabed;  
(b) Plants and vegetable products grown or harvested there;  
(c) Live animals born and raised there;  
(d) Products from live animals raised there;  
(e) Products from slaughtered animals born and raised there;  
(f) Products obtained by hunting or fishing conducted there;  
(g) Products of aquaculture where the fish, crustaceans and molluscs are born and raised 
there;  
(h) Products of sea fishing and other products taken from the sea outside any territorial sea by 
its vessels;  
(i) Products made on board its factory ships exclusively from the products referred to in point 
(h);  
(j) Used articles collected there fit only for the recovery of raw materials; 
(k) Waste and scrap resulting from manufacturing operations conducted there;  
                                                 
789 See Paragraph 1 (d) Article 67 Section 1 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
790 See Paragraph 1 (e) Article 67 Section 1 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
791 See Paragraph 1 (c) Article 67 Section 1 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
792 See Paragraph 1 (b) Article 67 Section 1 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
793 See Article 66 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
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(l) Products extracted from the seabed or below the seabed which is situated outside any 
territorial sea but where it has exclusive exploitation rights;  
(m) Goods produced there exclusively from products specified in points (a) to (l). 
When product originating from the beneficiary country exported to another country 
and returned to the same beneficiary country, it would not be entitled origin from 
beneficiary country concerned. Except it “demonstrated” that such products is the same 
products and not undergone of any treatment.794 It is not allowed to transform the product 
under any circumstances except the process to keep the product in the “good condition”. 
The custom authorities is allowed to ask traders or exporters to provide supporting 
document as evidence, such as, bills of lading795 or factual or concrete evidence based on 
marking or numbering of packages or any related document.796 
Products considered as the originating product of beneficiary country when all of the 
elements of the products wholly obtained in the country of origin. The set of products that 
accumulated from originating and non-originating materials would be deemed as 
“originating” if the content of non-originating materials does not exceed 15 % of the ex-
works price of the set.797 
 
XIV.b.2. Cumulative origin of the European Union Generalised System of Preferences. 
The cumulative origin of GSP is regulated in Paragraph 3 Article 5 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008.798 Cumulation of origin is defined as a certain group of 
countries under the preferential tariff treatment that is given “identical rules of origin”. This 
sort of facility gives a certain group of countries the possibility to cooperate together in the 
manufacturing product.799 Article 67 of Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 
defines four different types of cumulation: bilateral cumulation, regional cumulation, 
extended cumulation, and cumulation with goods originating in Norway, Switzerland, and 
Turkey.800 According to Harris, “[…] cumulation is the provision that allows materials which 
meet the requirements of the rules of origin in one country to be considered as originating in 
another when determining the originating status of goods produced using those materials in 
the latter […] cumulation zone is defined as the set of countries from which a producer may 
source cumulable materials”.801 While Bhagwwati noted the establishment of cumulation of 
origin under the FTA based on the “spaghetti bowl” approach, inefficiency in trade policy 
has been created.802  
                                                 
794 See Article 73 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
795 “[…] A document signed by a carrier (a transporter of goods) or the carrier's representative and issued to a consignor (the 
shipper of goods) that evidences the receipt of goods for shipment to a specified designation and person”, available 
at: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/bill+of+lading, last accessed : 21 April 2011.  “A document issued 
by a carrier, or its agent, to the shipper as a contract of carriage of goods. It is also a receipt for cargo accepted for 
transportation, and must be presented for taking delivery at the destination […]”, see available at : 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/bill-of-lading-B-L.html, last accessed : 21 April 2011. 
796 See Paragraph 2 Article 74 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010. 
797 See Article 82 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010. 
798 “[…] Regional cumulation within the meaning and provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 shall also apply where a 
product used in further manufacture in a country belonging to a regional group originates in another country of the 
group, which does not benefit from the arrangements applying to the final product, provided that both countries 
benefit from regional cumulation for that group […]”. 
799 See Recitals 10 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010. 
800 See also Gibbon, Peter, 2008. 
801 See Harris, Jeremy T, 2009, Op. Cit., p. 5. 
802 See Bhagwwati, Jagdish and Krueger, Anne O. “U.S. Trade Policy: the Infatuation with Free Trade Agreements,” in The 
Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements, AEI Press, 1995. Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements, 
AEI Press, 1995; Jones, Vivian C., and Martin, Michael F., 2011, Op. Cit., p. 6. 
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Bilateral cumulation is defined as “a system that allows products which are originating 
from EU to be considered as originating materials in a beneficiary country when they are 
further processed or incorporated into a product in that beneficiary country”.803 In addition, 
Article 83 Sub-section 3 of Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 is a special 
provision governing bilateral cumulation. 
Regional cumulation is defined as “a system whereby products originating in a 
country, which is a member of regional group (for instance ASEAN), are considered as 
materials originating in another country of the same regional group (or a country of another 
regional group where cumulation between groups is possible) when further processed or 
incorporated in a product manufactured in one of those countries in the regional group”.804 
In this regard, regional groups are referred to as a group of countries between which 
regional cumulation applies.805 In pursuance of Article 86, there are four regional groups, 
consisting of: 
(a) Group I: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Vietnam;  
(b) Group II: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela;  
(c) Group III: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka;  
(d) Group IV: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
Article 86 Paragraph 2 Sub-paragraph b (ii), stipulates, with regard to ensuring the 
appropriate implementation of the regional cumulation, that the countries of regional 
groups have to provide the administrative cooperation needed with the EU. This includes 
fostering administrative cooperation among the members of regional groups. The 
Secretariat of the regional group has the task of giving notification to the Commission with 
regards the undertaking of such requirements.806 For instance, the Secretariat of Group I is 
organised by Group I: the General Secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), then Group II is organised by: the Andean Community – Central American 
Common Market and Panama Permanent Joint Committee on Origin, and Group III is 
organised by: the Secretariat of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC).807  
The EU regional cumulation rules808 provides “possibility” of using products or 
materials originating from the graduated country, as stipulates by Article 5 paragraph 3 
Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 : 
“regional cumulation within the meaning and provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 
2454/93 shall also apply where a product used in further manufacture in a country 
belonging to a regional group originates in another country of the group, which does 
                                                 
803 See Paragraph 1 (f) Article 67 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
804 See Paragraph 1 (h) Article 67 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
805 See Paragraph 1 (k) Article 67 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
806 See Article 86 Paragraph 2 subparagraph c of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
807 See United Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences : Handbook on The Scheme of The 
European Community, 2008, Op. Cit., pp. 21- 34. 
808 “[…] Under the EC rules for regional cumulation, materials or parts imported by a member country of one of these three 
groupings from another member country of the same grouping for further manufacture are considered as originating 
products of the country of manufacture and not as third-country inputs, provided that the materials or parts are 
already products originating in the exporting member country. Originating products are those that have acquired 
origin by fulfilling the individual origin requirements under the basic EC rules of origin for GSP purposes […]”. See 
United Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences: Handbook on The Scheme of The 
European Community, pp. 21 - 34, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2008. 
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not benefit from the arrangements applying to the final product, provided that both 
countries benefit from regional cumulation for that group”.809  
Article 72 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 regulates the EU GSP 
regional cumulation.810 For instance, a product originating in Indonesia incorporating 
goods originating from Singapore can enjoy EU GSP preferences, although Singapore have 
already graduated811 from the GSP. Singapore included into Group I of the regional 
cumulation812 with other ASEAN member states.813 
There are some products and materials that excluded from the regional cumulation 
as listed in Annex 13b. It should be noted, that “the tariff preference applicable in the EU is 
not the same for all the countries involved in the cumulation”.814  Through cumulation of 
origin the products could get more favourable tariff treatment than the one who directly 
exported to the EU.815  
Article 86 paragraphs 4 stipulated about working or processing requirements carry 
out in the beneficiary country in the case of regional cumulation between countries in the 
same regional group exist. Paragraph 5 regulates about possibility of regional cumulation 
performed between countries of Group I or Group III based on the request of authority in 
beneficiary country concerned. Paragraph 6 elucidated the conditions to determine the 
origin of goods when products manufactured in the beneficiary country of Group I or 
Group III using materials originating in the country that belong to the other group.816  
 
XIV.b.3. Derogations. 
The possibility of “derogation” has been regulated under Sub Section 4, Article 89 of 
Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. The beneficiary country “may be granted a 
temporary derogation” under certain conditions as regulated in Section 1. Such 
“derogation” is given based on “the Commission’s initiative or as a response to a request from 
a beneficiary country”. The periods of “derogation” are limited based on the duration of the 
effects of the internal or external factors that cause it or the time needed by the beneficiary 
country to achieve conformity with the rules.817 The “derogation” request should be 
proposed to the Commission in writing and include the reasons for derogation, and be 
supported with appropriate documentation.818 During the period of derogation the 
                                                 
809 See Official Journal L 211/1, 6.8.2008. 
810 See Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2623/97, Official Journal L 354, 
30.12.1997, p. 9. 
811 According EC Council Regulation No. 2623/97 dated 19 Dec 97, there are three beneficiary countries, which consist of 
Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea graduated from EU GSP Scheme by 1 May 1998. 
812 “[…] Singapore’s status within the regional cumulation mechanism applicable to ASEAN will not be affected after the 
graduation i.e. products manufactured in Singapore can be used as inputs in the products of another ASEAN 
beneficiary country. This will enable the manufacturer in the ASEAN beneficiary country to qualify his products for 
the EU GSP Scheme under ASEAN Cumulation […]”. (Graduation from the Generalised System of Preference Scheme of 
the European Union (EU – GSP Scheme), TDB RU 33 99 02 Vol 3, 12 January 1998, available at : 
http://www.customs.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/12772/98GraduationFromTheGeneralised1.pdf, last accessed : 04 May 
2011). 
813 See United Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences : Handbook on The Scheme of The 
European Community, 2008, Op. Cit., pp. 21 – 34. 
814 See Article 86 paragraph 3 subparagraph a of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
815 See Article 86 paragraph 3 subparagraph b of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
816 See Paragraph 6 (a) and (b) Article 86 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
817 See Paragraph 2 Article 89 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
818 See Paragraph 3 Article 89 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
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beneficiary country has to provide information to the Commission with regard to the 
utilisation of derogation.819 
 
XIV.b.4. Export procedures in the beneficiary country. 
Sub section 5 regulates the implementation of e-trade in the export procedures in the 
beneficiary country. Paragraph 1 Article 91 states that the competent authorities of the 
beneficiary country have to establish and update the electronic data record of their 
registered exporters. The authorities of the beneficiary country are obliged to make any 
data changes and updates immediately, for instance if there is an exporter being 
withdrawn from the registered exporter. Paragraph 2 of the same Article elucidates the 
information included in the electronic record.820 The competent authorities of the 
beneficiary country are required to send notification to the Commission regarding the 
national numbering system used for designating registered exporters, which usually start 
with ISO alpha 2 country codes.821 
To get registration number as registered exporter, the exporters in the beneficiary 
country have to apply822 to the competent authorities in their country.823 The registered 
exporter will directly remove from the record whenever “no longer meet the conditions for 
exporting any goods under the preferential scheme” or “no longer intend to export related 
goods”.824 Under the certain circumstances competent authorities in the beneficiary 
country may withdraw the exporter from the record of registered exporters if the 
registered exporters convicted conduct a trade fraud related to rules of origin : 
 “[…] intentionally or negligently draw up, or cause to be drawn up, a statement 
on origin or any supporting document which contains incorrect information 
which leads to irregularly or fraudulently obtaining the benefit of preferential 
tariff treatment”.825 In other words, the committing trade deflection will lead to 
withdrawal of exporter from record of registered exporters […]”. 
The withdrawal of registered exporters will take in effect for the future (non-
retroactive principle).826 The exporters that have been removed from the registered 
exporters have possibility to be re-applied as registered exporter under certain condition, 
for instance they have to “remedied” the “situation” caused their withdrawal.827 
The EU preferential rules of origin provide some requirement to the exporters from 
the beneficiary country. Paragraph 1 Article 94 of the regulation obliged exporters to 
maintain appropriate commercial accounting records for production and supply of goods 
                                                 
819 See Paragraph 4 Article 89 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
820 The record shall contain the following information:  
(a) name and full address of the place where Registered Exporter is established/resides, including the identifier of the 
country or territory (ISO alpha 2 country code);  
(b) number of Registered Exporter;  
(c) products intended to be exported under the scheme (indicative list of Harmonized System chapters or headings as 
considered appropriate by the applicant);  
(d) dates as from and until when the exporter is/was registered;  
(e) the reason for withdrawal (registered exporter’s request /withdrawal by competent authorities). This data shall 
only be available to competent authorities. 
821 See Paragraph 3 Article 91 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
822 The exporter must submitted form 13c about application to become a registered exporter. 
823 See Article 92 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
824 See Paragraph 1 Article 93 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
825 See Paragraph 2 Article 93 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
826 See Paragraph 3 Article 93 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
827 See Paragraph 4 Article 93 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
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qualifying for preferential treatment. Keeping all available evidence relating to the material 
used in the manufacture; to keep all customs documentation relating to the material used 
in the manufacture; and keeping the statement on origin made out for at least three years. 
This obligation also applied to the suppliers to keep their suppliers’ declarations certifying 
the originating status of the goods.828 
Statement of origin defined as “a statement provide by the exporter indicating that the 
exported goods comply with the rules of origin of the preferential scheme”. This letter used 
for the purpose of free circulation in order to claim the benefit of preferential tariff 
treatment. In the context of cumulation origin, such letter used to prove the originating 
status of the goods. 829 Exporter provides statement of origin for theirs’ customer in the EU 
either in English or French language, and it is pursuant to Annex 13d.830 One statement of 
origin only allowed for one consignment. However, in the paragraph 3 Article 96 it 
stipulated that the single statement used for some consignments under certain 
conditions.831 Consignment defined as “goods which are either sent simultaneously from one 
exporter to one consignee or covered by a single transport document covering their shipment 
from the exporter to the consignee or, in the absence of such document, by a single invoice”. 
832 
 
XIV.b.5. Procedures at release for free circulation in the European Union. 
Sub section 6 of the regulation lays down the procedures of free circulation in the EU 
market. The statement of origin is used as the reference to issue the customs declaration of 
free circulation release.833 Article 97a stipulates the exemption to provide the statement of 
origin under certain technical conditions. For example products that are sent as small 
packages from private persons to private persons and the total value of which does not 
exceed 500 euros or goods forming part of travellers’ personal luggage and the total value 
of which does not exceed 1,200 euros. 
 
XIV.b.6. Control of origin. 
Control of origin is regulated in Sub section 7 Article 97g of the regulation. The 
competent authorities of the beneficiary country must perform “verifications of the 
originating status of goods at the request of the customs authorities of the member states and 
regular controls on exporters on their own initiative”. In this regard, the competent 
authorities of the beneficiary countries have the right to call for any evidence and to carry 
out any inspection of the exporter’s accounts. 
The technical procedures and methods of administrative cooperation are regulated 
by section 1 A of the regulation. Paragraph 1 Article 97k lays down the requirements that 
should be fulfilled by the beneficiary country.  For example, the rules of origin; the rules for 
completion and issue of certificates of origin Form A; the provisions for the use of invoice 
declarations; the provisions concerning methods of administrative cooperation; and the 
                                                 
828 See Paragraph 2 Article 94 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
829 See Paragraph 1 (v) Article 67. See also Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 2 Article 95 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 
1063/2010. 
830 See Paragraph 3 Article 95. See also Article 97o, 97p and 97q of Section 1A of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 
1063/2010. 
831 See Article 96 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
832 See Paragraph 1 (s) Article 67 Section 1 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
833 See Paragraph 1 Article 97 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
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provisions concerning granting of derogations. The competent authorities of the 
beneficiary country are obliged to cooperate with the Commission or the member states in 
order to perform monitoring, verification and origin investigations.834 A proof of origin will 
only be valid for 10 months from the date of issue in the exporting beneficiary country. It 
should be submitted to the customs authorities of the importing preference-granting 
country between those periods.835 The proof of origin is also used to obtain the tariff 
preferences.836   
Section 1 A provides export procedures in the beneficiary country. For instance, the 
certificate of origin Form A should be issued on the written application form.837 The 
exporter or its authorised representative must submitted appropriate supporting 
documents proving the exported goods is qualify for the issuance certificate of origin Form 
A. The certificate has to be issued as soon as the export takes a place.838 There are 
exceptions under certain circumstance when the certificate of origin issued after the 
exportation of the product. For instance, the competent government authorities reject to 
issue certificate of origin Form A due to some technical reasons.839 Certificate of origin 
Form A or invoice declarations submitted to the customs authorities of preference granting 
country will be used for procedures of the customs declaration.840  
Before the goods entering the preference granting country market free circulation it 
must have a customs declaration. Pursuant to Article 97s Section 1 A the beneficiary 
country obliged to notify the Commission the names and addresses of the governmental 
institutions located in their territory  that authorized to issue certificates of origin Form A, 
to control of the certificates of origin Form A and the invoice declarations. The beneficiary 
country must send that information with specimen of the stamps used by authorities 
concerned. Article 97t regulate about the technical procedures that ought to be carry out in 
the verification of the certificates of origin form A and invoice declarations. 
Annex I, Annex 13a of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010 provide “list of 
working or processing operation that confer originating status”, and it is applied for all 
goods. Materials excluded from regional cumulation laid down in Annex II, Annex 13 b. It is 
not all goods listed in Annex 13a covered by GSP.   
 
XIV.c. The implications of rules of origin to the economic development of developing 
countries. 
The significance of the rules of origin becomes crucial in the EU GSP in order to 
support the economic development of developing countries. Many scholars and 
researchers have written about the significant relationship between trade and economic 
development in developing countries.841 
                                                 
834 See Paragraph 2 Article 97k of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
835 See Paragraph 5 Article 97k of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
836 See Paragraph 1 Article 97n of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
837 See Paragraph 1 Article 97k of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
838 See Paragraph 2 Article 97l of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
839 See Paragraph 2 Article 97l of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
840 See Paragraph 1 Article 97n of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
841 See Gibbon, Peter (2008); Cadot, Olivier., et.al (2006:2007); Jones, Vivian C., et.al., (2011); Augier, Patricia., et.al; Dieter, 
Heribert., (2008); Harris, Jeremy T, (2009); Falvey., Rod et.al, (2000); Brenton, Paul., (2003); Fink, Carsten., et.al 
(2007); Lazaro, Dorothea C., et.al (2006); Estevadeordal, Antoni., et.al, (2005);Estevadeordal, Antoni., et.al, (2009); 
Naumann, Eckart., (2005); Cornejo, Rafael., et.al; anagariya, Arvind., et.al, (2003); Medalla, Erlinda M., et.al. 
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The rules of origin govern cross border goods movement in international trade 
relations. The rules of origin are not applied to goods or products that are manufactured 
and sold inside the country itself.842 The rules of origin also influence investment and 
production decisions.843 The production decision includes the “production factor” and 
“profit maximising firms”. One of the production factors is the source materials of the goods. 
Production efficiency is influenced by the use of good quality materials with the lowest 
price. This factor triggers the establishment of the FTA and PTA between potential trading 
partners. According to Heydon and Izam, almost 55% of international trade in goods is 
performed under the preferential arrangement.844 
Globalisation causes complexity in the determination of the origin of goods. As noted 
by Jones, “contemporary globalised manufacturing” has been proved to create complexity in 
the implementation of the rules of origin.845 Falvey et al., when determining the origin of 
goods, consider this as a crucial issue in international trade in goods since the 
manufacturing process takes place in more than one country.846 
Hummels et al.; Jones & Marjit; Deardorff; and Augier note that “changing patterns of 
multinational production” has caused “fragmentation”, “vertical specialisation”, or 
“outsourcing” of goods production.847 For instance, the emergence of the Multinational 
Corporation (MNC) or Transnational Corporation (TNC) has also created difficulties with 
respect to the determination of the origin of goods. For instance, production of MNC or TNC 
takes place in more than one country and leads to fragmentation of production.848 This 
situation creates complexity in the implementation of the rules of origin.849  
Based on its nature the rules of origin used as a justification tool to apply 
“discriminatory trade policies”. Therefore, the treatment applied to the goods will be 
different depend on the origin of the goods. The rules of origin divided into non-
preferential and preferential automatically would affect the customs treatment to the 
goods.850 
The rules of origin have significant economic value when the goods entering the 
market. Izam, noted that the rules of origin has “financial implication” with the price and 
“the allocation of productive resources”.851 The rules of origin affect the treatment of 
customs office on imposing the customs and duties to the products. Therefore, origin of 
goods would influence the price of the goods when competing in the markets.  
Economist considers rules of origin as a “factor of production”. In this point, rules of 
origin have strong relation with “profit maximizing firms”. Based on economist it is 
important to analyze the various type rules of origin, related to investment, source of raw 
materials or intermediate materials, manufacturing activities, transportation cost, goods 
final assemble and availability of labours. The company or producer tends to establish 
                                                 
842 See International Center for Economic Growth, Op. Cit., p. 1. 
843 See Naumann, Eckart., 2005. 
844 See Izam, Miguel, 2003, Op. Cit., p. 13.  
845 See Jones, Vivian C., and Martin, Michael F., 2011, Op. Cit., p. 11. 
846 See Falvey., Rod and Reed, Geoff., 2000, Op. Cit.,  p. 14. 
847 See Augier, Patricia.,Gasiorek, Michael., and Lai-Tong, Charles., The Impact of Rules of Origin on Trade Flows, available at: 
http://www.defi-univ.org/IMG/pdf/0301.pdf, last accessed : 11 February 2011. 
848 See International Center for Economic Growth, Near East Program, Free Trade Agreements and Rules of Origin, Policy 
Brief, Economic Policy Initiative Consortium Project, p. 1.  
849 See Izam, Miguel, 2003, Op. Cit., p. 13. Also see the review documents : UN (2001); UN (2002a) and UN (2002b), all of 
which refer to the most recent contributions of UN/CEFACT on the question of rules of origin. 
850 See International Center for Economic Growth, Op. Cit., p. 1. 
851 See Izam, Miguel, 2003, Op. Cit., p. 13. 
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theirs’ production or business activities in the countries that have the “lowest total costs 
production”, 852 this also includes “cost to enter into the final market”.853 
 
XV. Trade facilitation and utilisation of the European Generalised System of 
Preferences.  
XV.a. Evolutions of international trade facilitation from ancient times to modern 
times. 
The origin of international trade stems from “long distance trade”854 and developed 
along with human civilisation. International trade started in 2500 BC when people used to 
practise the “free exchange of goods” or “bartering”. Archaeologists have discovered that in 
ancient times the Sumerians of Northern Mesopotamia achieved immense welfare from sea 
trade in textiles and metals. Before 2000 BC, the exchange of olive oil and wine for grain 
and metal benefited the Greeks.855 International taxation was the essential part of trade 
facilitation in business activity two thousand years ago. Traders from Mesopotamia, Greece 
and Phoenicia achieved their prosperity in Mediterranean Trade.856  
The early stages of modern commerce instruments and distant settlements existed in 
Greece in approximately 340 BC. For instance banking and credit, insurance, trade treaties, 
together with special diplomacies and other privileges.857 This reflects that trade 
preferences in international trade have been practised for 2350 years.  
After the decline of Greece, the Roman Empire became a strong empire and started to 
expand its imperialism to the East. Trade relationships with the east began with the 
Chinese Empire by 1st century AD. This trade relationship was carried out along the Silk 
Road and developed many trade routes and complex trading patterns by sea.  The war 
between the imperials led to the absence of peace and disturbed the movement and 
circulation of goods. Such situation caused the loss of distant markets because of perilous 
travel for traders.858 
Due to the insecure and unstable situation of that time, thus, the Greeks became the 
international trader superpower by mobilising their armies to secure long distant trade.859 
The Greeks took full advantage both of their military and intellectual leadership by 
asserting their authority over trade. In 500 BC, Greece achieved its advanced economy in 
the mass production of goods.860 While, the Romans achieved equal regional dominance a 
few hundred years later. The promotion of international business played a vital role in the 
Roman Empire. Its military power made Rome become the Great Empire. Military 
interference in the trading system was regulated by Pax Romana, or Roman Peace. This 
                                                 
852 The cost of capital, the cost of labour, the skill level of labour, the cost of raw or intermediate materials, transportation 
cost and taxation obligation which imposed.  
853 See International Center for Economic Growth, Op. Cit., p. 1. 
854 See Crouzet, François., A History of the European Economy, 1000-2000, University of Virginia Press, USA, 2001, p. 3. 
855 See Seyoum, Belay., Export-Import Theory, Practices and Procedures, Second Edition, The Haworth Press, Taylor & Francis, 
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856 See Liu, 1998; Lymer, Andrew, and Hasseldine, John., The International Taxation System, Kluwer Academic Publisher 
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857 See Seyoum, Belay., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 1. 
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859 See Czinkota et.al., 1985; Lymer, Andrew, and Hasseldine, John., 2002; Hewitt, Paul., Lymer, Andrew., and Oats, Lynne., Op. 
Cit., p. 44. 
860 See Taggart and McDermott, 1993; Lymer, Andrew, and Hasseldine, John., 2002; Hewitt, Paul., Lymer, Andrew., and Oats, 
Lynne., Op. Cit., p. 44. 
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treaty gave assurance to the traders that they would receive protection from the Roman 
army. They were also provided a safe passage along the roads to Rome where traders 
eventually conducted business.861 In this regard, the Roman Empire gave trade facilitation 
to the traders through its military guard to protect the safety of the traders during their 
passage to carry out trade in Rome. 
Along with the decline of the Roman Empire in the fifth century, the papacy (papal 
supremacy) emerged as a strong institution in such an unsteady world. The emergence of 
church power in the eleventh century supported the Crusades.862 The traders shipped their 
goods on a regular basis to the Crusaders “who had by now established themselves on the 
east coast of the Mediterranean”.863 
Following the breakdown of the Roman Empire, thus, Constantinople had become the 
successor of Rome, which was generally accepted as the centre of international trade. 
Constantinople remained the centre of international trade for approximately one hundred 
and fifty years until 650 AD. Throughout this period, the authority who disagreed with the 
notion of cross-border trade ruled almost the entire continent of Europe.864  
Through the discovery of the new continent and the introduction of new ideas, 
customs, and products from the East, international trade was restored in the West. The 
products from the east, especially from Egypt, Syria, India, and China, such as carpets, 
furniture, sugar, and spices, brought about new markets and the growing commercial life 
of the West. These new markets generated economic growth and prosperity in some Italian 
cities. International trade took place through stagnant periods, until Venice and Genoa 
began to exploit their strategic locations to maximise their business potential.865 Thus, the 
development of both cities replaced Constantinople as the leading centres of international 
commerce.866   
Rising commercial financial needs of traders and travellers widely introduced the 
usage of letters of credit, bills of exchange, and insurance of goods in transit.867 The 
absorption of goods in the market and the implementation of trade facilitation were helped 
by a common language. Most Germanic tribes, which flowed into the Roman Empire, were 
very fast in learning the language and the laws of their hosts.868 A common language was 
regarded as a tool in trade facilitation because it increased the market share of the goods. 
Trade does not only transfer goods, but also common languages, commercial law, culture, 
preferences and technology.869  
Non-policy elements is one of the factor to build close relation between countries. 
Non-policy elements include geographic proximity (distance and common borders), 
commonality of language, legal systems, and history. On the other hand, such “non-policy 
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elements” also might create “natural barriers” to trade facilitation, particularly related to 
geographical matters.870  
The international trade relations is influenced by the propinquity and likeness 
between trading partners. Neighbouring states used to trade more rather than with 
economies entities in distant or faraway states. This pattern of trade created a trade 
network, and led to the creation of regional economic organization. Along with trade 
expansion, states that not included in the network had less market compared to the 
member of trade network. In the old times when land transportation costs very expensive, 
in long distance trade traders only transported commodities of luxury goods such as silk, 
but not commodities like grain. Technology of transportation and information technology 
has brought influence in international trade.871 
 
XV.b. Definition of trade facilitation. 
Some authors have concluded that there is no uniform definition given to trade 
facilitation. For instance, as noted by Zanamwe, “there is no agreed definition of trade 
facilitation”. This is due to the variety of international and regional organisations that 
define trade facilitation in line with their mandates and objectives.872 While Wilson et al. 
and Jean also note that there is “no universal understanding of trade facilitation”873, 
whereas, each definition reflects different perspectives. The broad concept of trade 
facilitation is defined as interventions of the private and public sectors in order to support 
the cross-border movement of goods.  
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) defines trade 
facilitation as a comprehensive and integrated approach to reduce the complexity and 
transaction cost to be more efficient, transparent, and predictable, based on international 
norms, standard, and best practices.874 APEC defines trade facilitation in broad sense as the 
simplification, harmonization, use of new technologies and other measures to address 
procedural and administrative impediments to trade, i.e., customs procedures, 
environment regulatory, standard harmonization, business mobility, electronic commerce, 
and administrative transparency.875 The World Bank referring trade facilitation to the 
domestic policies, institutions, and infrastructures associated with the movement of goods 
across borders, which includes ports, customs administration, transit, transportation 
systems for trade, and the management of information and technology.876 WTO defines the 
objective of trade facilitation as the simplification and harmonization of international trade 
procedures, which includes activities of collecting, presenting, communicating and 
processing data required for the movement of goods in international trade. 877 According to 
the WTO definition, the objectives of trade facilitation is “to simplify formalities and 
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procedures related to foreign trade and transit of goods, to harmonize applicable regulations 
and laws, and to standardize and integrate definitions as well as requirements of information, 
and the use of information”. 878  The common practitioners’ defined trade facilitation in 
simple term as “the simplification, harmonization, standardization and modernization of 
trade procedures”.879  
Trade facilitation also defined as the simplification of trade interface between trader 
and trader or trader and authorities. Trade interface consists of many elements and 
continually develops based on the needs of the traders and the authorities. 880 International 
trade interface divided into intangible881 aspect and tangible882 aspect. The tangible aspect 
related to “international supply chain”. It is influenced by geography: transport; storage; 
and physical examination and presentation of documentation at customs agencies.883 The 
tangible aspect is including legal documents and physical examinations. 884 Thus, trade 
facilitation associated with the effort to “to improve the regulatory interface between 
government bodies and traders at national borders”.885 
Given that trade facilitation functions as a trade interface, Grainger notes that its 
objectives are “to reduce trade transaction costs at the interface between business and 
government”.886 In this regard, Grainger connects such reduction efforts with the customs 
activities that are connected between the governments and traders in both the beneficiary 
country and the preference-granting country. For instance, to obtain the reduction of 
tariffs under the GSP scheme, the government of the beneficiary country issues certificate 
of origin form A and the customs office in the preference-granting country makes a 
declaration of such goods in order to obtain the reduction of tariffs under the GSP. 
Furthermore, customs activities also play a role in the free circulation of goods.  
The implementation of trade facilitation involves a wide range of factors, however, 
difficulties are created when enforcing its principles.887 For instance, the simplification of 
foreign trade procedures needs support from technological information systems, 
infrastructure, facilities, and capable human resources. These factors are considered as an 
obstacle for the beneficiary country. The lack of human resources are also included as the 
beneficiary country challenge. Human resources development is considered as a high 
investment cost for beneficiary countries. However, it has been proven that such 
investment would generate more benefits for their economic development. In this way, 
trade facilitation is considered as a concept that favours the enhanced control and balance 
of additional burdens on legitimate888 traders.889 Improved facilitation of trade should lead 
to the increase in economic growth and enhanced competitiveness for their industries by 
                                                 
878 See Sheikhan, Pegah., Trade Facilitation in the Multilateral Trading System: An Analysis of the Doha Round Negotiations on 
Trade Facilitation, Department of Law School of Economics and Commercial Law, University of Gothenburg, 2008, 
available at : http://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19714/1/gupea_2077_19714_1.pdf, last accessed : 25 May 
2011. 
879 See Grainger,  Andrew., 2007. 
880 See Christophe Maur, Jean., 2008. 
881 For example intangible aspect is payment procedure. 
882 For example tangible aspect is infrastructure and transport facilities. 
883 See Christophe Maur, Jean., 2008. 
884 See Ibid. 
885 See Grainger,  Andrew., 2007. 
886 See Ibid. 
887 See Ibid. 
888 Legitimate trader under GSP scheme refer to the registered exporters of beneficiary country. 
889 See Grainger,  Andrew., 2007. 
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reducing unnecessary bureaucratic requirements and harmonising relevant processes. At 
the same time, it is ensured that each country has the right to protect itself from unlawful 
trade practices.890 
 
XV.c. Trade facilitation: the international trade law perspective.  
In modern times, trade facilitation principles are based on the simplifying, 
standardising, harmonising and modernising of international trade procedures. In order to 
implement those principles, a number of international, regional, and national organisations 
have drafted a wide variety of trade facilitation recommendations. According to Grainger, 
this is generally centred on encouraging best practices, enhancing cooperation between 
traders or business actors and government, adopting technical standards and harmonising 
trade and customs procedures.891 
 
XV.c.1. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).892 
UNECE was founded in 1947 and is considered as “an international central point” of 
trade facilitation recommendations, standards, and specifications.893 UNECE was 
established under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United 
Nations.894 One of its main goals is to promote “pan-European economic integration”. 
UNECE’s member states consist of 56 countries that cover the EU, non-EU Western and 
Eastern Europe, Southeast Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
North America. These member countries are encouraged to communicate and cooperate 
on economic and sector issues. UNECE is a supporter organisation of the United Nations 
(UN) global mandates in the economic field by providing analysis, policy advice and 
assistance to governments and promoting cooperation with other global actors and key 
stakeholders, especially the business community. In this regard, UNECE also arranges 
norms, standards, and conventions to facilitate international cooperation in international 
business activities.895 
In the multilateral trading system, UNECE is deemed as a multilateral policy to 
facilitate greater economic integration and cooperation among its member states, 
promoting sustainable development and economic welfare. There are some activities 
conducted by UNECE to implement such policies, for instance policy dialogue, negotiation 
of international legal instruments, development of regulations and norms, exchange and 
application of best practices as well as economic and technical expertise, and technical 
cooperation for countries with economies in transition. The UNECE also contributes to 
improve the effectiveness of the United Nations through the regional implementation of 
outcomes of global United Nation Conferences and Summits defined by ECOSOC.896 
                                                 
890 Draft WTO Trade Facilitation, Negotiations Support Guide, A Guidebook to assist developing and least-developed WTO 
Members to effectively participate in the WTO Trade Facilitation Negotiations, Prepared by the Centre for Customs & 
Excise Studies, University of Canberra, for and on behalf of the World Bank 2005. 
891 See Grainger, Andrew., 2007. 
892 See UNECE Legal Instruments, Norms and Standards - Trade Facilitation, available at : 
http://www.unece.org/leginstr/trade.htm, last accessed : 29 May 2011. 
893 See List of Trade Facilitation Recommendations, available at : 
http://www.unece.org/cefact/recommendations/rec_index.htm, last accessed 29 May 2011. 
894 The others similar organization are the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). 
895 See http://www.unece.org/about/about.htm. 
896 See Objectives and Mandate http://www.unece.org/oes/nutshell/mandate_role.htm 
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The UNECE has played a crucial role in the field of trade facilitation through its 
Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT).897 In other words, 
UNECE is a host of the UN/CEFACT.898 UN/CEFACT was established in 1996, to replace the 
UNECE Working party No. 4 formed in 1960 for the facilitation of international trade 
procedures.899 The establishment of the UN/CEFACT as a United Nations body aims to 
enhance “capability of business, trade, and administrative organisations, from developed, 
developing, and transitional economies, to exchange products and relevant services 
effectively”. The UN/CEFACT focuses on “facilitating national and international 
transactions, through the simplification and harmonisation of processes, procedures and 
information flows, and so contributes to the growth of global commerce”. 900   
The UN/CEFACT functioned as a “forum to develop, initiate and consolidate work by 
other international organizations”901, such as WTO, WCO, OECD, UNCITRAL, UNCTAD, ISO, 
IEC, and ITU.902 UN/CEFACT manage a range of document and electronic messaging 
standards that used in international trade transactions such as the United Nations 
electronic Trade Documents (UNeDocs) and Electronic Data Interchange for 
Administration, Commerce, and Transport (EDIFACT).903 UN/CEFACT also provides 33 
trade facilitation recommendations and range of electronic business standards and 
technical specifications. 904 In 2004, UN/CEFACT introduced the Single Window concept.905  
 
XV.c.2. Trade facilitation under the WTO Regime. 
Trade facilitation has been incorporated into the WTO. There are some articles that 
are related to the implementation of trade facilitation that were accommodated in GATT 
1994. For instance Agreements on Customs Valuation, Import Licensing, Pre-shipment 
Inspection, Rules of Origin, Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on Sanitary and 
                                                 
897 See Grainger, Andrew., 2007. 
898 See Ibid. 
899 See Ibid. 
900 See UN/CEFACT, available at : http://www.unece.org/cefact/about.htm, last accessed 29 May 2011. 
901 The trade facilitation activities perform under UN/CEFACT covers, as follows: 
(a) Analysing and understanding the key elements of international processes, procedures and transactions and 
working for the elimination of constraints; 
(b) Developing methods to facilitate processes, procedures and transactions, including the relevant use of 
information technologies; 
(c) Promoting both the use of these methods, and associated best practices, through channels such as government, 
industry and service associations; 
(d) Coordinating its work with other international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
World Customs Organization (WCO), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), notably in the context of a Memorandum of Understanding for a Global 
Facilitation Partnership for Transport and Trade; 
(e) Securing coherence in the development of Standards and Recommendations by co-operating with other 
interested parties, including international, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. In particular, 
for UN/CEFACT Standards, this coherence is accomplished by cooperating with the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and selected non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the context of the 
ISO/IEC/ITU/UNECE Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). These relationships were established in 
recognition that UN/CEFACT's work has broad application in the areas beyond global commerce and that 
interoperability of applications and their ability to support multi-lingual environments, are key objectives. 
902 See Grainger, Andrew., 2007. See also See UN/CEFACT, available at : http://www.unece.org/cefact/about.htm, last 
accessed 29 May 2011. 
903 See UNECE 2006c; Grainger, Andrew., 2007. 
904 See UN/CEFACT 2005; UNECE 2005; Grainger, Andrew., 2007. 
905 See UN/CEFACT 2004; Grainger,  Andrew., 2007. 
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Phytosanitary Measures.906 There are three major articles in GATT that are considered 
focal points of trade negotiations in trade facilitation, which consists of Article V (Freedom 
of Transit), Article VIII (Import and Export Procedure), and Article X (Transparency and 
Administration of Trade).907  
Trade facilitation is one of the types of aid for trade that includes capacity-building 
initiatives, it has promoted many customs modernisation programmes and e-trade 
applications.908 As we know, the international trade formalities involve the collection of 
duties909 and administration of tariff measures that are governed by customs 
procedures.910 Therefore, it is imperative to establish a uniform, simple, and transparent 
system of trade facilitation in order to reduce the cost of trade and eliminate 
discrimination of trade. Cross border co-operation between states is needed, especially in 
the sphere of customs services and administration to achieve the “common objective of 
facilitating trade”.911  
Trade facilitation is one of the challenges in multilateral trade negotiations that has 
to be agreed among the WTO members in order to provide a trade facilitation system that 
is accessible to all traders across the world. Developing countries, especially GSP 
beneficiary countries, should take the benefits gained from the WTO agreement on trade 
facilitation into consideration as they would assist their trade institutions and traders by 
developing an efficient system in “cross border formalities”. 
Trade facilitation negotiating history started at a national, bilateral, and regional 
level.912 Since 1996, trade facilitation was included as one of the major agendas of the 
Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996.913 Nevertheless, developing countries strongly 
expressed their objection914 to the beginning of negotiations on these issues.915 The Council 
for Trade in Goods (CTG) played a role in the Singapore Ministerial Declaration by 
providing guidance as follows: “to undertake exploratory and analytical work, drawing on 
the work of other relevant organisations, on the simplification of trade procedures in order to 
assess the scope for WTO rules in this area”. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration 
recommends the WTO to take more comprehensive action in the respect of trade 
facilitation issues.916 
In 1998, the Council on Trade in Goods (CTG) organized symposium on trade 
facilitation. At the four meeting of CTG,  September 1998 and July 1999, the discussion 
focused on export-import formalities and requirements, issues of physical movements of 
consignments and the significance of ICT in trade. Developed members countries in the 
preparatory work for the Seattle Ministerial Conference proposed to establish an 
additional legal framework on existing WTO rules with purposed to maximize 
                                                 
906 See Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2005; Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2009. 
907 See Grainger, Andrew., 2007. See also  Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2005; See  Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2009. 
908 See Ibid. 
909 Such customs and duties collection will become the state revenue or state income of the country concerned. 
910 See Grainger, Andrew., 2007. 
911 See Christophe Maur, Jean., 2008. 
912 See Weerakoon, Dushni., Thennakoon, Jayanthi., and Weeraratne, Bilesha., Multilateral Agreement on Trade Facilitation : 
Important but Complex Agenda for South Asia, available at : http://www.cuts-international.org/SAFIT/chp5-
TradeFacilitation.pdf, last accessed : 26 May 2011. 
913 See Weerakoon, Dushni., Thennakoon, Jayanthi., and Weeraratne, Bilesha. 
914 See The reason behind the rejection of developing country in the WTO negotiation of trade facilitation will be further 
discussed. 
915 See Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2005; Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2009. 
916 See Weerakoon, Dushni., Thennakoon, Jayanthi., and Weeraratne, Bilesha. 
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transparency, simplification, and harmonization of trade procedures and provide capacity-
building programme for developing countries. 917 On the other side, developing countries 
maintained the result of the Singapore Conference. They are not so enthusiastic and 
consider that new WTO obligations not urging yet.918 
Trade facilitation negotiation divided into two groups of interest, developed 
countries, and developing countries on the other side. For instance, EU argues about the 
importance of binding rules on trade facilitation under WTO legal framework. While 
developing countries stand to oppose the establishment of new binding rules of trade 
facilitation under WTO.919  The developing countries refused to have new binding 
obligations in the WTO that “exceed their implementation capacities”, however, many of 
them supporting of the purposes of trade facilitation.920 Some developing countries argues 
that such binding rules does not provide much benefits, but rather burden them with new 
obligations that have to be implemented in their limited condition. For instance, 
developing countries will be burdened with the extra cost budget to prepare the 
infrastructure.  
 
XV.c.2.1. Trade facilitation negotiations under the Doha Development agenda. 
The fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha on 2001, known as the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, aimed to enhance revenues and trade advantages for developing countries. 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration launched the Doha Development Agenda that covers 
twenty (21) subjects, such as the Singapore issues, agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market 
Access (NAMA), services, WTO rules (anti-dumping, subsidies, regional trade agreements) 
and trade and environment.921 In line with the objectives of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, trade facilitation was brought onto the negotiating table of the Doha round as 
one of the major points in the Singapore Ministerial Conference. Trade facilitation is 
acknowledged in Paragraph 27 of the Doha Declaration922, as follows: 
“[…] recognising the case for further expediting the movement, release and clearance of 
goods, including goods in transit, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and 
capacity building in this area, we agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth 
Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit 
consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations. In the period until the Fifth 
Session, the Council for Trade in Goods shall review and as appropriate, clarify and 
improve relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X of GATT 1994 and identify the trade 
facilitation needs and priorities of members, in particular developing and least-
developed countries. We commit ourselves to ensuring adequate technical assistance 
and support for capacity building in this area […]”. 
There are three important points that should be noted in Paragraph 27 of the Doha 
Declaration:  
(a) All the members recognise that there is a case for expediting the movement, 
release, and clearance of goods including goods in transit. 
                                                 
917 See Ibid. 
918 See Ibid. 
919 See Ibid. 
920 See Ibid. 
921 See Sheikhan, Pegah., 2008. 
922 See Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, Adopted on 14 
November 2001, available at : http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm, last 
accessed : 29 May 2011. 
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(b) Enhancement of technical assistance and capacity building needs by developing 
countries in trade facilitation. 
(c) The Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) needs to review, clarify and improve current 
provisions of GATT 1994 that relate to trade facilitation and to identify the trade 
facilitation needs of WTO members, particularly those needs of developing 
countries.923 
The third point constitutes the directive of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration to 
the Council on Trade in Goods (CTG) of the WTO to discover and analyse ways to simplify 
the movement of goods across international borders.924 Since trade facilitation issues do 
not have an independent working group for discussions and negotiations, the CTG was 
specifically assigned to tackle the concerned issues. From 1997 to 1999, the CTG was given 
the task to collect information on a wide range of trade facilitation aspects from several 
regional and multinational organisations, private enterprises, and industry groups, 
respecting their reports of the experiences they had in their work on trade facilitation.925 
The main objective of the current negotiations on trade facilitation in the Doha Round is to 
promote enhancements on judicial and administrative international trade procedures.926 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration is considered as a positive progress to the establishment 
of binding rules regulating trade facilitation.927  
There are several important issues related to trade facilitation raised before the Doha 
Ministerial. It is summing up as follows: (a) the cost of implementation of trade facilitation 
measures; (b) the importance of providing simplified official requirements in applying 
information technology; (c) the significant of trade facilitation to Small and Medium 
Enterprises; and (d) the efforts to promote a mutual relationship between governments 
(public sector) and the traders (private sector).928  
Respecting principles of transparency and simplification some measures were 
proposed, covering : (a) publications and making easily accessible all administrative rules 
and amended procedures; (b) advance ruling; (c) establishment of enquiry points; (d) 
minimum procedures of trade; (e) modern customs practices; (f) adaptation of 
international standards; and (g) ‘single window’ submissions. 929  
The “July Package” of 2004 adopted as the follow up of deadlock in Cancun 
Ministerial Meetings. This package considered as framework agreements that provides 
broad guidelines for completing the Doha round negotiations. Through this package, the 
WTO members brought the negotiations back on the table. In this package, trade 
facilitation separated as an independent subject of Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and 
no longer related to the Singapore Issues.930 
The Annex D of the “July Package” 2004 stipulated about the Negotiating Group on 
Trade Facilitation (NGTF). 931 The first issue discussed in the negotiations concerning 
                                                 
923 See also Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, and affiliated partnership, Updated Analysis of the Doha Round of Trade 
Negotiations: New Opportunities & Challenges for Global Business, 2002, available at: 
http://www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/dohaupdate.pdf, last accessed : 26 May 2011. 
924 See Ibid. 
925 See Sheikhan, Pegah., 2008. 
926 See Ibid. 
927 See Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, 2002. 
928 See Weerakoon, Dushni., Thennakoon, Jayanthi., and Weeraratne, Bilesha. 
929 See Ibid. 
930 See Sheikhan, Pegah., 2008. 
931 See Annex D paragraph 10 of the decision adopted by the General Council of the WTO on 1 August 2004, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm, last accessed : 30 May 2011. 
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clarification and improvement of Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994. 932 Several WTO 
members presented papers on their experiences on trade facilitation. The major concerns 
addressed on excessive documents, lack of transparency, inadequate procedures, and a 
lack of modernization of customs and other government agencies.933 The July Package 2004 
deemed as the guidance for the WTO Doha Round negotiations on trade facilitation.  
“[…] trade Facilitation: taking note of the work done on trade facilitation by the Council 
for Trade in Goods under the mandate in paragraph 27 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration and the work carried out under the auspices of the General Council both 
prior to the Fifth Ministerial Conference and after its conclusion, the General Council 
decides by explicit consensus to commence negotiations on the basis of the modalities 
set out in Annex D to this document […]”.934 
The Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (TA/CB) included as integral parts of 
the negotiations and linked to the outcome. The paragraph 4 Annex D of “July package” 
encourages the WTO Members to identify trade facilitation needs and priorities related to 
cost implications of implementation, particularly developing countries and LDC.935 
The Hongkong Ministerial Declaration 2005, focused on the improvement and 
clarification of Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT as well as provisions for effective 
cooperation between customs and other authorities on trade facilitation:936 
We recall and reaffirm the mandate and modalities for negotiations on Trade 
Facilitation contained in Annex D of the Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 
August 2004.937 
 “[…] work needs to continue and broaden on the process of identifying individual 
Member's trade facilitation needs and priorities, and the cost implications of possible 
measures. The Negotiating Group recommends that relevant international 
organizations be invited to continue to assist Members in this process recognizing the 
important contributions being made by them already, and be encouraged to continue 
and intensify their work more generally in support of negotiations […]”.938 
Developing countries have to identify theirs needs and priorities by carry out consultation 
that involved various stakeholders including customs officials, traders, various 
government departments, civil society, and non-governmental organizations.939 
In the “July Package” 2008, the NGTF encourage developing and LDC to fully 
participate and gain benefit from the negotiation :940 
                                                 
932 See Sheikhan, Pegah., 2008. 
933 See Ibid. 
934 See Paragraph (g) of the decision adopted by the General Council of the WTO on 1 August 2004, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm, last accessed : 30 May 2011. 
935 “[…] as an integral part of the negotiations, Members shall seek to identify their trade facilitation needs and priorities, 
particularly those of developing and least-developed countries, and shall also address the concerns of developing and 
least-developed countries related to cost implications of proposed measures […]”. See See Annex D paragraph 4 of the 
decision adopted by the General Council of the WTO on 1 August 2004, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm, last accessed : 30 May 2011. 
936 See Draft WTO Trade Facilitation, Negotiations Support Guide, A Guidebook to assist developing and least-developed WTO 
Members to effectively participate in the WTO Trade Facilitation Negotiations, Prepared by the Centre for Customs & 
Excise Studies, University of Canberra, for and on behalf of the World Bank 2005.  
937 See Paragraph 33 Trade Facilitation negotiations of Ministerial Declaration, Doha Work Programme, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 
22 December 2005, Adopted on 18 December 2005, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.htm#tradfa, last accessed : 30 May 2011. 
938 See Paragraph 5 Annex E,  Ministerial Declaration: Annexes, Doha Work Program, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, 
Adopted on 18 December 2005, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_annex_e.htm#annexe, last accessed : 30 May 2011. 
939 See Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2005; Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2009. 
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“[…] technical assistance and support for capacity building is being provided to 
developing and least-developed countries to help them to fully participate in and 
benefit from the negotiations, in particular by assisting them individually, on request, to 
conduct a national assessment to identify their needs and priorities in the area of trade 
facilitation.  The programme of needs assessment will contribute to the successful 
conclusion of these negotiations […]”.941 
The technical assistance and capacity building are the heart of trade facilitation 
negotiations.942 Trade facilitation requires enormous investment in infrastructure that 
many poor countries difficult to afford it.943 
 
XV.c.2.2. Developing countries on trade facilitation negotiation. 
As explained above, the definition of developing countries is not precisely defined by 
the WTO but the country concerned declares its own status.944 While there is a set of 
standards that should be fulfilled, which is widely recognised by the international 
community, in the definition of a developed country. Those standards cover a high income 
per capita, high human index development, and high GDP.945 Since the majority of the WTO 
member states are developing countries, as a consequence, their full participation in the 
WTO negotiations is strongly needed. In this regard, this is related to their active 
participation in trade facilitation negotiations under the legal framework of the WTO in 
order to improve efficiency and to reduce the high cost of trade at an international level. 
Essentially, the improvement of trade facilitation is aimed to give maximum benefits to 
WTO members, particularly to developing countries. 
 The refusal of developing countries to commence negotiation on Singapore issues, 
especially on trade facilitation lead the failure of Cancun Ministerial Meeting in September 
2003.946 Demand of agreement on trade facilitation is based on the strong concern of the 
significance transparency, efficiency, and procedural uniformity of cross-border flow of 
goods and services.  
“[…] developing countries were not convinced that binding rules in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) would be necessary, or helpful, in this area. From the beginning of 
trade facilitation as a separate issue (added to the agenda at the WTO Singapore 
Ministerial Meeting in 1996), developing countries have not shown enthusiasm to 
negotiate a multilateral agreement of trade facilitation commitments. While some 
developing countries have even suggested that trade facilitation remain a national, 
bilateral or regional concern, others have asked that the agreement – if members insist 
on creating standards through the WTO – be a list of voluntary guidelines, or an 
agreement based on capacity building, rather than a legally binding rule-based 
agreement […]”.947 
                                                                                                                                                
940 See Report By The Chairman of the Negotiating Group Trade Facilitation, TN/TF/6, (08-3495), 18 July, 2008, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_texts_e.htm, last accessed : 30 May 2011. 
941 See Paragraph 5 Report By The Chairman Of The Negotiating Group Trade Facilitation, TN/TF/6, (08-3495). 
942 See Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2005 ; Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2009. 
943 See Ibid. 
944 See Who are the developing countries in the WTO?, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm, last accessed : 30 May 2011. “[…] There are no WTO 
definitions of “developed” and “developing” countries. Members announce for themselves whether they are 
“developed” or “developing” countries. However, other members can challenge the decision of a member to make use 
of provisions available to developing countries […]”. 
945 See Sheikhan, Pegah., 2008. 
946 See Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2005; Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2009. 
947 See Weerakoon, Dushni., Thennakoon, Jayanthi., and Weeraratne, Bilesha. 
 216 
 “[…] The main reason why developing countries opposed negotiations on trade 
facilitation is that they were concerned that such an agreement would have a negative 
impact on their domestic policies. They do not have adequate negotiating resources or 
the capacity to implement the resulting obligations. More importantly, they were 
opposed to binding rules on trade facilitation because they did not want to be hauled 
before the dispute settlement body for failing to implement commitments […]”. 948 
Developing countries argue that trade facilitation should not be undertaken through 
binding multilateral agreement of WTO. The lack of infrastructure of developing countries 
creates difficulty to meet the standard requirements. It also imposes extra budget for 
developing countries in order to upgrade their trade infrastructures. 949 When the binding 
rules established it must be implemented, but in the absence of capability of 
implementation, it might create disputes between contracting parties. 950  
On the other side, some developed countries WTO members, consists of Canada, the 
EU, Japan, Switzerland and the US, “campaigned comprehensive rules governing trade 
facilitation”. According to EU a rules based approach will guarantee transparency and 
predictability for traders, ensure political commitment to reform, and ensure appropriate 
measures.951 In addition, developed countries argue that trade facilitation is significant to 
increase international trade and states revenues, especially for developing countries. 952 
 
XV.c.2.3.  The negotiations history of trade facilitation articles under GATT 1994. 
Trade facilitation articles existed prior to the establishment of GATT 1947. There are 
some international agreements on trade that contained some principles or rules relating to 
trade facilitation. In the negotiating history of GATT 1947, an essential rule on trade 
facilitations was included in the agreement. There are three essential provisions related to 
trade facilitation, i.e. Articles V, VIII and X. Since 1995, they have been incorporated into 
the WTO Agreement. For more than fifty years, trade facilitation provisions in GATT have 
developed to a lesser extent. The establishment of WTO has brought trade facilitation 
provisions into multilateral trade negotiations.953 
 
XV.c.2.3.1. The Article X of the GATT. 
The Article X of the GATT 1994 governs transparency of the publication and 
administration of trade regulations.954 International Convention relating to the 
Simplification of Customs Formalities 1923 is the evidence of international concerns on the 
trade facilitation. 955 The essentials content of Article X of the GATT is similar to Article 38 
of the Havana Charter956. Both of the provisions require the member states to provide 
information about their national laws and regulations to the organization.  
Paragraph 1 Article 38 of the Havana Charter 1948, stipulates: 
                                                 
948 See Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2005; Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2009. 
949 See Weerakoon, Dushni., Thennakoon, Jayanthi., and Weeraratne, Bilesha. 
950 See Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, 2002. See also Sheikhan, Pegah., 2008. 
951 See Ibid. 
952 See Weerakoon, Dushni., Thennakoon, Jayanthi., and Weeraratne, Bilesha. 
953 See Sheikhan, Pegah., 2008. 
954 See Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2005; Zanamwe, Gainmore, 2009. 
955 See Ibid. 
956 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Held at Havana, Cuba, From November 21, 1947, To March 24, 
1948, Final Act and Related Documents Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization, Lake Success, 
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“[…] laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general 
application made effective by any Member, pertaining to the classification or the 
valuation of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, 
or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer 
of payments therefore, or affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, 
warehousing, inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or other use, shall be published 
promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted 
with them. Agreements affecting international trade policy which are in force between 
the government or governmental agency of any Member country and the government 
or governmental agency of any other country shall also be published. Copies of such 
laws, regulations, decisions, rulings and agreements shall be communicated promptly to 
the Organization. The provisions of this paragraph shall not require any Member to 
divulge confidential information the disclosure of which would impede law 
enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the 
legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private […]“. 
 
Paragraph 1 Articles X GATT, 1994 : 
“[…] laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general 
application, made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or 
the valuation of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other 
charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the 
transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, 
insurance, warehousing inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or other use, shall be 
published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become 
acquainted with them. Agreements affecting international trade policy which are in 
force between the government or a governmental agency of any contracting party and 
the government or governmental agency of any other contracting party shall also be 
published. The provisions of this paragraph shall not require any contracting party to 
disclose confidential information which would impede law enforcement or otherwise 
be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial 
interests of particular enterprises, public or private […].” 
The Appellate Body in the EC-Poultry case interpreted “general application” of Article 
X957, as follows: 
“[…] Article X relates to the publication and administration of laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions and administrative rulings of  ‘general application’ rather than to the 
substantive content of such measures […]”.958 
The EU obliged its member states to publish “all laws, procedures and rules affecting 
imports, exports, and goods in transit, which includes administrative guidelines, decisions and 
rulings as well as customs and other government agencies’ management plans relating to the 
implementation of WTO commitments”. This information has to be made available in a 
“simple and accessible manner”,959 and expected to help traders gain more benefits.960 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
957 See Appellate Body Report. 1998. European Communities –Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, 
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XV.c.2.3.2. The Article VIII of the GATT. 
Article VIII governs about fees and formalities on export and import.961 According to 
Zanamwe, “the language in Article VIII of GATT was drawn from a proposal submitted by the 
US in September 1946”. This proposal drafted based on the “International Convention 
Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities” 1923 and recommendations of the 
“World Economic Conference” 1927. Its purposed to reduce consular fees imposed on 
issuing visas for commercial travellers and consignment of goods.962 The World Economic 
Conference 1927 recommend that the consular fees should be fixed in amount, not exceeds 
the cost of issue, and should not be used as a source of revenue. Various consular fees lead 
to unexpected increases in charges and cause uncertainty in trade. 963 
Provisions on Formalities connected with export and import laid down in Article 36 
of the draft Havana Charter964. The essence of Article VIII of the GATT and Article 36 
Havana Charter are commonly similar. 965 
 
XV.c.2.3.3. The Article V of the GATT. 
Barcelona Convention regulates the requirement applied by a member state to the 
goods of another member states when passing through its territory to a third destination. 
The Freedom of Transit in international trade laid down in the Article 33 of the draft 
Havana Charter966. Paragraph 6 Article 33 of the draft Havana Charter, stipulated: 
“[…] the Organization may undertake studies, make recommendations, and promote 
international agreement relating to the simplification of customs regulations 
concerning traffic in transit, the equitable use of facilities required for such transit and 
other measures designed to promote the objectives of this Article. Members shall co-
operate with each other directly and through the Organization to this end […]”. 
Landlocked states or countries that do not have direct access to the sea have 
proposed this provision. The preparatory work on the Havana Charter can be helpful in 
understanding Article V. Hitherto, the real freedom of transit cannot be implemented 
completely.967 
 
XV.c.3. The World Customs Organization. 
The World Customs Organization (WCO) is an international organisation that 
supports international trade related to the customs system. The WCO plays a significant 
role in trade facilitation related to aspects of customs in national borders and trade 
procedures.968 The functions of the WCO are to maintain, support, and promote 
international instruments for the harmonisation and uniform application of simplified and 
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effective customs systems and procedures. Trade facilitation concepts help customs 
administrations to carry out their tasks properly.969 
The legal relationship between the WCO and WTO in trade facilitation is related to 
the technical interpretation of valuation rules under GATT (especially Article VII) and non-
preferential origin rules under the WTO agreement on rules of origin. The framework of 
standards to secure and facilitate global trade was adopted by the WCO on 23 June 2005. 
This instrument provides “an explicit commitment to the principles of trade facilitation”.970  
Pascal Lamy speech in Brussels 2011 highlighted about the contribution of WCO 
and its relationship with WTO in the framework trade facilitation program. WTO and WCO 
need to build close co-operation to support agreement on trade facilitation. The WTO 
focused to help countries obtaining better technical assistance and capacity building that 
appropriate to their needs. During DDA negotiations the WCO played important role 
related to preferential rules of origin. Related to the customs system, Mr. Lamy stated that 
Harmonized System (HS), customs valuation and rules of origin as other areas that 
extremely fruitful, considered as important instrument for the WTO. Further as Mr. Lamy 
said that : 
“[…] the WCO has recently established a database of preferential rules of origin which 
covers only rules of origin of FTAs or other preferential schemes like the GSP and which 
I am told is simple and user friendly. This database allows users to compare different 
rules of origin of the same good. This has a significant potential to simplify the task of 
exporters in developing countries, particularly the least-developed. The latter have 
consistently called for a simplified system of rules of origin that would allow them to 
understand and comply with rules of origin requirements and this database is a positive 
step towards this goal. It is therefore our wish to see this database linked to the WTOs 
Non-Tariff Measures database being built […]”.971 
With respect to the improvement of Article VIII of the GATT 1994, WCO recommend 
the application of technology, paperless administration and statistic data to support trade 
facilitation. For instance, establishment of the Single Window concept;  standardization 
and simplification of customs and trade documents; simplification of governing trade 
procedures; and adherence to international customs conventions.  
 
XV.c.4. Regional trade facilitation. 
As mentioned above, one reason why developing countries refuse trade facilitations 
negotiations as a multilateral trade negotiation is because “trade facilitation should be 
undertaken at the regional level”.  Moïsé and Jean note that “current regional trade 
agreements have gradually incorporated trade facilitation dimensions”. The trade 
facilitation is commonly adopted or incorporated in regional trade integration agreements 
and regional cooperation agreements. Regional initiatives are considered to have strategic 
roles in the management of trade facilitation issues.972  
According to Bin and Misovicova, and Jean, the number of regional agreements 
including trade facilitation has significantly increased. In addition, the number of 
agreements concerning trade facilitations in Asia and the Pacific has significantly increased 
                                                 
969 See Ibid. 
970 See Ibid. 
971 See WTO News: Speeches — DG Pascal Lamy, WTO Trade Facilitation Deal To Reduce Trade Costs and Boost Trade, 
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in recent years. It has been shown that 34 out of the 102 countries to sign Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) have incorporated trade facilitation provisions. The institutional 
setting of regional agreements is deemed appropriate to the implement of a trade 
facilitation agenda. In this regard, Jean noted that “trade facilitation indeed requires not only 
the elimination of distortion and inefficient rules and practices, but mostly to carry on an 
ambitious and positive agenda of reform by implementing internationally compatible modern 
legislation, systems and skills”.973 
Regional approaches on trade facilitation also aim to improve the competitiveness of 
countries in trade. Trade facilitation at a regional level contributes to trade creation by 
helping to reduce the cost of trading and increase the availability of services to exporters 
and importers. According to the World Bank, customs cooperation committees established 
under the RTAs usually function to discuss enforcement issues and help solve disputes.974 
The World Bank notes that trade facilitation within the RTAs is identified to give possible 
advantages to the improvement of the customs system and procedures. For instance the 
alignment of customs codes with international standards; simplification and 
harmonisation of procedures (e-documents and single document); alignment of tariff 
structures with the HS; transparency; effective implementation of the WTO valuation 
agreement; joint work towards customs integrity; establishment of joint border posts; and 
joint training centres.975 
Trust is the basic foundation in international cooperation and international 
agreements. In addition, trust is also a vital aspect of trade facilitation cooperation. As 
argued by Schiff and Winters, and Jean, “regional trade agreements act as a trust building 
mechanism, favouring interactions between officials and exchange of information”. Trust in 
trade facilitation cooperation can help minimise risk and reduce tangible restraint "on the 
transport of the goods such as examinations or requirements to abide to certain requirements 
such as compulsory routes". Trust can be manifested through increasing the sharing of 
information and systems.976 It has been proven that, recently, many RTAs include 
additional trade facilitation contents. The evidence was reported by Bin and Misovicova, 
and Jean, that “regional agreements in Asia have included clauses covering transparency of 
laws and rulings, use of ICT and e-commerce, freedom of transit, mobility of business people, 
facilitation of transport and logistics, and facilitation of payment and trade finance”.977 The 
most prominent progress on trade facilitation cooperation is through customs and trade 
procedures integration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by 
Agreement on the single window systems (ASEAN 2005).978 
The implementation of trade facilitation has multi-challenges that need to be 
addressed seriously especially inter-borders cooperation and coordination, and capacity 
building. It is important to design trade facilitation at the national, regional, and 
multilateral level based on efficiency to reduce cost transaction in international trade.979 
Low and middle-income countries are mostly beneficiary countries of GSP, and generally 
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lack capacity of technology, financial budget, institutions and human resources to 
participate equally in such cooperation. 
The RTA has created new barriers to trade, such as preferential trade agreement. The 
existence of preferential and non preferential trade has increased the complexity on 
administration and formalities in the national borders, it requires more sophisticated trade 
facilitation measures.980   
RTA has increased complexity on preferential rules of origin, such as application of 
cumulation preferential rules of origin. Most RTAs are focused on the application of the 
rules of origin in the trade facilitation aspect.981 EU deems customs (and probably border 
processes in general) as an important instrument in favouring regional integration and 
promotion of preferential links. The special rulesadopted in the union delivers benefit to 
the third countries. For instance, automatic reduction of transaction costs for traders when 
dealing with more than one customs union member. 982 According to the World Bank, 
capacity building of trading partners is an important factor for establishing trade 
facilitation at regional and international level:  
“[…] one lesson that seems to emerge from regional cooperation on standards is that 
the nature of regional cooperation on standards depends on the specific capacity of the 
trade partners such as preparedness to perform conformity assessments, and the 
institutional setting of the agreement, where depending on how strong institutions are, 
more or less active harmonization or recognition routes can be followed […].983 
To strengthen capacity building at regional level needs stronger and permanent 
institutions. It is also required to establish better cooperation and coordination to attain 
harmonization and mutual recognition of rulings.984 Adequate RTA useful for the 
establishment of regional trade facilitation.985 
 
XV.d. Trade facilitation: economic implication in GSP. 
According to Butterly, trade facilitation covers political, economic, business, 
administrative, technical and technological issues.986 Trade facilitation is a concept to 
simplify, harmonise, standardise, and modernise trade procedures.987 It is designed to 
reduce transaction costs in international trade, mainly addressed to the relation between 
business actors or traders and government institutions at national borders.988 
In 2007, the European Commission spent a budget of 133 million euros on customs 
modernisation. In 2013, it is going to increase the budget to 324 million euros for the 
customs programme. Trade facilitation is considered as the driving force for such 
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programme.989 The reduction of bureaucratic costs in trade procedures has been estimated 
to give benefits equal to 300 billion euros of worldwide annual savings.990  
As stated by Lamy, the WTO Director General, in a speech at the World Customs 
Organization in Brussels on 24 June 2011, stated that “the trade facilitation deal is therefore 
one simple step to reduce the costs of trading and also to boost trade”. He continued, 
“according to OECD the implementation of the Trade Facilitation measures could reduce total 
trade costs by almost 10% […] every extra day required to ready goods for import or export 
decreases trade by around 4%.”991 Furthermore, the success of the trade facilitation 
programme increases customs productivity, improves trade tax collections and attracts 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). It also has a positive impact on state income where 
several countries increase their revenues after introducing trade facilitation reforms.992 
According to this speech, trade facilitation has strong contributions regarding utilisation of 
GSP. 
In addition, trade facilitation also plays a significant role for least developing 
countries (LDCs), developing countries, and smaller developed countries as “a tool for 
economic development, especially for economic growth”. 993 Trade facilitation is also deemed 
as one of the important factors for the utilisation of the preferences scheme. 
Trade facilitation has been acknowledged as an interface tool between traders and 
governments and faces major challenges to ensure and manage “excessive transaction 
costs” and simplify formalities of bureaucracy. As identified by the OECD and Grainger, 
excessive transaction costs can reduce economic benefits of trade liberalisation. Business 
costs are divided into direct and indirect costs. Direct business costs covers the collection 
of information and submitting of declarations or documents. While indirect business costs 
occur as an effect of border checks, in the form of delays and associated time penalties that 
cause losses of business opportunities and reduce competitiveness.994 It is concluded that 
country borders could create costly obstacles to international trade.995  
The border delays is causing losses of business opportunities and reducing profits of 
traders, particularly small and medium enterprises (SME’s). Developing countries gained 
higher benefits from trade facilitation rather than the reduction or removal of tariff 
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barriers.996 According to Sheikhan, that trade facilitation can generate more economic 
growth than tariff reductions.997 According to the OECD the Trade Transaction Costs 
(TTCs) is between 2% and 15% of the value of goods.998 The SMEs, that cannot afford “high 
costs of compliance” very helped by trade facilitation.999 The OECD study discovers that 
developing countries earn higher advantages from trade facilitation rather than developed 
countries. Better cooperation and coordination of trade facilitation can minimize the losses 
of business opportunities of traders. 1000 
The positive impacts of trade facilitation had been studied through measuring its cost 
and benefits to the trade activities.1001 In 2003, OECD made a research to incorporate 
empirical characteristics of the border process into a model-based analysis to identify 
features that generate benefits from trade facilitation. This research discovered that “1% 
reduction in Trade Transaction Costs (TTCs) would yield about US$ 40 billions in gains to 
world income with no losers; more than 80% of benefits are estimated to come from 
reduction in indirect TTCs”. Therefore, trade facilitation have important role in trade 
activities. 1002 It is shown that benefit obtained through better trade facilitation measures is 
linear to the amount of Trade Transaction Costs (TTCs). Other studies estimated about the 
potential medium-term income obtained from trade facilitation is equal to 2-3 % of the 
total value of goods traded in the world.1003 
Further economic studies related to the positive impact of trade facilitation carry out 
by Wilson et. al, where he attempted to analyze “the relationship between trade facilitation 
and trade flows in the Asia Pacific region”. This research used gravity model analysis, 
including tariffs and some standard variables. Four variables applied in this research as 
indicators for measuring trade facilitation, consists of port efficiency, customs 
environment, regulatory environment, and e-business usage. The result of this study stated 
that : 
“[…] improvement in port efficiency, custom environment, and improvements behind 
the border in regulatory harmonization and e-business usage are estimated to amount 
to gains of US$ 117 billions, US$ 22 billions and another US$ 116 billions, respectively 
[…] the positive effects of enhanced port efficiency and regulations have a larger effect 
on trade flows than those resulting from improved customs efficiencies and usage of 
greater e-business […] total gain in trade flows from improvements in trade 
facilitation is higher than that from reductions in tariff […]”.1004 
 
XV.e. Trade facilitation and good governance. 
It has been noted that trade facilitation has great importance in the reduction of non-
tariff barriers in international trade. In this regard, non-tariff barriers cover “excessive 
documentation requirements, lack of modernisation in required trade procedures, lack of 
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transparency in import and export requirements, and other bureaucratic provisions that 
unnecessarily increase the cost and hamper the efficiency of international trade”. 1005 The 
roles of good governance in trade facilitation are linked through transparency, efficiency, 
and bureaucratic procedures. Good governance has to be implemented by the government 
trade institutions. In this regard, the government has a role as a public service provider in 
trade facilitation. 
Transaction costs are influenced by government policies on the trade facilitation.1006 
Zanamwe noted improvement of trade facilitation could benefitted the government itself: 
“[…] the use of international standards and best practices to rationalise, simplify and 
harmonise customs procedures, formalities, documents, regulations and laws related to 
import, export and transit of goods, and making them transparent, efficient and 
predictable. The implementation of automation and the use of cutting edge information 
and communication technology to exchange trade facilitation related information 
[…]”.1007  
There are two important components in the trade facilitation, i.e., public sector and 
private sector. The government as public sector is the regulator and administrator of the 
trade facilitation. Traders or business actors are private sector, deemed as government 
customers of public services. Government as the public service provider in trade 
facilitation entitled some competences, for instance customs administration, issuing 
certificate of origin, export import license, establishing international agreement and 
cooperation in trade facilitation.1008  
According to OECD, there are five principles that must be implemented in the trade 
facilitation, as follows: 1009 
“[…] Transparency of relevant domestic regulations, procedures, and practices is 
critical for ensuring that regulatory objectives are achieved efficiently, while, at the 
same time, enhancing the benefits expected from trade and investment liberalization. 
By revealing the costs and benefits of administrative regulations and ensuring their 
purpose is clear and appropriately implemented, transparency plays an important role 
in making governments more effective and efficient. Greater transparency allows 
market participants and stakeholders to get better understanding of the conditions and 
constraints for entering and operating in a market, to assess more accurately the costs 
and returns of their involvement, to be better prepared to meet existing requirements 
and adjust to potential changes, and to deal with discriminatory or arbitrary decisions. 
It implies that information on border requirements and procedures are made available 
easily and systematically […]”.1010 
 
“[…] Consistency and predictability in the application of rules and procedures is also 
important. Uncertainty can translate into unwarranted transaction costs in 
international trade, such as warehousing expenses, transport and insurance fees and 
financing charges. Smaller businesses are likely to be more vulnerable to such 
problems, given their relative lack of resources. It calls for standard policies and 
operating procedures that are applied consistently and without discrimination […].”1011 
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“[…] Non-discrimination refers to uniform application of all border-related 
regulations, procedures, and practices. It goes beyond equal treatment between trading 
partner countries, to focus on the treatment of individual traders […]”.1012 
 
“[…] Simplification of border procedures is one means of increasing the efficiency of 
border administrations that can result in improved revenue collection and enhanced 
productivity. At the same time, simplifying procedures may also reduce unnecessary 
restrictions and burdens that add to transaction costs of international trade, including 
undue delays at borders. Measures to simplify border procedures include limiting 
unnecessary paperwork, upgrading regulations, technical capacity, etc […]”.1013 
 
“[…] Due process refers to the availability of appropriate mechanisms for reviewing 
and addressing administrative actions related to customs and border matters. General 
legal frameworks available may not always be sufficient to address the more highly 
technical customs and border matters. The quality of such mechanisms should be 
judged by their accessibility, impartiality, and efficiency in offering redress in 
accordance with national legislation […]”.1014 
According to Winter,  trade policy has important role to combat against corruption, 
elaborated as follows: 
 “[…] The most important aspects are the simplest: the less restrictive is trade policy, 
the lower are the incentives for corruption while simpler more transparent and non-
discretionary policies reduce the scope for corruption. Thus if tariffs or other barriers 
exist there are important benefits to their being uniform, stable and widely published. 
The rules of origin that accompany preferential trading arrangements are burdensome 
to be the honest trader and great opportunity for less honest ones […]”.1015 
The bureaucratic practices in the customs and port authorities potentially generate 
abuse of power and corruption. Many traders and business actors complaining about 
bureaucracy practice under customs authorities. Rent-seeking behaviour at government 
offices for facilitating clearance and other trade document increase the cost of exports, 
imports, and other related services. Weerakoon et. al, studied  the case of corruption that 
often occurs in the bureaucracy: 
 “[…] about 85 percent of them were compelled to pay such bribes or gifts, since they 
could not clear goods without such transactions. Some stakeholders indicated that in 
the absence of paying ‘speed money’ to officials, goods could never be cleared, passing 
relevant stages […]”.1016 
Trade facilitation is not merely technical and technological issues but also includes 
some other aspects such as economic, business, administrative and political issues. Trade 
facilitation has wide scope that includes “government regulations and controls, business 
efficiency, transportation, information and communication technology to the financial 
sector”. 1017 The political will and adherence of good governance principles contributed in 
the improvement of trade facilitation.1018 Trade facilitation associated with corruptions 
eradication, creating friendly business environment and reduceing transaction cost.1019 
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Beneficiary countries’ trade facilitation identified as a constraint in optimizing GSP. 
The Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment on GSP, noted “that bureaucracy 
in the exporting countries cause of the preference utilization gap”.1020 CARIS assessment on 
“Final Report Mid-term Evaluation of the EU’s GSP”, correlated the flexibility of rules of 
origin, bureaucratic costs in the exporting country and its impact on preference utilization. 
“[…] the use of preferences is correlated with the size of the preferential margin, the 
flexibility of rules of origin and how large are bureaucratic costs in the exporting 
country… Furthermore, the results indicate that a positive impact on preference 
utilization, and as result on exports as indicated in, could be achieved by improving 
rules of origin and export procedures in export countries […].1021 
Porto studied about the effects of informal export barriers on poverty. Barriers to 
trade divided into formal trade barriers (tariff, quotas, export, and taxes) and informal 
trade barriers. Informal export barriers covers transport costs, cumbersome customs 
practices, bureaucracy, regulations and corruption.1022 When formal trade barrier is 
decreased, the informal trade barrier is increased. Improvement transport infrastructure, 
fighting corruption, and improving customs practices would have a significant impact on 
poverty alleviation.1023  
 
XV.f.  Significance of e-trade in trade facilitation.  
Globalisation and ICT development have caused evolutionary changes in techniques 
of trade from manual to digital. ICT developments have changed traders’ attitude in their 
effort to expand markets and to increase production efficiency. ICT usage in international 
trade has helped to increase efficiency (reduction of time consumption and costs) of trade 
and increase profit traders (market expansion products). ICT has played a significant role 
in trade facilitation reforms through features such as e-trade, e-business, the single 
window concept, e-contract, and e-payment. In this regard, observably the ICT is vital in 
the development of world trade.1024 Sheikhan notes that the rapid development of ICT is 
due to the need for “faster, cheaper and more efficient transport systems (for instance just 
in time-management and e-business)”.1025 In addition, the growth of Transnational 
Corporation (TNC) or Multinational Corporation (MNC) has led to the change from a 
manual to a digital environment. 
Application of ICT brought consequences in the field trade facilitation such as 
preparedness of infrastructure, human resources, and operational budget. The application 
of ICT in trade facilitation has gives a lot of benefits but in the same time also creating some 
constraints to developing countries and LDC. Such constraint related to standards set out 
on e-trade and e-custom application where not all the developing countries well-prepared. 
It becomes main of the reasons of developing countries refused trade facilitation to be 
                                                 
1020 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment: Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences. 
1021 See Gasiorek, Michael, et.al, Mid-term Evaluation of the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences: Final Report, Centre for 
the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex (CARIS), University of Sussex, p. 81, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146196.pdf , last accessed : 6 June 2011. 
1022 See Porto, Guido G., Informal Export Barriers and Poverty, Journal of International Economics 66 (2005) 447-470, 
Development Research Group, MailStop MC3-303, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, Washington DC 20433, United 
States, 2004, p. 399. Winters, L. Alan., Critical Perspective on the Global Trading System and the WTO : The WTO and 
Poverty and  Inequality, Volume I,  An Elgar Reference Collection, UK , 2007. 
1023 See Porto, Guido G., 2004, Op. Cit., p. 419. Winters, L. Alan., 2007. 
1024 See UN/CEFACT, available at : http://www.unece.org/cefact/about.htm, last accessed 29 May 2011. 
1025 See Sheikhan, Pegah., 2008. 
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included as a legal obligation under WTO law. According to Hellqvist “human capital 
capacity in the form of computer literate work force, computerised systems, functioning 
telecommunication system, use of information and technology solutions, harmonised payment 
system and standardised transport facilities”. These factors has strong correlation with the 
“country’s overall level of development”. To meet such requirements developing countries 
need helps on capacity building and technical assistants. 1026  The practitioners’ proposed 
trade facilitation concepts “based on observation in the area of the application of 
information technology are covering standardization of documents and electronic data 
requirements, automation, Single Window and International electronic exchange of trade 
data”. 1027  
The ICT projects related to trade facilitation is the adoption of single windows 
systems by Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN).1028 Singapore is one of the 
leading countries that succeed implement single window system. It made Singapore as the 
role model for other countries.1029 The single window concepts set up based on “a high use 
of electronic systems, eliminating requirements for paper and providing an infrastructure for 
greater integration among the many government agencies as well as between government 
and business actors”. 1030 
 
XV.g. European Union trade facilitation in optimising GSP utilisation.  
The EU has provided a large budget for the customs modernisation programme 
through the “electronic customs initiative”1031. Where its goal is to enhance the trade 
facilitation programme. This programme is in line with the “e-Europe”1032 proposed by the 
Commission in 2005. The essence of the e-Europe programme is to create an information 
society for all in order “to provide a favourable environment for private investment and for 
the creation of new jobs, to boost productivity, to modernise public services, and to give 
everyone the opportunity to participate in the global information society”. The 
encouragement “to participate in the global information society” is consistent with the 
implementation of the transparency principle as stipulated in Article X of GATT 1994. The 
                                                 
1026 See Weerakoon, Dushni., Thennakoon, Jayanthi., and Weeraratne, Bilesha. 
1027 See Grainger,  Andrew., 2007. 
1028 See Ibid. 
1029 See Applegate, Neo et al. 1993; 1995; Wulf 2004; International Trade Institute of Singapore 2005; Grainger, Andrew., 
2007. 
1030 See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee a simple and paperless environment for Customs and 
Trade Communication from the Commission to the Council, European Parliament and the European Economic and 
Social Committee on the role of customs in the integrated management of external borders: Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and Of The Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the 
Community Customs Code, Brussels, 24.07.2003, COM(2003) 452 final, 2003/0167 (COD), available at : http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0452:FIN:EN:PDF, last accessed : 6 June 2011; Grainger, 
Andrew., Trade Facilitation: A Review, 25 June 2007, available at      : 
http://www.tradefacilitation.co.uk/papers/AGrainger_TradeFacilitation_Review%282007%29.pdf, last accessed : 15 
May 2011. 
1031 See Ibid. 
1032 See Commission Of The European Communities,  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, The Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions, eEurope 2005: an information 
society for all, Brussels, 28.5.2002, COM(2002) 263 final, an Action Plan to be presented in view of the Sevilla 
European Council, 21/22 June 2002, available at : 
http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/aboutETSI/EC_Communications/eEurope2005_actionPlan.pdf, last 
accessed : 7 June 2011. 
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government required the provision of the accessible publication of procedures and 
requirements of foreign trade.1033 
In accordance with Article VIII of GATT 1994 the “electronic customs initiative” 
proposes the usage of ICT, builds common data models, implements the use of risk 
management techniques, applies the single window concept, simplifies governing trade 
procedures, and standardises and simplifies customs and trade documents (for instance 
the application of e-trade and e-customs).1034 Another programme to enhance trade 
facilitation is the adoption of documentation standards (such as the Single Administrative 
Document in the EU) in order to facilitate the access to information and cooperation 
between customs authorities for fact-finding.1035  
The e-Europe programs are covering e-Government, e-Learning, e-Health, and e-
Business.1036 It is part of the Lisbon strategy to improve the EU competitiveness. The e-
Europe increase the number of businesses actors that utilize the ICT in their business 
activities. The e-Europe provide better and cheaper services driving efficiency and 
economic growth.  The e-business designed to increase the competitiveness of European 
company, enhancing productivity, and growth through investment in ICT, human resources 
(notably e-skills) and new business models. 1037 The Commission and member states 
support the development of e-business solutions for cross-border business transactions for 
instance e-signature and e-payment. 
Intensive use of ICT in public administrations improve transparency and efficiency 
economic in business activities, thus, reducing transaction costs, cut down administrative 
burdens and increased effectiveness.1038 On 27 May 2011, the Council adopted conclusions 
on the European e-Government action plan for the period 2011-2015. The objectives of the 
action plan is to promote the application of e-Government (electronic government) 
                                                 
1033 See Grainger, Andrew., 2007. 
1034 See Ibid. 
1035 See Christophe Maur, Jean., 2008. 
1036 See Barcelona European Council, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 40&41, available at : 
(http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm). The Barcelona European Council called upon "the Commission 
and the Member States to foster the use of open platforms to provide freedom of choice to citizens for access to 
applications and services of the Information Society, notably through digital television, 3G mobile and other 
platforms that technological convergence may provide in the future.  
“[…] It also invited the Commission to present “a comprehensive analysis of remaining barriers to: the achievement 
of widespread access to new services and applications of the information society through open platforms in digital 
television and 3G mobile communications, the full roll-out of 3G mobile communications, the development of e-
commerce and e-government and the role that national electronic identification and authentication systems could 
play in this context […]”. 
1037 See Commission Of The European Communities,  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, The Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions, eEurope 2005: an information 
society for all, Brussels, 28.5.2002, COM(2002) 263 final, an Action Plan to be presented in view of the Sevilla 
European Council, 21/22 June 2002. 
1038 See Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the European eGovernment Action Plan 2011-2015 3093rd 
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council meeting – telecommunication items only – Brussels, 27 May 
2011, available at : http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/122278.pdf, last 
accessed : 9 June 2011. See also Council of The European Union, Press Release, Transport, Telecommunications and 
Energy, Telecommunications items only, 10494/11 PRESSE 145, PR CO 33, 3093rd Council meeting, Brussels, 27 May 
2011, available at : http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/122294.pdf, last 
accessed : 9th 2011. See also Council of the European Union The European eGovernment action plan 2011-2015, 
Adoption of Council Conclusions, Brussels, 19 May 2011, 10308/11, available at : 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st10/st10308.en11.pdf, last accessed : 9 June 2011.  
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services at local, regional and EU level, to make them more accessible and available for 
citizens and businesses throughout the EU regardless of their country of origin.1039 
The Council Resolution on 30 May 2001, concerning “strategy for the Customs Union” 
invited the Commission “to develop a broad-based programme for computerization of 
customs procedures and exchange of customs information, as well as a credible strategy for 
the development and use of information networks in customs activities”. To facilitate creation 
of paperless environment it is important to review and simply existing regulations, 
systems, and formalities. It is important to take into account the "latest developments in 
commercial logistic practices, the reduction of customs duties, and the forthcoming 
enlargement", because customs controls “would become a part of the trade transaction, with 
optimised efficiency”.1040 
Single automated access point of trade is very important in which traders only have 
single entry point to access all the relevant customs clearance and information systems. 
Traders provide data only once where efficiency of time and formalities enhanced through 
single entry point. To adhere transparency principle all information on customs 
procedures, simplifications, accreditation criteria, guidelines have to be available on the 
internet in a language widely understood in international trade. The cost of ICT application 
considered as long-term investment. 1041  
Traders allocate budget to provide the infrastructure in their company, for instance 
computer, software (client software), network/communications costs, training, and 
possible security measure. To operate the system necessary to provide maintainance costs. 
Traders gains the benefits1042 from e-customs due to improvement of customs clearance 
and release time, increasing of transparency, predictability, and flexibility of customs 
administration, cost reduction, and availability of single entry point. 1043 
On the other hand, the authority to provide more budgets to finance the project,  such 
as planning budget (includes seminars and meetings), infrastructure, research and 
development, human resources and technical assistance. The custom modernization  
improve collection of revenues (own resources). 1044 With respect to the earlier detection 
                                                 
1039 See Council of the European Union, available at : 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showFocus.aspx?id=1&focusid=608&lang=en, last accessed : 9 June 2011. 
1040 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and Of The Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, Brussels, 24.07.2003, COM(2003) 452 final, 2003/0167 (COD). 
1041 See Ibid. 
1042 “[…] Increased responsiveness of the customs administrations, particularly regarding reductions in the overall elapse 
time required to obtain customs clearance; Simplification and streamlining of compliance obligations and procedures 
to be followed, deriving specifically from the simplification and reduction of customs procedures, the Single 
European Authorization, and the possibility to use global guarantees; Increased transparency, predictability, co-
operation and uniformity in interactions with customs administrations and systems; General reduction in the costs of 
doing business in the European Union via the automation of procedures and consequent replacement of paper-based 
procedures; Availability of a single automated entry point to the EU administrations, including the single 
window/one-stop-shop for customs and other agencies; Availability of lower cost customs software via the creation 
of an EU-wide market for a customs software following a unique set of specifications instead of 15 (or 25) markets of 
country-specific software; New business opportunities for customs agents and clearing houses in the area of bridging 
EU interfaces to private companies’ systems interfaces, and for representing traders established outside the 
Community regarding declaration and payment obligations; Increased flexibility in co-operation structures with 
customs administrations via expanded use of MOUs (Memoranda of Understanding); Better proof of export for tax 
purposes […]”. 
1043 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of The Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, Brussels, 24.07.2003, COM(2003) 452 final, 2003/0167 (COD). 
1044 Ibis. 
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of fraud and trade deflection, it would greatly influence the utilization of GSP by 
beneficiary countries and/the most need countries.1045  
With respect to the relationship between trade facilitation and the implementation of 
preferential rules of origin, Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 requires the 
beneficiary countries to establish an electronic database of registered exporters.1046 These 
databases will be used to facilitate targeted post-export controls, especially to issue the 
declaration of free circulation.1047  The competent authorities of the beneficiary country 
must continue to update the electronic records of registered exporters located in the 
country or concern.1048 The establishment of such database by beneficiary countries 
requires ICT infrastructure (e-trade)1049, human resources, and operational costs. The 
database is protected under the data protection provisions of the EU and national law.1050 
Such database must be in line with export formalities in the beneficiary countries, 
procedures at the release of free circulation in the EU and methods of administrative 
cooperation. 
The failure to fulfil the administration requirements of the preferential rules of origin 
and to provide administrative cooperation may lead to temporary withdrawal from the 
GSP scheme.1051 Administration cooperation refers to the implementation of the 
preferential rules of origin in order to obtain tariff reductions under  the GSP scheme.1052  
Public participation considered as elements of transparency principle. The 
Commission held public consultation involving variety of stakeholders, consists of citizens, 
business associations, companies, no profit organizations and others elements.1053 This 
activity is purposed to get proportional feedbacks from different range of groups in order 
to establish an improvement of the next GSP scheme. The public consultation held used 
online systems, known as “Interactive Policy Making”1054. This system is established in line 
with the e-Europe programme in order to create information society, to enhance efficiency, 
to reduce the bureaucracy cost, and to cover the worldwide society.1055 
The DG of Trade provides e-service, called as “the export helpdesk” to facilitate 
developing countries accessing EU markets.1056 The export helpdesk established in 2004, it 
is functioned as the point to access online information about exporting to Europe. This site 
is available in multilanguage languages: English, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Arabic and 
                                                 
1045 “[…]  Due to implementation of Generalized System of Preferences scheme which derogate from “Common Customs Tariff 
duties”, refer to duties specified in Part Two of Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on 
the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (6), except those duties set up within the 
framework of tariff quotas […]”; (6) OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 360/2008 (OJ L 111, 23.4.2008, p. 9). See also Altomonte, Carlo., Nava, Mario., 2005. See also Gormley, 
Laurence W., 2009. 
1046 See Article 69 Paragraph 3 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010. 
1047 See Recitals 18 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
1048 See Article 91 Paragraph 1 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. See also Article 93 Paragraph 2 of the 
Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
1049 See Recitals 23 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
1050 See Recitals 19, 20, 21, 22 and Article 69 Paragraph 4 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
1051 See Article 16 Paragraph 1 Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
1052 See Article 16 Paragraph 2 (a) Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
1053 See Public Consultation on the EU Generalised System Of Preferences (GSP), available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/september/tradoc_146463.edited.pdf, last accessed : 14 June 2011. 
1054 See http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/forms/dispatch?form=NEXTGSPSCHEME&lang=en.  
1055 See Public Consultation exercise on the revision and updating of the European Union's scheme of Generalised System of 
Preferences (the GSP scheme), available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/march/tradoc_145972.pdf, 
last accessed : 14 June 2011. 
1056 See The Export Helpdesk, available at : http://exporthelp.europa.eu/index_en.html, last accessed : 14 June 2011. 
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Russian. The export helpdesk provide guidance for exporters or traders from the third 
countries about trade opportunities, preferential arrangement, rules of origin, trade 
restriction, export-import formalities and procedures to EU, and provide import tariffs and 
taxes information. The export helpdesk provide trade statistics on EU trade with the rest of 
the world. 1057  On Customs and Tariffs, the EU established TARIC Consultation systems.1058 
In overall, EU trade facilitation improvement in line with Article X and Article VIII of 
GATT 1994. The transparency principles on publication and administration of trade 
regulations implemented by providing accessible information of export and import to the 
traders and other stakeholders, for instance the “export helpdesk and interactive policy 
making programme”. Trade facilitation open more access for beneficiary countries to 
optimizing utilization the EU GSP. 
 
XVI. The proposal for new EU GSP regulations. 
The EU GSP as the main instrument of trade and development was established under 
the framework of CCP. Trade preferences are considered as a tool to sustain development 
in beneficiary countries. It is clear that the EU GSP is dedicated to the assistance of 
developing countries to improve their economic development through increasing export 
earnings, alleviating poverty, promoting sustainable development and good governance 
and ensuring the enforcement of core human and labour rights in developing countries. 
However, the implementation of GSP always needs domestic sacrifices such as reducing the 
preference-granting country’s revenues because of tariff reductions. This invites debatable 
issues between the interest groups and stakeholders by taking into account the costs and 
benefits for its domestic industries.1059 Hudec, states that “preferences did more harm than 
good, they were something developed countries could give”. GSP is interpreted as a voluntary 
contribution to help developing countries in the framework of development. 
The Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff 
preferences expired on 31 December 2011.1060 The proposal for new EU GSP is based on 
detailed impact assessment. The proposal was prepared by considering input from the 
public consultation held on 27 March to 4 June 2010.1061 This assessment studied the effect 
of different policies to enhance the utilisation of the GSP scheme for the countries most in 
need.1062 The new GSP scheme must take into account the significant changes in 
international trade relations and global economic development. The new GSP is designed 
to enhance it modalities on the eligibility criteria of beneficiary countries, preferential 
                                                 
1057See About the Export Helpdesk, available at : http://exporthelp.europa.eu/display.cfm?page=intro/intro_HowToExport 
ToEurope.html&docType=main&languageId=EN, last accessed : 14 June 2011. 
1058 Available at : http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/taric_consultation. 
1059 See Hudec, Robert E., 1987, Op. Cit., p. 50. 
1060 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008  Amending Regulations (EC) No. 552/97, (EC) No. 1933/2006 And 
Commission Regulations (EC) No. 1100/2006 And (EC) No. 964/2007 (Officials Journals L 211/1, 6.8.2008) 
1061 See Proposal For A Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Applying A Scheme Of Generalised Tariff 
Preferences, {SEC(2011) 536 Final},{SEC(2011) 537 Final}, Brussels, 10.5.2011, COM(2011) 241 Final, 2011/0117 
(COD), p.. 3. 
1062 "[…] Global economic balances have shifted tremendously in the last decades. World tariffs are at all-time lows. If we 
grant tariff preferences in this competitive environment, those countries most in need must reap the most benefits. 
Trade and development go hand in hand and tariff preferences are a small part of our wide agenda to help poorer 
economies scale up their presence in global markets […] " (European Union’s Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht). 
See Focusing on needs: the EU reshapes its import scheme for developing countries, Brussels, 10 May 2011, available 
at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147894.pdf, last accessed: 12 May 2011. 
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rules of origin1063, the withdrawal mechanism,1064 and the graduation and de-graduation 
mechanism.1065 Those elements are identified as the main core of the GSP to attain its goal 
in giving assistance to targeted countries.  
In the new GSP regulation, beneficiaries who have enjoyed the GSP scheme will be 
reduced from 1761066 to 801067 countries and territories.1068 This policy was established 
based on economic criteria such as the increase of income per capita based on the World 
Bank Classification. In fact, some GSP beneficiaries have income similar or even higher than 
some member states of EU1069, thus, the EU argues that the grants of the GSP scheme 
towards those countries with a higher income would go against the objectives of GSP, 
which is given as a favour to improve their economic development using tariff reductions. 
The beneficiary country concerned is considered as capable to compete in the EU market 
without any assistance of trade preferences. The beneficiary country that has a FTA or a 
                                                 
1063See Recitals (22) by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010 (OJ L 307, 23.11.2010); See Proposal for a regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 8. 
1064 See Recitals (23) “[…]  The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the three arrangements should include serious and 
systematic violations of the principles laid down in certain international conventions concerning core human rights 
and labour rights, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions […]”.  
“[…] Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance 
should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the 
ratification and effective implementation of the conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed 
by the conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the European Union’s monitoring 
procedures as set out in this Regulation […]”.  
“[…] Recitals (24) due to the political situation in Myanmar and in Belarus, the temporary withdrawal of all tariff 
preferences in respect of imports of products originating in Myanmar and Belarus should be maintained […]”. See 
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff 
Preferences, p. 8. 
1065 See Recitals (21) “[…] Graduation based on criteria related to sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff. 
Graduation should apply in respect of a section or sub-section in order to reduce cases where heterogeneous 
products are graduated. The graduation of a section or a sub-section (made up of chapters) for a beneficiary country 
should be applied when the section meets the criteria for graduation over three consecutive years, in order to 
increase the predictability and fairness of graduation by eliminating the effect of large and exceptional variations in 
the import statistics. Graduation should not apply to the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement 
for sustainable development and good governance and the beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the 
least-developed countries as they share a very similar economic profile rendering them vulnerable because of a low, 
non-diversified export base […]”. See Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 8. 
1066 See Annex I Beneficiary countries and territories of the Community’s scheme of generalised tariff preferences Council 
Regulation (EC) 732/2008.  
1067 See Annex I Eligible Countries of The European Union’s Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences Referred to in Article 3 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff 
Preferences, p. 29.  
1068 The decision to reduce the number of beneficiary of GSP needs to be finalized by co-decision mechanism referred to 
Paragraph 2 Article 188C The Treaty of Lisbon. See also Karel De Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade, Remarks 
at the press conference on the review of the Generalised System of Preferences, Press Conference on the GSP review, 
Strasbourg, 10 May 2011, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147895.pdf, last 
accessed : 12 May 2011. See also Article 5 Paragraph (3), Article 6 Paragraph (2), Article 9 Paragraph (2), Article 10 
Paragraph (8), Article 11 Paragraph (2), Article 16, Article 17 Paragraph (3), Article 19 Paragraph (10) and (13), 
Article 22 Paragraph (4), Article 37 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying 
a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences.  
1069 Countries which have achieved a high or upper middle income per capita, according to the internationally accepted World 
Bank classification (such as Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Qatar). See Focusing on needs: the EU reshapes its 
import scheme for developing countries, Brussels, 10 May 2011, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147894.pdf, last accessed: 12 May 2011. This achievement 
is such that their income is similar or even higher than that of some EU Member States. So, trade preferences did not 
make that much sense anymore. See also Karel De Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade, Remarks at the press 
conference on the review of the Generalised System of Preferences, Press Conference on the GSP review, Strasbourg, 
10 May 2011, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147895.pdf, last accessed : 12 
May 2011. 
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Special Autonomous Trade Regime with the EU would be removed from the list. Some 
beneficiary countries and territories also have alternative market access arrangement for 
developed markets, which means that they have greater market access for their products. 
The modalities in the new GSP scheme must comply with Enabling Clause 1979 and 
correspond to the priorities of the United Nations for the combating of global poverty.1070 
The GSP is deemed as a policy that is coherent with economic development and that 
contributes to the eradication of poverty through opening affordable market access for 
developing countries and LDCs.1071 EU regulations under the CCP must be consistent with 
the principle laid down in Article 208 of the TFEU.1072 
Commitment of granting GSP caused losses to EU customs revenue due to zero tariff 
reductions. In 2009, the revenue losses caused by the implementation of the GSP scheme 
were estimated at 2.97 billion euros corresponding to a net amount of 2.23 billion euros 
after the deductions of member states’ collection costs. The re-designed graduation 
mechanism and eligibility criteria of the beneficiary countries in the proposal of the new 
EU GSP scheme aims to minimise such losses. The estimation of annual loss of customs 
revenue from the coming GSP scheme is 1.87 billion euros (net amount 1.4 billion euros). 
The new regulation of the GSP is projected to reduce customs revenue losses.1073 The 
estimation budget provided by the EU for the implementation of the GSP regulation 2011 is 
16.6 billion euros1074. Hence, the focal point of the proposed regulation is to reduce 
revenue losses through the graduation mechanism of the beneficiary country.  
 
                                                 
1070 “[…]  Generalized System of Preferences designed to increasing export earning and protecting infant industries in the 
beneficiary country. The assumption of increasing export quantity hoped also generates the employments, which 
directed to alleviate poverty and inequalities of economic development in the beneficiary country. The WTO is one of 
international organization, which supports the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in which 
covers eight international development goals that all 192 Members and a Number of International Organizations 
have agreed to achieve by the year 2015 to end poverty […]”. (See The WTO And The Millennium Development Goals, 
available at : http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/mdg_e/mdg_e.htm, last accessed : 14 May 2011; See 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/, last accessed : 14 May 2011). Pascal Lamy, Director of WTO also stressed that 
“Open, Rules Based, Predictable and Non Discriminatory Trading System” can be a powerful engine for economic 
growth and development. For instance, Lamy said that there is a fact that the regions where most progress has been 
made in eradicating poverty are those that trade most, and there is a direct correlation between integration into the 
Multilateral Trading System and Economic Growth, between Growth and Poverty Reduction. ( See Lamy Underlines 
WTO’s Role in Reducing Poverty, available at : http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl170_e.htm, Last 
Accessed : 14 May 2011). 
1071 See EU Contribution To The Millennium Development Goals: Some Key Results From European Commission Programmes 
2010, available at : http://ec.europa.uu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/188a_Mdg_En.Pdf, 
last accessed : 14 May 2011. 
1072 See Recital (4) “[…] The European Union’s common commercial policy is to be consistent with and consolidate the 
objectives of development policy, laid down in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in 
particular the eradication of poverty and the promotion of sustainable development and good governance in the 
developing countries. Compliance with WTO requirements, ‘Enabling Clause’, WTO Members may accord differential 
and more favourable treatment to developing countries. Recitals (7) By providing preferential access to the market of 
the Union, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and promote good 
governance and sustainable development by helping them generate additional revenue through international trade, 
which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development. The scheme’s tariff preferences should focus 
on helping developing countries having greater development, trade and financial needs […]”. Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, pp. 4-
5. 
1073 See Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff 
Preferences, p. 3, available at : Http://Trade.Ec.Europa.Eu/Doclib/Docs/2011/May/Tradoc_147893.Pdf, last 
accessed : 12 May 2011. 
1074 See Legislative Financial Statement For Proposals Having A Budgetary Impact Exclusively Limited To The Revenue Side, 
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff 
Preferences, p. 104. 
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Table 3. Estimation of customs revenue losses proposed by GSP regulation.1075 
 
Mio Euro Pref. Imports Loss of Revenue Revenue of  
New Graduation 
Total Loss 
EBA 6,237 730 - 730 
GSP+ 2,835 307 - 307 
GSP 31,066 1,066 231 835 
Total 40,138 2,103 231 1,872 
 
 
Table 4. Estimation1076 of the loss of revenue to the EU budget (net amount). 
  
 
Year Loss of Revenue 25% Reduction “Member States Collection Costs” 
2009 1,872 1,404 
2010 1,966 1,474 
2011 2,064 1,548 
2012 2,167 1,625 
2013 2,276 1,707 
2014 2,389 1,792 
2015 2,509 1,882 
2016 2,634 1,976 
 
 
Table 5. The European Union loss of revenue: example Indonesia. 
 
 
Geonom 
Country 
Code 
Beneficiary 
Country 
GSP 
Scheme 
Total 
Import per 
Euro 1,000 
Eligible 
Imports per 
Euro 1,000 
Preferential 
Imports per 
Euro 1,000 
MFN 
Average 
EBA Rate 
Average 
EU Loss of 
Revenue 
per Euro 
1,000 
0700 Indonesia General 
Arrangement 
11,571,832.86 5,074,782.31 3,383,547.47 4.81 3.02 126,244.36 
 
 
Table 6. Correlation of European Union loss of revenue and graduated section: 
example Indonesia. 
 
Geonom 
Country 
Code 
Beneficiary 
Country 
Graduated 
Sections 
Total Import 
x Euro 1,000 
Eligible 
Imports 
per 1,000 
euros 
Preferential 
Imports per 
1,000 euros 
MFN 
Average 
GSP rate 
Average 
EU Loss of 
Revenue 
per 1,000 
euros 
0700 Indonesia S-1a 15,538.24 13,989.51 13,989.51 0.58 - 895.33 
0700  Indonesia S-3 18,887,166.53 - - 8 5.89 - 
 
                                                 
1075 See Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff 
Preferences, p. 105. 
1076 Assuming an increase of imports of 5% per year and deducting 25% that are retained in the Member States to 
compensate for collection costs. 
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The proposed regulation laid down in Article 207 of the TFEU (Ex Article 133 TEC) as 
the legal basis of granting GSP.  The new proposed regulations of GSP give more 
elaboration on the implementation of the “non discriminatory principle of the enabling 
clause” as interpreted by the Appellate Body in the EC Preferences Case.1077 In this regard, 
the scheme of general arrangement will be granted to “all those developing countries which 
share a common developing need and are in a similar stage of economic development”.1078 
The wording “share a common developing need1079” and “similar stage of economic 
development” should be underlined, which set out the conditions known as “similarly-
situated”. The Appellate Body stated that identical tariff preferences must be available for 
“similarly-situated” beneficiary countries.1080 The general arrangement considers the fact 
that development, financial and trade needs are dynamic and assures that the arrangement 
remains open if the situation of a country changes.1081 
On the other hand, beneficiary countries are defined as “not similarly situated”, 
where they do not share the same development, trade and financial needs, have different 
stages of economic development, and are categorised as developing countries that are 
more vulnerable. To prevent unjustified discrimination different needs should be granted 
to different treatments. Beneficiaries are classified by the World Bank as high-income or 
upper-middle income countries and successfully completion of their migration from 
centralised to market economies is excluded from the general arrangement.1082 
With respect to the other PTAs established between developing countries and the EU, 
the proposed regulation clearly states that:1083 
“[…] the tariff preferences granted under the general arrangement should not be 
extended to developing countries which are benefiting from a preferential market 
access arrangement with the EU, which provides at least the same level of tariff 
preferences as the scheme for substantially all trade […]”. 
The Commission will monitor the implementation of special incentive arrangements 
and present the report to the European Parliament and the Council.1084 The classification of 
                                                 
1077 See Appellate Body Report in EC-Preferences Case paras. 153-154. 
1078 See Recitals (9) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of 
Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 5. 
1079 See also Appellate Body Report in EC-Preferences Case para. 153. “[…] The European Communities, however, appears to 
regard GSP beneficiaries as similarly-situated when they have "similar development needs".  Although the European 
Communities acknowledges that differentiating between similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries would be inconsistent 
with footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause, it submits that there is no inconsistency in differentiating between GSP 
beneficiaries with different development needs […]”. 
1080 See Appellate Body Report in EC-Preferences Case para. 154. 
1081 See Recitals (9) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of 
Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 5. 
1082 See Ibid. 
1083 See Ibid. 
1084 See Recitals (14) “[…] The Commission should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions and their 
effective implementation, by examining the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies 
established under the respective conventions. Every two years, the Commission should present, to the European 
Parliament and the Council, a report on the status of ratification of the conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary 
countries with any reporting obligations under the conventions, and the status of the implementation of the 
conventions in practice; Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme 
of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 7. The Commission should monitor the status of ratification of the international 
conventions and their effective implementation, by examining the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant 
monitoring bodies established under the respective conventions. Every two years, the Commission should present, to 
the European Parliament and the Council, a report on the status of ratification of the conventions, the compliance of 
the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under the conventions, and the status of the implementation 
of the conventions in practice […]”. 
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sensitive and non-sensitive products in the general arrangement scheme will be 
maintained in order to protect domestic products of similar manufacturing sectors.1085 In 
the current regulation non-sensitive products have been suspended,1086 and will be 
maintained in the GSP proposal. While, sensitive1087 products will be maintained to enjoy 
tariff reductions in order to increase GSP utilisation. Therefore, GSP tariff reductions are 
designed to attract traders to utilise the GSP scheme facility.1088 
Non-legislative acts1089 will be applied in the amendments of the Annexes of the 
regulation and in temporary withdrawals from the special incentive arrangement. The aim 
is to create uniformity and detailed technical arrangements in the enforcement of the 
regulation. In addition, the Commission is obliged to hold appropriate consultations in the 
preparatory work of the “non legislative act”, which involves the relevant experts.1090 
                                                 
1085 See Recitals (17) “[…] As regards the general arrangement, the differentiation between tariff preferences for ‘non-
sensitive’ products and tariff preferences for ‘sensitive’ products should be maintained, to take account of the 
situation of the sectors manufacturing the same products in the European Union […].” Proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 7. 
1086 See Common Customs Tariff duties on products listed in Annex V as non-sensitive products shall be suspended entirely, 
except for agricultural components. See Paragraph (1) Article 7 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 7. See also Recitals (14) Council Regulation 
(EC) No 732/2008. See also Paragraph (1) Article 8 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 7. See also Recitals (14) Council Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008. 
1087 See Paragraph (2), (4), (6) Article 7 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a 
Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 7. See also Recitals (14) Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008. 
1088 See Recitals (18) “[…] Common Custom Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while 
duties on sensitive products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate while at 
the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding European Union industries […]”; Recitals (19) “[…] 
Such a tariff reduction should be sufficiently attractive, in order to motivate traders to make use of the opportunities 
offered by the scheme. Therefore, the ad valorem duties should generally be reduced by a flat rate of 3.5 percentage 
points from the MFN duty rate, while for textiles and textile goods they should be reduced by 20 %. Specific duties 
should be reduced by 30 %. Where a minimum duty is specified, that minimum duty should not apply […]”; Recitals 
(20) “[…] Duties should be suspended totally, where the preferential treatment for an individual import declaration 
results in an ad valorem duty of 1 % or less or in a specific duty of EUR 2 or less, since the cost of collecting such 
duties might be higher than the revenue gained […].” Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, pp. 7-8. 
1089 See Article 290 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerning “non legislative act”; see also Article 
249 B Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, stipulated as follows :  
1. A legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application 
to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act. The objectives, content, scope and 
duration of the delegation of power shall be explicitly defined in the legislative acts. The essential elements of an 
area shall be reserved for the legislative act and accordingly shall not be the subject of a delegation of power. 
2. Legislative acts shall explicitly lay down the conditions to which the delegation is subject; these conditions may 
be as follows: 
(a) the European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; 
(b) the delegated act may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the European 
Parliament or the Council within a period set by the legislative act. 
For the purposes of (a) and (b), the European Parliament shall act by a majority of its component members, and 
the Council by a qualified majority. 
3. The adjective ‘delegated’ shall be inserted in the title of delegated acts. 
1090 See Recitals (25) “[…] In order to achieve a balance between the need for better targeting, greater coherence and 
transparency on one hand, and better promoting sustainable development and good governance through a unilateral 
trade preference scheme on the other hand, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of due to failure to adhere 
to the principles of sustainable development and good governance, as well as procedural rules regarding the 
submission of applications for the tariff preferences granted under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable 
development and good governance, the conduct of a temporary withdrawal and safeguard investigations in order to 
establish uniform and detailed technical arrangements. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out 
appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level. The Commission, when preparing 
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In addition, the GSP proposal has put forward regular assessment to review GSP 
scheme implementation every five years. The Commission will carry out such assessment 
and submit the report to the Council and European Parliament. The assessment covers the 
implications of the GSP scheme for the development, trade, and financial needs of 
beneficiary countries.1091 
The proposal of GSP regulation consists of seven Chapters,1092 forty-two Articles, and 
nine Annexes.1093 The proposed regulations have been maintained from the previous GSP 
scheme that consists of three arrangements.1094 Article 2 of Chapter I of the proposed 
regulation contains a definition of terms.1095 The eligibility criteria for general 
                                                                                                                                                
and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure the simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant 
documents to the European Parliament and Council […]”; Recitals (26) “[…] In order to ensure uniform conditions for 
the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission […]”. Those 
powers exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. The advisory procedure used for the adoption of 
decisions on suspension from the tariff preferences of certain GSP sections in respect of beneficiary countries and on 
the initiation of a temporary withdrawal procedure, taking into account the nature and impact of these acts. The 
examination procedure should be used for the adoption of decisions on safeguard investigations and on suspension 
of the preferential arrangements where imports may cause serious disturbance to European Union markets. Proposal 
for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, 
p. 9. See also Recital 15, 16, 17 Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008. 
1091 See Recitals (27)” […] The Commission should report regularly to the Council and the European Parliament on the effects 
of the scheme. Five years after its entry into force, the Commission should report on the operation of the Regulation 
and assess the need to review the scheme, including the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development 
and good governance and temporary withdrawal provisions of tariff preferences, taking into consideration the fight 
against terrorism and the field of international standards on transparency and exchange of information in tax 
matters. In reporting, the Commission should take into account the implications for development, trade and financial 
needs of beneficiaries. Where applicable, compliance with EU sanitary and phytosanitary rules should also be 
assessed. The report should also include an analysis of the effects of the scheme with regard to imports of biofuels 
and sustainability aspects […]”; Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a 
Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 9. See also Recital 15, 16, 17 Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008. 
1092 Chapter I (General Provisions), Chapter II (General Arrangement), Chapter III (Special Incentive Arrangement For 
Sustainable Development And Good Governance), Chapter IV (Special Arrangement For The Least-Developed 
Countries), Chapter V Temporary Withdrawal Provisions Common To All Arrangements, Chapter VI (Safeguard And 
Surveillance Provisions), Chapter VII (Common Provisions). 
1093 Annex I (Eligible countries of the European Union’s Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences referred to in Article 3; 
Eligible countries of the European Union’s Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences referred to Article 3 which have 
been temporarily withdrawn from this scheme, in respect of all or of certain products originating in these countries), 
Annex II (Beneficiary countries of the general arrangement referred to Article 1 (2) (A); Beneficiary countries of The 
general arrangement referred to Article 1 (2) (A) which have been temporarily withdrawn from this scheme, in 
respect of all or of certain products originating in these countries),  Annex III (Beneficiary countries of the special 
incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to Article 1 (2) (B); beneficiary 
countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to Article 
1 (2) (B) which have been temporarily withdrawn from this scheme, in iespect of all or of certain products 
originating in these countries), Annex IV (Beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the LDC referred to 
Article 1 (2) (C); Beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the LDC referred to Article 1 (2) (C) which have 
been temporarily withdrawn from this scheme, in respect of all or of certain products originating in these countries), 
Annex V (List of products included in the general arrangement referred to Article 1 (2) (a)), Annex VI (Modalities for 
the application of Article 8), Annex VII (Modalities for the application of Chapter III), Annex VIII (Conventions 
referred to in Article 9), Annex IX (List of products included in the special incentive arrangement for sustainable 
development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2)(b)). 
1094 See Articles 1 paragraph (2), Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme 
of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 10. See also Recital (15), (16), (17) Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, 
stipulated as follows : 
This Regulation provides for the following tariff preferences: 
(a) a general arrangement; 
(b) a special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance; and 
(c) a special arrangement for the least-developed countries. 
1095 For the purposes of this Regulation:  
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arrangements are regulated in Paragraph 1 Article 4. General arrangement criteria are 
based on economic classification, and state income per capita of the World Bank.1096 To 
implement and utilise the GSP facility the beneficiary country needs to prepare 
infrastructures such as administration support, human resources, and trade facilitations. 
However, not all the beneficiary countries are well prepared in such matters. Hence, the 
proposal of GSP regulation is to accommodate an adoption period for eligible beneficiary 
countries and economic operators in order to prepare the infrastructures concerned.1097 
                                                                                                                                                
(a)  ‘GSP’ means the Generalised Scheme of Preferences by which the European Union provides preferential access to 
the market of the European Union through the three separate preference regimes provided for in Article 
1(2)(a),(b) and (c); 
(b)  ‘eligible countries’ means all developing countries as listed in Annex I; 
(c)  ‘GSP beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the general arrangement as listed in Annex II; 
(d) ‘GSP+ beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable 
development and good governance as listed in Annex III; 
(e)  ‘EBA beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for least developed 
countries as listed in Annex IV; 
(f)  ‘Common Customs Tariff duties’ means the duties specified in Part Two of Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2658/87 of 23 July 198716, except those duties established as part of tariff quotas; 
(g)  ‘section’ means any of the sections of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87; 
(h)  ‘Chapter’ means any of the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87; 
(i)  ‘GSP section’ means a section listed in Annex V and established on the basis of sections and Chapters of the Common 
Customs Tariff; 
(j)  ‘preferential market access arrangement’ means preferential access to the European Union market through a trade 
agreement, either provisionally applied or in force, or through autonomous preferences granted by the European 
Union; 
(k) ‘effective implementation’ means the integral implementation of all undertakings and obligations undertaken under 
the relevant conventions, thus ensuring fulfilment of all the principles, objectives and rights guaranteed therein. 
1096 See also Article 3 Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008.   
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 Proposal For A Regulation Of The European Parliament and 
of The Council Applying A Scheme Of Generalised 
Tariff Preferences 
- A beneficiary country shall be removed from the 
scheme when it has been classified by the World 
Bank as a high-income country during three 
consecutive years, and when the value of imports 
for the five largest sections of its imports covered 
by the GSP into the Community represents less 
than 75 % of the total GSP-covered imports from 
that beneficiary country into the Community. 
- When a beneficiary country benefits from a 
preferential trade agreement with the Community 
which covers all the preferences provided for by 
the present scheme to that country, it shall be 
removed from the list of beneficiary countries. 
An eligible country, as listed in Annex I, shall benefit from the 
tariff preferences provided under the general 
arrangement referred to in Article 1(2)(a) unless: 
- It has been classified by the World Bank as a high-income or 
an upper-middle income country during three 
consecutive years immediately preceding the update 
of the list of beneficiary countries. 
- It benefits from a preferential market access arrangement 
which provides the same tariff preferences as the 
scheme, or better, for substantially all trade. 
 
1097 See Articles 5 paragraph (2), Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme 
of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 10. See also Recital (15), (16), (17) Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, 
stipulated as follows : 
By 1 January of each year following the entry into force of this Regulation the Commission shall review Annex II. To 
provide a GSP beneficiary country and economic operators with time for orderly adaptation to the change in the 
country’s status under the scheme: 
(a)   the decision to remove a beneficiary country from the list of GSP beneficiary countries, in accordance with 
paragraph 3 and on the basis of Article 4(1)(a), shall apply as from one year after the date of entry into force 
of the decision; 
(b)  the decision to remove a beneficiary country from the list of GSP beneficiary countries, in accordance with 
paragraph 3 and on the basis of Article 4(1)(b), shall apply as from two years after the date of application of a 
preferential market access arrangement. 
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The criteria to grant special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and 
good governance in the proposal of GSP regulation elaborated more details, as follows:1098 
(a) The beneficiary country must be considered as vulnerable due to a lack of 
diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system. 
(b) The beneficiary country has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VIII and the 
most recent available conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies do not identify a 
serious failure to effectively implement any of these conventions. 
(c) The beneficiary country gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the 
conventions listed in Annex VIII and to ensure their effective implementation. 
(d) The beneficiary country accepts without reservation the reporting requirements 
imposed by each convention and gives a binding undertaking to accept regular 
monitoring and review of its implementation record in accordance with the 
provisions of the conventions listed in Annex VIII. 
(e) The beneficiary country gives a binding undertaking to participate in and cooperate 
with the monitoring procedure referred to in Article 13. 
To obtain facilities of the special incentive of GSP+ the eligible beneficiary countries 
must submit a written request to the Commission by providing “comprehensive information 
regarding the ratification of the conventions and the binding undertakings”.1099 Upon such 
request, the Commission will notify the European Parliament and the Council.1100 The 
decision of whether to grant a special incentive arrangement will be informed to the 
applicant country after the Commission has examined the request.1101 The beneficiary 
country will be excluded from the list of GSP+ if it no longer fulfils the criteria or 
withdraws from any of its binding undertakings of the listed international conventions.1102 
In order to implement the GSP+ scheme the Commission will adopt the delegated act.1103 
The Commission will carry out the mechanism review of GSP+ implementation by 
considering the report from relevant monitoring bodies.1104 In this regard, the beneficiary 
countries have to cooperate with the Commission by providing the necessary information 
related to the implementation of the listed international conventions.1105 Every two years, 
the Commission should present the report before the European Parliament and European 
Council regarding the conclusions or recommendations of any relevant international 
monitoring body of each GSP+ beneficiary country. The report will also contain conclusions 
on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country undertakes the obligation to report and to 
cooperate with international monitoring bodies ensuring the effective implementation of 
the listed international conventions. 
                                                 
1098 See Articles 9 paragraph (1), Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme 
of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 13. 
1099 See Articles 10 paragraph (1) and (2), Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Applying a 
Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, p. 14. 
1100 See Articles 10 paragraph (3), Ibid., p. 14. 
1101 See Articles 10 paragraph (4), Ibid., p. 14. 
1102 See Articles 10 paragraph (5), Ibid., p. 14. 
1103 See Articles 10 paragraph (6) and (8), Articles 11 paragraph (2) Ibid., p. 14. The delegated act will be implemented to 
establish and to amend Annex III in order to add or remove a country to or from the list of GSP+ beneficiary 
countries; to establish rules related to the procedure for granting the special incentive arrangement for sustainable 
development and good governance in particular with respect to deadlines and the submission and processing of 
requests; to amend Annex IX to take into account amendments to the Combined Nomenclature affecting the products 
listed in that Annex. 
1104 See Articles 13 paragraph (1), Ibid., p. 15. 
1105 See Articles 13 paragraph (2), Ibid,,  p. 15. 
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The eligible countries of LDC’s arrangement are based on the classification United 
Nation.1106  The Commission continuing reviews the list of the LDC’s beneficiary 
countries.1107 The temporarily withdrawal on LDC’s arrangement will be applied under 
condition as follows :1108 
(a) Serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the listed conventions as 
condition of LDC’s arrangement. 
(b) Export of goods made by prison labour. 
(c) Serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs n(illicit 
substances or precursors), or failure to comply with international conventions on 
anti-terrorism and money laundering. 
(d) Serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of 
raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have 
not been addressed by the beneficiary country.  
(e) Serious and systematic infringement of the objectives adopted by Regional Fishery 
Organizations or any international arrangements of which the European Union is a 
member concerning the conservation and management of fishery resources.  
Upon temporarily withdrawal, the Commission will monitor and evaluate the 
situation in the beneficiary country concerned for six months from the date of publication 
of the notice from the Official Journal of the EU.1109 With respect to the Commission’s 
findings, the beneficiary country concerned has the right to submit its comments on the 
report.1110 
Cases of fraud, irregularities or systematic failure to comply with or to ensure 
compliance with the rules of origin of the products and its procedures, or failure to provide 
administrative cooperation will lead to the temporarily withdrawal of all or of certain 
products originating from the beneficiary country.1111 However the temporarily 
withdrawal will only be taken if there is sufficient evidence.1112 The period of temporarily 
withdrawal will only be imposed for a period not exceeding six months, thereafter, the 
Commission will decide whether to terminate the temporary withdrawal or to extend the 
period of temporary withdrawal.1113 
In the proposed GSP regulation, the general safeguard clauses are regulated by 
Articles 22-28. Specifically the GSP proposal also provides safeguard clauses regarding the 
textiles, agriculture and fisheries sectors. The general safeguard clauses will be applied 
when imported products entering the Union market at a certain level will cause, or 
threaten to cause, serious difficulties to domestic producers of like or directly competing 
products. In this regard, normal CCT duties on that product will be re-imposed as 
safeguard measures.1114 Like the products under the proposed regulation defined as “a 
product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects, to the product under consideration, or, in 
the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has 
                                                 
1106 See Articles 17 paragraph (1), Ibid.,  p. 17. 
1107 See Articles 17 paragraph (2), Ibid.,  p. 17. 
1108 See Articles 19, Ibid.,  p. 19. 
1109 See Articles 19 paragraph (4) sub paragraph a dan b, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences,  p. 19. 
1110 See Articles 19 paragraph (7), Ibid.,  p. 19. 
1111 See Articles 21 paragraph (1), Ibid.,  p. 20. 
1112 See Articles 21 paragraph (3), Ibid.,  p. 21. 
1113 See Articles 21 paragraph (6), Ibid.,  p. 21. 
1114 See Articles 22 paragraph (1), Ibid.,  p. 22. 
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characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.”1115 The 
proposed regulation sets out parameters regarding how to measure the “deterioration” or 
“serious economic injury” that occurs and causes EU producers to suffer. There are 10 
parameters that will be used by the Commission in the examination of such deterioration. 
The parameters that should be taken into account consist of market share, production, 
stocks, production capacity, bankruptcies, profitability, capacity utilisation, employment, 
imports, and prices.1116 
 
XVII. General overview of New GSP Regulation Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
XVII.a. New beneficiary countries list.  
The new GSP regulation was finally published on 31 October 2012; however, the 
tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements will be applied as of 1 
January 2014.1117 The new GSP regulation reduces the number of beneficiaries from 176 to 
89 on the grounds of enhancing efficiency and focusing more on GSP for the countries most 
in need. This new regulation explicitly divides the developing countries into two groups, 
e.g. more advanced developing countries and developing countries. The more advanced 
developing countries are described as high-income or upper-middle income countries and 
those that have successfully completed the transformation of their centralised market-to-
market economies. Application of “similarly situated” criteria of beneficiary countries that 
are eligible for general arrangement is identified by sharing a common developing need 
with a similar stage of economic development. More advanced developing countries are 
considered as having a different stage of development and do not share the same 
development, trade and financial needs.1118 These advanced economies have successfully 
diversified their exports, have more resources to manage with their economic 
development, and have more access integrated into international trade. The existence of 
more advanced developing countries that enjoy GSP is distressing competition for poorer 
countries, particularly regarding the exports of similar products. In fact, almost 40% of 
preferential exports are dominated by more advanced developing countries. In order to 
avoid overlaps of the preferences granted by the EU, thus, the GSP beneficiaries will be 
excluded from the list if they benefit from another preferential market access arrangement 
with the EU. In this regard, the preferences provide at least the same level of tariff 
preferences as the GSP scheme.1119 Therefore, GSP is more focused on beneficiaries that 
have no other preferential arrangement to penetrate the EU market. 
The beneficiary countries that are excluded from the GSP list are divided into three 
groups:1120 
1. Partners that are no longer eligible for GSP consist of 33 countries and 
territories that already have special market access to the EU or belong to 
developed countries. These countries consist of Anguilla, The Netherlands, 
Antilles, Antarctica, American Samoa, Aruba, Bermuda, Bouvet Island, Cocos 
Islands, Christmas Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Greenland, South Georgia 
                                                 
1115 See Articles 22 paragraph (2), Ibid.,  p. 22. 
1116 See Articles 23, Ibid.,  p. 23. 
1117 Article 43 paragraph 2 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
1118 Recitals 9 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
1119 The EU’s new Generalised Scheme of  Preferences (GSP), The European Commission, October 2012, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/october/tradoc_150028.pdf, last accessed : 12 November 2012, p. 3. 
1120 Regulation (EU) No 978/2012. The EU’s new Generalised Scheme of  Preferences (GSP), The European Commission, 2012, 
Op. Cit., p. 18. Highlights of the EU's New General Scheme of Preferences (GSP), The European Commission. 
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and South Sandwich Islands, Guam, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, British 
Indian Ocean Territory, Cayman Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, Montserrat, 
New Caledonia, Norfolk Island, French Polynesia, St Pierre and Miquelon, Pitcairn, 
Saint Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands, French Southern Territories, Tokelau, 
United States Minor Outlying Islands, Virgin Islands – British, Virgin Islands- US, 
Wallis and Futuna, Mayotte. 
2. There are 34 partners that no longer benefit from GSP because they have been 
granted preferences through other channels, such as bilateral agreements, 
autonomous arrangements, and no longer benefit from GSP. 
Euromed (6) : Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia. 
Cariforum (14)  : Belize, St Kitts and Nevis, Bahamas, Dominican 
Republic, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Jamaica, 
Saint Lucia, Saint-Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Guyana, 
Surinam. 
EPAs Market 
Access 
Regulation (8) 
: Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Namibia, 
Botswana, Swaziland, Fiji. 
Eastern and 
Southern 
Africa (3) 
: Seychelles, Mauritius, Zimbabwe 
Pacific (1)  : Papua New Guinea 
Other (2) : Mexico, South Africa. 
 
3. At least 20 partners that are classified as high income and upper middle-income 
countries by the World Bank are excluded from the new GSP beneficiary list. 
High income countries and territories excluded from the EU GSP beneficiary list 
consist of 8 partners (7 countries and 1 territory), i.e., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Brunei Darussalam, and Macao. 
While, the upper-middle countries consist of 12 partners, that is, Argentina, 
Brazil, Cuba, Uruguay, Venezuela, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Gabon, Libya, 
Malaysia, and Palau. 
Yet, the new GSP regulation provides the possibility to re-introduce these more 
advanced developing countries into the GSP beneficiary list due to some requirements. It is 
stipulated that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and it is 
ensured that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.1121 In this 
regard, if the country situation changes (if it is no longer classified as a high- or middle-
upper income country) it will be included as a GSP beneficiary country.1122 Therefore these 
groups of countries are included into Annex I concerning eligible countries into the 
scheme. In this regard, the re-introduction of these countries into the GSP list is regulated 
by Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012. 
There are 89 beneficiaries that are considered as the most in need countries in the 
new GSP regulation, which consist of 49 LDCs and 40 of these countries are classified as 
low income and lower middle-income countries by the World Bank. LDCs are granted EBA 
arrangement and developing countries are classified by the World Bank as low income and 
lower middle-income countries eligible for general arrangement and GSP+. The tariff 
preferences of Myanmar, one of the LDCs of the ASEAN member states, are being 
                                                 
1121 Recitals 9 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
1122 The EU’s new Generalised Scheme of  Preferences (GSP), The European Commission, 2012, Op. Cit., p. 6. 
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temporarily withdrawn in the new GSP regulation due to serious and systematic violations 
of principles of core international labour conventions.1123 Until the new GSP regulation is 
published, the European Parliament and Council are still considering the Commission’s 
proposal to reinstate this country into the EBA scheme.1124 The list of beneficiary countries 
of the general arrangement is set out in Annex II of the new GSP regulation. While, Annex 
IV of the new GSP regulation contains the list of beneficiary countries for the EBA 
arrangement. For the GSP+, the beneficiary countries who fulfil the eligibility criteria can 
apply to obtain additional benefit of such arrangement. The beneficiary countries listed in 
the current GSP+ must re-apply to obtain special incentives under the new GSP 
regulation.1125 
 
XVII.b. Features of the preferential facilities under the new GSP regulation. 
GSP provides exports facilities for its beneficiary countries through duty reduction, 
zero duty (GSP+), and full duty free and quota free (EBA).1126 The general arrangement is 
regulated under Chapter II (Articles 4-8) of the new GSP regulation. The eligibility criteria 
of the general arrangement are regulated under Article 4 of the regulation. Article 5 
regulates the removal of the beneficiary countries from the general arrangement. The 
preference facilities of the general arrangement are regulated under Article 7. This facility 
provides CCT tariffs suspension for non-sensitive products, except for agricultural 
components. While sensitive products will be entitled to CCT ad valorem duties with 3.5% 
reduction, except for clothes and textiles (Section 11-a and 11-b of Annex V). With regard 
to the CCT, specific duties, other than minimum or maximum duties, on sensitive products 
will be reduced by 30%. In the case of CCT duties on sensitive products that include ad 
valorem duties and specific duties, the specific duties must not be reduced. Article 8 
regulates section graduation of export products of GSP beneficiaries based on the 
threshold standard. Further, the threshold for section graduation is calculated based on the 
percentage of the total value of Union imports of the same products from all GSP 
beneficiary countries. As stipulated in the Annex VI of the new GSP regulation the section 
graduation threshold will be increased from 15% to 17.5%, especially for textile products 
it will be raised from 12.5% to 14.5%.  
GSP+ on the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good 
governance is regulated in Chapter III (Articles 9-16) of the new GSP regulation. Section 
graduation will no longer be applied in the GSP+ of the new regulation. Beneficiary 
countries that fulfil the requirements of GSP+ may submit their formal written applications 
to the Commission. In the new GSP+, the application can be submitted at any time, while 
under the current regulation the application is submitted every 1.5 years. The new GSP 
regulation has maintained the number of core conventions that are similar with the 
current regulation.1127 The requirements to apply the GSP+ facility are regulated by Article 
9 of the new GSP regulation. While, Article 10 regulates conditions to grant GSP+ tariff 
preferences. Annex IX contains products that grant the special incentive arrangement for 
                                                 
1123 Recitals 25 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
1124 The EU’s new Generalised Scheme of  Preferences (GSP), The European Commission, 2012, Op. Cit., p. 19. 
1125 Recitals 13 of the Regulation (EU) No .978/2012. 
1126 See Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Regulation (EU) No 978/2012. The EU’s new Generalised Scheme of  Preferences (GSP), 
The European Commission, 2012, Op. Cit.,  p. 2. 
1127 Recitals 13 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. The EU’s new Generalised Scheme of  Preferences (GSP), The European 
Commission, 2012, Op. Cit.,, p. 8. 
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sustainable development and good governance.1128 Under the GSP+, beneficiary countries 
receive tariff suspension on CCT ad valorem duties and CCT specific duties (except for 
products for which the CCT duties include ad valorem duties).1129  
The GSP+ scheme in the new regulation improves the monitoring mechanism to 
ensure the effective implementation of the principles and rights of the respective 
international conventions.1130 This monitoring is carried out by the Commission with 
scrutiny by the Council and the European Parliament. Monitoring will be performed every 
2 years.1131 The beneficiary countries of GSP+ have to cooperate fully with international 
monitoring bodies without reservation.1132 To maintain the objectivity of monitoring or to 
withdraw processes, supplemented information from other sources would be included.1133 
Temporarily withdrawal of the GSP+ is regulated under Article 15 of the new regulation. 
Special arrangement for the LDCs (EBA) is regulated in Chapter IV (Articles 17-18). 
The EBA arrangement is maintained under the new GSP regulation as an open-ended 
scheme. The EBA provides facilities duty free, and quota free for all products to get access 
into the EU market, with the exception of arms and ammunition. The reduction of the 
number of GSP beneficiaries is expected to be able to enhance export opportunities for 
LDCs.1134 
 
XVII.c. Comitology on the new GSP regulation. 
A powerful institutional reason to change the instrument is the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. This requires the redesigning of the GSP Regulation to reflect the new 
institutional environment, with the reinforced role of the European Parliament in trade 
policy.1135 
Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012 adopts the new institutional framework of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, which enhances the role of the European Parliament in trade policy. The new EU 
GSP scheme is a dynamic instrument equipped with some features to control the 
implementation of the regulation, such as the graduation mechanism, product coverage, 
change in the list of GPS+ beneficiaries countries, safeguard mechanism, and temporary 
withdrawals. Successful GSP utilisation by beneficiary countries will be assessed 
periodically by the Commission. The assessment results may affect graduation of 
beneficiaries or temporary withdrawal and all other elements of the regulation, especially 
the annexes of the regulation. Therefore, the Commission is conferred power through 
delegated acts rather than ordinary legislative procedures to improve efficiency and to 
save time.  
                                                 
1128 Article 11 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. Annex IX — List of products included in the special incentive 
arrangement for sustainable development and good government.  
1129 Recitals 12 and Article 12 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012.  
1130 Article 13 paragraph 1 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
1131 See Recital 14 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012: 
“[…] every two years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the 
status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting 
obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice […].” 
1132 Article 13 paragraph 2 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. See also Article 9 paragraph 1 (e) of the Regulation No. 
978/2012 : 
“[…] it accepts without reservation the reporting requirements imposed by each convention and gives a binding 
undertaking to accept regular monitoring and review of its implementation record in accordance with the provisions 
of the relevant conventions […]” 
1133 See Recital 15 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012: 
1134 The EU’s new Generalised Scheme of  Preferences (GSP), The European Commission, 2012, Op. Cit., p. 9. 
1135 The EU’s new Generalised Scheme of  Preferences (GSP), The European Commission, 2012, Op. Cit., p. 2. 
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Annex VII - GSP Regulation (amended by ordinary 
legislative procedure). 
 
Recitals. 
Chapter I General provisions. 
Annex I List of eligible countries. 
Chapter II GSP. 
Annex II GSP beneficiary list. 
Annex V GSP product list. 
 
Annex VI Graduation thresholds. 
 
Chapter III GSP+. 
 
Annex III GSP+ beneficiary list. 
Annex VIII List of conventions. 
Annex IX GSP+ product list. 
Annex VII Vulnerability thresholds. 
 
Chapter IV EBA. 
 
Annex IV EBA beneficiary list. 
Chapter V Temporary withdrawals. 
 
Decision to amend annex II, III or IV to temporary 
withdraw or to reinstate GSP, GSP+ or EBA 
preferences. 
Decision to amend the decision to temporary 
withdraw preferences. 
 
Chapter VI Safeguards. 
 
Chapter VII Common provision. 
 
Final provisions. 
Regulation on procedures: 
-application for GSP+ 
-withdrawal/reinstatement of GSP+ 
-withdrawal/reinstatement of GSP, GSP+, 
EBA 
Decision to establish or review a list of GSP 
sections that are suspended from GSP 
preferences. 
Decision to initiate or terminate GSP+ 
temporary withdrawal procedure. 
Decision to amend annex III to temporary withdraw or 
to reinstate GSP+ preferences. 
 
Decision to amend the decision to temporary withdraw 
preferences. 
 
Decision on rules for implementing the provisions on 
imports of sugar products. 
 
Decision to initiate or terminate GSP,GSP+ or EBA 
temporary withdrawal procedure for reasons of Art19(1). 
 
Decision to temporary withdraw the preferences, prolong 
or terminate temporary withdrawal in the case of fraud. 
 
Decision to immediately reintroduce Common Customs 
Tariff duties for a period of up to 12 months in the 
exceptional circumstances. 
Decision to reintroduce Common Customs Tariff 
duties due to findings of safeguard investigation. 
Decision to terminate safeguard 
investigation. 
 
Decision to apply surveillance mechanism in 
agriculture. 
 
Decision to suspend preferences due to serious 
disturbance to EU markets, in particular to outermost. 
 
Decision to remove preferences in textile and 
agriculture sector. 
 
Decision to amend Annex IV to add or remove a 
country from the list of EBA beneficiary countries. 
 
Decision to amend Annex III to add or remove a 
country from the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries. 
 
Decision to amend Annex VI to change graduation 
thresholds. 
 
Decision to amend Annex V to change GSP product list. 
Decision to amend Annex II to add or remove a 
country from the list of GSP beneficiary countries. 
 
Decision to amend Annex I to add or remove a country 
from the list of eligible countries. 
 
Decisions amending the Annexes. 
Decision to amend Annex VII to change vulnerability 
thresholds. 
 
Decision to amend Annex IX to change GSP+ product 
list. 
 
Implementing Acts Delegated Acts 
Figure 50. The Comitology Procedures in the New GSP Regulation. 
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These new features of the institutional framework are needed to deliver speedy 
decisions, which are more business friendly due to the predictable and stable principles 
of the scheme guaranteed. Following the basic GSP regulation the EU will issue some 
legal acts, which include the list of graduated sectors, procedures regarding GSP+ entry, 
withdrawals and safeguards, and adjustment of the GSP beneficiary due to the 
graduation mechanism.1136 
The implementation mechanism of the delegated acts in the new GSP regulation 
is regulated under Articles 36 and 27. Delegated acts would be implemented in thirteen 
articles of the new GSP regulation, i.e. Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 
22.1137 However, the delegation power may be revoked at any time by the European 
Parliament or by the Council.1138 Delegated acts enter into force only if no objection has 
been expressed by either the European Parliament or the Council within a period of 
two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, 
before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both 
informed the Commission that they will not object.1139 To ensure uniform conditions for 
the implementation of the new GSP regulation the Commission is attributed with 
implementing powers in accordance with Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011.1140 The new 
GSP regulation has adopted the new features of Comitology in the Article 39 and is 
elaborated as follows: 
“[…] The advisory procedure should be used for the adoption of implementing acts 
on suspension from the tariff preferences of certain GSP sections in respect of 
beneficiary countries and on the initiation of a temporary withdrawal procedure, 
taking into account the nature and impact of those acts […]”.1141 
“[…] The examination procedure should be used for the adoption of implementing 
acts on safeguard investigations and on suspension of the preferential arrangements 
where imports may cause serious disturbance to Union markets […]”.1142 
“[…] In order to ensure the integrity and orderly functioning of the scheme, the 
Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly 
justified cases relating to temporary withdrawals due to non-compliance with 
customs-related procedures and obligations, imperative grounds of urgency so 
require […]”.1143 
Overall, the preferences scheme in the new GSP regulation is not very different, 
yet, it enhances some of its modalities due to the change in the institutional framework 
of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1136 Recitals 26 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012 : 
“[…]the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in 
respect of amendments to the Annexes to this Regulation and temporary withdrawals of tariff preferences due 
to failure to adhere to the principles of sustainable development and good governance, as well as procedural 
rules regarding the submission of applications for the tariff preferences granted under the special incentive 
arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the conduct of a temporary withdrawal and 
safeguard investigations in order to establish uniform and detailed technical arrangements […]”. 
1137 Article 36 paragraph 2 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
1138 Article 36 paragraph 3 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
1139 Article 36 paragraph 5 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
1140 See Recitals 28 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
1141 See Recitals 29 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
1142 See Recitals 30 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
1143 See Recitals 31 of the Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012. 
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Chapter IV 
The role of EU Generalised System of Preferences 
to discover trade relationships between ASEAN-EU 
 
The EU’s Generalised System of Preferences is commonly recognised as having 
been the only trade preferences system operating among the European Union and 
ASEAN member states for 40 years. As such, it seems that Southeast Asian countries 
have been placed at a low-priority level within the framework of EU foreign trade 
policies.  Such circumstances were influenced by the political and economic context, 
due to the regional dominant power of the US and Japan in the Southeast Asian market. 
The establishment of AFTA and membership enlargement has increased ASEAN 
bargaining power in international trade. Due to the various levels of economic 
developments, ASEAN member states are granted different arrangements in the EU GSP 
scheme. Most ASEAN member states are able to utilise EU GSP at a utilisation rate of up 
to 75%. In the end of 2012, the EU issued a new GSP basic regulation, which is intended 
to be in effect by January 2014. There are some crucial changes in the new regulation in 
order to improve the GSP scheme, compared with the previous one. First, the 
application of an open-ended system review, replacing the annual review, is aimed to 
develop a more stable and predictable GSP scheme. Second, GSP would be given based 
on the considerations of the country most in need. Consequently, based on such policy, 
the EU would cut down the number of beneficiary countries from the current 176 to 89 
countries. Such reduction has the purpose of increasing the efficiency of GSP utilisation.  
 
I.  ASEAN: The long road to becoming an economic community. 
The history of Southeast Asia in international trade can be traced back to the 5th 
century AD when the Strait of Malacca started to become one of the major international 
sea-lanes that connected the India Ocean and the Southeast coast of Sumatra. The 
earlier role of the Strait of Malacca was the major channel to expand networks of long 
distance trade between India, China, and Southeast Asia.1 Southeast Asia has a strategic 
geographic position2 as the main road of world trade, which  has significant advantages 
to the economic development of the region. After the arrival of European traders in 
Asia, the Strait of Malacca was monopolised under the era of colonisation.3  
                                                 
1 See Leifer, Michael, International Straits of the World : Malacca Singapore and Indonesia, Edited by Mangone, Gerard J., 
Volume II, Sijthoff & Noordhof International Publisher BV Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, 1978, p. 6. 
2 “[…] For instance the existences of Malacca Strait which located between the Malaysia Peninsula and the Indonesia 
island of Sumatra is deemed as the most important maritime passage in the world, especially for commercial 
shipping. Malacca strait is the main shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, linking 
major Asian economies such as India, China, Japan and South Korea. The 900-km long (550 miles) Malacca Strait 
is vital channel of Asia with the Middle East, Africa and Europe, carrying about 40 percent of the world's trade. 
More than 50,000 merchant ships ply the waterway every year. Since the 1950’s the straits have become of vital 
importance to the carriage of ever increasing amounts of fuel oil between the Persian Gulf and Japan in tankers 
known as Very large Crude Carriers (VLCCs). Indeed, more than eighty percent of Japan’s oil supply was 
conveyed in such tankers in 1977 and a considerable portion of them passed through the Strait of Malacca and 
Singapore. Oil also been shipped through the straits from the East Sumatra terminals of Dumai and Sungai 
Pakning […]”. (See Leifer, Michael, Op. Cit., p. 52. See also Malacca Strait is a strategic 'chokepoint', available at : 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/03/04/idINIndia-46652220100304, last accessed : 14 October 2011.) 
3 “[…] The conquest of Malacca, in 1641, had given the VOC (the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie) a great advantage. 
Dutch East Indiamen could safely use the strait, and thus Malacca became rendezvous in the network of the 
Company Shipping. The conquest had made the Dutch a powerful nation in the region, but they were by no 
means the only influential nations, and their hopes of monopolizing the Malayan tin trade were never fulfilled. 
Instead of monopolization and exclusion of foreign trade, the VOC could try to develop Malacca as a centre for 
Asian trade for Indian merchants or even for Dutch free traders. Dutch applied duties and customs system in 
Malacca strait was complex. VOC has absolute monopoly, for instance imports of tin and pepper were exempt 
from duty, but these products had to be sold exclusively to the VOC. Import of gold and silver were taxed at 10% 
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Due to its important role in international trade, from the 17th to 18th century, the 
Strait of Malacca was a rivalry object between Britain and the Netherlands. Leifer notes 
that in the dynamics of contemporary international relations of the region of Southeast 
Asia, the strait has become an important issue for the great maritime powers. The US 
and USSR are competed in the economic and politic sector to infuse their influence on 
Southeast Asia. In addition, Japan and Korea also have interests in the Strait of Malacca. 
East Asian countries import oil from the Middle East through the Strait of Malacca. The 
Strait of Malacca is the route of international commerce for many countries in the 
world.4  
Due to its strategic location, many traders from all over the world have crossed 
the Southeast Asia region. According to Lim, it has formed ethnic diversity as traders 
have migrated and settled across the region.5 Colonisation in Southeast Asia has 
continued the legacy of internationalisation by linking conquered land with its 
conqueror country. Most Southeast Asian countries were colonised by European 
powers, for instance Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei by Britain; Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia by France; Indonesia by the Netherlands; the Philippines by Spain 
and then the US. Independence came to some by the late 1940s (Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Myanmar) and to most of the other countries by the 1950s (Cambodia, 
Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore). The last was Brunei Darussalam that finally got its 
independence in 1984.6  
In the early postcolonial era, Southeast Asia was surrounded by internal conflicts, 
civil wars, and territorial disputes between countries. This raised political tension in 
the region.  Communism spread largely in Indochina, such as Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam. The communist system was seen as an ideological threat to other Southeast 
Asian countries that had developed the market economic model backed by the US.7 The 
US had the important role of re-shaping economic development in Southeast Asia after 
the Second World War. The key interest of the US was to restrain communism from 
spreading across Southeast Asia. It was fully committed through “high levels of aid and 
military spending”. This included the establishment of an open international economy 
with rapid growth and trade expansion.8 
In the Cold War era, the US and USSR were in competition regarding taking 
control of Southeast Asia. In the mid-1950s, the USSR provided aid to Southeast Asia. At 
the same time, the US also started to distribute regular economic and military 
assistance missions to the region. For instance, in order to prevent communism from 
                                                                                                                                          
of the value, but were free in case of delivery to the company. Ships under European flag were asked to call at 
Malacca, but if the masters of these ships, despite urgent requests, refused to do so, then they could sail 
unmolested. Portuguese merchants were obliged to pay a toll for their passage, while Spaniards were not 
allowed to pass at all. Asian ships were forced to go to Malacca for control the passes but if Asian merchants did 
not want to carry on any trade at Malacca, they could sail through the strait without making any payment […]”. 
(Gaastra, Femme S., Competition or collaboration? Relations between the Dutch East India Company and Indian 
Merchants around 1680: Chaudhury, Sushil, and Morineau, Michel, Studies in Modern Capitalism : Merchants 
Companies and Trade (Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1999, p. 195-
197) 
4 See Leifer, Michael, 1978, Op. Cit., p. VIII. 
5 In the past Malacca strait was passed by traders from Arabia, Africa, Persia, and Southern Indian for trading with 
Chinese. Such trading environment has brought so much influenced to the Southeast Asia especially on the 
politic, economic, culture and religion, which colorized the landscape of the regions until today. 
6 See Lim (1995); M. Dent, Christopher., The European Union and East Asia : An Economic Relationships, Routledge, Taylor 
& Francis Group, London and New York, 2002, p. 37. 
7 See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 37. 
8 See Bowie, Alasdair., and Unger, Danny., The Politics of Open Economies : Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, The Press Syndicate of The University of Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 
2002, p. 25. 
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spreading in Indochina, by 1954 the US had increased its aid to 800 million US dollars, 
mainly in the form of military supplies.9 Unfortunately, the majority of US aid and 
institutional effort towards Southeast Asia focused on “security institutions”, such as 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. In fact, the US was not so eager to encourage 
the establishment of “regional economic institutions”, which were by far the most 
needed by Southeast Asian countries to promote regional cooperation in economic 
development, such as boosting regional intra- and extra-trade, reducing transaction 
costs, improving technology transfers and  increasing infrastructure development.10 
In order to secure US economic and security interest through open development 
policies, the US campaigned the doctrine of economic liberalism. This doctrine directly 
influenced decision-makers in developing countries and the US backed them up 
through the provision of capital, technology and managerial skills, and access to the US 
market.11 After the US defeated Japan in the Second World War it became known as the 
“regional dominant power”. Its control was directly linked to Southeast Asia's markets 
and raw materials. The US also played a key role in the nurturing of the international 
economic institutions that facilitated the expansion of an open international economy. 
According to Bowie and Unger, “the economic choices of Southeast Asian decision-makers 
was supposed to be seen, in the first instance, as responses to the security concerns and 
geopolitical considerations of the United States and their regional consequences”.12 
In the 1960s, territorial disputes rose into critical situation due to the 
confrontation between Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Followed Singapore 
separation from the Malaysian Federation in August 1965. ASEAN established initially 
is to prevent the wider spread of communism within Southeast Asia. In other words, 
ASEAN used  as a septum to divide Southeast Asia based on ideology. At the beginning 
of its establishment ASEAN used to maintain political stability in the south east asian 
region. 13 
The ASEAN Chapter was signed on August 8, 1967, in Bangkok.  US as the 
dominant regional power in the region,  welcomed ASEAN establishment. Japan with 
ambivalence attitudes gradually supporting the establishment ASEAN.14 In 1977, 
Japanese officials attended the first meeting of the ASEAN-Japan forum, at the same 
year, Prime Minister Fukuda attended the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur.15 Japan 
established some programs to foster ASEAN economic development, these includes, 
providing $ 1 billion USD in loans for ASEAN regional projects, driving ASEAN export 
earning, and re-examine its tariff policies conformed with Tokyo Round negotiation.16 
ASEAN develops without any direct participation from Japan or the United States. 17 
ASEAN have five initial member states consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, but along with its development some Southeast 
Asia countries are joining into the membership. Brunei Darussalam is the sixth member 
                                                 
9 See Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell, The Changing Face of Southeast Asia, Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1966, pp. 368-369; Bowie, Alasdair., and Unger, Danny., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 30. 
10 See Bowie, Alasdair., and Unger, Danny., 2002, Op. Cit., pp. 31-32. 
11 See Ibid., p. 26. 
12 See Richard Stubbs, Geopolitics and the Political Economy of Southeast Asia, International Journal 44 (1989), pp. 519-
520; Bowie, Alasdair., and Unger, Danny., 2002, Loc. Cit., p. 26. 
13 See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 37. 
14 See Masahide Shibusawa, Japan and the Asian Pacific Region, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984, pp. 101-3; Bowie, 
Alasdair., and Unger, Danny., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 32. 
15 See Ibid., pp. 104; Ibid., p. 32. 
16 See Sueo Sudo, "The Road to Becoming a Regional Leader: Japanese Attempts in Southeast Asia, 1975-1980," Pacific 
Affairs 61 (1988), 27-5; Bowie, Alasdair., and Unger, Danny., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 32. 
17 See Bowie, Alasdair., and Unger, Danny., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 32. 
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states, joined on 8 January, 1984. Followed by Vietnam joined on 28 July, 1995, Laos 
and Myanmar joined on 23 July, 1997, and Cambodia joined on April 30, 1999. ASEAN 
main purpose is promoting intra-regional trade by reducing tariffs between member 
states. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the share of intra-ASEAN trade in the total trade 
value of its member states was between 12% and 15%.18  
Facing globalization, many regions are integrating their economy into regional 
organization, such as PTA and FTA. In Cold War era, regional organization is designed 
to create and to keep politic stability and security of the region. Regionalism is 
developed to have a better bargaining position with other regional group such as the 
EU, NAFTA and East Asian countries. As regional organisation ASEAN has two main 
objectives,  i.e., : 
1. to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in 
the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in 
order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of 
Southeast Asian nations, and 
2. to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and 
the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to 
the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
According to Bangkok Declaration ASEAN is represented the collective will of the 
Southeast Asia nations to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation, and 
through joint efforts and sacrifices to secure the blessings of peace, freedom, and 
prosperity for their peoples and their posterity.19 
ASEAN never intended used as an instrument of integration with supranational 
authority. ASEAN used as an instrument to manage intra-regional conflicts, and to 
maintain and to strengthen national sovereignty. 20 Raison d’être of ASEAN is explicitly 
stated in the founding declaration, that is “[…] to ensure their stability and security from 
external interference . . . in order to preserve their national identities […]”. This explains 
why from the very beginning ASEAN choose the model of “state-to-state cooperation 
where diplomacy used as the main instrument”. For that reason, regional economic 
integration is not mentioned as ASEAN objective in the founding declaration. 21 In this 
regard, Aekaputra stated that Bangkok Declaration “[…] is simply a political instrument 
that designed to show the political good intention of the signatory states to cooperate 
more closely with one another mainly in the fields of economic, political and social 
cooperation […]”. 22 
ASEAN early economic development based on “export-oriented principal”. It is 
started in the mid-1960s, when Singapore’s implemented “export-oriented 
industrialisation (EOI)” and it had demonstrated positive development. Singapore 
gained successful in implementing EOI,  which making them becomes the role model 
for other ASEAN member states. In the late 1960s, Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines 
are following by implementing EOI strategy. While, Indonesia started to implement EOI 
in the early 1980s. At that time, USA is a prime export market for the ASEAN member 
states, and Japan served as an essential source of imports. 23 
                                                 
18 See http://www.aseansec.org. See also Welfens, Paul J.J., Ryan, Cillian., Chirathivat, Suthipand., and Knipping, Franz., 
EU-ASEAN : Facing Economic Globalisation, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009, pp. 76-77. 
19 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et.al., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 137. 
20 See Balme, Richard.,  and Bridges, Brian., Europe – Asia Relations : Building Multilateralism, Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, 2008, p. 84. 
21 See Ibid., p. 91. 
22 See Herrmann, Christoph., and Terhechte, Jorg Philipp., European Yearbook of 2011, Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht 
London New York, 2011, p. 376. 
23 See Ariff and Hill 1985; M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 38. 
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During the first two decades following its establishment in 1967, development of 
ASEAN as a regional organisation was considered to be very slow. Few “concrete 
integrative efforts” were performed and only limited economic cooperation was noted 
among the ASEAN states. According to Balme and Brian, in order to expand the market 
and invite foreign investment, ASEAN started to open up to international economic 
cooperation, for instance with the EU. ASEAN market access expansions increased 
export revenues and rapidly stimulated economic growth. In the late 1980s, the ASEAN 
socioeconomic landscape changed. Significant improvement in interdependency factors 
between ASEAN member states encouraged the establishment of closer economic 
cooperation.  In 1992, the path of closer economic integration was embodied through 
the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). The AFTA was 
considered as a milestone in the perception of shifting economic development from a 
national to a regional approach.24 
According to Nischalke, the model of ASEAN integration is “particularly ASEAN”, 
also known as the “ASEAN Way”. Model integration of the ASEAN Way is based on 
respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful resolution of 
conflicts, and non-use of force. The ASEAN Way is a way to describe integration in 
ASEAN and to distinguish it from EU integration. Since two mechanisms exist in EU 
integration, consisting of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. 
Supranationalism or the executive in the organisational level does not exist in ASEAN, 
such as the EU Commission. There is no delegation of power establishing laws and 
regulations to one specific body in ASEAN. As previously mentioned, ASEAN was never 
designed as an instrument of integration with a supranational authority. 
According to Tay and Estanislao, there is no need for ASEAN to establish a 
supranational authority similar to the EU Commission, but what it needs is to develop 
“[…] sufficient authority to regional mechanisms and institutions to enable it to review 
and coordinate between the different countries […]”.25 ASEAN consists of various, large 
ethnic groups, languages and cultures. However, such characteristic has been identified 
as having a two sided effect that can be taken as an advantage and a challenge to 
strengthen integration. Even though the ASEAN group consists of a diverse collection of 
nation states26, there are also noteworthy similarities within the members’ 
assemblage.27  
A unique feature of the ASEAN Way is the adoption of the Southeast Asian 
society’s local wisdom of elements and customary norms in organisational practice. 
Such feature is reflected through “privilege informalism and non-confrontational 
behaviour” that are implemented within the concept of musyawarah (consultation) and 
mufakat (consensus).28 However, features of informality, flexibility, and pragmatism of 
ASEAN are considered as a weakness to go further for deeper integration. For instance, 
the ASEAN Way has failed to handle the economic crisis that hit Southeast Asia in 1997 
and it has drowned some ASEAN member states in prolonged and severe economic 
crisis. The crisis has challenged the norms and procedures of regional cooperation. 
Thus, it leads to the serious re-thinking of institutionalisation and the development of 
                                                 
24 See Balme, Richard.,  and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., p. 91. 
25 See Tay and Estanislao, 2001, p. 19; Balme, Richard.,  and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., p. 92. 
26 See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 37. 
27 For instance Singapore and Brunei are both rich ‘microstates’ which more techno-industrial base compares to other 
member states. Most members are resource-rich with many being oil and gas producers since the late 1970s 
(Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand). 
28 See Nischalke, 2000, Op. Cit., p. 90-93; Balme, Richard.,  and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., p. 91. 
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new regional mechanisms to go for further integration development.29 Therefore, after 
the Asian financial crisis, ASEAN started to look to the EU experience on integration.30 
According to Tay and Estanislao, “[…] the long-standing EU–ASEAN relations did not 
contribute directly to a policy shift in approaches to regional cooperation by the ASEAN 
countries, EU provides itself if not as a model, at least as a subject for study and for 
lessons-drawing […]”. The example of the adoption of EU norms and organisational 
works to ASEAN strengthens the ASEAN Secretariat.31 
The EU’s concrete contribution to encourage the strengthening of the institutional 
capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat was given through aid and assistance in the “ASEAN 
Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS)”. In the Regional Indicative 
Programme for ASEAN, the Commission stated that APRIS addressed the need for 
closer economic integration between ASEAN countries after the Asian financial crisis 
struck.32 APRIS gives facilitation to the ASEAN Secretariat to obtain flexible and 
responsive technical assistance from the EU. It includes the know-how and shared-
experience on aspects of regional cooperation that are relevant to ASEAN’s integration, 
primarily focusing on strategic planning.33 For instance, the delivery of policy papers, 
work programmes, institutional capacity building, and training.34 It cannot be denied 
that the ASEAN-EU relationship has significantly influenced the evolution of ASEAN 
integration.35 
Back to the earlier development of ASEAN, according to Welfens et al., the share 
of intra-ASEAN trade from the total trade of member states amounts to 12% to 15%. 
This indicates that trade among the ASEAN member states in its earliest era was not so 
significant. Initially, ASEAN economic cooperation schemes focused on the increase of 
intra trade.36 In 1977, ASEAN introduced the first Preferential Trading Agreement 
(PTA)37 that contractually accorded tariff preferences in the form of tariff reductions 
for trade among ASEAN economies. After ten years, at the 3rd ASEAN Summit in Manila, 
the enhancement of the PTA Programme was adopted to increase intra-ASEAN trade.38 
During the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore, two Agreements were signed, i.e., the 
Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPTS) for the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area and Framework Agreements on Enhancing ASEAN Economic 
Cooperation.39  
In 2005, in order to cope with international economic competition, ASEAN 
established AFTA based on the CEPTS agreement. In 2003, almost 95% of 
manufactured goods and services had been included in AFTA.40 In the investment 
sector, the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) was established in order to induce more 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the region.41 To support traders or business 
actors in how to solve problems related to trade and investment, the ASEAN 
Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues (ACT) was established.  The 
                                                 
29 See Ibid., p. 90-93; Ibid., p. 91. 
30 See Balme, Richard., and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., pp. 91-92. 
31 See Tay and Estanislao, 2001, p. 19; Balme, Richard.,  and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Loc. Cit., p. 92. 
32 See Balme, Richard.,  and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., p. 92. 
33 See Ibid., p. 92. 
34 See Ibid., p. 92. 
35 See Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
36 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 137. 
37 See ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements signed in Manila on 24 February 1977. 
38 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 137. 
39 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit., pp. 76-77. See  also Balme, Richard.,  and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., p. 86. 
40 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 48. 
41 See Ibid., p. 48. 
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objective of ACT is to support the creation of a business friendly environment in 
ASEAN.  Through ACT, traders and business actors have the opportunity, within the 
long bureaucracy chain, to get speedy settlements regarding cross border operational 
problems related to the implementation of ASEAN agreements, especially in trade and 
investment. The legal basis of the establishment of ACT is the Bali Concord II 
Declaration and the recommendations of the High Level Task Force. ACT is an ICT 
based service that provides online problem solving for business actors. The problem 
settlements of ACT are considered as a non-legal and non-binding mechanism. Business 
actors or traders who have encountered operational problems related to a given 
member state’s implementation of the ASEAN agreement are invited to highlight such 
problems through the ACT.42 
According to Welfens et Al., ASEAN-EU economic cooperation has produced a 
positive effect marked by significant improvement in trade volumes and investment 
grades in both regions. Further new areas of cooperation need to be explored in order 
to strengthen the relationship between ASEAN and EU. The establishment of AFTA and 
AIA aims to provide a secure and conducive environment for EU direct investments.43 
The CEPTS44 contains removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers between member 
states in order to promote greater economic efficiency, productivity, and 
competitiveness. AFTA has the strategic objective to increase the ASEAN region’s 
competitive advantage as a single production unit. Therefore, the final goal of AFTA is 
to improve the competitiveness of ASEAN goods and products. It has been noted that 
three years after the launch of AFTA, the share of intra-regional trade in ASEAN’s total 
trade volume rose from 20% to 25%.45  
In 1993, the exports among ASEAN countries increased from $43.26 billion USD 
to $80 billion USD. In 1996, ASEAN average annual growth is 28.3%.46 The CEPTS 
agreement identified as a factor in lowering intra-regional tariffs. In 2003,  ASEAN 
adopted the Protocol to Amend the CEPT-AFTA Agreement for the Elimination of Import 
Duties to encourage closer integration and realizing ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC),. This Protocol contains the commitment of ASEAN-6 to eliminate tariffs on 60% 
of their products that listed in the CEPT Inclusion List (IL).  
“[…] more than 99% of the products in the CEPT Inclusion List of ASEAN-6 had been 
brought down to the 0–5% tariff range. The average tariff for ASEAN-6 under the 
CEPT Scheme was cut from 12.76% in 1993 to its current level of 1.51%. ASEAN’s 
newer members or ASEAN-4, consists of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, 
are not far behind in the implementation of their CEPT commitments. Almost 80% 
of their products are included in their respective CEPT IL. Of these items, about 66% 
already have tariffs within the 0–5% band. Vietnam is expected to bring down 
tariffs on products in the IL to no more than 5% duties by 2006, while Laos and 
Myanmar are to follow in 2008 and Cambodia in 2010 […]”47 
In 1995, the 5th ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok adopted the Agenda for Greater 
Economic Integration, which included acceleration timetable for the launch of AFTA 
                                                 
42 See ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues (ACT), available at : 
https://act.aseansec.org/act/login/about.do, last accessed : 16 January 2012. 
43 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit., pp. 48-49. 
44 "[…] CEPTmeans the Common Effective Preferential Tariff, and it is an agreed effective tariff, preferential to ASEAN, to 
be applied to goods originating from ASEAN Member States, and which have been identified for inclusion in the 
CEPT Scheme […]”. See Article 1 of the Agreement on the CEPTS for the AFTA, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/12375.htm, last accessed : 14 October 2011. 
45 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit.,  p. 86. 
46 See Ibid.,  p. 138. 
47 See Ibid.,   pp. 77-78. 
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from a 15 years timeframe into 10 years. In 1997, the ASEAN leaders have adopted the 
ASEAN Vision 2020 that called for ASEAN Partnership in dynamic development. It is 
purposed to promote closer economic integration in the region. ASEAN Vision 2020 
also purposed to create stable, prosperous, and highly competitive economic region. 
ASEAN Vision 2020 is branded by free flows of goods, services, investments, and 
capitals. The deeper integration expected could stimulate economic development to 
reduce poverty and narrowing socio-economic disparities.48 
Framework Agreements on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation has the 
objective to strengthen and enhance ASEAN economic co-operation, covering five 
major areas of cooperation that consist of cooperation in trade, cooperation in industry, 
minerals, and energy, cooperation in finance and banking, cooperation in food, 
agriculture, and forestry, and cooperation in transportation and communications. It 
also includes other areas of cooperation related to economics, such as intellectual 
property rights, tourism promotion49, and human resources development.50 
In the external cooperation, the Framework Agreement has laid down “extra-
ASEAN economic cooperation” to encourage member states to establish and/or 
strengthen cooperation with other countries, including regional and international 
organisations, for instance the ASEAN-EU relationship.51  
The shifting of EU external policies towards Asia was reflected through the EU 
Commission’s Communications, issued in July 1994, with titles “Towards a New Asia 
Strategy (NAS)” and “Creating a New Dynamic in EU–ASEAN relations”.52  Welfens et al., 
note this as “the cornerstone of the new partnership that Europe would seek in Asia”.53 
Unfortunately none of those polices were ever implemented into real policies until the 
enlargement of the ASEAN memberships. Thus, it has slowly changed the perspectives 
of the EU in its relationship with ASEAN.54  
ASEAN enlargement has made the EU consider building further cooperation. In 
fact, ASEAN has growth as the “key player”55 in the region of Southeast Asia. It has a 
large population reaching almost 500 million people and covers 10 countries in 
Southeast Asia. It is assumed that the EU sees ASEAN as a large market to be 
penetrated. Shifting of EU policy was proved in the 11th AEMM, which was held in 
Karlsruhe, Germany, in September 1994. ASEAN became the upper hand in determining 
the topics, styles, and procedures of the meeting.56 ASEAN enlargement and EU 
enlargement increased the importance of the ASEAN–EU trade relationship.57  
                                                 
48 See Ibid.,   pp. 76-77. 
49 “[…] tourists from ASEAN countries themselves have been representing an increasingly important share of tourism in 
the region. Of the 28.6 million tourist arrivals in ASEAN during 1996, 11.2 million or almost 40% came from 
within ASEAN itself […]”. (See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 138.) 
50 See Balme, Richard.,  and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., pp. 87-88. 
51 See Framework Agreements on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/12374.htm, last accessed : 14 October 2011. See also Article 5 of the Agreement. 
52 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit.,  p. 49. 
53 See Ibid., p. 49. 
54 See Balme, Richard.,  and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., pp. 87-88. 
55 “[…] ASEAN Integration which covers 10 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei 
Darussalam, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos Peoples Democratic Republic) integrating a region which 
has a population of about 549 million, a total area of 4.5 million square kilometres, a combined gross domestic 
product of US $800 billion, and a total trade of US $1047 billion (as of 2004). This will have a great impact on the 
region, not only economically but with respect to other aspects as well […]”. (See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, 
Op. Cit., pp. 138-139) 
56 See Rueland, J. (1996). “The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Towards a New Euro-Aseam Relationship. Universität Rostick 
(Rostock Information zu Politik und Verwaltung.5); Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 49. 
57 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 49. 
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In September 2001 the Commission presented a communication, regarding 
“Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships”, where ASEAN was 
identified as the major economic and political partner of the EU. The Commission’s 
Communication on “A New Partnership with Southeast Asia”, presented in July 2003 
reiterated the previous communication.58 Since 1977, the dialogue relations between 
ASEAN and EU were formalised in the 10th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) 
attended by the Council of Ministers of the EEC, the Permanent Representative of the 
EEC countries and the EEC Commission. Hence, both regions agreed to establish a 
formal cooperation and relationship.59 
 
II. ASEAN Economic Community60. 
The ASEAN Vision 202061 aims to encourage closer economic integration of the 
region. In 1998, the Hanoi Plan of Action was adopted. It was designed as the first 
series of plans of action leading up to the realisation of the ASEAN vision.62 
Liberalisation of trade and investment are believed to have driven the realisation of 
AEC. Regional economic integration is being pursued through the development of 
trans-ASEAN infrastructures such as transportation, ICT, and energy.  
The Trans-ASEAN transportation network consists of major inter-state highway 
and railway networks, principal ports, and sea-lanes for maritime traffic, inland 
waterway transport, and major civil aviation links. ASEAN has been promoting 
interoperability and interconnectivity of the national telecommunications equipment 
and services. In the area of energy, ASEAN is developing trans-ASEAN energy networks 
that consist of the ASEAN Power Grid and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Projects.63  
An initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) was launched in November 2000. IAI 
gives direction and focus to  collective efforts, narrowing the development gap among 
ASEAN member states and between ASEAN and other parts of the world. Currently, IAI 
covers some priority areas such as infrastructure, human resources development, ICT, 
capacity building for regional economic integration, energy, investment climate, 
tourism, poverty reduction, and improvement of quality of life.64 
ASEAN is an important regional actor and driving force for trade liberalisation in 
Southeast Asia. In this regard, ASEAN should be able to integrate itself into the global 
economy. It is undeniable that ASEAN operates in the global environment with 
interdependent markets and globalised industries. Hence, it is very important for 
ASEAN to “look beyond the borders of AEC” by taking into account external rules and 
regulations in developing trade policies.65  
  Integration acceleration into the global market would enable ASEAN traders and 
business actors to compete in the international environment. Integration into the 
global market would also enhance the capability and capacity of ASEAN as part of the 
                                                 
58 See http://www.delkhm.cec.eu.int/eu/asean/relations.htm; Joint Co-Chairmen’s Statement Of The 15th ASEAN–EU 
Ministerial Meeting Jakarta, 10.3.2005, available at : http://www.aseansec.org/17355.htm; Welfens, Paul J.J., et. 
al., 2009, Op. Cit.,  p. 70. 
59 See Overview of ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations, available at : http://www.asean.org/23216.htm, last accessed 14 
October 2011. 
60 ASEAN Community consists of three pillars, ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN 
Socio-Cultural Community. 
61 One Vision, One Identity and One Community. 
62 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit.,  p. 138. 
63 See Ibid., p. 138. 
64 See Ibid., p. 138. 
65 See Ministers Discuss Implementation Progress of AEC Blueprint, Jakarta, 7 May 2011, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/26240.htm, last accessed 17 October 2011. 
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global supply chain and attract more foreign investment in the internal market. The 
ASEAN external economic relationship is based on the “ASEAN Centrality” approach, 
where a system has been established to enhance coordination in a regional and 
multilateral sphere. The 18th ASEAN Summit Jakarta emphasised the importance of 
ASEAN’s centrality in developing the architecture of regional cooperation with external 
partners. ASEAN’s centrality also reiterated basic  principles  and  modalities  and the 
commitment  of  the  East  Asia Summit (EAS)  as  outlined  in  the  Kuala  Lumpur  
Declaration  2005.66 The Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr Surin Pitsuwan, stated that 
“ASEAN needs to be fully integrated to remain competitive, strong and attractive to 
ensure ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture.”67 
The success story of the EU in establishing a single market and single currency 
(Economic and Monetary Union) has motivated ASEAN to go further into economic 
integration. During the ASEAN Summit in Bali 2003, all ASEAN member states agreed to 
establish what is known as the “ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)”. According to the 
ASEAN Vision 2020, it is deemed as the realisation and final goal of economic 
integration. AEC is designed to achieve the ASEAN single market and production base 
by managing the diversity of the region into business opportunities. The AEC blueprint 
aims to make ASEAN more dynamic and stronger in terms of global competition.68  
The ASEAN Community consists of three pillars, that is, the ASEAN Economic 
Community, the ASEAN Security Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. 
These three pillars must work in harmony with each other as a single unity. The 38th 
ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM) 2006 agreed to develop a single and 
coherent blueprint for advancing the AEC by identifying the characteristics69 and 
elements of the AEC by 2015 consistent with the Bali Concord II  with  clear  targets  
and  timelines  for  implementation  of  various  measures  with  pre-agreed flexibilities 
to accommodate the interests of all ASEAN member states.  In addition, the Ministers 
have agreed to recommend the ASEAN leaders to accelerate ASEAN economic 
integration from 2020 to 2015.70  
Declaration on the AEC Blueprint was signed at the 13th ASEAN Summit 2007 that 
took place in Singapore.71 The AEC structure building should be based on an “[…] open, 
outward-looking, inclusive, and market driven economy that is consistent with 
multilateral rules and adherence to rules based systems for effective compliance and 
implementation of economic commitments […]”. 72  
The ASEAN single market and production base include five core elements, i.e., 
free flow of goods, free flow of services, free flow of investment, freer flow of capital, 
and free flow of skilled labour.  It also includes two other important components that 
consist of the priority of the integration sectors, and food, agriculture and forestry.73  
                                                 
66 See The ASEAN Secretariat, Chair’s Statement of the 18th ASEAN Summit Jakarta, “ASEAN Community in a Global 
Community of Nations” 7 - 8 May 2011, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/Statement_18th_ASEAN_Summit.pdf, last accessed 17 October 2011. 
67 See Ministers Discuss Implementation Progress of AEC Blueprint, Jakarta, 7 May 2011, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/26240.htm, last accessed 17 October 2011. 
68 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit.,  p. 138. 
69 “[…] Key characteristics and elements of AEC consists of  : (a) a single market and production base, (b) a highly 
competitive  economic  region,  (c)  a  region  of  equitable  economic  development,  and  (d)  a  region fully 
integrated  into  the  global  economy […]”.   
70 See Joint Media Statement of the Thirty-Eight ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM) Meeting Kuala Lumpur, 22 August 
2006, available at : http://www.asean.org/18692.htm, last accessed 17 October 2011. 
71 See Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, available at : http://www.asean.org/21081.htm, last 
accessed 17 October 2011. 
72 See Ibid, 
73 See Ibid. 
 257 
In order to facilitate free movement of business actors, and skilled labour, it is 
important to set up cooperation in human resources development and capacity 
building, and in the recognition of professional qualifications. Concerning free flow in 
the area of investment, capital, goods, and services there is the need for a “[…] closer 
consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies; trade financing measures; 
enhanced infrastructure  and  communications  connectivity;  development  of  electronic  
transactions  through e-ASEAN;  integrating  industries  across  the  region  to  promote  
regional  sourcing;  and  enhancing private sector involvement for the building of the AEC 
[…]”.74 
In the framework of the AEC, external trade of ASEAN is considered as the 
significant factor driving economic growth. Of the other five elements of AEC, free flow 
of goods is a principal instrument in the establishment of a single market and 
production base unit. Single markets for goods serve as a facilitation to develop 
production networks and improve ASEAN’s capacity as a global production centre.  
Honourable Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
emphasised the importance for ASEAN to continue engaging and expanding linkages 
with major trading partners in his opening speech. In addition, the Ministers also 
agreed that the free flow of goods is considered as the main key of the AEC. The free 
flow of goods can be achieved through trade facilitation development to transaction 
cost and the cost of doing business in ASEAN.75 
To ensure the free flow of goods within AEC, agreements and policies must be 
established to remove the barriers of free flow and facilitation to make sure such flow 
is established. The most important component to establish the free flow of goods is the 
removal of tariff barriers and non-tariffs barriers to trade. ASEAN has achieved 
significant progress in removing tariff barriers through AFTA.76 Elimination of tariffs 
from all  intra-ASEAN  goods  has to comply with  the  schedules  and  commitments  set  
out  in  the  CEPTS-AFTA  Agreement  and  other  relevant Agreements/Protocols.  
NTBs play an important role since there are many obstacles that inhibit the free 
flow of goods. NTBs often inhibit trade flow such as excessive and long chain 
formalities and procedures, long bureaucracy chains, corruption, and lack of facilities 
and infrastructures. Trade facilitation measures are provided to eliminate NTBs and to 
facilitate the free flow of goods. Trade facilitation measures make up some essential 
components, such as integrating  customs  procedures,  establishing  the ASEAN Single 
Window (ASW), continuously enhancing the CEPTS rules of origin including its 
operational certification procedures, and harmonising standards and compliance 
procedures. The focus of ASEAN to realise AEC in 2015 is the full elimination of NTBs.77  
Establishing regional cooperation on the trade facilitation mechanism is deemed 
as a strategic issue under the framework of AEC. The objective of trade facilitation is to 
                                                 
74 See Ibid. 
75 See Joint Media Statement of the Thirty-Eight ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM) Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 22 August 
2006, available at : http://www.asean.org/18692.htm, last accessed : 17 October 2011. 
76 “[…] ASEAN Member Countries have made significant progress in the lowering of intra-regional tariffs through the 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for AFTA. More than 99 percent of the products in the 
CEPT Inclusion List (IL) of ASEAN-6, comprising Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand, have been brought down to the 0-5 percent tariff range. ASEAN’s newer members,  
consists of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam, are not far behind in the implementation of their CEPT 
commitments with almost 80 percent of their products having been moved into their respective CEPT ILS. […]” 
(See ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Council, available at : http://www.asean.org/19585.htm, last accessed 17 
October 2011). 
77 The schedule of removing all NTBs comply with the agreed Work Programme on NonTariff Barriers (NTBs) 
elimination, whereas, for ASEAN-5 by 2010, for the Philippines by 2012, and for ASEAN-4 with flexibilities by 
2015 to 2018. 
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reduce transaction costs in ASEAN to improve export competitiveness and accelerated 
ASEAN integration into a single market for goods, services and investments and a single 
production base. Generally, trade facilitation covers simplification, harmonisation, and 
standardisation of trade and customs, procedures and formalities related to the flow of 
information. The focal point of trade facilitation is to promote the transparency and 
visibility of all actions and interventions that are carried out by all stakeholders within 
international trade transactions.  
In the framework of AEC, trade facilitations are divided into two major 
components. The first component is related to physical infrastructures such as 
cooperation on transportations and infrastructure development. Transportation 
infrastructures include maritime, land, and air transport to ensure the free flow of 
goods, services, and capital.78 ASEAN transportation infrastructures are designed to 
provide links and connectivity to facilitate distribution between ASEAN with Northeast 
and South Asian countries. Providing efficient, secure, and integrated transport 
networks in ASEAN is crucial to manage the full potency of AFTA. Moreover, such 
infrastructures could improve the attractiveness of the region as a single production, 
tourism and investment destination and reduce development gaps. The second 
component is integrated under ASW, which covers ICT infrastructures, e-customs, e-
trade or e-commerce, and automation rules of origin. The establishment of ASW is 
considered as the stepping-stone to accelerate the realisation of AEC by 2015. ASW 
systems stress the use of ICT applications for efficiency in trade facilitation. ASW is also 
defined as a comprehensive system involving private and public stakeholders from a 
wide range of areas to cooperate by creating an environment that enhances trade 
efficiency and competitiveness.  
ASEAN is the third largest trading partner of the EU. Most ASEAN member states 
are listed as EU GSP beneficiary countries, except for Singapore that has been 
graduated and Myanmar that has been suspended due to its non-compliance with 
human rights. Under GSP preferential rules of origin, ASEAN has been given a facility 
known as cumulative origin. Cumulative origin is considered as an opportunity to 
improve GSP utilisation among ASEAN countries. It is carried out through production 
networking and enables comparative advantages of ASEAN member states to improve 
production quality, efficiency and to generate job opportunities. In other words, the 
cumulative origin could facilitate trade and investment  among  ASEAN  member states,  
promote  a  regional  production  network,  encourage  growth of Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs), reduce economic development gaps, and promote the use of the 
AFTA CEPTS. Hence, it is important for ASEAN to enact the rules of origin (ROO) that 
are responsive to the dynamic changes of global production processes. ASEAN 
continuously reforms and enhances its CEPT ROO to respond to such changes in the 
regional production processes. Including making necessary adjustments such as the 
introduction of advance rulings and improvements to the ROO, simplifying  the  
operational  certification  procedures  for  the  CEPT  ROO, introducing electronic  
processing  of  certificates  of  origin,  and  harmonising national procedures as much as 
possible. 
ASEAN customs integration is an essential component to increase the collection of 
revenues and reduce transaction costs for traders. ASEAN has established a “strategic 
plan of customs development”, which was implemented from 2005 to 2010. This 
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programme had seven goals consisting of  a) integration of customs structures; b) 
modernisation of tariff classification; c) customs valuation  and  origin  determination 
and establishment of  ASEAN  e-Customs; d) enhancement of customs clearance; e) 
improvement of  human  resources  development; f) promoted  partnership  with  relevant 
international  organisations to reduce the  development  gaps  in  customs;  and g) 
adoption of  risk  management techniques and audit-based control for trade facilitation. 
Custom integration is carried out through the modernisation of custom techniques, 
simplification, and harmonisation of procedures and formalities aligned with 
international standards and best practices. 
Secure and connected ICT infrastructures must be provided urgently in order to 
sustain the region’s economic growth and competitiveness.  ICT networks need to be 
developed at the national level, and then integrated into the regional infrastructure 
system. It is crucial to facilitate interconnectivity and technical interoperability among 
ICT systems within ASEAN. Some effort has been made at the national and regional 
level under the National Single Window (NSW) and ASW. In order to promote e-
commerce, it is vital to lay down policies and legal infrastructures for electronic 
commerce, by enabling on-line trade in  goods (e-commerce)  within  ASEAN  through  
the  implementation  of  the  e-ASEAN  Framework Agreement and based on common 
reference frameworks. It is also important to encourage internet use for electronic 
transactions, payments, and settlements among traders and business actors. 
Establishing Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade is equally important to 
attain greater transparency, improved quality of conformity assessment and active 
participation of the private sector.  Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade are 
defined as “[…] a system of  standards,  quality  assurance, accreditation,  and  
measurement  [that is]  crucial  to  promote  greater  efficiency  and  enhance  cost 
effectiveness of production of intra-regional imports/exports […]”. Standards, technical 
regulations and conformity assessment procedures will be harmonised through the 
implementation of the ASEAN Policy Guidelines on Standards and Conformance. 
In the 4th AEC Council Meeting August 2010, which took place in Da Nang, 
Vietnam, the Ministers noted that 80% of deliverables under the AEC Blueprint for 
2008-2009 have been achieved. There are some significant progresses related to the 
initiative programme that supports the realisation of AEC, such as the ASEAN Trade in 
Goods Agreement79, and finalises the ASEAN connectivity master plan.80  
The ASEAN connectivity master plan covers the Master Plan on ASEAN 
Connectivity81, ASEAN Strategic Transport Plan (ASTP) 2011-2015, Information 
Communications Technology (ICT) Master Plan 2011-201582, and ASEAN Tourism 
Strategic Plan (ATSP) 2011-2015. It involves cross-sectorial coordination to enhance 
physical and institutional connectivity through cost reductions of investment and 
international trade in goods and services.83 During the 5th AEC Council Meeting May 
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2011, which took place in Jakarta, agreements were made to achieve further AEC 
progress, greater concerns on the implementation of the AEC pillar and equitable 
economic development. It was particularly stressed to encourage the growth of SMEs 
and to reduce the development gap in ASEAN.84 The 18th ASEAN Summit in Jakarta 
reiterated that SMEs should benefit from AEC. Therefore, it is necessary to facilitate a 
free market system that encourages competition. In this regard, ASEAN SMEs must 
have better access to technology, and the market.85 
 
III. ASEAN-EU trade relationship. 
III. a. An international political economic theory. 
The trade relationship between ASEAN and the EU has been influenced by so 
many factors. In the 1970s-1980s both regions went through a stagnation period in 
their trade relationship. After the Asian economic crisis struck, the trade relationship 
between the two regions became more intimate. Economic and political factors were 
considered as the main factors shaping the relations between both regions. From the 
geo-politic perspective, Welfens et al. studied the factors influencing the development 
of trade relations between ASEAN and the EU. It is important to note that during the 
nine years after its establishment, “[…] the ASEAN relation with the EU has not developed 
more than it has […]”.86  
Initially, ASEAN-EU cooperation was purely related to economic interest.87 The 
main motivation was rooted in fears of Japanese economic domination. In the late 
1960s Japanese products were flooding into Thailand and Indonesia, while at the same 
time Japanese investments were dominating all ASEAN states. This raised anti-Japanese 
campaigns throughout the region. Governments of the ASEAN states responded to such 
situation by exploring options that might reduce their economic dependence on Japan. 
In this regard, the ASEAN started “considering” the EU as a potential partner. In 
November 1971 ASEAN representatives began to consider the possibility of closer 
relations. In February 1972 the European Commissioner, represented by Ralf 
Dahrendorf, visited the region to examine the prospects for European investment.88  
In 1975, a special coordination committee of ASEAN was formed with the 
purpose of creating new economic links with the EU. The committee would meet 
alternately in the EU and ASEAN. The committee had the responsibility to examine all 
aspects of economic cooperation between the two groups. This was followed by the 
creation of the ASEAN–EU joint study group with the task to foster talks on economic 
cooperation and trade. In 1978, a conference on ministerial cooperation was held in 
Brussels and representatives from both sides were present. Unfortunately, no 
significant decisions arose from this. However, there were exchanges of views on issues 
such as capital transfer and technical assistance.89 
According to Grilli and Welfens, there are three reasons why the EU needed to 
build cooperation with ASEAN. First, the entry of the United Kingdom into the EU made 
it essential to provide alternative arrangements for states such as Malaysia and 
                                                 
84 See Ministers Discuss Implementation Progress of AEC Blueprint, Jakarta, 7 May 2011, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/26240.htm, last accessed 17 October 2011. 
85 See The ASEAN Secretariat, Chair’s Statement of the 18th ASEAN Summit Jakarta, “ASEAN Community in a Global 
Community of Nations” 7 - 8 May 2011, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/Statement_18th_ASEAN_Summit.pdf, last accessed 17 October 2011. 
86 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit.,  p. 68. 
87 See Balme, Richard.,  and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., p. 84. 
88 See Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit.,  p. 68. 
89 See Kesavan, K. V. (1981). Japan, and the EEC. In K. V. Lall & H. S. Chopra (Eds.), The EEC and the third world. New 
Jersey: Humanities Press; Welfens, Paul J.J., et. al., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 68. 
 261 
Singapore that had lost Commonwealth preferences. The EU saw Southeast Asia as 
former colonies and new-potential markets. Second, US evacuation from Indochina 
following its failure in the Vietnam War left ASEAN countries vulnerable to external 
threats from the new potential regional hegemonic power, such as communism of 
North Vietnam. In fact, some EU countries did have commercial interest in the region. 
Particularly, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had strong investment interests 
in ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Hence, the EU needed 
to keep its interest in Southeast Asia through some aids to support the economic 
development of the region.90  
In the area of security and politics, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was 
established at the Post-Ministerial Conference. It was held immediately after the annual 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meetings. It functioned as a forum of dialogue to strengthen 
ASEAN’s strategic position  as the key player in the Asian Region.91 After being hit by 
economic crisis, ASEAN rose up and gained its confidence to build its reputation as the 
strategic regional organisation. It was known as the period of recovery for ASEAN 
economics. To prevent economic and political disruptions within the region, ASEAN 
tended to use cooperation and informal approaches rather than institutions and rules.92 
Some scholars have studied the relationship between ASEAN and the EU in 
different perspectives. Referring to Hudec, it is difficult to separate economic and legal 
issues in GSP policy, since it was established to accommodate legal equality in 
inequalities of economic development. In respect of the issues discussed in this 
research, which cover international trade issues on EU GSP, we used the “international 
political economy” perspective. This goes back to the notion of GSP as the “gift” or 
“grant” from the preference-granting country to the beneficiary country in which the 
policy of the GSP scheme is considered as an autonomous right. ASEAN member states 
comprise developing countries where most are beneficiary countries of EU GSP. Except 
Singapore that has been graduated from the scheme since 1997, together with Hong 
Kong. The international political economic perspective is the suitable approach to 
analyse the relation of EU-ASEAN in the context of international trade. Because both of 
these entities have been recognised as international organisations that have their own 
characteristic in international relations. At first we should define what international 
political economy is. According to Frieden and Lake (1995:1), international political 
economy is: 
“[…] the interaction of economics and politics in the world arena, where the economy 
can be defined as the system of producing, distributing, and using wealth and politics 
as the set of institutions and rules by which social and economic interactions are 
governed […].”93 
In this regard we have seen that GSP was established based on the political and 
economic relationship between developed countries and developing countries in which 
both parties have different political interests, different economic development, but are 
interdependent on one another to enhance international trade liberalisation. According 
to Christopher, there are three main theories of international political economy that are 
used to study the ASEAN-EU relationship, consisting of “Neo-realism, Neo-liberalism and 
Marxism”.  
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III. a.1. The application of neo-realism theory in the EU-ASEAN relationship. 
Neo-realism derives from the realism theory that was developed by “Thucydides 
and Machiavelli”. In the perspective of realism theory, “nation-states” are considered as 
the only important actors in international relations while the other actors are 
considered as subordinates. According to realism theory, anarchy is something that 
usually occurs in international relations since there is no supra authority or “global 
governing authority” that influences states to act in a certain way when establishing 
their relations with another state. States are free to decide their international policy 
and their international relations. Neo-realism believes that the anarchic structure of the 
international system as a whole could lead to inevitable competition between states. 
Naturally, every state would struggle to have an advanced position and status in the 
international community. Some states might bind themselves into alliances to attain 
certain goals. However, in some cases, such alliances would not be stable and would not 
be permanent due to the different interests of member states.94 Therefore, neo-realism 
argues, “[…] the balance of power between states can change quite rapidly with the 
frequent shift in interstate alliances […]”.95 
Neo-realism believes that the central power of the international economic system 
could influence state behaviour.  In conclusion, neo-realism concerns states and 
systemic structure, where advanced economics of a state can improve the status of 
states in the international community.96 The more advanced a state in its economic 
development the more significant its role and status within the international 
community. 
In the “anarchic” international relationship between states, hegemonic issues will 
be present. Hegemony prevails between states to increase their economic development 
through market expansion overseas. The trade liberalisation system forces the states to 
comply with international rules. There are certain international actors that have an 
important role in the establishment of an international system and rules should be 
applied by member states, for instance the WTO.97  
On the topic of hegemonic roles in international trade, Robert Pahre wrote a book 
with the title “Leading Questions: How Hegemony Affects the International Political 
Economy”. According to his book, the hegemony theory has a crucial role and can be 
applied across a wide scope of theoretical perspectives, from Realism to Marxism.98 
According to realists, a hegemonic persuades other states to create an open 
international economy, even in a world of power-seeking states that find themselves in 
an anarchic international system.99 Marxists perceive hegemony as a recurring feature 
of the world-system by which the capitalist class at the core of the world economy 
exploits both its own workers and the peoples of other countries through its control of 
international finance, money, trade, and ideological production.100 While according to 
the liberal view, the hegemony is considered as a guarantor of international 
cooperation and as a state that can help other states to solve their problems through 
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coordinated collective action.101 To understand the relationship between international 
trade policy and hegemony theory, it usually begins by identifying the existence of a 
single dominant state or hegemonic power. The hegemonic state due to its political, 
economic, and military power would make it possible to provide many services for the 
international economy, for example, guaranteeing freedom of the seas, encouraging 
trade cooperation, and managing the world’s monetary system.102 The hegemonic 
power is also seen as a driving force to encourage open trade policy. 
In the conceptual relationship between ASEAN-EU, the dynamic change of world 
hegemony shifted EU policy towards ASEAN. In the 1970s US hegemony strongly 
influenced ASEAN. The EU did not want to compete with US interests over ASEAN, 
which might have disturbed US hegemonic stability.103 US hegemony in ASEAN was due 
to its commitment to provide an open market for developing country products. It also 
became the means to keep US domination over ASEAN.104 
As the dominant regional power in Asia in the post Second World War, US 
shaping constellation of economic and politic on the region. Some strategies are made 
by the “dominant state” to influence the development process of countries in the 
region. First, it is carried out by reducing transaction costs in order to create wider 
international environment and generate opportunities of economic growth. Expansion 
of market access to the dominant power (developed countries) deemed could stimulate 
the growth and increased gains from trade.105 Second, using political power to 
encourage government of the countries in the region implementing public policies 
aligns with the dominant power, which is aimed to stimulate rapid economic growth.  
The dominant power may employ ideological tool, or use the demonstration effect of its 
economy to encourage pro-growth policies. Third, using the tool of direct influence that 
involving trade, the provision of capital, transfers of technology, technical assistant, 
capacity building, and expansion of market access.106 
In 1990s, the hegemonic of the Southeast Asia region shifted from politic to 
economic. It is starting the gold era for ASEAN member states develop their economy 
before the hit of 1997 economic crisis. ASEAN growth to be one of the EU major trading 
partners and shifting the pattern of dependency relationship into interdependency 
relationship. 107 
In the neo-realism theory, relationship between ASEAN and EU is seen as an 
economic relations between two regions, or regional groups of states. As a regional 
organization, EU has more advanced organizational organs and deeper integration, 
which implemented through the Union’s competences and EMU system. The 
supranational level, in this regard, the EU Commission represent Union’s interest in the 
external trade relation under CCP. 108  
After gained their independency, ASEAN member states continuously produce 
efforts to develop theirs’ industrializations, to build the nation's confidence, and to 
improve their status in the international community. In order to accelerate the 
economic development during post war these new states encourage themselves to 
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build international relationship with developed countries.109 On the other hand, the EU 
that consists of developed countries, have to compete with US and Japan as the post 
war economic power and strong industrial countries. Neo-realists argued the similarity 
of interest to deal with industrial rivalry increase the alliance endurance of regional 
organization.110 
In the context of the ASEAN and EU relationship, neo-realists argued that the 
internal structures of each region had influenced their external relationships. First, 
neo-realists argued that the EU’s international agenda under CCP was seen as a 
manifestation of inter-state bargaining within the Union. It is argued that the more 
powerful member states would significantly influence the policymaking and decisions 
in the Union. In other words, EU CCP was often influenced by specific national interest 
of powerful member states.111 Second, according to Regelsberger, post-colonial ties 
significantly influenced the differences of foreign policy interests of EU member states 
in Southeast Asia.112 On the other hand, the variance of national interests within ASEAN 
also explained why consensus on matters relating to the EU was often vague.113 
Furthermore, in the neo-realist perspective ASEAN is identified as a regional 
organisation that has many weaknesses. This has made its bargaining position in trade 
diplomacy less powerful. Since there are no compromises of national sovereignty in 
ASEAN to establish supranationalism like in the EU, thus, it gives greater space for 
nation-state objectives to be pursued.  Such organisational conception is considered 
counterproductive to achieve common interests of the group because there will be a 
fragmented policy. The common interest is needed for the group to gain welfare.  Thus, 
uniform policy is necessary to ensure that the common interest is attained properly. In 
fact, to implement uniform policy a condition is required where economic development 
disparities are not too wide. While ASEAN member states are in the process of 
narrowing such disparities, therefore, ASEAN still needs more time and learning to 
adjust and reach such level.114 
Due to such organisational structure, this could explain ASEAN failures to impose 
greater collective pressure upon the EU, especially regarding trade policy. According to 
Indorf, in the early 1980s “[…] the complexity of their organisations, the lack of 
procedural mobility, and the stagnating effects of diverse national standpoints […]” in 
general hampered the ASEAN-EU relationship. Along with the dynamic change of the 
international trading system, the organisational behaviour tended to change in order to 
meet the economic demand.115 
 
III. a. 2. The application of neo-liberalism theory in the EU-ASEAN relationship. 
The neo-liberalism theory stems from the classic liberal theory that is based on 
the “notion of individual self-determination and utility-maximising rationality”. In the 
later development it has contributed to the existence of laissez-faire principles of free 
trade and comparative advantage. Both of these principles are the basis of market 
economy where the government should not interfere with the market except when 
there is a threat to public interest.116  
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Neo-liberalists have placed the individual as the most important actor in the 
international economic systems. In this term, individual actors usually refer to a 
company or firm. Therefore, neo-liberalists are more focused on inter-company 
competition rather that inter-state competition. Based on laissez-faire principles of free 
trade, neo-liberalists support trade without borders by placing the superiority of 
markets over the states.117  
Neo-liberalism takes into account the significant role of Non-State Actors (NSA) in 
international economic relations. In this term, NSAs are trans-national actors where 
their existences were produced from the globalisation system. Trans-national actors 
usually refer to the representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This 
includes industry associations, officials from supranational or international agencies, or 
business executives employed by multinational Companies (MNCs).118 
In the context of the ASEAN–EU relationship, neo-liberalism has emphasised the 
importance of NSA in the economic relationship, especially in the era of the 1990s 
when the rapid expansion of EU-ASEAN economic exchanges turned a dependency 
relationship into an interdependency relationship. In the period of diplomatic deadlock, 
business representatives and other trans-national, NSAs bore the burden of greater 
responsibility to maintain ASEAN-EU economic relations. However, both parties were 
criticised for their failures in not involving NSAs effectively, particularly business 
representatives, to promote the formalisation of the ASEAN-EU economic 
relationship.119  
Interconnected issues relate to trade that also influences the ASEAN-EU economic 
relationship. Those issues have broadened the EU-ASEAN economic agenda to include 
technology, the environment, human resources development, labour standards, and 
other issues related to trade, investment, and financial assistance. In the area of trade, 
the EU gives support to ASEAN in the establishment of trade facilitation through APRIS 
I and II with the purpose to increase trade flows between ASEAN and the EU.120 On the 
other hand, inevitably the “value-system friction” has perpetually become part of the 
interface in the EU-ASEAN relationship. In this regard, most ASEAN states apparently 
distrust the policies of EU to include non-trade conditions such as environmental, 
human rights issues and social clauses in the GSP scheme.121 
 
 
III. a. 3. The application of the Marxist doctrine in the EU-ASEAN relationship. 
The Marxist doctrine was developed in the nineteenth-century by political 
economist Karl Marx. The basic theoretical position of Marxism is to divide the 
dominant actors’ class in the international political economy. Therefore, the Marxist 
doctrine contends that international economic relations are essentially “conflictual”. 
Marxism recognises that states, societies and various NSAs operate as part of the world 
capitalist system. The Marxist doctrine argues that the notion of inter-class friction 
occurs within a capital and labour relationship, where capitalists exploit and suppress 
their labour in order to maximise the benefits of their firm. According to Marxism, 
hierarchy in the international economic system is determined by the patterns of 
production and exchange is established by multinational corporation (MNC). The 
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Marxist doctrine also emphasises the economic objectives as the main key in the 
agenda of foreign policy of the states.122 
Marxism stresses the relationship between the expansion of internationalised 
capital interests and imperialism. Imperialism occurs from the exploitation of labour-
intensive countries by their capital-intensive counterparts. In the past, in order to 
protect the trade interests of their indigenous firms the states colonised other 
countries. Inter-state competition also occurred between capitalist countries to control 
the colonial territories. The post colonialism era brought a new imperialism where 
“trans-national class conflict” took place, for instance competition between MNC to 
obtain global market shares.123 The new-imperialism practices also covered 
multinational Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in which MNC extended their control 
over factors of production in other countries.124 According to Frobel et al., MNC used 
their market power to play off workforces against each other within international 
production networks in their endeavour to drive down labour costs and maximise 
economic rents. For instance, MNC fragmented their production in some countries in 
order to maximise their firm profit with low labour cost. Thus leading to competition 
between workforces from developed and developing country locations where MNC 
exploit them for their own advantage.125 Therefore, the Marxists doctrine puts strong 
emphasis on the dependency theory to explain the persisting gap between developed 
and most developing countries. Capital, technology, finance, and trade are considered 
as dependent factors that sustain the economic relationship between industrialised 
regions and under-developed regions. The dominant capitalist supports such 
relationship pattern126 in order to maintain the status quo.127 
New imperialism has an influence on the ASEAN-EU economic relationship, with 
many EU companies establishing their MNC in ASEAN. For instance, Malaysia and 
Singapore are strongly dependent on EU FDI flows. EU governments are concerned 
with protecting the foreign investment interests of their indigenous MNC in those 
countries.128 
The EU MNC has a significant influence in determining the role of ASEAN 
economy. The dependency factor of developing countries to developed country has 
contributed to this matter. Over the last three decades, ASEAN has continued to depend 
highly on European companies as important sources of imports, investment, finance, 
technology, and capital.129 However, the ASEAN industry revival that started in the 
1980s130 migrated such dependency relationship into an interdependency relationship. 
ASEAN has evolved from the recipient state to a potential EU trading partner. With 
respect to the EU GSP scheme, Marxists criticise the motives of the non-trade 
conditionality application, for instance new environmental and social clauses and the 
graduation mechanism. Marxists argue that less developed ASEAN member states 
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would have difficulty complying with such conditions.131 Such conditionality will not 
significantly contribute to the economic development of the less developed country.  
 
III.b. A legal and historical review of the ASEAN-EU trade relationship. 
The first direct commercial linkages between Europe and Southeast Asia date 
back to the fifteenth century when the European maritime powers started their 
eastward expeditions. Then due to economic and trade interests, a series of colonial 
relationships were developed that lasted until after the Second World War. Over this 
period, European firms dominated many aspects of Southeast Asia’s economy.132  
Before the establishment of ASEAN, the relationship between Europe and Asia 
were embodied as a state-to-state relation, or mother state and former colony, and 
trade ventures.133 The first Europeans who came to Asia were Portuguese. They came 
as traders for political, religious, strategic, and economic motives. After the routes to 
the new Asia were founded, other European countries started to come to Asia for 
similar reasons such as the British, French, Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese. When they 
first came to Asia, the motivation of the Europeans was to trade and to find new market 
and production resources. However, the need to strengthen political and economic 
power in order to compete with other European states turned this into an era of 
colonisation. For instance, the Dutch came to Indonesia and started establishing 
Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) in 1602, which had been backed up by the 
Dutch Kingdom. Based on the permission of the Dutch Kingdom, VOC was given 
absolute monopoly to colonise Indonesia.  
In the late 1940s some Asian countries obtained their independence, for instance 
the UK renounced its sovereign over Burma in 1947, India in 1948, Singapore in 1956, 
Malaysia in 1957, and Hong Kong in 1997. While Indonesia gained independence from 
the Netherlands in 1945.134 According to Sung-Hoon Park and Heung-Chong Kim, the 
relationship between Asia and Europe is “ambivalent”. First, the two continents have 
maintained a long-standing relationship in trade since Marco Polo “discovered” Asia. 
Second, some Asian countries are former colonies of European states. However, history 
has increased Asia’s ignorance and distrust of Europe.135 In the post-Second World War 
period, Asia’s trade largely went to the US and Japan. 
In the 1990s, the relationship between Asia and Europe was largely shaped by 
bilateral relations, country-to-country negotiations. It caused a low degree of 
congruence and weak focus from the European perspective.136 In fact, Asia needed 
Europe to avoid “absolute dependency” on the US and Japan. Asia also needed to expand 
its market access to the western world.137 
Establishment of ASEAN has transformed the relationship Southeast Asian 
countries and the EU, from state to state relation into region to region relation. Yeo Lay 
Hwee, defined the relationship of ASEAN – EU “as one of the oldest group-to-group 
relationships”. From the perspective of ASEAN, trade relationship with the EU is aimed 
to achieve greater market access and price stabilization scheme for ASEAN’s primary 
commodities. While from the EU perspective, ASEAN is an important sources for raw 
                                                 
131 See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., pp. 74-75. 
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134 See Balme, Richard., and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Loc. Cit., pp. 2-3. 
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History and New Developments; Balme, Richard., and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., p. 66. 
136 See Ibid., p. 66. 
137 See Balme, Richard., and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., p. 28. 
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materials, beside the hidden political interest. In this point, ASEAN is a peaceful non-
communist area and potential economic partner. 138 
The Bangkok Declaration 1967 is the umbrella to establish ASEAN external 
relationship with another regional group, where it is stipulated that the purpose of the 
association is “[…] to maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing 
international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all 
avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves […]”. The EU is advanced role 
model for the regional integration, which successfully developed Economic and 
Monetary Union system.139 ASEAN external’s relationship’s with EU primarily focused 
to boost trade and investment between two regions. The cornerstone of the ASEAN 
international relations is the Bali Economic Minister meeting in 1976, which laid down 
the common approaches to international problems. 140 
The relationship between ASEAN and the EU begun in 1972. It is started with 
informal dialogue between ASEAN ministers and the Vice-President and Commissioner 
of the European Commission. Dialogue is focused on trade and market access issues.141 
The EU is ASEAN the first regional partner dialogue. 142 Dynamic changes of economic 
and political situation extending dialogue to political area and functional 
cooperation.143 These issues are uniting two regions that have different economic 
development. 
The relationship between ASEAN and EU has been evolved during four decades 
and it has been influenced by so many factors such as economic, political, and security. 
This evolution is divided into four stages of period. According to Welfens et.al, first 
stage is taken from the period 1972 to 1980, which so-called as exploration of 
cooperation. Second stage is taken from period 1980 to 1991, namely consolidation 
periods. Third stage is taken from period 1991 to 2001, which identified as unstable 
situations due to security problems, international conflict, and economic crisis.144 
Fourth stage is associated with re-discovery and re-building relationship along with the 
dynamic change of global situations including Eurozone crisis. 145 It has to be noted that 
during more than forty-four years ASEAN never intended to be an instrument of 
integration with supranational authority. 146 
Three informal meetings were held between the EU Commission and ASEAN 
between 1972-1974.. The first meeting was held in Brussels on 16th June 1972, the 
second was held in Bangkok on 5th-6th September 1973, and the third meetings was 
held in Jakarta on 24-25 September 1974. As stated in the  “Joint Statement the Informal 
Meeting of ASEAN Ministers and Vice-President and Commissioner of the EC Commission, 
1974”, the third meetings was more focused on some trade topics. These topics are 
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covering issues on trade promotion and regional integration projects, the world 
economic situation, ASEAN development, the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN), 
and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).147  
The third informal meeting stressed the importance of effective implementation 
of GSP148 and it has been included into the cooperation agenda of both regions. In 1971, 
the EU become the first pioneer that extend their GSP scheme to ASEAN member states. 
In the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings (AEMMs) 1978 until 1994, the GSP is deemed as 
an effective tools to boost exports earnings and helping improve economic 
development of ASEAN member states. Yet after the establishment of WTO both 
regions shifted their focus into cooperation on trade liberalization through trade aid, 
capacity building, and trade facilitation project. The ASEAN-EU cooperation to 
maximizing utilization of GSP scheme is moderately successful and it has been proven 
by the full graduation and sector graduation given to some ASEAN member states. In 
1997, Singapore has been graduated from the list of GSP beneficiary countries because 
of classified as the high-income country by World Bank. In 2008, five out of ten ASEAN 
member states, consists of Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines, 
included into the 20 top exporters countries under EU GSP Scheme.149 
Back to the 10th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM), held on 5th – 8th July 
1977, ASEAN and EU have agreed to formalise their “dialogue relation” into “formal 
cooperation”. This agreement named as “ASEAN’s formal cooperation and relationship 
with the European Economic Community (EEC)”. Formalisation of cooperation has 
involved “the Council of Ministers of the EEC, the Permanent Representative of the EEC 
countries and the EEC Commission”. This cooperation stage is covering some areas such 
as political and security, economic and trade, social and cultural, and development 
cooperation.150 
In 1975, during several informal meetings, ASEAN and EU established the Joint 
Study Group151 that focused on trade sectors. According to Luhulima and Welfens et al., 
this Joint Study Group was used to appraise other possible areas of cooperation, such as 
joint ventures in the exploration of ASEAN resources, the prospect of encouraging some 
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extent of EU participation in ASEAN manufacturing activities and the mobilisation of 
capital for financing ASEAN projects.152  
In 1978, the ASEAN–EU Ministerial Meetings (AEMMs) had greater political 
significance and improved cooperation between both regions. During the second 
ASEAN–EC Ministerial Meeting, which was held in Kuala Lumpur in March 1980, the 
ASEAN–EU Cooperation Agreement was formulated. This agreement started the new 
era of cooperation between the two regions.153 The provisions of the agreement 
covered trade and development cooperation, the promotion of investments, joint 
ventures and other miscellaneous economic issues such as technological transfers.154  
The 1980 cooperation agreement was considered as positive progress in the 
trade relations between the two regions. The EU had extended its GSP to ASEAN to 
enhance market access for ASEAN exports, but EU investment in ASEAN was limited. 
Through GSP, ASEAN’s finished, semi-finished manufacture and agricultural products 
were allowed to enter the EU market at lower tariffs. However, ASEAN considered that 
the GSP did not go far enough and there were demands for more concessions. Welfens 
et al., also note that the “[…] basic (preferential) export regime unilaterally extended by 
the EU in 1971 to non-associated developing countries, including those in ASEAN, was not 
altered in any way by the 1980 Cooperation Agreement […]”.155  
The rise of ASEAN manufactured exports, stimulated by Japanese investments, 
caused the EU to grant ASEAN a low priority development status. Not surprisingly, the 
EU proved unwillingly to grant ASEAN member states trade preferences other than GSP 
status.156 On the other hand, these were advantageous during the 1980s as ASEAN 
manufactured exports began to develop.157  
  The Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) was established as a monitoring device 
in ASEAN–EU cooperation. The ASEAN–EU Cooperation Agreement constitutes of the 
Framework Agreement that is considered as the milestone that institutionalised the 
relationship between ASEAN-EU. Since, the major focus of the agreement was on 
economic cooperation and development, it consequently opened up an exclusive 
channel for the exchange of information and requests that paved the way for EU 
assistance in several development projects. Hence, this agreement also included 
technical assistance cooperation.158 
Ruelend and Welfens et al. comment on the existence of the unequal relationship 
between ASEAN and EU, wherein the ASEAN countries certainly had a weaker 
bargaining position. From the beginning of cooperation, ASEAN was economically far 
behind the EU. At that time the EU did not consider ASEAN as its priority compared to 
African, Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) and Latin American countries which received more 
favourable trade benefits covered by the Lomé Convention. In addition, the irregular 
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attendance of the AEMM by the EU ministers apparently showed that the ASEAN–EU 
relationship was a donor-recipient relationship.159 
In the post-Cold War period, the EU started to introduce “conditionality policy” 
that linked trade preferences to issues on human rights, democratisation, and 
environmental protection. The EU argued that such policy was designed to improve 
economic development and democratisation in developing countries by means of trade 
preferences. The politicisation of the trade preferences policy raised tensions between 
the EU and ASEAN member states. Some ASEAN leaders saw it as neo-colonialism in 
trade because the beneficiary has no bargaining power to negotiate the conditions and 
is obliged to comply with the conditions, otherwise it will be excluded from the 
beneficiaries list. Dr Mahathir Muhammad, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, complained 
that the conditionality policy seemed to burden the beneficiary country since some of 
the non-trade conditions had no significance in the increasing of trade volumes.160  
The polemics of the “conditionality policy” in obtaining trade preferences were 
brought onto the negotiating table during the 9th and 10th AEMMs, which were held in 
1991 and 1992. The major agenda of the AEMMs was considered as a very sensitive 
topic for both parties as it involved exchanges over East Timor and the new 
conditionality of EU aid and cooperation policy.161 Significant economic growth of 
ASEAN and East Asia nurtured self-confidence in diplomatic relations. In other words, 
the economic achievements of ASEAN have been translated into the ability to confront 
and challenge the decision or intervention action of western countries in order to 
defend their self-interest for development.162  
In the 1990s, the relation between ASEAN-EU was extremely tense, where both 
regions were involved in international trade disputes. ASEAN criticised the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that imposed higher tariffs on oleo chemicals such 
as palm oil and dry fruit products. In 1995, other disputes were raised by Thailand 
when submitting a request for WTO consultations with the EU over its import duties on 
rice.163 
Some persisting trade disputes arose as the EU protectionist regimes164 had 
become an obstacle for ASEAN exports such as the treatment of ASEAN exports within 
the GSP scheme.165 The original EU GSP granted facility of free duty for selected 
products of beneficiary countries but subject to quantitative restriction or quantitative 
limitation. After 1994, the policy of quantitative restriction under the GSP scheme 
radically changed and was replaced by tariff modulations, where tariff cuts of the GSP 
product coverage were divided into four categories according to the import sensitivity 
of the products related to the EU market. “Product sensitivity” had four categories 
consisting of a 15% preferential margin for very sensitive products; a 30% preferential 
margin for sensitive products; a 65% preferential margin for semi-sensitive products; 
and duty-free entry for non-sensitive products, for instance a 100% preferential 
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margin.166 In the ASEAN perspective, such scheme was seen as too rigid and 
complicated, and may have created obstacles for GSP utilisation.167 
The GSP Scheme 2002-2004 simplify products sensitivity into two categories that 
is “non-sensitive products” and “sensitive products”. Simplification of product sensitivity 
maintained under current scheme, where eligible non-sensitive products continue 
enjoying preferential tariff at zero rate. While, sensitive products are eligible enjoying a 
reduction of 3.5 percentage points at the full ad valorem rate of customs duty. 168 
 In the middle of 1990’s, the EU GSP launched open policy on graduation 
mechanism, to set out criteria for country-sector graduation and country graduation. 
Country graduation mechanism is granted based on economic criteria when the 
beneficiary country included as high-income country’s based on the World Bank 
classification. On 1 January 1998, the EU GSP introduced special incentive 
arrangements that operated on the basis of additional margin of preference and it is 
granted to beneficiary countries that comply with certain requirements related to 
labour standards and environmental norms.169 Most of ASEAN member states are 
major beneficiaries of the EU GSP that has large export’s volume and covering wide 
range of product’s. In 2010, ASEAN is the biggest region trading partner that shared 
10.6% of export to EU market under GSP scheme. 170 The comparative advantages of 
ASEAN member states that combined with the opportunity granted under GSP scheme, 
it offers greater advantages to expand market share and improving competitiveness of 
developing countries producers.  GSP schemes are expected to be an effective 
instrument for ASEAN producers to penetrated EU “sensitive” and “semi-sensitive” 
products market.171 
Both of organizations agreed to improve their cooperation through adoption of 
“Nuremberg Declaration on EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership in 2007”. Nuremberg 
Declaration contains long-term vision and commitment to cooperate achieving 
common goals and covering wide range of areas. 172 In order to implement the 
Nuremberg Declaration effectively, both of parties agreed to adopt “the ASEAN-EU Plan 
of Action 2007”. The Plan of Action promoting exchanges information on trade rules 
and regulation between both parties. It is important for traders to have open 
information and to understand trading partner rules and regulations on trade and 
investment, such as anti-dumping, subsidies, and tariff and non-tariff measures.173 The 
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Plan action is encouraging cooperation of the enhancement and modernization of 
customs clearance and transit regime in ASEAN, through strengthening the capacity of 
the Customs Administrations and the ASEAN Secretariat.174 The Plan of action initiated 
concrete steps and activities to develop further ASEAN-EU dialogue relations.175  
In the area of economic cooperation, the Plan of Action is driving implementation 
of ASEAN Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS II) and Regional EC-
ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI) as a key instrument to support ASEAN closer 
integration.176 The Plan of action also emphasized the significant role of statistical data 
modernisation in order to build integrated economic region and support further 
integration measures.177  
With respect to the improvement of trade and investment, a programme called 
“Trans Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI)” was established. TREATI 
functioned as a channel to promote dialogue and cooperation on regulatory issues, to 
improve two-way trade and to enhance investment flows between ASEAN-EU. For 
instance, practical improvements in ASEAN-EU trade through expert dialogues and 
seminars/workshops on the priority sectors.178 TREATI was established in order to 
promote trade and investment flows between the two regions through the dialogue 
mechanism, covering issues on economics and trade such as capacity building and 
technical assistance.179 TREATI was also considered as an important initiative to 
strengthen cooperation on trade facilitations between ASEAN and EU.180  
The trade relationship between ASEAN and EU focused on the development 
strategy on export growth. It has to be noted that ASEAN exports to all parts of the 
world saw dramatic rises in the last decade but the region was particularly successful 
in developing trade with the EU.181 
Furthermore, the trade relationship between ASEAN and EU entered a new era 
when the First Business Summit was organised on 5 May 2011 and took place in 
Jakarta, Indonesia. The ASEAN-EU Business Summit resulted from the mutual 
agreement reached in the 9th Consultation meetings between the ASEAN Economic 
Ministers (AEM) and the EU Commissioner for Trade, which was held in Vietnam on 27 
August 2010. The Summit served as an opportunity for ASEAN and EU leaders to 
discuss ways in which the private sector can exchange views and contribute on ASEAN-
EU trade and investment relations with governmental decision makers.182 This Summit 
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provided a solid foundation to strengthen cooperation and partnerships between the 
two regions.183 
 
IV. The European Union Generalised System of Preferences and ASEAN. 
The intention to develop and improve EU GSP that was granted to the ASEAN 
member states was the focus of the Ministerial Meetings between the two regions. In 
trade relations with EU, ASEAN’s position is as the mutual trading partner and the 
recipient of the EU GSP. The rapid economic development of ASEAN has increased the 
volume of trade between ASEAN and EU, significantly creating interdependency factors 
between the two regions. 
Since ASEAN is not included in any other PTA, such as the Lomé Agreement, GSP 
is the only trade preferential scheme granted by EU to ASEAN member states. Currently 
the Lomé Agreement has been replaced by the EPA’s regime covering ACP (Africa, 
Caribbean and Pacific) countries. Originally, this PTA was based on colonial ties. Since 
the beginning of its implementation, other countries have expressed disagreement due 
to the breach of the non-discrimination principle under GATT 1947.  As mentioned 
before, earlier developments of ASEAN were not so fast, thus, they were placed as low 
priority for the granting of a preferential trade scheme. Therefore, GSP has played an 
important role in its contribution to strengthen cooperation between the two regions. 
GSP was first discussed in the AEMM in Brussels on November 1978. The meeting 
was attended by five ASEAN member states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand), and eight EU Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). It included the President of 
the Council and the President of the Commission of the EU. During the meeting, the EU 
explicitly expressed its awareness of the special needs of developing countries, 
particularly ASEAN. Therefore, the EU reiterated its intention to meet the special needs 
of developing countries using “legal” agreements in international trade principles.184  
In the sphere of their economic relationship, ASEAN and EU affirmed their mutual 
interest to stimulate economic cooperation between the two regions.185 In trade 
matters, ASEAN focused on measures adopted by the EU. ASEAN argued that some of 
those measures were considered as exports constraints. On the other hand, the EU 
argued that such measures would not significantly influence trade flows between the 
two regions. Furthermore, the EU stated that such measures were taken based on the 
special situation in a few sectors and were applied temporarily.186 
In the AEMM in 1978, ASEAN expressed its needs to improve access to EU 
markets. ASEAN needed to expand the market for its manufactured, semi-
manufactured, and primary product exports and EU responded positively towards the 
request.187 In respect of trade facilitations, ASEAN demanded the EU to remove or relax 
                                                 
183 See The ASEAN Secretariat, Chair’s Statement of the 18th ASEAN Summit Jakarta, “ASEAN Community in a Global 
Community of Nations” 7 - 8 May 2011, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/Statement_18th_ASEAN_Summit.pdf, last accessed 17 October 2011. 
184 See Paragraph 18 of the Joint Declaration The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting  
Brussels, 21 November 1978, available at : http://www.asean.org/5617.htm. “[…] ASEAN and the Community 
agreed on the necessity to maintain free trade conditions in order to promote a recovery in the world economy 
through expanding international trade. They confirmed their readiness to cooperate constructively to achieve 
satisfactory results in the MTN negotiations. The Community expressed its awareness of the special needs of the 
developing countries and particularly of ASEAN and reaffirmed its intention to seek provisions which would 
satisfy these needs […]”. 
185 See Paragraph 20 of the Joint Declaration The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Brussels, 21 November 1978, available 
at : http://www.asean.org/5617.htm. 
186 See Paragraph 21 of the Joint Declaration The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Brussels, 21 November 1978. 
187 See Paragraph 23 of the Joint Declaration The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Brussels, 21 November 1978. 
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tariff and NTB and to streamline its administrative procedures.188 ASEAN requested 
efficiency improvements and excessive bureaucracy reductions that were imposed on 
ASEAN’s export products. The relaxation of tariff and NTB to trade could help ASEAN 
products compete in the EU market. Since EU GSP significantly contributed to the 
economic development of the ASEAN member states, therefore, ASEAN asked the EU to 
improve its GSP scheme, formalising it into a permanent policy.189  
It should be noted that before the Enabling Clause was enacted in 1979, the EU 
GSP was established based on the Waiver of GSP 1971. According to the Waiver of GSP, 
Article I of GATT 1947 waived for a period of ten years, thus, allowing developed 
contracting parties to come to an agreement on the preferential tariff treatment on 
products originating from developing countries based on generalised, non-reciprocal, 
and non-discriminatory principles.190  
The EU responded to such positive opportunity and expressed its intention to 
extend such GSP “beyond the initial decade foreseen at its establishment”. Furthermore, 
the EU considered the request of “favourably to the fullest possible extent for 
improvements” that would significantly favour the economic development of ASEAN 
member states.191 Before the legalisation of GSP into the Enabling Clause, the EU 
intended to formalise the GSP scheme as its permanent policy and to improve the 
scheme as part of its commitment to favouring the economic development of 
developing countries. 
Some identified factors have caused low utilisation of GSP by beneficiary 
countries. For instance, Corbet and Ariff criticise the EU GSP scheme for its restrictive 
rules on origin, low quota provisions, and high administrative costs incurred upon 
beneficiaries. They consider that such factors do not allow the utilisation of GSP to be 
maximised. However, ASEAN member states were constantly seeking better access for 
particular products through the scheme (e.g. tapioca, palm oil, and plywood). In the late 
1980s, the GSP scheme reforms started to be introduced through limiting the scope of 
benefits enjoyed by ASEAN, especially on the provisions that limited GSP concessions to 
non-sensitive sectors. As a result, ASEAN exports to the EU that enjoyed GSP status, 
decreased by 70% in 1989.192 
The Cooperation Agreement between the “Member Countries of ASEAN and 
European Community in 1980” is considered as the cornerstone of ASEAN-EU 
cooperation. The Cooperation Agreement did not specifically mention the EU GSP, but 
the provisions of the agreement supported the implementation of GSP, especially 
Article 2 (Commercial Cooperation) and Article 3 (Economic Cooperation). For 
instance, Paragraph 3 Article 2 contains provisions on Commercial Cooperation. Where 
both parties should accommodate trade facilitation in their policy in compliance with 
national legislation. First, both parties must use their best endeavours to grant each 
other the widest facilities for commercial transactions. Second, both parties must take 
into full account their respective interests and needs for improved access for 
manufactured, semi-manufactured and primary products as well as the further 
processing of resources. Third, there must be cooperation between the economic 
operators in both regions with the aim of creating new trade patterns. Fourth, a study 
must be carried out to recommend trade promotion measures that are likely to 
                                                 
188 See Paragraph 24 of the Joint Declaration The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Brussels, 21 November 1978. 
189 See Paragraph 24 of the Joint Declaration The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Brussels, 21 November 1978. 
190 See Waiver of Generalized System of Preferences, Decision of 25 June 1971, BISD 18S/24.  
191 See Paragraph 25 of the Joint Declaration The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Brussels, 21 November 1978. 
192 See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 54. 
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encourage the expansion of imports and exports. The Cooperation Agreement has laid 
down the fundamental basis of trade facilitations that is useful to help improve GSP 
implementation in ASEAN.193  
The Cooperation Agreement reflects mutual trade cooperation between two 
regions that have very different economic development levels. In 1981, the ASEAN 
Ministers and the EU Commission had a meeting that was held in Brussels, where EU 
“reiterated its strong support for ASEAN's endeavours towards closer regional economic 
cooperation”.194 Both parties agreed to undertake cooperation and carry out positive 
roles in international trade organisation in order to establish a new international 
economic order.195  
Following the success of the 3rd Meeting of the Joint Cooperation Committee in 
1982, thus, in 1983 the 4th AEMM was held in Bangkok, with the aim to increase 
cooperation between the industrial and business sectors between the two regions. 
During the 4th AEMM, the importance of economic and technical cooperation among 
developing countries was explicitly recognised as a means to promote the efficient use 
of human capital, material, financial, and technological resources that are available 
within the region for the individual and collective welfare of the people of ASEAN and 
other developing countries. In later development, the importance of technical 
cooperation among developing countries is very useful to enhance trade facilitation and 
to improve utilisation of EU GSP.196  
During the 5th AEMM, the EU has reiterated its commitment to implement the 
basic principles of the GSP. The EU also agreed to take into account the interests and 
needs of the ASEAN countries in the second phase of its GSP scheme improvement to 
ensure utilisation of the GSP economic benefit.197  
Thus, in the AEMM on Economic Matters, which was held in Bangkok in October 
1985, ASEAN and EU agreed, “that the EU GSP is the effective tool to expand trade 
between ASEAN and EU”. Since 1975, the EU has applied “cumulative rules of origin 
provisions” to ASEAN imported products under the GSP scheme. The cumulative origin 
has promoted trans-national export-oriented production within the regions to facilitate 
closer economic integration, particularly to attain a single market and production 
base.198  
In addition, the EU also emphasised the importance of making further 
improvements particularly in respect of product coverage, preferential margins, and 
quantitative limitations of preferential imports in the GSP scheme.199 The EU policy on 
reforming its GSP scheme has answered the demand of ASEAN expressed in AEMM 
1978. During the first five years of the cooperation agreement the EU increased its 
development aid to ASEAN.200 
                                                 
193 See Paragraph 3 Article 2 of the Cooperation Agreement between Member Countries of ASEAN and European 
Community, Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 1980, available at : http://www.asean.org/1501.htm. 
194 See Paragraph 4 of the Joint Press Statement The ASEAN Ministers and the Commission of the European Community 
Brussels, 15 October 1981, available at : http://www.asean.org/5626.htm. 
195 See Paragraph 7 of the Joint Press Statement The ASEAN Ministers and the Commission of the European Community 
Brussels, 15 October 1981. 
196 See Paragraph 30 and 31 of the Joint Declaration The Fourth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Bangkok, 25 March 1983, 
available at : http://www.asean.org/5628.htm. 
197 See Paragraph 25 of the Joint Declaration The Fifth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Dublin, 15-16 October 1984, 
available at : http://www.asean.org/5630.htm. 
198 See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 51. Its has emerge the establishment of multinational company in ASEAN. 
199 See Paragraph 10 of the Joint Statement The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting on Economic Matters, Bangkok, 17-18 
October 1985, available at : http://www.asean.org/5631.htm. 
200 See Paragraph 11 of the Joint Statement The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting on Economic Matters, Bangkok, 17-18 
October 1985. 
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The EU and ASEAN agreed to maintain open trading systems and improve market 
access in both regions. In the 6th AEMMs the EU GSP scheme regarded as the effective 
instrument to penetrated EU market. In other words, EU GSP still played significant role 
to expand ASEAN market access in EU. Therefore, ASEAN is keen “welcomed” the EU 
intention to make further improvement on their GSP scheme.201 
Single European Act (SEA) entered into force by 1 July 1987 with aimed to create 
single market by 1992. SEA has brought the Union into closer integration and created 
an internal market of 360 million populations. The completion of the EU single market 
provides larger opportunities and greater market access for EU trading partners’.202 
Enlargement of EU enhance ASEAN market shares, yet elimination of NTB is still 
needed to have better market access. The EU GSP has significant contribution of 
increasing ASEAN exports’, especially in manufactured goods in which constitute 50% 
of ASEAN total exports to the EU, therefore, the EU Ministers agreed to examine the 
possibility of improving the EU GSP scheme further.203 In the early of 1990s the trade 
flows between two regions have significantly increased, especially for industrial 
products. 204 
The 8th AEMMs is prioritized on the “Market Access and Trade Promotion”, for 
instance ASEAN requested EU to provide better market access and vice versa. Both of 
the parties made focus on tariffs reduction, removal of non-tariff barriers, and 
minimizing tariff increases in order to improve the market access for their export 
products’. The EU needs market access improvement in respect of products such as 
motor cars, personal computers, paper, textiles and clothing, fertilisers, 
pharmaceuticals, and chemical products. While ASEAN tends to demand market access 
improvement for agricultural products and strongly criticized the EU common 
agricultural policy (CAP).205  
Important improvement is made in the EU GSP Scheme 1989 and 1990, which 
include sensitive products under its’ product coverage. Accordingly, the beneficiary 
countries including ASEAN member states are given market access improvement in the 
EU sensitive sectors, which had never been opened under previous scheme. At the 
same time, the EU GSP cumulative rules of origin contributes positive progress to 
enhance GSP utilization. 206 In addition, the EU also giving aid and technical assistance 
                                                 
201 See Paragraph 19 of the Joint Declaration The Sixth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Jakarta, 20-21 October 1986, 
available at : http://www.asean.org/5633.htm. 
202 See Paragraph 26 of the Joint Declaration The Eighth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Malaysia, l6-17 February 1990, 
available at : http://www.asean.org/5637.htm. 
203 See Paragraph 45 and 46 of the Joint Declaration The Seventh ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, in Duesseldorf on 2 and 
3 May 1988, available at : http://www.asean.org/5636.htm. 
204 See Paragraph 26 of the Joint Declaration The Eighth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Malaysia, l6-17 February 1990. 
205 See Paragraph 30 and 32 of the Joint Declaration The Eighth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Malaysia, l6-17 February 
1990. “[…] The ASEAN Ministers request the EU to provide better market access and a more open trade policy 
for textiles and clothing, tropical vegetable oils, cocoa products, canned pineapple, timber products, tapioca 
products, pulp, and fuel wood through reduction of tariffs, elimination of non-tariff barriers and elimination of 
tariff escalation. The ASEAN Ministers also request the EU to take into account agricultural products of export 
interest to ASEAN in its implementation and review of the CAP. The EU Ministers requested ASEAN to sign the 
MTN agreements (technical barriers, government procurement, etc.) and to provide improved market access for 
products such as motor cars, personal computers, paper, textiles and clothing, fertilisers, pharmaceuticals and 
chemical products through reduction of tariffs and elimination of non-tariff barriers […].” 
206 See Paragraph 35 of the Joint Declaration The Eighth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Malaysia, l6-17 February 1990. 
See also paragraph 47 of the Joint Declaration The Ninth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting Luxembourg, 30-31 May 
1991, available at : http://www.asean.org/5638.htm. “[…] The Minister agreed that the EU GSP Scheme was an 
important tool by which ASEAN's exports to the EU could be diversified and increased. They welcomed the 
significant increase in benefits arising from the use of GSP. The ASEAN Ministers noted that the EU is revising 
the GSP Scheme in order to make it simpler and more transparent. They urged the EC to take into account 
ASEAN interests inter alia the inclusion of the donor country content […]”. 
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on ASEAN trade promotion programmes. This program designed to improve ASEAN 
exports to the EU and third countries. 207  
In the beginning of 1990s ASEAN-EU’s trade grown significantly. ASEAN exports 
to EU are continuing to improve faster than its exports to any other market. EU 
nowadays is the second largest market for ASEAN’s manufactured products. The EU’s 
exports to ASEAN is increasing at a higher rate than to any other region in the world. 
According to the ASEAN secretariat, the implementation of two-way trade has exceeded 
amount of $50 billion USD. During the 10th AEMMs it is agreed some important points 
with purposed to enhance cooperation between two regions, i.e.: 208 
1. Each side would continue to improve access to its market to maintain these high 
rates of growth in two-way trade. 
2. Both sides would continue to improve access and enhance rapid information 
networks linking business operators in the two regions, for example, through the 
establishment of business information centres and networks of European Chambers 
of Commerce in ASEAN. 
3. The EU would provide more systematic information on the Single European Market 
with the view to assisting ASEAN to adjust to changes and market opportunities 
arising there from. 
In the early of 1990s, the EU was on the process of ratifying Treaty of Maastricht 
that very crucial for the establishment of what we called now as “Treaty on European 
Union”.209 At the same time, the fall of the Berlin wall has encouraged the enlargement 
of the EU to the East Europe. While, on 28th January 1992, took a place in Singapore, the  
“Agreement on the CEPTS for the AFTA” was signed by ASEAN member states to apply 
effective tariff preferential to the goods and products originating from its’ members.210 
According to this agreement , ASEAN member states are obliged to implement tariff 
reduction under the CEPT Scheme. 211   
In the 10th AEMMs the EU GSP Scheme still included in the main menu of 
discussion, because it is deemed as an important tools to diversify and to increase 
ASEAN’s exports to EU. 212 The meeting was took a note about the important role of 
cumulative rules of origin in the ASEAN economic integration. 
“[…] The Ministers recognized that the General System of Preferences (GSP) has 
contributed to the growth in exports from ASEAN to the EU. More than one third of 
ASEAN's exports to the EU enjoy tariff concessions under the GSP.213 The Ministers 
                                                 
207 See Paragraph 36 of the Joint Declaration The Eighth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Malaysia, l6-17 February 1990. 
See also paragraph 49 of the Joint Declaration The Ninth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting Luxembourg, 30-31 May 
1991, available at : http://www.asean.org/5638.htm. “[…] The ASEAN Ministers expressed their appreciation to 
the EU for its assistance in ASEAN's trade promotion programmes which were found to be an important element 
in the process towards the diversification of exports […]”. 
208 See Joint Declaration The Tenth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Manila, 29-30 October 1992, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/5639.htm. 
209 See Joint Declaration The Tenth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Manila, 29-30 October 1992. 
210 See Paragraph 1 Article 1 Agreement on the CEPTS for the AFTA. 
211 See Paragraph 1 Article 2 Agreement on the CEPTS for the AFTA. 
212 See Joint Declaration The Tenth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Manila, 29-30 October 1992. 
213 “[…] Changes made by the EU to its GSP scheme during the mid-1990s were another cause of concern for the ASEAN 
beneficiaries. The group still enjoyed considerable advantages from participating in the scheme, receiving 
around 30% of its total concessions in value terms in 1993. However, in 1995 the system of fixed and flexible 
quota restrictions on industrial products was replaced by preferential CCT duty concessions granted according 
to ‘sensitivity’ classification. Unlimited market access was also offered to GSP imports, although safeguard 
measures were still applicable under certain circumstances. These revisions meant that GSP imports were no 
longer eligible for automatic zero-CCT rates, but attracted a Modulated Preferential Duty (MPD) commensurate 
with the degree of sectoral sensitivity associated with the products in question. Four types of classification are  
exist. Very sensitive with MPD equivalent to 85% of the CET. Its mainly includes textiles and ferro-alloys. 
Sensitive with 70% MPD rate. Its covering a wide range of products such as chemicals, consumer electronics, 
cars and footwear. Semi-sensitive with 35% MPD rate, its covers diverse range of products in less sensitive 
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noted that the EU envisages a revision and updating of the GSP for the next decade. 
In this context, the Ministers recognised that the Cumulative Rules of Origin (CRO) 
provision has contributed to ASEAN's regional integration and would further assist 
ASEAN in achieving its objectives of an ASEAN Free Trade Area. . The ASEAN 
Ministers stressed their concerns about certain elements such as "Social Incentives" 
in the Commission proposals on the review of the GSP. The ASEAN Ministers asked 
that the proposed scheme should take into account the need for smooth industrial 
development in the ASEAN countries and the multilateral principles. The EU 
Ministers took note of these remarks while stressing the development aspects of the 
proposed scheme […]”.214 
In the early of 1990s, the EU announced about their plan to apply new features of 
GSP scheme that enter into force in 1994. The EU provide opportunities for further 
discussions of the new features of GSP with ASEAN. In respect of trade promotion 
assistance, the EU considers it did increased two-way trade and significantly 
contributing to ASEAN’s exports diversification. Therefore, both of parties were agreed 
to continue such programmes. 215 
In 1993, the ASEAN secretariat noted that trade flows between EU and ASEAN 
exceeded 49 billion ECU216. This is equal to four times the volume of trade in 1980 
when the ASEAN-EU started formalising their trade cooperation into an agreement.217  
According to Christopher, in 1980 EU15 represented ASEAN’s third biggest external 
trading partner with 14.1% of its total export and import trade. While ASEAN shared 
only 3.0% of extra-EU15 exports and 2.7% of extra-EU15 imports.218  
Continuously the value of trade between ASEAN and the EU reached 86 billion 
USD in 1995.  This proved that the trade flow of ASEAN-EU increased significantly with 
remarkable progress.219 Both parties agreed that there should be mutual efforts to 
improve market access, promoting, and facilitating the free flow of goods and services 
between the two regions, in this regard referring to the establishment of the FTA.220  
  In 1996, the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) took place in Bangkok and was 
officially launched as an interregional forum dialogue. ASEM was seen as a new 
dynamic parallel with the AEMMs. The central role of the AEMMs was policy-
formulating and coordinating organs of the ASEAN-EU dialogues.221 In 1997, the 
relationship between ASEAN and EU entered its third decade since ASEAN was 
                                                                                                                                          
sectors than the above, e.g. jewellery, calculators, watches. Non-sensitive with zero MPD rate is applied to 
products deemed to not to possess any degree of sectoral sensitivity […]”. (See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. 
Cit., p. 58).  
214 See Paragraph 10 of the Joint Declaration The Eleventh ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Karlsruhe, 22-23 September 
1994, available at : http://www.asean.org/5642.htm. 
215 See Joint Declaration The Tenth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Manila, 29-30 October 1992. 
216 “[…] ECU is standfor European Currency Unit (symbol ₠). The name of the currency used in the European Community 
before the Euro applied. The ECU by the EU member states as the internal accounting unit. The ECU was begin to 
be applied in the European Economic Community (EU) on 13 March 1979. Hence, ECU considered as the 
precursor of the euro introduced on 1 January 1999 […]”. See  European Currency Unit, available at : 
http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/ECU.html, , last accessed : 12 January 2012.  
217 See Paragraph 8 and 9 of the Joint Declaration The Eleventh ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Karlsruhe, 22-23 
September 1994. 
218 See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 49. 
219 See Subparagraph 5 Paragraph 12 of the Joint Declaration The Twelfth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 13-
14 February 1997, available at : http://www.asean.org/5643.htm. 
220 See Subparagraph 5 Paragraph 12 of the Joint Declaration The Twelfth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 13-
14 February 1997. 
221 See Paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration The Twelfth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 13-14 February 
1997. 
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established as a regional organisation in Southeast Asia and covered so many areas of 
cooperation.222 
The establishment of WTO in 1995 significantly influenced the current 
relationship between ASEAN and EU since all their members states had WTO 
Membership including the EU itself. Therefore, they were obliged to carry out the entire 
obligations laid down in the WTO Agreements. Accordingly, the ASEAN and EU trade 
relationship had to be governed by fair and equitable principles based on open trade 
rules of the international trading system. The pattern of the trade relationship between 
ASEAN and EU shifted into an “equal economic partnership”, since economic 
development and industrialisation in Asia was rapidly growing. In a multilateral 
context and at a global level, the WTO establishment developed consciousness of 
globalisation. The post-Cold War détente also influenced “the anomaly” of international 
relations between states from geo-politics into geo-economics. 
Nowadays, either ASEAN or the EU is considered as the most dynamic economic 
region in the world. The EU is the world’s largest trading entity, while ASEAN is one of 
the fastest growing regions in the world. Accordingly, this provides a sound basis for 
dynamic economic cooperation between ASEAN and EU.223 Christopher briefly outlines 
the reasons that explain changes in the EU mind-set and policies in its relationship with 
ASEAN, which is based on economic interest.224 
                                                 
222 See Paragraph 9 of the Joint Declaration The Twelfth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 13-14 February 
1997. “[…] Since 1977, ASEAN and EU have established a strong network of mechanisms to drive ASEAN-EU 
cooperation. These mechanisms include the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, the Post-Ministerial Conference, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN-EU Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and the Joint Cooperation Committee 
(JCC) […]”. 
223 See Subparagraph IV Paragraph 12 of the Joint Declaration The Twelfth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 
13-14 February 1997. 
224 “[…] The European perception of ASEAN as a minor economic partner was to change over the course of the 
1980s. Southeast Asia’s dynamic industrial development during the decade had made the EU increasingly 
aware of the growing interdependent economic relationship that was evolving between itself and ASEAN. In 
this context, a number of trends are worth noting. By 1990, ASEAN’s share of extra-EU-15 exports had risen to 
4.8%, thus becoming a larger export market than the whole of Latin America, while its share of extra-EU 
imports had increased to 4.0%, making it a more important source of imports than Canada and Australia 
combined, The acceleration of ASEAN-EU trade flows was especially apparent from the late 1980s onwards. EU 
imports from ASEAN has increased by 66.8% over 1987–1990. It was rising from 10.0 billions ECU to 16.8 
billions ECU by the end of the period […]”. (See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., pp. 65-66). 
“[…] Meanwhile, EU exports to ASEAN had increased even faster at 80.5 %, rising from 8.9 billions ECU to 16.1 
billions ECU. Furthermore, the EU-15’s position as ASEAN trade partner had improved slightly, with its share 
of total ASEAN imports and exports standing at 15.5 % and 15.9 % respectively by 1990. A growing 
interdependence was also manifest in sectoral trade trends with ASEAN manufacture exports to the EU as a 
share of the group’s total EU exports increasing from 54.4 % in 1980 to 58.4 % by 1987. Among the ASEAN 
member states, the highest individual rates were attained by Singapore (86.4 %), Malaysia (83.7 %) and the 
Philippines (83.0 %). The EU’s imports from ASEAN rose from 16.8 billions ECU in 1990 to 45.7 billions ECU by 
1997, and its exports from 16.1 billions ECU to 45.5 billions ECU […]”. (See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Loc. 
Cit., pp. 65-66). 
“[…] Over the 1985–1989 period, the stock of FDI from EU firms in the ASEAN increased by 57.2 % from $7.7 
billions to $12.1 billions, thus maintaining the EU’s position as the second largest inward investor in Southeast 
Asia after Japan. Moreover, in the structure of EU financial assistance to ASEAN there was a notable switch of 
emphasis towards economic co-operation and away from development co-operation and humanitarian 
assistance over the 1980s, a further reflection of ASEAN being perceived by the EU as a more capable 
economic partner. Thus by the end of the 1980s, there were calls for a more equal partnership to be 
established within the institutionalised framework of EC-ASEAN economic relations. This was to set the tone 
for a new phase of EU-ASEAN economic relations in the 1990’s […]”. (See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., 
p. 59). 
“[…] At the industrial level, we have already commented on how Southeast Asia’s continued rapid 
industrialisation had brought about significant structural changes to EU-ASEAN economic exchange by the end 
of the 1980s. In the early 1990s, manufactured goods share of ASEAN’s exports to the EU rising from 58.4 % in 
1987 to 78.6 % by 1993. The intra-industry trade ratios of ASEAN country trade with the EU had all risen over 
the 1989–1994 period: Indonesia from 11.7 % to 26.3 %; Malaysia from 42.2 % to 46.2 % ; the Philippines 
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EU GSP has evolved since it was first launched in 1971. The EU Commission 
reviews the implementation of the GSP annually to ensure that the benefits of GSP are 
delivered properly to the beneficiary countries. The section graduation mechanism that 
is applied in the GSP has allowed the EU to gradually reduce or eliminate GSP benefits 
from certain products that exceed the quota restrictions or from countries that 
successfully diversify their exports. Section graduation is determined based on the 
criteria that represent the development level and product specialisation of the 
beneficiary countries. However, the EU also provided a mechanism for the beneficiary 
countries that have been granted sector graduations to re-apply for the product 
concerned to get GSP facility.225 
There are five ASEAN countries that have been granted sector graduations. They 
consist of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, and the Philippines. In 
May 1998, Singapore as the most advanced economy of ASEAN, totally graduated from 
the EU GSP.  Christopher notes, “[…] these changes did have some significant impact on 
Southeast Asia’s less advanced economies whose dependence upon the EU GSP concessions 
was naturally more pronounced […]”. In addition, the non-trade conditionality that 
applied in the GSP seemed to be a burden for the developing countries thereof the 
ASEAN member states were dubious of the new social and environmental clauses that 
had been incorporated into the scheme in 1998.226 
The pattern of the ASEAN-EU relationships had changed from dependence into 
interdependence, where at the beginning the relationship of ASEAN-EU started from 
historical factors such as colonial ties.  After the Second World War, the relationship 
between Southeast Asian and European countries was established as a relationship 
between developed and developing countries (north and south relation). In the 
framework of the GSP, the relationship pattern that exists is the relationship between 
beneficiary countries and preference-granting countries. In other words, the 
relationship pattern under the GSP scheme apparently works as “dependency” of 
recipient countries and donor countries. 
In the early years of the ASEAN-EU relationship, the concept of their relationship 
was based on donor (rich) countries and recipient (poor) countries. The rapid 
development of some ASEAN member states changed the EU trade policy by 
considering ASEAN as “equal trading partners”. ASEAN started feeling more confident to 
be able to criticise the EU CCP related to trade and development issues.227 
While in the north and south relation concept the character of the relationship 
traditionally existed based on “comparative advantage”. ASEAN was exporting labour-
intensive products and receiving EU capital-intensive products. Hence, this reflected 
Southeast Asia’s technological dependency on European companies. In the beginning of 
the 1980s more intra-industry development was emerging in ASEAN.  In 1973, ASEAN 
manufacture exports to the EU as share of its total EU exports was 25.5%, thus, in 1980 
it had risen by 54.4%. Obviously, it reflected the rapid industrialisation achieved by the 
ASEAN states, which to some extent depended on imported technology and capital 
goods supplied by European companies.228 
The increased trade and investment flows between ASEAN and EU made ASEAN 
one of the largest exporters and importers to the EU. The rise in ASEAN economic 
                                                                                                                                          
from 28.9 % to 44.7 %; Singapore from 45.3 % to 47.1 %; Thailand from 32.1 % to 34.1 % […]”. (See M. Dent, 
Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., pp. 64-65). 
225 See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., pp. 64-65. 
226 See Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
227 See Ibid., p. 49. 
228 See Ibid., p. 49. 
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development placed this region as a potential market for EU products. The ASEAN 
member states as the beneficiary countries of the EU GSP scheme were either involved 
to give contributions towards the scheme reform through the forum of discussion in 
the AEMM or through public consultation held by the EU Commission. At the 12th 
AEMM, both parties recognised “mutually beneficial economic cooperation”, in this 
regard, it can be interpreted that the EU started to consider ASEAN as its important 
trading partner.229 
The Joint Declaration of the EU and the ASEAN in 1994 brought concern 
regarding the conditionality of labour rights in the EU GSP, but ASEAN did not challenge 
its legality under the Enabling Clause. The language of the Declaration is as follows:230  
“[…] The ASEAN Ministers stressed their concerns about certain elements such as 
“Social Incentives” in the Commission’s proposals on the review of the GSP.   It is 
clear that although the ASEAN Ministers had “concerns” about some conditions in 
GSP that differentiated between different developing countries, these concerns did 
not lead to the least hint of questioning the legality of the EC GSP scheme under the 
GATT Enabling Clause. Moreover, it is clear that there is no agreement between the 
EC and the ASEAN Ministers that such incentives were disciplined in any legal sense 
by WTO rules […]” 
Regarding conditionality and selectivity in the GSP scheme, Howse notes that 
over 30 years no legal instrument had ever been promulgated to elevate the elements 
of non-discrimination or non-reciprocity to a legal condition standard for the granting 
of preferences otherwise it would be inconsistent with Article I.231 Since the nature of 
GSP is a “grant” from a developed country to a developing country, obviously it is the 
autonomous right of the preference-granting country. Therefore, it has been considered 
as an unstable preferences system.  
ASEAN would never be a European Union, even though its integration originally 
derived from the EU model of regional co-operation.232 Some studies have compared 
the emergent Asian-style regionalism with European-style regionalism. The differences 
identified were mainly due to politico-cultural differences. Both organisations have 
their unique institutional structures and mechanism, and a distinctive policy to carry 
out international relations.233  
Additionally, Christopher briefly elaborates the distinction of regionalism 
between ASEAN and the EU. First, the EU approach is essentially based on contract or is 
treaty based and managed with the assistance of supranational institutions. Second, 
ASEAN is founded on a consensus-building, inter-governmental model of 
regionalisation. ASEAN member states consist of a heterogeneous composition of 
politics, economy, and culture. Many obstacles and difficulties have been created in the 
attempt for deeper integration.234 
ASEAN, as the regional organisation where most of its member states are 
developing countries that receive GSP facilities, must be able to facilitate its members 
in order to utilise the GSP properly to increase its extra-trade. In addition, the 
improvement of the EU GSP scheme also requires the support of regional stakeholders, 
especially in providing trade facilitation, increasing awareness of business 
opportunities, and minimising impediments to inter-regional trade.  
                                                 
229 See Paragraph 12 of the Joint Declaration The Twelfth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 13-14 February 
1997. 
230 See Robert, Howse., 2003.   
231 See Ibid., 2003. 
232 See Rajendran 1985; Rieger 1991; M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., pp. 50-51. 
233 See Palmer 1991; Langhammer 1997; Palmujoki 1997; M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Loc. Cit., pp. 50-51. 
234 See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Loc. Cit., pp. 50-51. 
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In 2010, the EU was the second largest trading partner for ASEAN after China. 
ASEAN and the EU have a total trade value of 11.2% of the total trade among the top 
ten trading partners. However, the trade relationship between ASEAN and the EU is 
asymmetric due to the gap between exports and imports. Based on the population, 
ASEAN has a population of 600 million, which is a larger market than the EU. However, 
based on the situation of the economic level of the population, the EU has a greater 
potential market to absorb more goods or products.  ASEAN exports to the EU in 2010 
were $92.99.9 million USD or a 11.5% share of the total value of exports among the top 
ten export trading partners. The EU was the first destination for ASEAN exports. The 
second destination for imports was the US with a total value of exports of $82,201.8 
million USD or a 10.1% share of the total value  among the top ten export trading 
partners. China is the third destination for ASEAN exports with the total value of 
$81,591.0 million USD or a 10.1% share of the total value. Japan is the fourth 
destination for ASEAN exports with the total value of $78,068.6 million USD or a 9.6% 
share of the total value. Hong Kong is in the fifth rank with the total value of exports at 
$56,696.7 million USD. 
While the biggest import partner in ASEAN is China with the total value of 
imports reaching $96,594.3 million USD or a 13.3% share of the total value among the 
top ten import trading partners. The second biggest import partner is Japan with total 
value of imports $82,795.1 million USD or a 11.4% share of the total value. Followed by 
the EU in the third position with a total value of imports of $78,795.0 million USD or a 
10.8% share of the total value. There is an unbalance in trade between ASEAN and the 
EU due to the gap between exports and imports in ASEAN. ASEAN exports to the EU are 
larger than ASEAN imports from the EU. This shows that ASEAN largely depends on 
exports to the EU. It has placed the EU as the important market for ASEAN exports. 
Despite the GSP scheme being the only trade preferences given by the EU in the last 40 
years. 
ASEAN has established a free trade agreement with some countries in East Asia 
and the Pacific. Five agreements have been established by ASEAN in FTA consisting of 
AANZFTA (ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand), ASEAN-Republic Korea, ASEAN-Japan, 
ASEAN-China (ACFTA), and ASEAN-India. In 2003, China was the fourth biggest trading 
partner with ASEAN and the EU was placed as the third biggest trading partner.235 
Thus, in November 2004 ASEAN and China signed the Agreement on Trade in Goods 
(TIG) of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation.236 The 
TIG agreement contains the non-maintenance of quantitative restrictions and the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers with the purpose of lowering the costs of trade 
transactions, to increase ASEAN-China trade, and to enhance economic efficiency. This 
agreement generates low-cost imports and boosts real income in both ASEAN and 
China.237 The ACFTA is divided into two different schedules of tariff reduction and 
elimination. ASEAN 6 and China completed the removal of their tariff barriers in 2010. 
While ASEAN CMLV countries have been given the schedule to reach zero tariff by 
                                                 
235 See Raul L. Cordenillo, The Economic Benefits to ASEAN of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), Studies Unit 
Bureau for Economic Integration, ASEAN Secretariat, 18 January 2005, available at : 
http://www.aseansec.org/17310.htm, last accessed : 02 February 2012. 
236 See ASEAN-CHINA Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) available at : 
http://www.mtib.gov.my/repository/woodspot/website_acfta_23july09.pdf, last accessed : 02 February 2012. 
237 See Raul L. Cordenillo, 2005. 
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2025.238 China also joined ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Cooperation with Japan and the 
Republic of Korea. APT covers cooperation in areas of finance and economic and social 
cultural.239 The trade between ASEAN and China has grown quickly, thus, it has placed 
China as the first biggest trading partner of ASEAN. Even replacing the US position in 
the first rank, skipping the Japanese position in the second rank and EU position in the 
third rank. ASEAN total trade values to China have reached $81,591.0 million USD or a 
11.6% share of the total value among the top ten trading partners. 
 
                                                 
238 See Chia Siow Yue, ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Paper for presentation 
at the AEP Conference, Hong Kong, 12-13 April 2004, available at : http://www.hiebs.hku.hk/aep/chia.pdf, last 
accessed : 02 February 2012. 
239 See ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation, available at : http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm, last accessed : 02 February 
2012. 
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Table 7. Top ten export markets and import origins, 2009240 
 
as of 15 July 2010 
value in million USD; share in per cent 
 
Export market Import origin 
Country of destination1/ Value of exports Share to total Country of origin1/ Value of Imports Share to total 
ASEAN        199,587.3             24.6   ASEAN            176,620.1             24.3  
European Union-27          92,990.9             11.5   China              96,594.3             13.3  
USA          82,201.8             10.1   Japan              82,795.1             11.4  
China          81,591.0             10.1   European Union-27              78,795.0             10.8  
Japan              78,068.6                   9.6   USA                  67,370.3                   9.3  
Hong Kong          56,696.7               7.0   Republic of Korea              40,447.4               5.6  
Republic of Korea              34,292.9                   4.2   Saudi Arabia                  17,901.7                   2.5  
Australia          29,039.3               3.6   Australia              14,810.8               2.0  
India              26,520.3                   3.3   United Arab Emirates                  13,797.0                   1.9  
United Arab Emirates              10,569.5                   1.3   India                  12,595.5                   1.7  
Total top ten destination countries            691,558.3                 85.3  Total top ten origin countries               601,727.1                 82.8  
Others2/            118,930.9                 14.7  Others2/               124,626.9                 17.2  
Total        810,489.2           100.0  Total           726,354.1           100.0  
            
Source: ASEAN Merchandise Trade Statistics Database (compiled/computed from data submission, publications and/or websites of ASEAN Member States' national ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) units, national statistics offices, customs departments/agencies, or central banks) 
 
 
 
                                                 
240 Cited from ASEAN External Trade  Statistics,  available at : http://www.asean.org/18137.htm, last accessed : 16 November 2011. 
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Table 8. Top ten ASEAN trade partner countries/regions, 2009241 
 
 
as of 15 July 2010 value in million USD; share in per cent 
Value Share to total ASEAN trade 
Trade partner country/region1/ 
Exports Imports Total trade Exports Imports Total trade 
ASEAN        199,587.3         176,620.1         376,207.3              24.6              24.3              24.5  
China          81,591.0           96,594.3         178,185.4              10.1              13.3              11.6  
European Union-27          92,990.9           78,795.0         171,785.9              11.5              10.8              11.2  
Japan          78,068.6           82,795.1         160,863.7                9.6              11.4              10.5  
USA              82,201.8               67,370.3             149,572.1                  10.1                    9.3                    9.7  
Republic of Korea          34,292.9           40,447.4           74,740.3                4.2                5.6                4.9  
Hong Kong              56,696.7               11,218.6           67,915.2                    7.0                    1.5                    4.4  
Australia          29,039.3           14,810.8           43,850.1                3.6                2.0                2.9  
India              26,520.3               12,595.5           39,115.8                    3.3                    1.7                    2.5  
United Arab Emirates              10,569.5               13,797.0           24,366.5                    1.3                    1.9                    1.6  
Total top ten trade partner countries            691,558.3             595,044.0          1,286,602.3                  85.3                  81.9               83.7  
Others2/            118,930.9             131,310.1             250,241.0                  14.7                  18.1                  16.3  
Total        810,489.2         726,354.1      1,536,843.3            100.0            100.0            100.0  
              
Source:  ASEAN Merchandise Trade Statistics Database (compiled/computed from data submission, publications and/or websites of ASEAN Member States' national  
 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) units, national statistics offices, customs departments/agencies, or central banks)     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
241 Cited from ASEAN External Trade  Statistics,  available at : http://www.asean.org/18137.htm, last accessed : 16 November 2011. 
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Table 9. ASEAN Member States Trade with China, 2004-2008242   
 (Value in million USD)     
Country Name 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Brunei Darussalam           243            234            174            201                0  
Cambodia             12              15              13              11              13  
Indonesia        4,605         6,662         8,344         8,897        11,637  
Lao PDR               1                4                1              35              15  
Malaysia        8,634         9,465        11,391        15,443        18,422  
Myanmar             75            119            133            475            499  
The Philippines        2,653         4,077         4,628         5,750         5,467  
Singapore       15,321        19,770        26,472        28,925        29,082  
Thailand        7,098         9,083        10,840        14,873        15,931  
Vietnam        2,711         2,828         3,015         3,336         4,491  
ASEAN Export       41,352        52,258        65,010        77,945        85,558  
Brunei Darussalam             87              94            120            157            171  
Cambodia           337            430            516            653            933  
Indonesia        4,101         5,843         6,637         8,616        15,247  
Lao PDR             89            185              23              43            131  
Malaysia       11,353        14,361        15,543        18,897        18,646  
Myanmar           351            286            397            564            671  
The Philippines        2,659         2,973         3,647         4,001         4,250  
Singapore       16,137        20,527        27,185        31,908        31,583  
Thailand        8,183        11,116        13,578        16,184        19,936  
Vietnam        4,416         5,322         7,306        12,148        15,545  
ASEAN Import       47,714        61,136        74,951        93,173      107,114  
Source: ASEAN Trade Statistics Database (Data as of July 2009)   
                                                 
242 ASEAN Member States Trade Data with China, available at : http://www.asean.org/23752.htm, last accessed : 02 February 2012. 
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V. ASEAN Trade Facilitations. 
V.a. Trade Facilitations at a regional dimension. 
Over the years, trade facilitation has established mainly at a regional level and 
developed along with regional institutions and trade organisation. Establishment of 
trade facilitation at a regional level has played a key role in the encouragement of 
closer integration. Regional trade facilitation usually has special characteristics based 
on the uniqueness of each region. It is influenced by so many factors such as the 
political and security situation, economic development, culture, population 
(demography), and geographical locations. Therefore, adopting an individualised 
approach to each region is indispensable.243 According to Kerr and Gaisford, trade 
analysis must extend beyond neoclassical-based welfare analysis and incorporate 
political economy elements such as rent seeking behaviour, and political decision-
making.244 
In order to establish regional trade facilitation with a global approach, it is also 
important to build collaboration with international organisations and international 
financial institutions such as the WTO, WCO, United Nations regional economic and 
social commissions, UNCTAD, regional development banks, and trade promotion 
organisations.  Further Carol Cosgrove-Sacks has explained, “[…] global standards and 
technical co-operation projects, for example, can be implemented in practice through 
existing regional structures, while regional knowledge and experience can be realised 
through global co-operation in the elaboration and harmonisation of standards […]”. The 
network of regional institutions can play an important role in the future building of 
trade facilitation. Its strategy is through extracting local experience and best practice 
around the world and then implementing it into the local setting of trade facilitation. 
Such strategy would increase efficiency of regional trade facilitation through global 
knowledge building and high quality standards. In the perspective of international 
trade, regional trade facilitation can be further developed related to the existing work 
done within the WTO DDA. The WTO strategy for technical co-operation and capacity 
building includes a regional approach. It has focused on the delivery of technical 
assistance on regional platforms, and assembled to the needs of the particular regions 
of the world.245 
The business community significantly contributed to the establishment and 
improvement of trade facilitation. According to Julian Oliver, the Director General of the 
IECC, there are three important elements in trade facilitation, i.e. “cooperation, 
modernisation and reformation”.   
“[…] Cooperation for trade facilitation, or else see their business migrate to those 
who do; customs modernisation or else see their revenues decline as trade 
migrates elsewhere; and governments reformation or else see other countries 
attract trade and foreign direct investment away from them […].”246  
Furthermore, the business community can contribute to attain a common goal of 
trade facilitation through dialogue with the government agencies. The dialogue can be 
                                                 
243 See Cosgrove-Sacks, Carol and Apostolov, Mario, Trade Facilitation: The Challenges for Growth and Development, 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations New York and Geneva 2003, ECE/TRADE/299, 
United Nations Publication, Sales N°. E.03.II.E.10, ISBN 92-1-116824-4, p.13, available at: 
http://www.unece.org/cefact/publica/ece_trade_299.pdf. Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Director, UNECE Trade 
Division  and Mario Apostolov, Coordinator, International Forum on Trade Facilitation, UNECE, How to Achieve 
Efficient and Open Collaboration for Trade Facilitation?. 
244 See Kerr, William A., and Gaisford, James D., Handbook on International Trade Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 
Massachusetts, USA, 2007, p. 4. 
245 See Cosgrove-Sacks, Carol and Apostolov, Mario, 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., p. 13. 
246 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., p. 15. 
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carried out when new regulations are introduced and old ones reviewed (and this is the 
key to compliance), providing expertise, and participating in training programmes. The 
business community demanded that government regulations should be adapted to the 
modern technology solutions and be more practical and efficient. Solutions can be 
found through harmonisation regulations across borders and the elimination of 
excessive formalities and procedures such as the implementation of the single window. 
Application of ICT on risk management is indispensable to overcome global trade 
volume growth. To determine the risk factor involved in trade transactions it is 
necessary to assess selective issues247 in international trade. It is very important to 
maintain efficiency in customs modernisation through regular validation and updating 
the system.248 
Trade facilitation is very complex because all of its elements are interrelated. 
Therefore, there is the need for an integrated system and synergic cooperation among 
the parties involved. Each state has to ensure that its trade facilitation strategy is 
integrated into its national and regional trade policy and its economic development 
plans. At a regional level, trade facilitation gives advantages to promote 
competitiveness and market integration. Improving transparency and speedy 
procedures is considered as a crucial element to establish successful competition in the 
global market.249 
According to Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, trade facilitation is defined as “public goods” 
that deliver benefits for all parties (including the public and private sector). In an 
economic perspective, public goods are defined as goods that are non-rivalrous and 
non-excludable,250 which means it should be free and common and enjoyed by all 
citizens. Therefore, trade facilitation should deliver benefits for all parties. It is 
delivered either directly or indirectly to business actors, traders, other stakeholders, 
governments and common citizens. 251   
Trade facilitation has the potential of saving billions of dollars for world economic 
growth and development. It enables trade liberalisation as an important tool for 
development based on predictable rules, openness, and lack of discrimination.252 Carol 
Cosgrove-Sacks includes predictable rules and logistical infrastructures as a part of 
public goods. The government is considered as not fulfilling its major tasks to citizen 
when public goods are not provided, in this term, trade facilitations, based on 
predictable rules.253  
The demands for the government to provide trade facilitation have increased 
since the rapid development in the area of ICT, which has a significant influence. In fact, 
trade facilitation faces so many challenges. As mentioned above, trade facilitation is 
very complicated because it covers a wide range of areas, for instance government 
regulations, business practices, international trade law, ICT and other areas related to 
it.254  
In order to provide trade facilitation as public goods collaboration is needed 
between the private and public sector to agree on concrete acts, commitments, and 
payments. Therefore, trade facilitation would be realised as long as the sum of the 
                                                 
247 For example documentary requirements, valuation, checks of quality, brand or origin. 
248 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Loc. Cit., p. 15. 
249 See Ibid., p. 15. 
250  See Public good, available at : http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/EEP101/spring05/Chapter07.pdf.  
251 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., p. 11. 
252 See Ibid., p. 11. 
253 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., p. 19. 
254 See Ibid.,, p. 19. 
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willingness of all stakeholders to contribute goes beyond the cost of the product.255 
However, to elaborate the interest of all parties into one vision is not an easy job. 
The governments of developing countries face problems related to the extra-cost 
that trade facilitation would impose. On the other hand, they do need trade facilitation 
to boost their exports. Demands from the business community have encouraged the 
government to establish trade facilitation. For example the Philippines, it claims that 
the implementation of trade facilitation measures was not based on WTO or regional 
trading arrangements, but due to demands from its business community.256 
As mentioned above, trade facilitation should deliver benefits to all parties. In this 
regard, the benefits do not only go to business actors, traders, or stakeholders but are 
also distributed for the welfare of society through the improvement of economic 
development. To deliver benefits for all, there is the need for collaboration of political 
will257, good government and good governance, and private sector participation. Pasca 
Lamy emphasises that political pressure from the top down is crucial to establish and 
run trade facilitation as it should be. In other words, the lack of “political will” hampers 
the correct running of trade facilitation.258  
Such collaboration goes beyond price, where in the long run building a dynamic 
system reduces the extra-cost of trade facilitation. Collaboration works in the 
complementary system that covers simplification, harmonisation, automation of trade 
procedures (e-trade and e-business), the guarantee of secure information, reduction of 
excessive bureaucratic procedures, and the removal of other obstacles to trade.  
In line with the idea “that trade facilitation should deliver benefit for all”, hence, 
ASEAN prescribes principles on trade facilitation259 in order to give guidance for the 
member states to carry out trade facilitation measures, i.e.: 
a. Transparency principle, means that all information on policies, laws, 
regulations, and administrative rulings, related to the trade have to be made 
available to all parties concerned, consistently, and at reasonable cost. 
b. Communications and Consultations principle, means the authorities must 
carry out facilitation and promoting effective mechanisms to the business 
community, including opportunities of consultation when formulating, 
implementing and reviewing rules related to trade. 
c. Simplification, practicability and efficiency principle, means that rules and 
procedures relating to trade must be simplified to ensure no more constraints 
to achieve its legitimate objectives. 
d. Non-discrimination principle, means that is rules and procedures relating to 
trade have to be applied in non-discriminatory manner and be based on market 
principles. 
e. Consistency and predictability principle, means that rules and procedures 
related to trade have to be applied in consistent, predictable, and uniform 
manner so as to minimise uncertainty and corruption. In this regard, rules and 
procedures related to trade has to be provided with clear and precise, having 
standard operating procedures, and to be applied with non-discretionary. 
f. Harmonisation, standardisation and recognition principle, means the rules 
between member states has to be harmonised accordance to international 
standards. 
                                                 
255 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., pp. 19-20. 
256 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., p. 20. 
257 See Alexander Arevalo, also argued that trade facilitation needs “highest-level support”, in this point, its interpreted 
as political will. It is not purely involve government functions, it is also necessary to mobilize private and public 
sectors participation and support. 
258 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., pp. 13-14. 
259 See Article 47 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement. 
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g. Modernisation and use of new technology principle, means that’s rules and 
procedures related to trade has to be reviewed and updated if necessary. Its 
due to changes of situation such as development of ICT.   
h. Due process principle, means as an access to adequate legal appeal 
procedures, adding greater certainty to trade transactions, in accordance with 
the applicable laws of member states. 
i. Co-operation principle, means member states must undertake to work closely 
with private sector through opening channels of communication and co-
operation. 
According to “doing business organization”, there are three elements that 
important in the export trade facilitation, consists of the number of all documents 
needed by traders to export, time to export, and cost to export. Documents of export are 
covering clearance document by government ministries, customs authorities, port and 
container terminal authorities, health and technical control agencies, and banks. The 
time to export is calculated starting from procedure of export initiated and runs until it 
is completed. The cost to export covering all the fees paid until the completion 
procedures to export the goods such as costs for documents, administrative fees for 
customs clearance and technical control, customs broker fees, terminal handling 
charges and inland transport.260 
ASEAN member states requires four to ten documents to completed export 
formalities. Singapore and Thailand are the ASEAN member states that requires less 
documents than others. Cambodia and Laos are the ASEAN member state that requires 
more documents compared to others. Indonesia in the third position as ASEAN member 
states that requires less document after Thailand and Singapore. Exports document has 
been identified as one of the barriers to the utilization of GSP 
 
Table 10. Time to do  exports procedures (days)261 
 
Countries 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Brunei Darussalam 27 27 27 25 19 
Cambodia 37 22 22 22 22 
Indonesia 18 18 18 17 17 
Malaysia 17 17 17 17 17 
Lao PDR 50 50 50 48 44 
The Philippines 17 16 16 15 15 
Thailand 17 14 14 14 14 
Vietnam 24 24 22 22 22 
Myanmar .. .. .. .. .. 
Singapore 5 5 5 5 5 
 
The average time to carry out export procedures in ASEAN is fifteen days. 
Singapore is the leader with the shortest time to export compared to other ASEAN 
member states. While among the other nine ASEAN member states, Laos is nominated 
as a country with the longest times to carry out export procedures and is also the most 
expensive country that has imposed the highest cost to export. It takes 48 days to 
completed export procedures in Laos. While in Indonesia, it takes 20 days to complete 
                                                 
260 Trading Across Border, available at : http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/trading-across-borders, last 
accessed : 20 January 2013. 
261 Available at : http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/html, last accessed : 21 January 2012. 
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the export procedures. The gap between the shortest periods and the longest periods is 
too wide. Such gap in the time to export and the cost to export between ASEAN member 
states is one of the obstacles of AEC realisation and ASW implementation. It is also one 
of the significant obstacles for a trader to maximise the utilisation of GSP.  
 
Table 11. Document to export (Number)262 
 
Countries 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Brunei Darussalam 6 6 6 6 6 
Cambodia 10 10 10 9 9 
Indonesia 4 4 4 4 4 
Malaysia 6 6 6 6 6 
Lao PDR 9 9 9 9 9 
The Philippines 7 7 7 7 7 
Thailand 7 5 5 5 5 
Vietnam 6 6 6 6 6 
Myanmar .. .. .. .. .. 
Singapore 4 4 4 4 4 
 
Table 12. Cost to export (USD per container)263 
 
Countries 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Brunei Darussalam 515 630 630 630 680 
Cambodia 722 732 732 732 732 
Indonesia 607 644 644 644 644 
Malaysia 432 450 450 450 450 
Lao PDR 1750 1860 1860 1860 1880 
The Philippines 755 771 771 630 630 
Thailand 615 625 625 625 625 
Vietnam 468 533 555 555 580 
Myanmar .. .. .. .. .. 
Singapore 416 456 456 456 456 
 
V.b. ASEAN Single Window 
For sixty-four years, the great achievement of the GATT was the significant 
reduction of tariffs and quotas to encourage further trade liberalisation. Unfortunately, 
it was followed by the increase of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) which have now become 
the largest obstacles to trade. NTBs allegedly serve as trade protectionism, which off 
course distorts fair trade competition and discourages trade liberalisation. In recent 
decades, the role of trade facilitation has increased to reduce NTBs. Trade facilitation is 
more effective to enhance trade liberalisation than tariff barrier removal. In the tight 
international trade competition, NTBs have been transformed and become a 
protectionism tool. This situation could create new protectionism in the international 
community. With respect to such matters, in Pascal Lamy’s speech, he states that: 
                                                 
262 Available at : http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/html, last accessed : 21 January 2012. 
263 Available at : http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/html, last accessed : 21 January 2012. 
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“[…] it is understandable that at a time of suffering, people want protection. But the 
irony is that trade protectionism does not protect. One country’s exports are another 
country’s imports, and vice versa. One country’s protectionism will lead to another 
country’s protectionism. This is even more true in today’s world of global value chains 
where protectionism hurts not only consumers but also upstream domestic producers 
importing low valued-added input to focus on higher technology-oriented tasks – 
hence endangering highly paid, export-oriented jobs. To turn to protectionist trade 
measures in the current circumstances would be a huge mistake – one that could send 
the slowing global economy back into deep recession […]”.264 
There are several factors that have made trade facilitation grow rapidly, such as 
ICT evolution, public participations, and infrastructure development. First, the rapid 
development of information society has driven the creation of sophisticated tools for 
trade, for instance e-business. Accordingly, positive opportunities are created from this 
digital revolution. The ICT development is utilised within trade facilitation to reduce 
NTBs.265  
Second, to provide trade facilitation governments would not be able to work 
alone. In this regard, participation of the private sector (business community/traders) 
and NGOs are urgently needed. Therefore, the government as a policy maker needs to 
involve the active participation of all stakeholders concerned, particularly the most 
vulnerable groups in society. Previously, the task of establishing standards on trade 
facilitation was the domain area of the public sector.  Currently the private sector also 
plays an active role in such field and its contributions have increased. Even though the 
roles of public policy have changed, but remain of great importance. The government 
has several main tasks, for instance to disseminate best practice, promote market 
access, and maintain fair competition in the market.266 
Third, trade facilitation is recognised as an essential component of the basic 
infrastructure of the market economy and of democracy. Inherently, it is related to 
availability of the tangible and intangible public infrastructures of a state. Tangible 
infrastructures include transportation, energy, customs services, and 
telecommunications. Intangible infrastructures cover knowledge, networking, 
education, training, capacity building of institutions, and good governance. Therefore, it 
requires a broad and comprehensive approach to trade policy. 267 
Trade facilitation could stimulate trade creation between regions. In the regional 
dimension, trade facilitation plays a positive role in the exploitation of all the 
comparative advantages that belong to the region. Regional trade facilitation is 
supposed to play “a unique role” in promoting consistency and co-operation among 
many relevant players at the regional level. Regional trade facilitation also contributes 
to the integration of economic, social, and environmental aspects for sustainable 
development.268 
Single windows have become a global trend due to the significant reduction in 
transaction costs of trade. Singapore is the pioneer single window in ASEAN, while 
                                                 
264 See WTO News: Speeches – Directorate General Pascal Lamy: Lamy makes a strong plea for global co-operation, 
6 October 2011, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl208_e.htm?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter, last 
accessed : 6 October 2011. 
265 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Paolo Garonna, Deputy Executive Secretary, UNECE : The Policy Debate on Trade 
Facilitation, pp. 6-7.  
266 See Ibid., pp. 6-7.  
267 See Ibid., pp. 6-7.  
268 See Ibid.,  p. 7.  
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Africa is led by Senegal and Kenya. Australia is currently undergoing preparations for 
the establishment of their National Single Window.269 
The ASEAN Single Window (ASW) was established as part of a step to realise AEC.  
During the 9th ASEAN Summit 2003, the ASEAN member states committed to deepening 
and broadening their internal economic integration and links with the world economy 
through a “bold, pragmatic, and unified strategy”.270 In the context of the ASW’s wording 
of a bold, pragmatic, and unified strategy, this was described as the process of 
developing infrastructures of trade facilitation, especially ICT connectivity through e-
ASEAN. Furthermore, Alexander M. Arevalo271 elaborates the importance of the “[…] 
adoption of the single window approach including the electronic processing of trade 
documents at national and regional level […],” to accelerate ASEAN economic integration 
2010. 
As the follow up of the Bali Concord II Declaration, the Informal ASEAN Economic 
Ministers (AEM) Meeting was held in January 2004. During the meeting eleven 
sectors272 were discussed that were identified for priority integration.  In this regard, 
the Ministers considered that such priority sectors were crucial to accelerate the 
realisation of the AEC. To facilitate the establishment of the ASW, the Ministers agreed 
to set up “the ASEAN inter-agency Task Force”. It comprises representatives from 
relevant government agencies, such as, trade, health, agriculture, customs, and those 
who are responsible for standards and the conformance of the ASW design.273 In short, 
the ASEAN inter-agency Task Force was given the task of designing an appropriate 
model for the ASW. Members of the ASEAN inter-agency Task Force consist of Customs 
Authorities of 10 ASEAN member states, including the Ministry of International Trade, 
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN-EU Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS) 
and other government agencies (OGA) involved  in cargo clearance processing such as 
permit/license processing and cargo inspection. 
APRIS is a programme that is co-financed by the ASEAN Secretariat and the 
European Commission Co-operation Office.274 It is directly used to support ASEAN 
accelerate realisation of AEC. Practically, it helps establish the ASEAN single market 
and production base. It has the further goal of strengthening the relationship between 
ASEAN-EU. There were two phases of APRIS that are known as APRIS I and APRIS II.275 
APRIS II is the successor of APRIS I that ended in September 2006. APRIS I made a 
successful contribution to help ASEAN integration. APRIS II started on 20 November 
2006, for a period of 3 years, and ended in 2010. The next successor of APRIS II was the 
ASEAN Economic Integration Support Programme (AEISP) that started in 2011 with a 
                                                 
269 See Alvin C.K, ASEAN Single Window, Head of Company Dagang Net Commerce, Presented in 
Asian Forum for Information Technology (AFIT) Tokyo, Japan, 22-23 October 2007, available at: 
http://www.cicc.or.jp/japanese/kouenkai/pdf_ppt/pastfile/h19/afit/presentation_2.pdf 
270 See The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), available at : http://www.asean.org/15159.htm. 
271 See Chairman, Inter-Agency Task Force on the ASEAN Single Window. 
272 See ASEAN Framework Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors, Vientiane, 29 November 2004, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/16659.htm. The priority sector according to paragraph Article 2 of this agreement is 
covering agro-based products, air travel, automotives, e-ASEAN, electronics, fisheries, healthcare, rubber-based 
products, textiles and apparels, tourism; and wood-based products. 
273 See Media Statement, Informal Asean Economic Ministers Meeting, 19-20 January 2004, Yogayakarta, Indonesia, 
available at : http://www.asean.org/15661.htm. 
274 See ASEAN-EU Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS) - Phase II, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/apris2/index.htm. 
275 See  APRIS Phase I and Phase II have been operating for the last eight years with EU grant support of €10 million 
(approximately  IDR 120 billion). 
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total budget of approximately €15 million Euro. The AEISP is directly used to assist 
ASEAN realise its targets for the creation of a single market by 2015.276 
The APRIS II successfully assisted the initial establishment of ASW.277 The APRIS 
II Team was given the task of designing a fully computerised ASEAN Customs Transit 
System (ACTS). This system provides electronic messages that are used for 
communications between traders and customs. The communications include the 
submission of transit declarations, discharge of completed transit movements, and 
exchange of transit movement data between customs authorities based on risk 
assessment. The EU computerised transit system is designed with the purpose to 
prevent fraud in exports and imports.278  
In the 7th ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting, it was stated that “[…] ASW is the 
most important initiative of customs that will ensure the expeditious clearance of goods 
and reduce the cost of doing business in ASEAN […]”. ASW facilitates the speedy 
clearance of ASEAN extra-trade through the electronic processing of trade documents 
at a national and regional level.279 The major goal of ASW is to develop harmonious 
collaboration and partnership between governmental agencies and economic 
operators280 within the framework of the international supply chain.281 The first pilot 
project of ASW was operated by Thailand and the Philippines. ASW was fully 
implemented by ASEAN 6282 (The Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei 
Darussalam, and Malaysia) in 2008. Thus, it will be followed by the ASEAN 4 
(Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam and Myanmar) in 2012.283 According to the schedule of 
the establishment, the first phase of the ASW has to be completed by 2012 when all the 
National Windows of the ten ASEAN member states are ready to operate. 
                                                 
276 See Press Release European Commission Provides € 7.2 million to Support ASEAN Integration Process, Jakarta, 5 June 
2007, http://www.asean.org/20649.htm. 
277 “[…] During four-year period (2006-2010), APRIS II focused its support on developing key agreements and 
implementation mechanisms leading to trade facilitation and removal of non-tariff barriers between the ASEAN 
members.  This  had  led  to  tangible  successes  including  the simplification  of  customs  procedures  across  
borders,  harmonisation  of  administrative  documents, and standardisation of technical requirements. As stated 
by the Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr Surin  Pitsuwan that “over  the  last  eight  years,  the  APRIS  support  
from  the  EU  has  been  successful  and  helpful  to ASEAN. The new phase of support opens a new and exciting 
chapter for economic cooperation with the EU.  I  look  forward  to  working  in  closer  partnership  with  the  EU  
in  advancing  economic integration […].” See Joint Press Release ASEAN and EU: Family matters, available at : 
http://www.delmys.ec.europa.eu/en/pdf%20files/Press_Release_APRIS_II_28_02_11_clear.pdf. 
278 See ASEAN-EU Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS) - Phase II, A Modern Regional Transit Transport 
System: Asean Customs Transit System (ACTS) To Ensure ASEAN Economic Community Trade Facilitation, 
available at : http://www.asean.org/apris2/file_pdf/result/%20trade%20facilitation.pdf. 
279 See Paragraph 14 of the Joint Media Statement of the Thirty Seventh ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM) Meeting, 
Vientiane, 28 September 2005, available at : http://www.asean.org/17780.htm. See also Joint Media Statement 
of the Thirty-Eight ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM) Meeting, in Kuala Lumpur, 22 August 2006, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/18722.htm. See also Article 5 Agreement to establish and implement the ASEAN Single 
Window., stipulated as follows : “[…] Member Countries shall develop and implement their National Single 
Windows in a timely manner for the establishment of the ASEAN Single Window. Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore shall operationalise their National Single Windows by 2008, at the 
latest. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam shall operationalise their National Single Windows no later 
than 2012 […]”. 
280 Such as importers,  exporters,  transport  operators,  express industries,  customs  brokers,  forwarders,  commercial  
banking  entities  and  financial institutions, insurers, etc. 
281 See Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006. 
282 See Paragraph 3 Article 2 of ASEAN Framework Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors. 
283 See Paragraph 14 of the Joint Media Statement of the Thirty Seventh ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM) Meeting. See 
also Joint Media Statement of the Thirty-Eight ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM) Meeting. See also Article 5 
Agreement to establish and implement the ASEAN Single Window., which stipulated as follows : “[…] Member 
Countries shall develop and implement their National Single Windows in a timely manner for the establishment 
of the ASEAN Single Window. Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore shall 
operationalise their National Single Windows by 2008, at the latest. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam 
shall operationalise their National Single Windows no later than 2012 […]”. 
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Figure 3. Phase 1 ASEAN Single Window in 2012284 
 
 
 
In the 11th ASEAN Summit 2005, ASEAN member states signed an “agreement to 
establish and implement the ASEAN Single Window”. ASEAN leaders are agreed adopting 
the single window to accelerate realization of AEC. Recommendation to implement 
ASW mentioned under Paragraph f Article 8 of the “ASEAN Framework Agreement for 
the Integration of Priority Sectors”, it is stipulated as follows: 
“[…] the member states be necessary to develop the single window approach including 
the electronic processing of trade documents at national and regional level by 31 
December 2005 […]”.  
ASW defined as the environment where National Single Windows of member 
states operate and integrate.285 ASW is “[…]  trade-facilitating environment that 
operated on the basis of standardized information, procedures, formalities, and 
international best practices to the release and clearance cargoes at entry points of ASEAN 
under any particular customs regime (imports, exports, and others) […]”. 286 The basic 
concept of ASW is to achieve better economic efficiency through trade facilitation.287 
ASW has been used to support the flow of intra-trade and extra-trade of ASEAN as part 
of the global supply chain. There are three layers institutions that playing crucial roles 
                                                 
284 Cited from ASEAN Single Window for Trade Facilitation and ASEAN Integration by 2015, SPECA-ASEAN UneDOCS 
Seminar, April 2007, available at : http://www.unescap.org/tid/projects/unedocs_s3_ le.pdf, last accessed : 3 
July 2011. 
285 See Paragraph 1 Article 2 Agreement to establish and implement the ASEAN Single Window, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/18005.htm. 
286 See Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006.  
287 One of the objective of ASW agreement is to strengthen the coordination and partnership among ASEAN Customs 
Administrations and relevant line ministries and agencies, and economic operators (importers, exporters, 
transport operators, express industries, customs brokers, forwarders, commercial banking entities and financial 
institutions, insurers, and those relevant to the international supply chain) to effectively and efficiently 
implement the ASEAN Single Window. 
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in the implementation of ASW consists of “custom administration288, lead agency289 and 
line ministries and agencies”290.  
While National Single Window (NSW) defined as “[…] a single entry and a single 
decision making under the concept of single submission of data and information, a single 
and synchronous processing of data and information, a single decision making for 
customs release and clearance of cargo[…]”. 291 NSW is functioned as the international 
supply chain, which serves movement of goods and commodities crossing national 
borders. In order to enhance trade facilitation NSW has been designed with modern 
features. These features are including internationally aligned standards and 
information parameters, appropriate modernized methods of information 
administration and processing, and streamlined decision-making by a customs 
administration. 292 
ASW and NSW are established based on the provisions and best practices as set 
forth in the Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC) and in other related international 
conventions. ASW and NSW are designed in accordance with numerous international 
recommendations and standards established by UNCTAD, UNECE, and UNCITRAL.293 
Establishment of ASW and NSW contributes tremendously to “just in time trade” 
through e-trade facilities. ASW and NSW serve and connect all parties involved in trade 
between borders.  The principle of “just in time trade” considerably influences the 
international supply chain flow. The implementation of “just in time trade” could reduce 
transaction costs, maximise the firm benefits, boost import and export earnings, and 
prevent loses of state revenues from customs duties.  
 
Figure 4. The role of ASW in the international supply chain.294 
 
 
 
                                                 
288 Referring to the government agency, which is responsible for the administration of Customs law and related national 
legislation. 
289 Referring to the government agency that appointed by Member Countries to take the leading role in the 
establishment and the implementation of the ASEAN Single Window.  
290 Referring to the government agencies, which are responsible for the administration and enforcement of trade laws 
and regulations as relevant to the release and clearance of cargo.  
291 See Paragraph 2 Article 2 Agreement to establish and implement the ASEAN Single Window, available at : 
http://www.asean.org/18005.htm. 
292 See Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006. 
293 See Ibid. 
294 Cited from ASEAN Single Window for Trade Facilitation and ASEAN Integration by 2015 SPECA-ASEAN UNeDOCS 
Seminar, April 2007, available at : http://www.unescap.org/tid/projects/unedocs_s3_le.pdf. 
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There are four main principles that have to be applied in the implementation of 
ASW. Those principles consist of consistency, simplicity, transparency, and 
efficiency.295 Consistency principles provide predictability rules and assure legal 
certainty for traders. In some countries, so many trade rules and policies are frequently 
changed, thus, creating insecurity in doing business. The simplicity principle is applied 
to reduce the processing time of documents or to simplify import-export procedures. In 
most countries in the world, complex bureaucracy chains and excessive documents are 
common obstacles for traders. In the context of developing countries, transparency 
principles are implemented to reduce corruption in bureaucracy. The purpose of 
efficient procedures is to transform the procedure into a more affordable and speedy 
system, which is supported by the implementation of a ICT system. 
 
V.b.1. The concept and implementation of ASW. 
To provide a legal and technical framework of the ASW, in the 8th Meeting of the 
Task Force, “the Protocol to establish and implement the ASEAN Single Window” was 
issued. The adoption of this Protocol is based on Article 6 of the ASW Agreement.296 The 
ASW Agreement is the hard law in the implementation of ASEAN Single Windows. 
Therefore, Paragraph 2 Article 1 explains the position of the Protocol towards the ASW 
Agreement, as follows: 
“[…] the Protocol shall be read and interpreted in accordance with the ASW 
Agreement. In the event of any inconsistency between this Protocol and the ASW 
Agreement, the provisions of the ASW Agreement shall take precedence […]” 
The member states issued “the technical guide of ASW and NSW implementation”,  
with the purpose of providing technical, functional, and operational guidance for the 
implementation of the single window. It contains a compilation of relevant 
international accepted standards, procedures, documents, glossary, and technical 
details as deemed appropriate to be adopted in the NSW. In this regard, the ASEAN 
member states have been given the freedom to make necessary modifications or 
updates related to the ASW and NSW implementation with the idea to improve 
efficiency.  
To achieve the planned target “the Action Plan of ASW implementation” was issued 
and contains the schedule of the ASW implementation activities. ASW operation 
requires linkages between economic operators and governments. To assemble NSW 
into ASW, strong cooperation and technological compatibility are required. The 
conceptual model of ASW connects all NSWs through secure connectivity. In this 
regard, the transactions among the NSW and ASW systems have to be carried out under 
a secure infrastructure as described below:  
                                                 
295 See Article 4 Agreement to establish and implement the ASEAN Single Window. 
296 See Article 6 of the Agreement to Establish and Implement the ASEAN Single Window, concerning “Technical Matters 
of the ASEAN Single Window”, stipulated that “[…] Member Countries shall, by means of a Protocol to be agreed 
upon, adopt relevant internationally accepted standards, procedures, documents, technical details and 
formalities for the effective implementation of the ASEAN Single Window […]”. 
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Figure 5. The conceptual model of a secure infrastructure.297 
 
 
 
 
 
ASW applies the most advanced development of information processing (ICT), and 
integrates this into the secure networking environment.298 Transactions covered under 
the ASW system include “Government to Business, Business to Business, Government to 
Government and others transactions with such nature”. The process of transaction 
business to business under ASW system is described as follows: 
 
Figure 6. The ASW process flow in the form business to business.299 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
297 Cited from Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006. 
298 See Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006. 
299 Cited from SPECA-ASEAN UneDOCS Seminar, ASEAN Single Window for Trade Facilitation and ASEAN Integration by 
2015,  April 2007, 
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The protocol of the ASW emphasises three crucial technical aspects in the single 
window implementation. It consists of documents and formalities300, data and 
information, and ICT application. Such aspects are important to synchronise the 
implementation of single windows among member states. ASW establishes the 
environment where ten NSWs operate and integrate to expedite customs release and 
clearance in order to reduce transaction costs and reduce bureaucracy chains.301  
The application and standardisation of ICT is deemed as “the backbone” of the 
single window.  As mentioned above, ASW and NSW operation requires compatibility 
and interoperability of national systems, such as data and information from customs 
administrations, ministries, and other government agencies. These components 
become crucial once member states use the ICT application in their NSW system. 
Adoption of commercial formalities, standards and documents is used to ensure 
synchronous processing. Relevant ministries and other government agencies have an 
essential role in the maintenance of steady coordination among the different 
components of the single window system.302 Adoption of the single window requires 
simplification, standardisation, and harmonisation of the following elements:303  
a. Documentation and processes undertaken by line ministries and agencies;  
b. Information requirements of line ministries and agencies; and  
c. Format of the data for ICT applications.  
 
Figure 7. Conceptual model of integration 10 NSWs into ASW.304 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
300 “[…] The documents and formalities that used in the ASW systems consist of : a) ASEAN Customs Declaration 
Document as endorsed by ASEAN Directors-General of Customs; b)  commercial and transport documents for 
the release and clearance of goods and commodities by Customs Administrations as stipulated in national laws 
and regulations of Member Countries; c)  formalities and documents required by national laws and regulations 
for the release and clearance of goods and commodities by Customs Administrations as stipulated in national  
laws and regulations of Member Countries; and d) other formalities as  stipulated by national laws and 
regulations and international conventions where relevant. With respect to the format of document and 
formalities will be determine by the respective national competent authorities compliance with international 
standards […]”. 
301 See Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006. 
302 See Ibid. 
303 See Ibid. 
304 Cited from Arevalo, Alexander M., Development of the Asean Single Window, Chairman Inter-Agency Task Force on the 
ASEAN Single Window, Chairman ASEAN CUSTOMS I.C.T., Heads Chairman, ASEAN CUSTOMS I.C.T., Heads 
Deputy Commissioner, Management Information System and Technolog, Deputy Commissioner Management 
Information System and Technology Group Bureau of Customs, Philippines, Presented on BIMP-EAGA CIQS Task 
Force Meeting & Seminar Discovery Suites – 21 to 22 August 2006, available at : 
http://www.adb.org/documents/others/ogc-toolkits/anti-money-laundering/documents/ASEAN-Trade-Single-
Window.pdf.  
 301 
According to Alexander Arevalo, “trade facilitation is not a purely government 
function”, in this regard, the government is not able to implement trade facilitation 
without support from other stakeholders. Further, he emphasises that collaborations 
and partnerships with stakeholders at the national, regional, and international level is 
indispensable. It is important for developing countries to use the bottom-to-top 
approach in NSW implementation.305  Such approach is supposed to eliminate certain 
constraints306 in trade facilitation.307 
 
Figure 8. Bottom-to-top strategy (integration of National Single Windows).308 
 
 
 
There are three technical pillars in the ASW.309 The first pillar consists of 
functions and processes. The second pillar comprises of standardisation and 
synchronisation. The third pillar is the ultimate goal known as “integration”. Each of 
these pillars are operated by a sophisticated ICT interface through e-customs, e-trade 
and other e-government facilities that link all the parties in the ASW. In a broad  
concept,  ASW  is operated  in  the  environment  that has  features comprising 
progressive synchronisation  and  integration with standardised information 
connecting governments and the business community.310 The functional linkage within 
ASW is based on relationships between government authorities and economic 
operators. 
 
                                                 
305 See Ibid. 
306 Constrains of trade facilitation includes of excessive documentation requirements; the lack of automation and 
transparency; unclear import and export requirements; inadequate procedures (especially concerning the lack 
of audit-based controls and risk-assessment techniques); and lack of modernisation and co-operation among 
customs and other government agencies. 
307 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit.,  p. 17.  
308 See Arevalo, Alexander M., 2006. 
309 See SPECA-ASEAN UNeDOCS Seminar, April 2007. 
310 See Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006.  
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Figure 9. The ASW strategy approach.311 
 
 
 
The focal point of the ASW is to streamline operational linkages and procedures 
in foreign trade. It is designed to facilitate a seamless flow of regulatory information 
among ministries and other government agencies at national level. Intra-agency 
cooperation plays a key role in streamlining management and enhancing just in time 
services.312  
NSW should be the common, neutral, secure, and trusted connection for business 
actors, industries, traders, and governments to communicate, exchange and process 
trade or related information.313 The wording of a “common, neutral, secure and trusted 
connection”, describes that the NSW should be easy to operate by users, have a friendly 
user interface, and give assurance of user data protection. The scope of NSW 
transactions comprise of customs administration, governmental agencies, and 
economic agents.314  
 
Figure 10. The conceptual model of a NSWs.315 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
311 Cited from Arevalo, Alexander M., 2006. 
312 See Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006.  
313 See Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006. 
314 Economic agent and operator, includes e.g.  importers,  exporters,  transport  operators,  express  industries, customs 
brokers,  forwarders,  commercial  banking  entities  and  financial  institutions, insurers, and the like), and the 
completion of procedures by management authorities in the respective arenas (trade management, duty and tax 
management. 
315 Cited from Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006. 
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The conceptual model of NSW comprises activities and interactions among six 
major components. Those components are described on the diagram above and consist 
of: “trading community, customs administration, other government agencies, transport 
operators, banking and insurance industry, and their linkages to ASEAN/international 
systems”.316 It enables ASEAN member states to enhance their capability to be more 
competitive and efficient in global competition. It also helps traders and producers of 
ASEAN, especially SMEs, to compete in the global market through reductions of 
transactions cost, cutback bureaucracy chains and time efficiency. 
 
VI.b.2. The role of e-customs, e-trade and e-government in the ASW. 
Many studies have identified that delays, unclear and/or redundant 
documentation requirements, and lack of adequate customs automation lead to costly 
trading procedures. In many cases excessive tariff costs can cause business losses. 
Providing effective and accessible trade facilitation is considered a smart solution with 
plus values such as a multiplayer effect on increasing trade and promoting economic 
growth.317 According to Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, ICT has a significant role in trade 
facilitation to eliminate the “invisible” barriers to trade.318 Corruption can be considered 
as an invisible barrier of trade.  
Inherently, in the world there is no such thing as a “sterile country” from 
corruption. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) organisation has ranked 183 
countries in the world.  In its assessment, CPI uses the scale of 0 to 10 to measure the 
level of corruption in those countries. Extremely corrupt countries are indicated by the 
scale 0 and very clean countries are indicated by the scale 10.  According to corruption 
perception index 2011, the top three cleanest countries in the world are New Zealand, 
Denmark, and Finland, where these countries were given a corruption index above 9.  
While the most corrupt countries in the world are Somalia, North Korea, and Myanmar, 
which have a corruption index below 1.5. Singapore is one of the countries in ASEAN 
that is included in the top five clean countries with a corruption index of 9.2 and 
Myanmar is ranked as the most corrupt country in ASEAN with a corruption index of 
1.5.319  
                                                 
316 See Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006. 
317 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., p. 17. 
318 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003;. Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., pp. 18-19. “[…] in a rapidly changing global 
economy, increasingly characterised by electronic business, using advanced ICT and global supply chains, 
government and business leaders should adopt trade facilitation as a key tool for economic development. 
ICT should be used to address issues of integrity, accountability, and transparency, for example by 
enhancing the free flows of information between customs administrations and the business community. 
One of the objectives would be to promote economic integration within the existing regional blocs. Finally, 
the “invisible” barriers to trade, which are mostly administrative in nature and simply add costs to trade, 
should be removed. The standards and projects for trade facilitation, which are administered by the United 
Nations and the other international organisations, are based on the principle of open access to all. Various 
countries and agents may value the products of trade facilitation differently (as is the case with 
UN/EDIFACT), they may have different capacity to contribute to providing them, yet at the end they have 
equal access to these products. Inefficient trade procedures are a troublesome externality for those 
involved in international trade, yet the products of trade facilitation can also be seen as an externality – 
available to everyone, no matter whether some parties want more or less of them than others […]” 
319 See Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), available at : http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/#CountryResults, 
last accessed : 14 January 2011. 
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Table 13.  ASEAN Member States Corruption Index 2011. 320 
 
No. Country Rank Corruption Index 
1. Singapore 5 9.2 
2. Brunei Darussalam 44 5.2 
3. Malaysia 60 4.3 
4. Thailand 80 3.4 
5. Indonesia 100 3 
6. Vietnam 112 2.9 
7 The Philippines 125 2.6 
8. Laos 154 2.2 
9. Cambodia 164 2.1 
10. Myanmar 180 1.5 
 
These data show the significant gap between ASEAN member states in the 
implementation of good governance and good government, especially the application of 
transparency and excellent services in public service.  The ASEAN member states need 
to address such gap by encouraging the “vulnerable member states” with the low 
corruption index scale to make more effort to combat corruption and implement good 
governance in their public service. This gap creates obstacles in the implementation of 
ASW since ASW is an integrated system. 
Principally, the use of the ICT application in the single window is part of a 
strategy to combat corruption. Infrastructures and applications of ICT must be based 
on the international standard and international best practices. Standardisation of ICT 
aims to avoid the creation of new “barriers” to trade and to provide an accessible and 
affordable ICT application to traders in ASEAN and traders from ASEAN trading 
partners. However, the differences between countries to provide trade facilitation 
cannot be neglected, due to their capacity and ability. In this regard, the situation of a 
country depends on its state income, economic development, human resources, and the 
capacity of its institutions to influence its infrastructure building on trade facilitation.  
Trade facilitation is not simply about technical standards, rules, or procedures 
but covering wide range of aspects. Each elements on trade facilitation needs to be 
seriously implemented in appropriate manner to produce “good practice” on trade 
services. Trade facilitation has to be formulated and evaluated in the context of policy 
strategies for economic reform, stabilisation, and growth. As mentioned before that 
trade facilitation supposed to be public goods, therefore, its implementation should 
give contribution to the society welfare. 321   
Trade facilitation also used for “developing comprehensive national strategies”, 
therefore, it has to be integrated into the national development strategy. Commonly, 
countries integrating trade facilitations into theirs national development strategy as 
part of trade liberalisation policy. It believed giving positive impact for the developing 
countries to “achieve financial stability and growth, attracting foreign direct investment, 
improving governance and competitiveness”. Thereby generating jobs, alleviating 
poverty, and increase standards of living. With respect to the correlation between trade 
                                                 
320 See Ibid. 
321 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Paolo Garonna, Deputy Executive Secretary, UNECE : The Policy Debate on Trade 
Facilitation, pp. 7-9.  
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facilitation and development, Paolo Garonna emphasized about the role of “good 
government” in the establishment of trade facilitation. 322  
“[…] sound policies in trade, customs, taxation, education, public services, etc. are both 
a condition and an outcome of trade facilitation. When the public administration is 
corrupt, customs are inefficient and unskilled, tax evasion and the black economies 
flourish, and there is no technical standard, software or magic bureaucratic formula 
that can facilitate trade. Trade facilitation presupposes, above all, “good government”, 
accountable democracies and sound and bold policies of economic and social reform 
[…]”323 
Application and standardization of the ICT is functioned to linking and integrating 
the e-trade and e-customs service. E-trade and e-customs is including into e-
government system. Within single window system, the relationship between traders 
and customs administrations commenced when traders submitted required data and 
information to the customs.  Its followed by processes of declaration, communication, 
and dialogue of declared information to customs administrations according to the 
national laws and regulations. 324  
When trader submitted the customs declaration document and other related 
documents to the customs administrations (customs office), they are entering into legal 
engagement based on the national law and regulations. 325  Custom administration will 
issued receipt and validation of the submitted information by traders. Thus, proper 
communication will be established with the relevant agencies and concerned 
parties/operators in the processing of clearance and release. Process completed upon 
the final decision by customs administration for physical release of shipment. 326   
Integration of e-customs into the ASW system has the purpose of enhancing trade 
competitiveness through the implementation of good governance in trade services. The 
application of ICT is used to ensure transparency through the modernisation of 
techniques for efficient customs release and clearance. It is also part of the ASEAN 
customs administration strategy plan to migrate into e-customs.  It is important to 
secure the connectivity and interoperability of systems dealing with customs clearance 
and release through the development of common protocols and standards of 
communication and messaging.327 One of the goals of ASW is to accelerate the customs 
clearance of goods and commodities to achieve higher economic efficiency through 
streamlining and simplifying related procedures.328  
ASW is also described as an integrated environment of the collective effort of all 
stakeholders, which are integrated as a major function of the international supply 
chain, such as transportation, commercial transactions, and cargo movement.329 In 
conclusion, ASW and NSW are part of a more comprehensive program of e-government 
in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of trade transactions. Overall, they do not 
merely contribute to the custom services for public users but also to the promotion of 
good governance. 
 
                                                 
322 See Ibid. 
323 See Ibid. 
324 See Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006. 
325 See Ibid. 
326 See Ibid. 
327 See Ibid. 
328 See Alvin C.K, 2007. 
329 See Alvin C.K, 2007. 
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Figure 11. NSWs ICT environment.330 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Information process of ASEAN Single Windows.331 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In July 2010 the US-ASEAN Business Council conducted a survey regarding the 
applications and features of ASW and NSW. The survey aimed to find out users’ opinion 
on what features or services they most need to be included in the ASW. This survey 
took into account both national and regional dimensions. In the end, the survey results 
were communicated to the ASEAN officials concerned. It was expected to be considered 
as an input for the design and implement of ASW. 332 
                                                 
330 Cited from SPECA-ASEAN UneDOCS Seminar, 2007. 
331 See SPECA-ASEAN UNeDOCS Seminar, 2007. 
332 See USABC (US-ASEAN Business Council Inc.),  Analysis of Results : Survey on ASEAN Single Window, August 2010, 
available at : http://www.usasean.org/ASEAN/ASW_Survey_Aug242010.pdf. (This survey and report were a 
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The survey revealed that two-thirds of respondents had not heard about ASW, 
and almost 90% would like to receive more information about it. Import and export 
declarations, certificates of origin, electronic payment of customs duties and taxes, and 
express consignments, were the most frequently used in the clearance procedures and 
processes. Most respondents generally thought that the processing of import and 
export declarations, electronic payment of duties and taxes and processing of 
certificates of origin were not all automated or processed electronically.  Therefore, 
ASEAN should enhance its efforts to implement electronic certificate of origin 
processing. ASEAN also needs to ensure that the efforts of NSW focus on the 
improvement of electronic submission, processing, and decision-making. This is 
associated with import-export declaration and electronic payment of duties. The 
possibility of exchanging data among ASEAN member states must be realised in the 
short term.333 
Practically, all respondents thought that they would derive either substantial or 
reasonable benefits from the full automation of the fifteen cargo clearance procedures 
listed on the survey.334 Particularly the automation of import-export declarations, 
certificates of origin, electronic payment of duties/taxes, port operations, and express 
consignments, where they are most often engaged with those processes. According to 
the survey, on average two-thirds of respondents thought that all potential features of 
NSW were important. In order to ensure these features run properly each ASEAN state 
member needs to provide good ICT infrastructures and secure connectivity.335  
According to the analysis of the survey, it has been recommended that ASEAN 
focus on its efforts to ensure that import-export declarations, certificates of origin, 
electronic payment of customs duties/taxes, and express consignments can be 
submitted and fully processed electronically. The data related to these transactions can 
be exchanged between member states to speed up cargo clearance. In addition, ASEAN 
also needs to accelerate the implementation of electronic processing and the exchange 
of certificates of origin in ASEAN.336 
 
V.b.3. The roles of ASW and NSW in the implementation of good governance and 
eradicating corruption. 
EU GSP has been changed and improved throughout the 40 years of its 
implementation. It is aimed to respond to the development needs of beneficiary 
countries. Despite the fact that many beneficiary countries deal with difficulties to 
utilise such preference benefit, utilisation of GSP is influenced by so many factors, 
which cover a wide range of areas at a local, national, regional, and international level. 
In the last two decades, trade facilitation measures have been considered as an 
important factor that could promote optimum utilisation of GSP. According to Luzius 
Wasescha, trade facilitation is “[…] an essential component of the basic infrastructure of 
the market economy and of democracy […]”. He argues that it is basically connected to 
                                                                                                                                          
joint effort of the U.S. ASEAN Business Council and the U.S. Agency for International Development-funded ASEAN 
Single Window Project, which is part of the ADVANCE Program supported by USAID and the U.S. Department of 
State). 
333 See Ibid. 
334 Import declaration, Export declaration, Transit, Transshipment, Express consignments,Financial Settlement (EFT 
Payment of customs duties/taxes), Certificate of origin, Health certificates/permits/licenses, Agriculture 
(sanitary and phytosanitary) certificates/permits/licenses, Other Government Agencies' requirements (not 
agriculture or health-related), Temporary admission or duty-drawback schemes, Bonded, Warehousing, Port 
operations, and Free zones. 
335 See USABC (US-ASEAN Business Council Inc.),  2010. 
336 See Ibid. 
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the tangible and intangible public infrastructures of a state, for instance covering 
transport, energy, customs services and telecommunications, knowledge, networks, 
education and training (human resources development), and good governance. In this 
regard, “a broad and comprehensive approach to trade policy” is needed.337 
According to Alexander M. Arevalo, a single window is not just trade facilitation 
but also governance.338 Bill Maruchi propounded three factors that are considered 
important in the promotion of stable trade facilitations. They consist of “[…] good 
governance and accountability, border controls, and governmental procedures and 
infrastructural development […]”. Good governance consists of three essential elements 
namely “transparency, accountability, and human resources”.339  
The single window as a public website portal provided by the government is 
supposed to be the most efficient, fastest, and most affordable tool to implement 
transparency. Since it is a public portal, therefore, it will contain rules and regulations, 
policies, fees, forms, and other official information about all countries concerned.340 
Transparency implementation not only reduces and prevents the irregularities of 
conduct, such as corruption, but also enhances the performance and efficiency of public 
services. This also includes the availability of convenient services that are easily 
accessible everywhere and at any time by traders and of the enforcement of legal 
certainty.  
The single window is based on an integrated ICT system enabling accountability 
in the trade process. For instance, the transaction flow and goods consignment can be 
tracked, and legally accountable to prevent trade deflection or trade fraud. The 
availability of competent human resources is indispensable in order to operate, sustain, 
and enhance the single window system at the national and regional level. Such 
professional capacity can be built using a system of which the processes require 
internationally approved best practices341 with professional training and workshops. 
While Milner, Morrissey, and Zgovu, argue that in trade facilitation, the 
automation of customs procedures are combined with the availability of skilled, 
competent and professional customs officials (human resources), it can enable controls 
of government functions, reduce administrative costs, eliminate technical constraints, 
and thus minimise opportunities for corruption. It also promotes a culture of 
cooperation between the government and business community.342 
According to Luzius Wasescha, high cost trade could injure governments, 
taxpayers, economic operators, and consumers. It is necessary for the government to 
implement good governance, and provide better regulation, prompt service and 
enhancement of ICT facilities. Trade facilitation has the potential to improve state 
revenues especially from customs duty collections. To increase such revenues 
governments need to improve the enforcement of regulations, improve customs 
integrity and low cost trade for traders.  The improvement of customs integrity 
significantly eradicates “invisible barriers” such as rent seeking behaviour and bribery, 
                                                 
337 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Ambassador Luzius Wasescha, Delegate of the Swiss Government for Trade 
Agreements, The Way Forward to Facilitate Trade, p. 321. 
338 See Arevalo, Alexander M., 2005. 
339 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Bill Maruchi, Chief Operating Officer, TATIS S.A., Addressing the Implementation 
Challenges, p. 227. 
340 See Ibid. 
341 See Ibid. 
342 See Chris Milner, Oliver Morrissey and Evious Zgovu, Trade Facilitation in Developing Countries, Credit Research 
Paper, No. 08/05, Center for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, University of 
Nottingham, available at : http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/credit/documents/papers/08-05.pdf, p. 9. 
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which is usually conducted by some “corrupted officials”.343 According to UNECE and 
UN/CEFACT, implementation of  the single window delivers a lot of benefits for 
economic growth such as reduction of bureaucratic processes, modernisation of 
participant entities, better  control  of  exports,  less  corruption  in  customs  and  
participant entities,  increase  in  the  reliability  of  statistics,  increase  in  exports  and 
investment,  and increase  in  job  opportunities.344 
To provide considerable benefits to developing countries, particularly SMEs, it is 
necessary to create a conducive climate for foreign investment, trade, and economic 
activity. Trade facilitation is an infrastructural asset that can give positive contributions 
to sustainable development, including encouraging the SMEs in developing countries to 
develop and expand their markets.  For instance, Tom Butterly argues, “[…] trade 
facilitation can help reduce the burdens of bureaucracy for companies, broaden market 
access, increase the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in international 
trade, reduce corruption, and help all countries obtain benefits from global trade 
development […]”.345 In addition, according to Butterly, trade facilitation could bring 
“direct benefits to both governments and the business community”. Trade facilitation 
measures can deliver extra benefit for business i.e. decrease transaction costs346 and 
increase business opportunities.347  
International trade scholars also consider that trade facilitation is necessary to 
boost the export earnings of countries. According to Anthony Kleitz “[…] trade 
facilitation can even so bring benefits to the public sector through more efficient 
implementation of customs and related regulations […]”. In this regard, Anthony Kleitz 
emphasises the “greater efficiency” produced from trade facilitation, for instance the 
increase of public revenue and minimisation of corruption in the bureaucracy.348 
Corruption and trade deflection have an extremely negative impact on economic 
development. It also creates obstacles that hinder the main purpose of the EU GSP. 
Michael, Ferguson and Karimov, elaborate the motivations and methods of corruption 
related to the fraud occurring in customs collection. They believe that traders generally 
pay bribes (corruption trigger factors)349 for three reasons. First, to obtain favourable 
classification for their goods so they will be allowed to pay lower taxes. Second, to 
receive more favourable conditions during clearance. Third, to avoid inspections since 
the traders knowingly committed trade fraud regarding their goods or products.350   
                                                 
343 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Ambassador Luzius Wasescha, Op. Cit., p. 321 
344 See Economic Commission For Europe, United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business 
(UN/CEFACT), Case Studies on Implemeneting a Single Window to enhance the efficient exchange of information 
between trade and government, Working Draft United Nations, p. 29. 
345 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Tom Butterly, Trade Facilitation, UNECE, Trade Facilitation in a Global Trade 
Environment, p. 60. 
346 The efficiency of trade facilitation measures will covers compliance costs (producing and transmitting required 
documents); service charges (banking, insurance, cargo handling, transport); time-costs (processing time, 
procedural time); business opportunities cost (lost business or business not considered); complex and time-
consuming trade process; personal opportunity cost which is particularly severe for SMEs; and costs related to 
unpredictability and corruption. 
347 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003;  Tom Butterly,  Op. Cit., p. 37. 
348 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Anthony Kleitz, Head, Trade Liberalisation and Review Division, Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Costs and Benefits of Trade Facilitation, p. 168. 
349 Michael, Ferguson, and Karimov., elaborated how the corruption in the customs related to trade could collapse states 
economy, “[…] bribes to customs (and tax) comprise the two main types of bribes paid by companies to 
government agencies. Firms pass through these extra taxes bribes, partly to their customers and partly to their 
workers and creditors causing lower demand and higher costs of production which hurts the conomy […]”. (See 
Michael, Bryane., Ferguson, Frank., and Karimov, Alisher., Do Customs Trade Facilitation Programmes Help 
Reduce customs-Related Corruption, available at : 
http://corruptionresearchnetwork.org/marketplace/resources/Abu%20Dhabi%20Combined.pdf, p. 15). 
350 See Ferreira et al., 2007; Michael, Bryane., Ferguson, Frank., and Karimov, Alisher., Op. Cit., p. 8. 
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Pomfret and Sourdin have analysed the existence of some unexplained variables 
that influence trade costs.351 They consider that the corruption index352 and inefficient 
trade process contribute to a higher cost to trade.353 While, Kunio Mikuriya considers 
that corruption is “a major obstacle to economic and social development”.354 Liliana 
Annovazzi-Jakab, argues that “corruption and fraud” need to be eradicated and 
prevented in order to provide a climate of confidence, stability and security in trade.355 
Leonid Lozbenko, also argues that corruption endangers security and hampers the 
economic development of every country.356 Baroness Symons, argues that the trade 
facilitation measures and efficient procedures of customs can eradicate corruption and 
deliver wider benefits to boost the country’s economy.357 
The customs process is part of the single window project that plays a significant 
role in delivering the benefit of EU GSP to the countries most in need. Michael, 
Ferguson, and Karimov deem “customs work as a big business”, since customs regulate 
between 20%-100% of the value of an economy.358 Leonid Lozbenko stresses that the 
main task of the customs service is to control over compliance with tariff and non-tariff 
regulation of foreign economic activity by taking into account international 
commitments. Further Leonid Lozbenko elaborates, the control function of customs 
that could promote trade, improve national economic and social development, 
eradicate corruption, and serve as a filter for cutting off illegal trade flows or trade 
fraud. On the other hand, the ineffective customs service can be seen as a barrier of 
international trade.359 While, Kunio Mikuriya considers that the customs process in 
international trade is “vulnerable” to corruption due to “its wide range of discretionary 
powers to discharge its multipurpose function”.360  
According to Michael, Ferguson, and Karimov, “[…] corruption costs state 
treasuries roughly $2.0 billion USD world-wide in lost trade taxes (not counting value-
added-taxes and excise taxes), though about 8 countries account for the bulk of such 
losses […]”.361 Serfaty de Madieros studied the impact of corruption on bilateral exports 
between countries. She found that corruption in both importer and exporter countries 
has a negative effect on trade between those two countries. She concludes that 
corruption has an effect on international trade much more than other factors.362 In 
                                                 
351 “[…] Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) argue that corruption adds a security cost to trade costs. The relationship may 
bemore complex if corruption imposes uncertainty and possible delays, so that traders concerned about time 
select a modeof transport that avoids hold-ups. Nordas et al. (2006) find that corruption-associated delays 
reduce the level of trade ina set of time-sensitive goods. Sequiera and Djankov (2008) report evidence of traders 
paying a premium to use routesthat avoid corruption-ridden ports in southern Africa […]”. 
352 The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. 
353 See Sourdin, Patricia., and Pomfret, Richard., Trade Facilitation and The Measurement of Trade Cost, Journal of 
International Commerce, Economics and Policy, Vol.1, No. 1 (2010) 145-163, World Scientific Publishing 
Company, available at : http://www.relooney.info/0_New_7428.pdf,  p. 9. 
354 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Kunio Mikuriya, Deputy Secretary General, WCO, The Challenges of Facilitating the 
Flow of Commerce in a Heightened Security Environment, pp. 156-157. 
355 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Liliana Annovazzi-Jakab, UNECE Trade Division, Landlocked Countries: Opportunities, 
Challenges and Recommendations, p. 127. 
356 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Leonid Lozbenko, Head of the Russian Customs Academy, Major-General of Сustoms 
Service, Fight against Corruption in the Sphere of Customs as a Trade Promoting Factor, p. 158. 
357 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Baroness Symons, UK Minister of State for International Trade and Investment, 
Trade Facilitation - everyone wins!, p. 141 
358 See Michael, Bryane., Ferguson, Frank., and Karimov, Alisher., Op. Cit., p.9. “[…] Malaysia and the Slovak Republic 
imported in 2009 over 100% of their GDP. Brazil and Japan imported about 16% of their (extremely large) GDP. 
Indian Excise and Customs handled roughly $8.3 billion whereas China Customs handled about $5.6 in trade 
revenues […]”. 
359 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Leonid Lozbenko, Op. Cit.,, p. 159. 
360 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Kunio Mikuriya, Op. Cit.,, pp. 156-157. 
361 See Michael, Bryane., Ferguson, Frank., and Karimov, Alisher, Op. Cit., p.9-10 
362 See Ibid. 
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addition, Staples also argues that “[…] high levels of corruption continue to plague many 
administrations causing loss of tax revenue and economic costs of countries […]”.363 
Therefore, trade facilitation should urgently be addressed in order to reduce such state 
losses and improve economic efficiency. 
Declaration on Customs Co-Operation Council Concerning Good Governance and 
Integrity in Customs (The Revised Arusha Declaration) was adopted in 1993. The 
Arusha Declaration aimed to strengthen international cooperation in customs cross 
border in order to combat corruption in the customs process of international trade and 
to implement good governance. Carol Cosgrove-Sacks364 and Ambassador Luzius 
Wasescha365 stress that cooperation between relevant institutions of governments, the 
business community, NGOs and international organisations is necessity to eradicate 
corruption in the international trade process. In addition, Leonid Lozbenko, also argues 
that the “[…] key to success of combating corruption is co-operation and interaction 
between all international organisations, regional unions, national governments, and 
businesses […]”, since one country, on its own, cannot successfully control corruption.366 
Therefore, in order to prevent and eradicate corruption in international trade there is 
the need for “[…] comprehensive, systematic, and coordinated work of all international 
and regional organisations and national governments […]” and an inter-governmental 
programme. It has already been carried out in the regional level of Southeast Asia 
through the ASEAN Single Window project.367 
Member states agreed establishing ASEAN Customs Code of Conduct368  and 
ASEAN Agreement on Customs369, which aimed to ensure the smooth cross-border flow 
of goods and services, facilitating implementation of ASEAN economic agreements, and 
preventing distortion or misuse of power on custom service that potentially injured 
economy and caused high cost economic. Both of these agreements are enabling six 
principles, which endeavour good customs conduct: 
1. Transparency principle, means that  member states will make all laws, 
regulations, administrative guidelines and policies pertaining to Customs 
administration in their economies publicly available in a prompt, transparent and 
readily accessible manner;  
2. Consistency principle, means that  member states will ensure the consistent 
application of Customs determinations to different traders, and in different cities, 
regions or states of ASEAN;  
3. Appeals and Challenges principle, means that  member states will ensure the 
availability to traders of readily accessible means of review or challenge of Customs 
determinations in ASEAN;  
4. Efficiency principle, means that  member states will ensure the efficient and 
effective administration and expeditious clearance of goods to facilitate intra-
ASEAN trade and investment; 
                                                 
363 See Brian Rankin Staples, Trade Facilitation, October 1998, p. 29, available at : http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/library/files/Staples%20-%20October%201998%20-%20Trade%20Facilitation.pdf. 
364 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Director, UNECE Trade Division  and Mario Apostolov, 
Coordinator, International Forum on Trade Facilitation, UNECE, How to Achieve Efficient and Open Collaboration 
for Trade Facilitation?, p. 27. 
365 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Ambassador Luzius Wasescha, Op. Cit., p. 321. 
366 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Leonid Lozbenko, Op. Cit., pp. 158-159. 
367 See Ibid., p. 163. 
368 See ASEAN Customs Code of Conduct  1995 amended Customs Code of Conduct  1983,  available at : 
http://www.asean.org/2165.htm, last accessed : 30 October 2011. 
369 See ASEAN Agreement on Customs, 1997 available at : http://www.aseansec.org/1905.htm, last accessed : 30 
October 2011. 
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5. Simplicity principle, means that  member states will strive to ensure the 
simplification and harmonisation of trade transactions and customs procedures 
within ASEAN;  
6. Mutual Assistance and Cooperation principle, means that member states will 
endeavour their utmost cooperation and mutual assistance between Customs 
Authorities. 
One of the objectives of ASEAN Agreement on Customs is to ensure consistency, 
transparency, and fair application of the customs regulations. It is very crucial to 
support implementation of good governance and good government in the ASW and 
NSW. These principles is affirmed under Article 54 of ASEAN Trade in Goods 
Agreement concerning customs procedures and control. It is stipulating that each 
member state have to ensure that their customs procedures and practices should be 
predictable, consistent, and transparent including speedy clearance of goods.  Member 
states are requested accordance to their respective national customs law adopting and 
complying the standards and recommendation practices provides by the WCO and 
other international organisations related to customs.  Article 65 of ASEAN Trade in 
Goods Agreement, emphasized regarding transparency principle. It is implemented 
through “[…] the timely publication, dissemination of statutory and regulatory 
information, decisions, and rulings on customs matters […]”. 
To build a strong cooperation in the trade facilitation, Tom Butterly, emphasized 
about the importance of “political will”. Trade facilitation is not merely about technical 
issues but rather to political and economic issues due to its goal improving economic 
development and competitiveness of trade. In practices trade facilitation, needs 
harmonization and standardization in the operation, mandate, and orientation of 
various governmental agencies at both the national and international level. 370 The open 
cooperation between public and private organisations is necessary to achieve common 
economic objective. The essence of trade facilitation is government/business 
partnership where both parties obtained mutual benefits. The active participation and 
commitment of the business community in the trade facilitation initiatives is 
paramount to their success.  
At the national level, political will is a crucial instrument, particularly, dealing 
with the corruption issues in the trade administration’s processes and promoting 
implementation good governance and good government. Political will is essential to 
establish further cooperation between various national, regional, and international 
organisations, which involving in the trade facilitation project. The benefits of trade 
facilitation must be seen to be reasonable for all countries in order to encourage 
government leaders to embrace such project.371 
In the ASEAN perspective, political will in trade facilitation, has been set forth in 
the e-ASEAN Framework Agreement and the ASEAN Agreement on Customs. These 
agreements are considered to have a strong contribution to the development of ASW 
and NSW. The e-ASEAN Framework Agreement is designed to facilitate the 
establishment of the ASEAN information infrastructure, promoting electronic 
commerce, and promoting the applications of e-government.372 With respect to the 
facilitation of e-commerce development, member states have to adopt electronic 
commerce regulatory and legislative frameworks. It aims to create trust and confidence 
                                                 
370 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Tom Butterly, Op. Cit., pp. 47-48. 
371 See Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
372 See Article 3 of the e-ASEAN Framework Agreement, sign in Singapore November, 2000 available at : 
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for consumers. It also facilitates the transformation to e-business based on 
international norms.373  
E-government has been acknowledged as one of the tools to apply good 
governance and good governance principles. E-government enables public control over 
public services and reduces bureaucracy chains. It automatically eliminates the 
opportunity for corruption, increasing efficiency of public services in terms of time and 
costs, and enforces transparency and accountability principles. Therefore, in the e-
ASEAN Framework Agreement member states must improve ICT utilisation in the 
delivery of public services. In order to promote transparency, the member states must 
provide a wide range of government services and transactions using ICT applications. 
ICT applications are also important to enhance inter-governmental cooperation, which 
includes facilitating the freer flow of goods.374 
 
V.b.4. The role of ASW and NSW for GSP utilisation. 
GSP is the result of the Uruguay Round, which forms part of multilateral trade 
negotiations that brought developed countries and developing countries to negotiate at 
the one table. GSP provides special tariff reductions for developing countries and LDCs. 
GSP was proposed to encourage the full participation of developing countries in trade 
liberalisation. It is granted to bridge the economic gap between developed countries 
and developing countries by increasing the export earnings of developing countries. It 
is supposed to generate employment, reduce poverty, and increase NI (Gross National 
Income)375 and GDP (Gross Domestic Product).376  
GNI is calculated on a per capita basis to demonstrate the “consumer buying 
power” of an individual from a particular country, and estimate average wealth, wages, 
and ownership distribution in a society. When the GNI of a country increases it is 
assumed that “consumer buying power” of its nationals also increases. Increasing 
“consumer buying power” creates a new market access for foreign country products in 
the domestic market and indicates the increase of its national welfare and prosperity. 
Hence, when a beneficiary country, according to the World Bank, has been classified as 
a high-income country for three consecutive years it is automatically excluded from the 
GSP list. 377 
Practically, GNP and GDP are used to describe a country’s economic development. 
Direct comparison between GDP and GNP can be used to observe the correlation 
between a country’s export and its local economy. GNP could be used to measure the 
overall economic strength of a country and the size of its local economy. Both of these 
parameters can be used to analyse the distribution of wealth throughout a society, or 
                                                 
373  See Article 5 of the e-ASEAN Framework Agreement. 
374  See Article 9 of the e-ASEAN Framework Agreement. 
375 See World Bank, available at : http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications. See also 
http://www.diffen.com/difference/GDP_vs_GNP. With regard to operational and analytical purposes, the World 
Bank’s main criterion for classifying economies is gross national income (GNI) per capita (it was named as GNP 
(Gross National Product)). According GNI there are three classification of economic rank low income, middle 
income (subdivided into lower middle and upper middle), or high income. GNI calculates the total income of all 
nationals of a country, therefore, GNI could give accurate description of a nation’s yearly economy. The 
formulation to calculate GNI = GDP(Gross Domestic Product) + NR (Net income from assets abroad (Net Income 
Receipts). 
376 See http://www.diffen.com/difference/GDP_vs_GNP, GDP of a country is defined as the total market value of all final 
goods and services produced within a country in a given period of time (usually a calendar year). The most 
common formula to calculate GDP is the expenditure method: GDP = consumption + investment + (government 
spending) + (exports – imports), or, GDP = C + I + G + (X-M). 
377 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., p. 20. 
 314 
the average purchasing power or consumer buying power of the individual.378 The 
relationship between GDP and GNP can be defined as follows: 
 “[…] an increase in exports of a country will lead to an increase in both GDP and 
GNP of the country, correspondingly, an increase in imports will decrease GDP and 
GNP […]”.  
Nowadays, as studied by many experts in international trade, tariff reductions 
have a less significant contribution to boost the export income of a country. It was 
argued that trade facilitation gave a significant contribution to the export influence of a 
country. Expanding market access is considered as one of the main keys to 
development of a country. Trade facilitation in line with the principles and goals of the 
United Nations to achieve faster economic growth and eliminate poverty.379 Trade 
facilitation has to “pro-develop” and provide more favour for LDCs.380 
In the framework of GSP, the concept relationship between developed countries 
and developing countries was based on a dependency relationship between a donor 
country and a recipient country or between a rich country and a poor country. During 
the GSP improvement process, the EU involved beneficiary countries to evaluate 
obstacles that hampered beneficiary countries from utilising GSP. Beneficiary countries 
and related stakeholders participated through public consultation that was held by the 
European Commission. 
The procedures and formalities applied in exports impose long bureaucracy, 
require excessive documents and have very complicated regulations, significantly 
obstacles for traders have been created, especially for developing countries that lack 
trade facilities. Such circumstances could hamper utilisation of GSP.  Thus, to obtain 
tariff facilities of the GSP scheme the EU has applied some requirements to the import 
formalities and procedures such as a certificate of origin document. Exporters from a 
beneficiary country who are allowed to obtain GSP facility are only authorised 
exporters or registered exporters. the EU also requires beneficiary countries to apply 
custom modernisation. The lack of trade facilitation could create barriers for trade and 
hinder the purpose of GSP. The success of GSP utilisation is not only the single 
responsibility of the preference granting country. It is the shared responsibility of the 
preference granting country and beneficiary country. The beneficiary country has the 
responsibility to provide trade facilitation for their traders in order to utilises the GSP 
scheme properly.  
It has been mentioned that ASW and NSW could provide better trade efficiency 
and competitiveness.  The target of ASW is to enhance competitive transactions of 
regional economies through the standardisation of the trading process. Implementation 
of ASW and NSW is achieved through collective efforts by related ministries and 
government agencies. ASW and NSW also function to promote closer regional 
integration to realise AEC. It is carried out through better compatibility and 
interoperability of functional systems of international trade transactions, and trade 
management of the respective stakeholders.  In conclusion, the ASW and NSW are the 
main engine of trade facilitation in ASEAN.381 
 
 
 
                                                 
378 See Ibid., p. 20. 
379 See Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
380 See Ibid., p. 20. 
381 See Technical Guide of ASW and NSW Version  3/2006. 
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V.b. ASEAN and cumulation preferential rules of origin. 
V.b.1. Cumulation preferential rules of origin. 
In its early development, the preferential rules of origin were commonly used in 
the “autonomous tariff preferential” such as in the GSP scheme. Moreover, the 
establishment of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), requested the EU to develop a 
system of rules of origin. Rules of origin is recognised as a crucial component within the 
FTA aiming to avoid trade deflection and trade fraud, so as to enable to deliver its 
advantage among the contracting parties.382 Thus, according to Falvey, Rod and Reed, 
and Geoff, the rules of origin have rapidly developed along with the “increase” in 
numbers of PTA and FTA.383 In fact, until the beginning of the 1990s there were only a 
few preferential rules of origin.384 According to WTO data, in January 2012 there were 
511 RTAs notified to the WTO. Those RTA notifications consisted of 370 RTAs under 
Article XXIV of the GATT 1947 or GATT 1994, 36 under the Enabling Clause, and 105 
under Article V of the GATS. From those RTA notifications, 319 agreements were put in 
force.385 For example, Indonesia as one of the ASEAN member states was involved in 8 
RTAs of trade in goods. The table of the RTAs enforced by ASEAN members states in the 
area of trade in goods can be seen below: 386 
 
                                                 
382 See Inama, Stefano., Rules of Origin in International Trade, Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, 2009, p. 174. 
See also See Falvey., Rod and Reed, Geoff., Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments, Research Paper 
2000/18, Centre for Research on Globalisation and Labour Markets, School of Economics, University of 
Nottingham, available at : http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/Research_Papers/2000/ 00_18.pdf, last accessed : 9 
April 2011. “[…] In the context of preferential trade, where partnerexports face a lower tax, the ROO has the 
ostensible purpose of reducing the revenue loss from trade deflection. We have shown that the importing 
country may gain from lower priced imports as well […]”. 
383 See Falvey., Rod and Reed, Geoff., 2000. 
384 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 174. 
385 See Regional Trade Agreements, available at : http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm, last 
accessed : 18 January 2012. See also Cheng Xin-xuan, The Impact of Preferential Rules of Origin On The 
Relationship of Free Trade Area and The Multilateral Trading System, available at : 
http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/mse/article/ viewFile/1614 /1884, last accessed : 9 April 2011. 
386 See RTA WTO available at : http://www.wto.org/rta_participation_map_e.htm?country_selected =MMR&sense=g, last 
accessed : 18 January 2012. 
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Table 14. RTAs of ASEAN member states 
 
No. Country RTA in goods sector 
1.  Indonesia  1) ASEAN – Australia – New Zealand; 2) ASEAN – China; 3) ASEAN – India; 4) ASEAN – Japan; 5) ASEAN – 
Republic of Korea; 6) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); 7) Global System of Trade Preferences among 
Developing Countries (GSTP); and 8) Japan – Indonesia. 
2. Singapore 1) ASEAN – Australia – New Zealand; 2) ASEAN – China; 3) ASEAN – India; 4) ASEAN – Japan; 5) ASEAN – 
Republic of Korea; 6) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); 7) China – Singapore; 8) EFTA – Singapore; 9) Global 
System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP); 10) India – Singapore; 11) Japan – 
Singapore; 12) Jordan – Singapore; 13) Republic of Korea – Singapore; 14) New Zealand – Singapore; 15) 
Panama – Singapore; 16) Peru – Singapore; 17) Singapore – Australia; 18) Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership; and 19) US – Singapore. 
3. Malaysia 1) ASEAN – Australia – New Zealand; 2) ASEAN – China; 3) ASEAN – India; 4) ASEAN – Japan; ASEAN – 
Republic of Korea; 5) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); 6) Global  System of Trade Preferences among 
Developing Countries (GSTP); 7) India – Malaysia; Japan – Malaysia; and 8) Pakistan – Malaysia. 
4. Thailand  1) ASEAN – Australia – New Zealand; 2) ASEAN – China; 3) ASEAN – India; 4) ASEAN – Japan; 5) ASEAN – 
Republic of Korea; 6) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); 7) Global System of Trade Preferences among 
Developing Countries (GSTP); 8) Japan – Thailand; 9) Lao People's Democratic Republic – Thailand; 10) 
Thailand – Australia; and 11)  Thailand - New Zealand. 
5. Philippines  1) ASEAN – Australia – New Zealand; 2) ASEAN – China; 4) ASEAN – India; 5) ASEAN – Japan; 6) ASEAN – 
Republic of Korea; 7) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); 8) Global System of Trade Preferences among 
Developing Countries (GSTP); 9) Japan – Philippines; and 10) Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN). 
6. Brunei Darussalam  1) ASEAN – Australia - New Zealand; 2) ASEAN – China; 3) ASEAN – India; 4) ASEAN – Japan; 5) ASEAN – 
Republic of Korea ; 6) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); 7) Brunei  Darussalam – Japan; and 8) Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership. 
7. Cambodia 1) ASEAN – Australia - New Zealand; 2) ASEAN – China; 3) ASEAN – India; 4) ASEAN – Japan; 5) ASEAN – 
Republic of Korea; 6) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
8. Vietnam 1) ASEAN – Australia - New Zealand; 2) ASEAN – China; ASEAN – India; 3) ASEAN – Japan; 4) ASEAN – 
Republic of Korea; 5) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); 6) Global System of Trade Preferences among 
Developing Countries (GSTP); and 7) Japan – Vietnam. 
9. Laos 1) ASEAN – Australia – New Zealand; 2) ASEAN – China; 3) ASEAN – India; 4) ASEAN – Japan; 5) ASEAN – 
Republic of Korea; 6) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); 7) Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA); 8) Asia Pacific 
Trade Agreement (APTA) – Accession of China; and 9) Lao People's Democratic Republic – Thailand. 
10. Myanmar 1) ASEAN – Australia – New Zealand; 2) ASEAN – China; 3) ASEAN – India; 4) ASEAN – Japan; 5) ASEAN – 
Republic of Korea; 6) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); and 7) Global System of Trade references among 
Developing Countries (GSTP). 
 
With regard to cumulation of origin, preference granting countries that have not 
yet done so should give serious consideration to adopting appropriate forms of 
"cumulative origin" treatment in their respective schemes.387 The increasing of various 
types and the contents of preferential rules of origin are influenced by some factors. 
First, the absence of a non-binding multilateral agreement in the preferential rules of 
origin causes a lack of international harmonisation and uniformity of such 
regulation.388 Second, the increased RTA, for instance FTAs or PTAs, usually applies 
tariff preferences through reducing tariff and/or eliminating tariff until 0% on imports 
from their trading partners (the contracting parties). In the RTAs, they use a different 
set of rules to determine the origin of products to grant preferential tariff treatment, 
namely the “contractual rules of origin”. The essential roles of preferential rules of 
origin were to ensure that only the goods and products originating from contracting 
                                                 
387 See Commentaries on the ILC’s Draft Articles, 1978, Op. Cit., p. 64. 
388 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 174. 
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parties can enjoy tariff or other preferences. In addition, a preferential rules of origin in 
the RTAs is designed to prevent trade deflection or trade fraud. For instance, “simple 
trans-shipment”, “[…] whereby goods or products from non-participating countries (non-
RTA members) are redirected through any RTA partner in order to avoid the payment of 
customs duties […]”.389 Third, the notion of GSP as an autonomous right of preference-
granting countries, has led to the establishment of various “unilateral preferential rules 
of origin”.390  
Contractual rules of origin under the FTA function to regulate the trade pattern 
between members, and minimise trade deflection. It should be noted that FTA is 
different from customs union, where “common external tariff” between members does 
not exist. Without the contractual rules of origin the existence of preferences among 
contracting parties could be distorted. For example, trade deflection might happen 
when a product is destined for a high tariff member-country and is first imported into a 
lower-tariff member country and then re-exported to the main export destination 
country. The objective of trade deflection conduct is to earn maximum gain through law 
circumventions. Such modus is generally used to escape high tariffs and take advantage 
of the FTA facility. 391 
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of preferential rules of origin, namely 
“unilateral preferential rules of origin” and “contractual rules of origin”. However, in 
certain cases of preferential agreement a combination of “unilateral preferential rules of 
origin” and “contractual rules of origin” have been implemented, such as the previous 
Lomè Convention and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. It has the character of a 
non-reciprocal and contractual agreement. Unilateral and contractual preferential rules 
of origin have the main function to ensure tariff preferences are granted exclusively to 
the goods originating from beneficiary countries or member states of the PTA.392 
GSP rules of origin have two main tasks related to their legal nature. First, they 
work  as an “integral part” of the GSP system that has the purpose of boosting export 
earnings, promoting industrialisation, and economic development of beneficiary 
countries. It is important to ensure that the beneficiary country gets the real benefits 
from the GSP scheme to accelerate its economic growth. Second, GSP rules of origin are 
set up for specific trade policy objectives such as “the allocation of preferences to 
products included in the GSP product coverage genuinely produced in beneficiary 
countries”. Inherently GSP rules of origin have derived an autonomous character that 
are not from the negotiation process.393  
The existence of various sets of rules of origin are caused by the different 
schemes of GSP that are granted by developed countries. According to the Enabling 
Clause, developed countries are asked to recognise some “unilateral obligation” to 
respond positively to the development needs of developing countries. The various 
schemes of GSP cannot be separated from its legal history when preference-granting 
countries decide to implement their national schemes independently. Consequently, 
each GSP scheme established has its own rules of origin. Thus, beneficiary countries are 
obliged to comply with such rules in order to take benefits of the GSP preferential tariff. 
On the other hand, the technical nature and the diversity of the rules of origin have 
                                                 
389 See Rajan Sudesh Ratna, Rules of Origin: Diverse Treatment and Future Development in the Asia and Pacific Region, p. 
69, available at : http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/tipub2469_chap3.pdf, last accessed : 28 October 
2011. 
390 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 176. 
391 See Ibid., p. 174. 
392 See Ibid., p. 175. 
393 See Ibid., p. 175. 
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brought some additional complexities to the GSP. It has been analysed that more 
complex and rigid rules of origin cause lower utilisation of the GSP.394 
According to the UNCTAD Secretariat, the use of preferential rules of origin by 
preference granting countries is divided into two broad categories. First, the GSP rules 
of origin based on percentage criterion, implemented by Canada, United States, and 
Rusia. Second, the GSP rules of origin based on combination of criteria such as change 
of tariff heading (CTH) criterion, percentage criterion, and specific working or 
processing requirements. The “product specific requirements” that including in the list 
called as “single list”. 395 EU, Norway, Switzerland, and Japan used the combination of 
criteria. The application of “percentage criterion” brings consequences of different 
calculation methods of local content's and minimum amount of local content's 
required.396 
Under the EU GSP rules of origin, product exported originating from beneficiary 
country are divided into two categories:397 
1. Products wholly obtained in that beneficiary country, means as products that 
have been entirely grown, extracted from the soil, or harvested within the 
exporting country, or manufactured there exclusively from any of these 
products, qualify as having been of GSP origin by virtue of the total absence of 
the use of any imported components or materials, or such of unknown origin. 
2. products  obtained  in  that  beneficiary country  incorporating materials which 
have not been wholly obtained there, provided that such products that are 
made from imported materials, parts, or components, that is, products that are 
manufactured wholly or in part from materials, parts or components imported 
into the beneficiary country or that are from unknown origin. These products, 
which are termed “products with import content,” qualify only if they have 
undergone “sufficient working or processing” (as defined under the individual 
rules of origin of preference granting countries) in the beneficiary country. 
Consequently, GSP scheme regulates detailed rules or definitions of “sufficient 
working or processing” that have to be fulfilled if goods are to be granted GSP 
tariff treatment.  
Cumulative rules of origin purposed to encourage trade amongst members of 
developing countries group or among developing countries in general. From the 
economic perspective, cumulative rules of origin could generate trade diversion and 
trade creation.  
GSP rules of origin are based on a “single country origin”, which means that the 
“origin requirements” must be fully complied by one beneficiary country. The 
development of RTA has influenced some preference-granting countries to adopt 
cumulation of origin. There are four types of cumulation of origin in the preferential 
rules of origin, consisting of “(a) bilateral cumulation or donor-country content; (b) 
diagonal or partial cumulation; (c) regional cumulation; (d) full cumulation”.398  
Bilateral cumulation is applied between two countries that are bound under a 
FTA or autonomous arrangement. The provisions allowing them to cumulate origin are 
contained in their arrangement. Hence, according to such agreement only products or 
materials originating from the contracting parties can benefit from it.399 Preference-
granting country “content” rules of origin are defined as the rule that allows products 
                                                 
394 See Ibid., p. 177. 
395 See Ibid., p. 179. 
396 See Ibid., p. 179. 
397 See Article 72, 75 and 76 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. See also Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 179. 
398 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit.,  p. 190. 
399 See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_774_en.htm 
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(materials, parts, and components) of their manufactures when supplied to a 
beneficiary country and used there in a process of production, to be regarded as of that 
beneficiary country’s origin for determining whether the finished product qualifies for 
GSP treatment. For example, products originating in the EU that are subject to sufficient 
working or processing in a beneficiary country are to be considered as originating in 
that beneficiary country.400 
Diagonal or partial cumulation provides liberalisation allowing a product to be 
manufactured and finished in a beneficiary country using imported materials, parts, or 
components from other beneficiary countries. Such material could be considered as 
originating in the beneficiary country claiming the preferential tariff treatment or 
where the last working or processing operation took place. EU diagonal cumulation is 
applied between the EU and the countries included in the "Pan-Euro-Mediterranean 
cumulation zone".401  
Regional cumulation is considered as another form of diagonal or partial 
cumulation. Regional cumulation can be applied by more than two countries under 
FTA, which contains identical origin rules and provisions for cumulation between them. 
According to the EU GSP preferential rules of origin, regional cumulation is defined as:  
“[…] a system whereby products originate in a country which is a member of a 
regional group and are considered as materials originating in another country of the 
same regional group (or a country of another regional group where cumulation 
between groups is possible) when further processed or incorporated in a product 
manufactured there […]”.402  
Regional cumulation is provided under the EU GSP that is applied for four 
separate regional groups.403 Besides the EU, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the US are 
preference-granting countries that apply regional cumulation to certain regional 
groups.404  
The basic philosophy of regional cumulation is economic complementarities.405 
The benefits can be maximised when countries with “identical rules of origin” work 
together for the purpose of manufacturing products that are eligible for preferential 
tariff treatment. In this regard, regional cumulation can also be considered as trade 
facilitation to strengthen regional economic cooperation among the member states 
within the groups. However, there are complexities in regional cumulation because of 
different levels of economic development between countries in the regional group. In 
this regard, some countries in the regional groups can have different facilities of EU GSP 
arrangements. For example, some ASEAN member states are granted general 
arrangements and some members who are classified into LDCs are granted EBA 
arrangements. There are some provisions that should be made to exclude certain 
sensitive products from regional cumulation. In the context of regional cumulation for a 
country that has been fully graduated, such as Singapore, it is still considered as part of 
regional cumulation.406 In other words, the withdrawal of certain countries or 
territories from the list of GSP beneficiaries due to the country graduation mechanism 
does not affect the possibility of using products originating in that country under the 
regional cumulation rules.407 
                                                 
400 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 189. 
401 See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_774_en.htm 
402 See Article 66 paragraph h Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010. 
403 See Article 86 paragraph h Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010. 
404 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., pp. 191-193.  
405 See Falvey., Rod and Reed, Geoff., 2000. 
406 See Recitals 10 and 11 See Article 86 paragraph h Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010. 
407 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit.,  p. 196. 
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Full cumulation is the most liberal scheme of cumulation origin. Full cumulation 
origin allowing cumulation of material, working and processes or value added of more 
than one beneficiary country to be added together to comply with origin requirements. 
All the working process must be carried out in the non-originating materials where the 
final product obtained origin. Therefore, in the full cumulation “all operations carried 
out in the participating countries are taken into account”.408  
Canada is the GSP preference granting country that applying full and global 
cumulation. In addition, Canada also applying donor-country content requirement to all 
of GSP’s beneficiary countries. According to the Canada GSP scheme, all beneficiary 
countries are deemed as “one single area for determining origin”. Therefore, the full and 
global cumulation, described, wherein all “[…] value-added and/or manufacturing 
processes performed in the area may be added together to meet the origin requirements 
for products to be exported to any of therefore mentioned preference granting country 
[…]”.409  
With respect to the concept of full and global cumulation, as recently WTO has 
launched a new brand, namely “made in the world” initiatives in the framework of 
accelerating trade liberalization.410 Gradually “the concept country of origin for 
manufactured goods” is being eroded. The vast development of trans-national or 
multinational company across the world supposed as the background of “made in the 
world” launching initiatives, as stated by Mr. Pascal Lamy : 
“[...] the concept of country of origin for manufactured goods has gradually become 
obsolete as the various operations, from the design of the product to the 
manufacture of the components, assembly and marketing have spread across the 
world, creating international production chains […]”411 
Further, Inama explained that the full cumulation of origin allows more scattered 
job opportunities and dividing labour operations among the beneficiary countries in 
order to fulfil the origin criteria. The distribution of manufactures can be performed 
based on the business demand of the member regional grouping. For instance, 
according to cost/benefit analysis working process may start in Country A, continue in 
Country B, and finished in Country C. Full cumulation in line with the globalization and 
interdependency of production, where developed countries might be attracted to 
farming out technology or labour intensive production processes in low-cost 
countries.412 Inama described the distinction between full and partial regional 
cumulation that applied between EU, Japan and US :   
“[…] the EU grants what is called partial or diagonal regional cumulation as opposed 
to the full regional cumulation accorded under the schemes of the United States and 
Japan. Partial or diagonal regional cumulation means that inputs imported from 
another member of the regional association and utilized for further manufacturing 
or incorporated in the ﬁnal exporting country must already have originated there to 
be considered as domestic content. This limitation does not exist under the regional 
cumulation option of the schemes of Japan and the United States, which consider 
the members of a regional association as one single customs territory. Any working 
or processing operations may be counted as domestic content in compliance with 
rules of origin requirements […]”  
                                                 
408 See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_774_en.htm 
409 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit.,  pp. 190-191. 
410 See Made in the World, available at : http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/miwi_e.htm.  
411 See WTO News : speeches - Director General Pascal Lamy speech to the French Senate in Paris on 15 October: Lamy 
says more and more products are “Made in the World”, 15 October 2010, available at : 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl174_e.htm, last accessed : 28 October 2011. 
412 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit.,  p. 193. 
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Under full regional cumulation, which is applied by Japan and the United States, 
all ASEAN member states are considered as one single customs territory.413 Therefore, 
all processing or manufacturing carried out in ASEAN member states, regardless of 
whether it acquires origin or not, it is counted as local content.  In the partial regional 
cumulation applied under EU GSP scheme, the materials counted as domestic content 
only if acquiring origin in one of the member states of the regional association. In the 
partial regional comulation only those products that already originate in other 
countries of ASEAN could be counted as local content when utilized for further 
manufacturing or incorporated into the finished product manufactured in the final 
member states. 414 The EU rules for partial and regional cumulation explained that : 
“[…] materials or parts imported by a member country of one of these four 
groupings from another member country of the same grouping for further 
manufacture are considered as originating products of the country of manufacture 
and not as third-country inputs, provided that the materials or parts are already 
originating products of the exporting member country of the grouping […]”.  
Thus, the originating products are those products that obtained origin by fulfilling 
the individual origin requirements under the EU rules of origin for the GSP objective. In 
this regard, Article 86 paragraph 4 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010 has 
stipulated: 
 “[…] where the condition laid down in the first sub-paragraph is not fulfilled, the 
products shall have as country of origin the country of the regional group which 
accounts for the highest share of the customs value of the materials used originating 
in other countries of the regional group […]”.  
The “proof of originating status good” regulated under Article 72a paragraph 4 
and 5 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93. It is stipulated that :  
“[…] proof of the originating status of goods exported from a country of a regional 
group to another country of the same group to be used in further working or 
processing, or to be re-exported where no further working or processing takes 
place, shall be established by a certificate of origin Form A issued in the first 
country […]”.  
Based on the first certificate a further certificate of origin Form A or invoice 
declaration is made in the country that establish proof of the originating status of the 
goods to be re-exported to the EU from a country belonging to a regional group.415 
                                                 
413 Except Singapore and Brunei which has been graduated from United States GSP Scheme. 
414 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit.,  pp. 193-194. Inama visualized an example for regional cumulation under the EU 
rules of origin. For instance cars production which classiﬁed under heading HS 8702 must not incorporate more 
than 40 percent of imported inputs. In this example a car manufactured in Malaysia, may incorporate the 
following inputs (all prices are in US$): 
 Inputs originating in Singapore      4,500 
 Inputs originating in the Philippines     1,400 
 Inputs originating in Japan      1,500 
 Value added in Malaysia (local content, labor costs, proﬁts)   2,600 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Total (ex-works price)       10,000 
 
According to the partial cumulation provision of the EU, to calculate the percentage of imported inputs, the 
materials imported from Singapore and the Philippines will not be considered imported materials if they 
originate in these countries. Materials originating in other ASEAN member countries will not be considered as 
imported inputs. Therefore, only the components imported from elsewhere are to be considered as imported 
inputs. As the amount of the input from Japan is US$1,500, equal to 15 percent of the export price, and as this is 
less than 40 percent, the car will be considered as originating. Since, the value of inputs originating in Singapore 
is greater that the value added in Malaysia the car will be considered as originating in Singapore.  
415 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 198. The example in proof of origin status, elaborated as follows: A 
trader/exporter in Indonesia wishes to export a ﬁnished product which contains imported inputs originating 
from Thailand and Philippine, where these countries are belonging to the same regional grouping (ASEAN). The 
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Since the first time launched, developing countries have challenged the rules of 
origin as the main obstacle to the utilization of GSP. Nevertheless, rules of origin is the 
“trade policy instrument” used to achieve the objective of GSP scheme. 416 Developed 
countries used the rules of origin as the tools to discriminate the import products or 
goods based on the production processes related to the social clauses such as the 
labour standard, human right and environment protection.417 Preferential rules of 
origin hold important role on the trade preferences, especially to promote trade 
creation and trade diversion. 418   
In broad outline it can be summed, innately “unilateral rules of origin” under GSP 
serve as the instrument to prevent trade deflection and trade fraud. It is also worked as 
a tool to ensure benefits of GSP scheme granted appropriately to the goods or products 
originating manufactured in the beneficiary countries. Trade fraud often occurs takes a 
form as tariff circumvention operation. The modus operandi of tariff circumvention 
happened when the goods simply trans-shipped or produce the object by minimal 
working or processing in the beneficiary countries just to take advantage of the trade 
preferences. The misuse the “origin of goods” of beneficiary country by traders or 
producers from non-beneficiary countries hindered achievement of the GSP final goal. 
419   
Experts in international trade law assessed the strong correlations between 
preferential rules of origins and utilization of GSP.  Its concluded that too rigid and 
details rules of origins could undermining the utilization of GSP. Too complex GSP rules 
of origin creates obstacles for developing countries and LDCs to obtain facility of 
preferential tariff, because it would burden extra cost on formalities and procedures to 
comply with the regulations. For instance, Carrère et. al noted that ….benefiting from 
market access requires proving origin which itself is costly and reduces the benefits from 
that market access…”420. While, Inama has written regarding “assessing the impact of 
rules of origin in the utilization of trade preferences under the GSP”.421  
“[…] Preferences are conditional on the fulfilment of an array of requirements 
related to rules of origin that in many instances, beneficiary countries may not be 
able to comply with. Recent literature, driven by the flourishing of unilateral and 
contractual preferential trading, has increasingly indicated rules of origin as prime 
suspects of underutilization of trade preferences and distortion in FTA. In spite of the 
evidence contained in various UNCTAD reports and related studies, since the last 
decade, part of this literature is still discussing the empirical foundation of the 
relation between rules of origin and low utilization rates as a new finding rather 
than acknowledged reality. Nevertheless, the fact that utilization rate is strictly 
linked to origin requirements is very clear to beneficiary countries……..In some cases, 
exporters may have not submitted the necessary documentation (such as a certificate 
                                                                                                                                          
trader/exporter must submit to the competent authority two certificate of origin Form A relating to the inputs 
originating from Thailand and Philippine, respectively, and issued by the competent authorities in each of these 
countries. On the basis of these two certiﬁcates, the competent authority in Indonesia will then issue the ﬁnal 
certiﬁcate of origin Form A relating to the ﬁnished product to be exported. 
416 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., pp. 341-342. 
417 See Falvey., Rod and Reed, Geoff., 2000. “[…] Yet one should also recognise that developed countries in particular are 
increasingly likely to employ policies that discriminate amongst imports on the basis of how they have been 
produced. This is equivalent to employing a ROO, and may be justified on the grounds of protecting the 
environment or discouraging the use of child labour […] ”. 
418 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., pp. 341-342. 
419 See Ibid., pp. 341-342. 
420 See Cèline Carrère, Jaime de Melo, and Bolormaa Tumurchudur, Disentangling Market Access Effects of Preferential 
Trading Arrangements with an Application for ASEAN Members under an ASEAN – EU FTA, EUDN/WP 2008 – 
04, 17  November, 2008. 
421 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit.,  pp. 360-361. 
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of origin or through bill of lading) to get preferential treatment because of lack of 
knowledge or incorrect information […]”. 422 
Since GSP facilities are granted based on the origin of the goods or products, thus, 
the goods must fulfil the conditions to be originating from the beneficiary country. It 
has to be remembered that trade preferences given under GSP are directed for a certain 
target country with the objective to help improve the economic development of that 
country. Therefore, the rules of origin have become a crucial technical requirement to 
obtain GSP facility, however, from the perspective of the beneficiary countries, they 
have caused some obstacles for exporters to obtain GSP facility. For instance in the EU 
GSP, regarding “not wholly obtained products” or products obtained in the beneficiary 
country incorporating materials which have not been wholly obtained in that country. 
In this case, such products “have undergone sufficient working or processing”,423 certain 
conditions are applied based on the “list of working or processing operations”.424 The set 
of products that accumulated from originating and non-originating materials would be 
deemed as “originating” if the content of non-originating materials does not exceed 
15% of the ex-works price of the products.425 According to the EU GSP rules of origin, 
there are four different types of rules to grant originating status to the not wholly 
obtained product: 
1. through working or processing a maximum content of non-originating materials is not 
exceeded;  
2. through working or processing the 4-digit Harmonised System heading or 6-digit 
Harmonised System sub-heading of the manufactured products becomes different 
from the 4-digit Harmonised System heading or 6-digit sub-heading respectively of 
the materials used;   
3. if a specific working and processing operation is carried out;  and 
4. if working or processing is carried out on certain wholly obtained materials.  
The beneficiary country is obliged to demonstrate evidence to obtain originating 
status of its products. That evidence should be in compliance with the standards 
applied by the EU. In addition, the beneficiary country is also required to provide 
“administrative structures and systems” to comply with the rules and procedures 
determined by the regulation including building an integrated system to support the 
implementation of “accumulation of origin”, such as ASW. More details and complex 
rules of origin create more difficulties for exporters to demonstrate evidence in order to 
obtain certificate of origin.  
As highlighted by Inama, another problem is the “lack of knowledge or incorrect 
information” regarding certificate of origin. The roles of government trade institutions 
in the beneficiary countries become crucial to ensuring that their traders have sufficient 
information to obtain tariff facilities under the GSP scheme. Dissemination of GSP 
information in the beneficiary country is crucial since not all traders are aware of the 
tariff reductions given under the GSP scheme. Therefore, trade institutions in the 
beneficiary country are deemed as the core engine to drive GSP utilisation. The 
preference-granting country has designed its policy to simplify and relax GSP rules of 
origin, however, the roles of the beneficiary country institutions to deliver information, 
public services, and assistantship to traders to access GSP facility is much more 
significant. Lack of knowledge or incorrect information is the common problem faced 
by local companies (SMEs) or local traders when they are located away from the centre 
                                                 
422 See Ibid., pp. 360-361. 
423 See Article 72 and Article 75 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
424 See Article 82 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
425 See Annex 13a of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010. 
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of the central government institutions. Generally, beneficiary countries lack 
infrastructures in transportation and communication that cause the high cost of fees for 
producers and traders to obtain documents of rules of origin. 
The minimum content of non-originating materials is not allowed to exceed 15% 
of the ex-works price of the final exported product, and has caused difficulties for the 
beneficiary country producers to manage their productions with limited choices. In this 
regard, producers of the beneficiary country cannot maximise their profits to choose 
the low cost materials from different sources. For LDCs, Commission Regulation (EU) 
No. 1063/2010 provides “maximum content of non-originating426 materials up to 70%” 
since LDCs are considered as not having enough resources to do production by 
themselves. 
As previously noted that GSP is settled under UNCTAD, in this regard, UNCTAD 
carries out tasks to ensure the general non-reciprocal system of preferences delivers 
benefit to all developing countries.427 According to Resolution 21(II) 1968, the Special 
Committee on Preferences428 was established under UNCTAD with the task of 
reviewing the operation and effects of the GSP. According to the Agreed Conclusion the 
tasks of the Special Committee to evaluate the effect of the GSP scheme “on exports and 
export earnings, industrialisation and the rate of economic growth of the beneficiary 
countries.”429 UNCTAD conducting analysis on GSP utilisation is based on the trade date 
notified by preference-granting countries. Therefore, trade data submitted by 
preference-granting countries have been internationally accepted as “reliable sources” 
to analyse the utilisation rate of GSP.430   
In practice,  the task of the Special Committee working with the UNCTAD Working 
Group on rules of origin is to review the “performance criteria of the GSP”. In the 
assessment of GSP performance UNCTAD has special methodologies that have been 
used for forty years. Three methodologies have been used by UNCTAD to assess the 
GSP performance, that is, product coverage431, utilisation rate432 and utility rate433.434  
Among those methodologies, the utilisation rate is used to measure the utilisation of 
the GSP related to the implementation rules of origin.  The degree of rigidity and 
difficulties of rules of origin include its additional criteria determining higher and lower 
utilisation rates of GSP. The utilisation rate is measured based on the ratio between the 
actual import that is granted preference and the covered import. The utilisation rate is 
                                                 
426 See Paragraph 1 (o) Article 67 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010, defined “[…] maximum content of 
non-originating materials as the maximum content of non-originating materials which is permitted in order to 
consider a manufacture as working or processing sufficient to confer originating status on the product. It may be 
expressed as a percentage of the ex-works price of the product or as a percentage of the net weight of these 
materials used falling under a specified group of chapters, chapter, heading or sub-heading […]”. 
427 See Commentaries on the ILC’s Draft Articles 1978, p. 60. 
428 See Yusuf, Abdulqawi., 1982., Op. Cit.,  p.143. 
429 See Robert, Howse., 2003, Op. Cit., p. 393. 
430 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit.,  pp. 360-361. 
431 “[…] Product coverage defined as the ratio between imports that are covered by a preferential trade arrangement 
and total dutiable imports from the beneficiaries’ countries. The higher the percentage, the more generous the 
preferences may appear, depending on the structure of dutiable imports of the beneficiary countries. Coverage 
does not automatically mean that preferences are granted at the time of customs clearance […]”. (See Inama, 
Stefano., 2009, Loc. Cit.,  p.  361). 
432 “[…] Utilization rate defined as the ratio between imports actually receiving preference and covered imports. This 
rate is based on the customs declaration made by the importer at the time of importation […]”. (See Inama, 
Stefano., 2009, Loc. Cit.,  p.  361). 
433 “[…] Utility rate defined as the ratio of imports actually receiving preference and all dutiable imports (covered or 
not), refers to the percentage of total dutiable imports that receive preferences. A low level of this ratio means 
that a large part of dutiable imports (either covered or not) pay the MFN rate […]”. (See Inama, Stefano., 2009, 
Loc. Cit.,  p.  361). 
434 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit.,  pp. 360-361. 
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calculated based on the customs declaration made by the importer at the time of 
importation. 
The EU has used the utilisation rate to evaluate the performance of its GSP 
scheme. According to the midterm evaluation on utilisation rates of EU GSP, 61 
beneficiary countries have high utilisation rates up to 100%. Then, 21 beneficiary 
countries have utilisation rates up to 75%. This is followed by 3 beneficiary countries 
with utilisation rates up to 50% and 2 beneficiary countries with utilisation rates up to 
25%. Then finally, there are 26 beneficiary countries that have utilisation rates up to 
10%. Based on this data, almost 54% of beneficiary countries under GSP have 
maximum utilisation rates and 23% of the beneficiary countries have utilisation rates 
less than 10%. 
 
Table 15. Utilisation Rates under EU GSP.435 
 
No. Utilisation of GSP (%) Number of Countries 
1. <10 % 26 
2. <25 % 2 
3. <50 % 3 
4. <75 % 21 
5. <100% 61 
 
 
The EU evaluates the performance of the EBA GSP scheme using utilisation rates. 
According to the midterm evaluation of EU28 countries, 49 beneficiary countries have 
utilisation rates up to 100%. Followed by 8 countries with utilisation rates up to 75%, 3 
countries with utilisation rates up to 50%, 1 country with utilisation rates up to 25% 
and 9 countries have utilisation rates less than 10%. Based on data of the evaluation 
almost 57% of beneficiary countries under EBA have utilisation rates up to 100%. 
 
Table 16. Utilisation rates under EBA.436 
 
No. Utilisation of GSP (%) Number of Countries 
1. <10 % 9 
2. <25 % 1 
3. <50 % 3 
4. <75 % 8 
5. <100% 28 
 
 
Singapore is the only countries of ASEAN that has been graduated from GSP since 
1997. Under general arrangements of EU GSP five countries of ASEAN have utilisation 
rates up to 75% and 1 country has utilisation rate less than 10%. In this regard, ASEAN 
needs to upgrade its efforts to facilitate the utilisation of the GSP scheme. As pointed 
out earlier, the utilisation rates are correlated to the rules of origin, where the obstacles 
not only come from the conditions of the rules of origin under GSP but also from the 
                                                 
435 Cited from Gasiorek, Michael, Mid-term Evaluation of the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences: Final Report, 
Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex (CARIS), University of Sussex, pg. 70, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146196.pdf , last accessed : 6 June 2011.  
436 Cited from Gasiorek, Michael, 2010, Op. Cit., p. 69. 
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facilitation provided by the trade institutions in the developing countries to issue the 
supporting documentation. 
 
Table 17. Utilisation rates of GSP by ASEAN member states.437 
 
No. Utilisation of GSP (%) ASEAN Countries 
1. <10 % Brunei Darussalam 
2. <25 % - 
3. <50 % - 
4. <75 % Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Vietnam 
5. <100% - 
 
 
V.b.2. The Rules of Origin within CEPT-AFTA and ASEAN trade in good agreement.  
The concept of “contractual rules of origin” is to prevent trade deflection within 
FTA or PTA. Trade deflection is deemed to hinder the benefit of regional integration 
that should be distributed among the contracting parties. According to Inama, FTA as a 
contractual obligation is intended to serve as a “discrimination instrument” against 
“unlawful imports” or trade fraud conduct of non-member FTA countries.  Thus, 
contractual rules of origin functions to ensure that preferential market access will only 
be granted to the goods that have actually been “substantially transformed” within the 
area of FTA, and not to goods that are produced elsewhere and simply trans-shipped 
through one of the member countries.438 Generally, the modus operandi of trade 
deflection within FTA is conducted by exploiting its weaknesses. Within FTA each 
member state maintains its own external tariff and commercial policy in its 
relationship with outside third country trading partners. Consequently, the tariffs and 
commercial policies are different related to the third country trading partners. 
Commonly, FTA reduces the customs duty tariffs between its members until 0%. 
Therefore, tariff circumvention operations can be conducted by some “opportunists 
traders or producers”. Those opportunists penetrate FTAs by means of minimal 
transformation in one of the FTA members in order to re-export the goods to the 
countries with the higher tariffs or to the member countries of FTA which offered 0% of 
custom duty tariffs. 
Trade deflection does not have per se439 a negative economic effect. In the 
economic perspective, trade deflection is considered as a positive effect to improve 
economic efficiency. Economically speaking, it is “[…] equivalent to a reduction in the 
tariff of the country having the higher tariff of the FTA to the country having the lower 
tariff […]”. 440  But, Falvey, Rod and Reed, and Geoff, argue that “it doesn't matter what 
rules of origin effects the trade preferences practice, such policies will distort trade”.441 
While, from the legal perspective it is not aligned with the objectives of the agreement 
                                                 
437 Cited from Gasiorek, Michael, 2010, Op. Cit., p. 72. 
438 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 340. 
439 Means that inherently trade deflection does not absolutely caused negative effect from the economic efficiency 
perspective. 
440 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 234. 
441 See Falvey., Rod and Reed, Geoff., 2000. 
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that has been agreed between the FTA contracting parties. For that reason, rigorous 
contractual rules of origin must be established within FTA as a traditional remedy of 
trade deflection.442 Related to the comparative advantages theory, the origin 
compliance and administrative costs bring effect to stimulate trade diversion and trade 
creation within FTA. 
While Cheng Xin-xuan considers preferential rules of origin under PTA as 
“internal protection and external discrimination”. In internal protection, rules of origin 
are used as tools to protect the contracting parties from trade deflection conducted by 
third parties. In external discrimination, rules of origin serve as a discrimination 
instrument to determine types of treatment granted to the products originating from 
contracting parties and non-contracting parties. The level of discrimination is 
influenced by two factors, that is, the coverage of regional trade agreements and the 
different degree between the free trade area and multilateral trade agreements.  In this 
regard, the more extensive coverage of RTA, the higher the level of foreign 
discrimination is based on the rules of origin.443 
The legal basis of ASEAN cumulative rules of origin is contained in the Agreement 
on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements that was signed in 1977. ASEAN PTA 
facilitates the member states to utilise the most resources available in the region to 
broaden the complementarities of each member’s respective economies and expand 
production opportunities within regions. ASEAN PTA covers areas of basic 
commodities, particularly food and energy, products of the ASEAN industrial projects, 
expansion of intra-ASEAN trade and increase in the utilisation of raw materials 
available in the member states. Enhancement of utilisation of raw materials, 
complementarities, and expanding production opportunities among member states is 
considered as the driving factors of trade creation and trade diversion. In order to 
maintain and to ensure that the benefits of ASEAN PTA are delivered and utilised 
properly by member states, the Agreement provides provisions, stating that eligible 
products under PTA should comply with the PTA rules of origin.444 ASEAN has 
acknowledged that cumulative rules of origin given under EU GSP have a significant 
role in ASEAN economic integration and AFTA. It was stated in the Joint Declaration of 
the EU and ASEAN in 1994, as follows: 
“[…] The Ministers recognised that the General System of Preferences (GSP) has 
contributed to the growth in exports from ASEAN to the EU. More than one third of 
ASEAN's exports to the EU enjoy tariff concessions under the GSP. The Ministers 
noted that the EU envisages a revision and updating of the GSP for the next decade. 
In this context, the Ministers recognised that the Cumulative Rules of Origin (CRO) 
provision has contributed to ASEAN's regional integration and would further assist 
ASEAN in achieving its objectives of an ASEAN Free Trade Area […].”445 
ASEAN PTA had contributed significantly to support the extra-ASEAN trade by 
establishing basic regulations related to cumulation rules of origin as set out in Annex 
1446 and Annex 2447 of the Agreement. ASEAN PTA rules of origin consist of eight (8) 
                                                 
442 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 234. 
443 See  Cheng Xin-xuan quoting Bonade. Haldeman and Michael.KeStecchi, stated that  “the liberalization of FTA 
depended on its rules of origin.” 
444 See Article 2, 4, and 15 of the Agreement On ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements  
Manila, 24 February 1977, available at : http://www.aseansec.org/1376.htm, last accessed : 30 October 2011. 
445 See Robert, Howse., 2003, Op. Cit., p. 393.. 
446 See Annex 1 Rules of Origin for the ASEAN referential Trading Arrangements, available at : 
http://www.aseansec.org/1376.htm, last accessed : 30 October 2011. 
447 See Annex 2 Operational Certification Procedures for the Rules of Origin of the ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Arrangements, available at : http://www.aseansec.org/1376.htm, last accessed : 30 October 2011. 
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rules, which are important to determine the origin of products eligible for preferential 
concessions. Rule 1 elaborates the definition of “originating product” that covers 
products wholly produced or obtained and products not wholly produced or obtained 
in the exporting members states.  
According to the Rule 4, products not wholly produced or obtained in the 
exporting member states, applies to the requirement that the total value of the 
materials from non-ASEAN countries or undetermined origin used does not exceed 
50% of the FOB value of the products produced, except for Indonesia, regarded it does 
not exceed 40%. In this regard, Indonesia only allows certain manufactured products of 
non-ASEAN content up to a maximum limit of 50%.  For the purpose of accelerating 
industrialisation in certain sectors, the rules on maximum limits of non-ASEAN content 
may be waived. In order to acquire origin under ASEAN PTA, the final process of 
manufacture of not wholly produced or obtained products  should be carried out within 
the territory of the exporting contracting states.448  
With respect to the certificate of origin, rule 7 regulates that the government 
authority appointed by the exporting member state should accept a claim that the 
product is eligible for preferential concession, thus, it has to be notified to the other 
member states. The certification procedures need approval from the Committee on 
Trade and Tourism.  Rule 4 of Annex 1 specially regulates “cumulative rules of origin”, 
stipulated as follows: 
“[…] products which comply with or requirements provided for in Rule 1 and which 
are used in a contracting state as inputs for a finished product eligible for 
preferential treatment in another contracting state/states shall be considered as a 
product originating in the contracting state where working or processing of the 
finished product has taken place provided that the aggregate ASEAN content of the 
final product is not less than 60% […]” 
In 1987, the Protocol on Improvements on Extension of Tariff Preferences under 
the ASEAN PTA, amended the regulation related to regional content requirement, as 
follows: 
“[…] The ASEAN content requirement in the rules of origin shall be reduced from 
50% to 35% on a case-by-case basis for a period of five years. With respect to 
Indonesia, the ASEAN content requirement will be reduced from 60% to 42%. After 
the said period of reduction it shall be reviewed with a view to revert to original 
levels […]”.449 
According to value content (VC), the criteria of a product or goods to have origin 
require a certain minimum local value in the exporting country. Value content can be 
calculated by three methods. First, the minimum percentage of value that must be 
added in the exporting country, known as domestic or regional value content (RVC). 
Second, the difference between the value of the final goods and the costs of the 
                                                 
448 “[…] products worked on and processed as a result of which the total value of the materials, parts or produce 
originating from non-ASEAN countries or of undetermined origin used does not exceed 50% of the FOB value of 
the products produced or obtained and the final process of manufacture is performed within the territory of the 
exporting contracting state …in respect of Indonesia, the percentage referred to subparagraph (i) above is 40%.  
On certain categories of manufactured products to be agreed upon from time to time, the requirement of 50 of 
non-ASEAN content may apply...in respect of the ASEAN industrial projects, the percent criterion of Rule 3(a) 
may be waived...The value of the non-originating mates, parts or produce shall be: (1) The CIF value at the time 
of importation of the products or importation can be proven; or (2) The earliest ascertainable price paid for the 
products of undetermined origin in the territory of the Contracting State where the working or processing takes 
place […]”. 
449 See Section V Protocol on Improvements on Extension of Tariff Preferences under The ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Arrangements, signed on Manila, 15 December 1987, available at : http://www.aseansec.org/1380.htm, last 
accessed : 29 October 2011. 
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imported inputs, known as import content (MC).  Third, the value of parts (VP), 
whereby originating status is granted to a product that meets a minimum percentage of 
originating parts out of the total.450  
Further, ASEAN rules of origin evolved along with the signing of CEPT-AFTA in 
1992451, wherein the rules of origin (ROO) for CEPT-AFTA was also adopted. This 
agreement applies a 40% requirement for “ASEAN Value Content” or the “Regional 
Value Content (RVC)” of goods to be deemed originating in the member state.452 
Furthermore, ROO for CEPT-AFTA introduces two formula for calculating ASEAN Value 
Content or RVC, that is, direct and indirect methods. 
 
a. Direct method: 
 
ASEAN Material Cost453 + Direct Labour Cost454 + Direct Overhead Cost455 + Other Cost456 + Profit 
       RVC = --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  x 100% 
     FOB price457 
 
b. Indirect method: 
 
FOB Price – Non-Originating Materials, Parts or Produce 
RVC =  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  x 100% 
     FOB price 
 
According to the regulations of the ROO CEPT AFTA, each member state is only 
allowed to choose and apply one of the calculating methods. Member states are given 
the flexibility to change their calculation methods by notifying the AFTA council at least 
six month before adoption.458 Cumulative ASEAN rules of origin are regulated in Article 
5 Paragraph 1459. It stipulates that goods originating in a member state used in another 
member state as materials for finished goods are eligible for preferential tariff 
treatment. It is deemed to be originating in the latter member state where working or 
processing of the finished good has taken place. In other words, under the ASEAN 
cumulative rules of origin the goods that are entitled under CEPT-AFTA to acquire their 
origin depend on where the finished goods are processed.  Partial cumulation is 
regulated in Article 5 Paragraph 2460, goods entitled partial cumulation, if at least 20% 
of the RVC of the good originates in the member state where working or processing of 
the goods has taken place.  
Rules of origin are regulated under the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement 
(ATIGA) almost similar with the regulation of rules of origin in ROO CEPT-AFTA. ATIGA 
                                                 
450 See Estevadeordal, Antoni., Harris, Jeremy., and Suominen, Kati., Multilateralising Preferential Rules of Origin around 
the World, IDB Working Paper Series # IDB-WP-137, Inter-American Development Bank, 2009, p. 9, available at: 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1803029, last accessed : 9 April 2011. 
451 See Agreement on the CEPTS for the AFTA. See also Rules of Origin for the Agreement on the CEPTS for the AFTA 
(ROO CEPT-AFTA), available at : http://www.aseansec.org/17293.pdf, last accessed : 29 October 2011. 
452 See Paragraph 1 (4) Article 4 of the ROO for CEPT-AFTA, stipulates as follows : “[…] a good shall be deemed to be 
originating in the Member State where working or processing of the good has taken place: (a)  if at least 40 
percent of its content (hereinafter referred to as “ASEAN Value Content” or the “Regional Value Content (RVC)”) 
originates from that Member State or it has undergone a change in tariff classification at four-digit level (change 
in tariff heading) of the Harmonised System […]” 
453 See Paragraph 3 (a) Article 4 of the ROO for CEPT-AFTA. 
454 See Paragraph 3 (b) Article 4 of the ROO for CEPT-AFTA. 
455 See Paragraph 3 (c) Article 4 of the ROO for CEPT-AFTA. 
456 See Paragraph 3 (d) Article 4 of the ROO for CEPT-AFTA. 
457 See Paragraph 3 (e) Article 4 of the ROO for CEPT-AFTA. 
458 See Paragraph 4 Article 4 of the ROO for CEPT-AFTA. 
459 See Paragraph 5 Article 1 of the ROO for CEPT-AFTA. 
460 See Paragraph 5 Article 2 of the ROO for CEPT-AFTA. See also Appendix B concerning implementing guidelines for 
partial cumulation under asean cumulative rules of origin. 
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was established to facilitate the establishment of the single market and the production 
base to attain AEC. Article 28 ATIGA regulates the criteria applied to not wholly 
obtained or produced goods. The goods deemed to be originating in the member state 
where working or processing of the goods has taken place. The goods must have a 
regional value content of not less than forty per cent (40%) calculated using one of the 
“ASEAN Value Content” formulae (direct or indirect methods). Accumulation of rules of 
origin is regulated under Article 30 of ATIGA in which the content of the article is 
similar to Article 5 of CEPT-AFTA. ATIGA is established to tackle economic development 
gaps and to facilitate the participation of member states in the AFTA, through technical 
and development co-operation.461 
According to Article 5 of the ASEAN Framework (Amendment) Agreement for the 
Integration of Priority Sectors, member states should establish rules of origin that are 
more transparent, predictable, standardised (compliance with international best 
practice) and trade-facilitating. Implementation of those principles is used to improve 
application of the rules of origin in the CEPT-AFTA.462 
Some experts who observed and studied the development of regional rules of 
origin, have criticised the development of regional rules of origin. For example Inama 
criticises that “[…] the drafting of the original AFTA rules was rather ambiguous and 
contained a number of provisions and wording, leaving too much space to interpretation 
and little guidance to the various actors of customs or the private sector who must 
implement this rule […]”. Further, he gives criticism on RVC, where it is stipulated that 
“[…] a product is originating if at least 40% of its content originates from any members 
state”. According to Inama, this provision “does not further specify what the criteria are 
for determining and calculating such 40% of local content […]”. He considers that, “[…] 
there is no definition of what could be considered local content that is a very vague 
concept unless properly defined […]”.463 
In the end, the efforts taken by ASEAN to develop "regional rules of origin" are 
considered as a tool to develop industrialisation and increase economic development in 
the region. Rules of origin also have the role to overcome the economic development 
gap among the member states. It is also deemed as positive progress in the framework 
of international trade facilitation. Enhancement of the rules of origin system, 
particularly related to the accumulation of origin, gives a positive impact to generate 
trade creation and trade diversion under PTA. Of course, in this discourse, it is also 
positive to improve the utilisation of EU GSP by ASEAN member states. 
 
                                                 
461 See ASEAN Framework (Amendment) Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors, 2006. 
462 See ASEAN Framework (Amendment) Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors, 2006. 
463 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit.,  p. 459. 
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Table 18. Utilisation of the Certificate of Origin ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement  
(ATIGA) on export to other ASEAN member countries 2010. 
 
YEAR No. ASEAN Member 
Countries Exports 
Destinations 
Total Number of 
Certificate of Origin 
ATIGA 
FOB USD 
2010 1 Brunei Darussalam                                      430                  20,712,615  
2010 2 Cambodia                                    258                       8,677,917  
2010 3 Lao PDR                                        43  1,165,160  
2010 4 Malaysia                                 32,856  3,063,156,406  
2010 5 Myanmar                                      333                     43,887,567  
2010 6 Philippines                           16,046                1,506,621,068  
2010 7 Singapore                                  8,392                   705,527,320  
2010 8 Thailand                                 26,237  1,923,370,993  
2010 9 Vietnam                                 15,479  954,114,480  
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Table 19. Utilisation of the Certificate of Origin ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement  
(ATIGA) on export to other ASEAN member countries 2011. 
 
 
YEAR No. ASEAN Member 
Countries Exports 
Destinations 
Total Number of 
Certificate of Origin 
ATIGA 
FOB USD 
2011 1 Brunei Darussalam                                     519  23,207,183  
2011 2 Cambodia                                416                     21,287,168  
2011 3 Lao PDR                                        35                     4,664,260  
2011 4 Malaysia                              36,042                4,012,309,792  
2011 5 Myanmar                                      401  64,627,933  
2011 6 Philippines                              17,725                2,298,166,912  
2011 7 Singapore                                   9,585              1,275,420,153  
2011 8 Thailand                                29,429                2,786,721,810  
2011 9 Vietnam                                 18,922               1,376,647,088  
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Source: Directorate General of Export and Import Facilitation Ministry of Trade Republic of 
Indonesia May 2012. 
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VI. Legal implication  of GSP post pause ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations. 
VI.a. Legal background establishing ASEAN-EU FTA. 
As previously mentioned, in the middle of the 1990s, ASEAN countries started 
establishing a network of bilateral and regional free trade agreements. Along with the 
immense progress of trade volumes between ASEAN, thus, since 2002 the EU has been 
considering the opportunity of proposing a FTA to ASEAN member states.464 
On 4 May 2007 the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) and the Trade 
Commissioner of the European Union (EU) held an 8th EM-EU Consultation in Bandar 
Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam. The Consultation was co-chaired by H.E. Dato’ Seri 
Rafidah Aziz, Minister of International Trade and Industry of Malaysia, and H.E. Mr 
Peter Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner. The ministers confirmed their shared 
desire to enhance economic relations by establishing a FTA providing for 
comprehensive trade and investment liberalisation.465 
FTA of trade on goods is one of the forms of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), 
wherein its establishment is based on Article XXIV of GATT. As mentioned above, 
Article XXIV was established as an “exception” of the general obligation under GATT, 
especially Article I:1 on MFN treatment. From the legal framework FTA exception is the 
same with the exception of the Enabling Clause.466 Under such exception contracting 
parties of FTA are allowed to establish preferential tariffs and remove the barriers to 
trade that only apply among them. WTO does not provide further elaborations on the 
norms regulating conflict and tension of rules within and outside the multilateral 
system. Article XXIV does not imply particular rules to govern conflict that are likely to 
occur between WTO obligations and obligations derived from RTAs. When conflict 
occurs between two legal obligations, the WTO regime and RTAs, and the general rules 
of international law on the treaty are applied. Inherently the existence of RTAs under 
the WTO regime are based on the “principle freedom of contract”, temporal sequencing 
(lex posterior derogate legi priori) and respect of third party rights (pacta tertiis nec 
nocent nec prosunt).467 In general public international law, the principle of freedom of 
contract is exercised when states are free to establish any agreement in any form and 
content. This free right is also derived from the equality principle in international 
relations between states. According to Thomas Cottier and Marina Foltea, equality of 
states entails the power to choose partners, and to discriminate against others. Since 
the ILC Draft Articles on MFN clauses never come as a treaty and are non-binding.468  
There is no general obligation to treat all states alike.469 Article XXIV and the Enabling 
Clause are subject to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.  According to Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), parties are under an obligation to 
honour a binding treaty in good faith.470 
                                                 
464 See Michael Astuto., EU – ASEAN Free Trade Agreement – Negotiation, Analysis, Instituto per gli Studi di Politica 
Internazionale,(ISPI), No. 26 – October 2010, available at : 
http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/Analysis_26_2010.pdf, last accessed : 12 February 2012. 
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the Launch of Negotiations for the ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), available at : 
http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-EU-FTA.pdf, last accessed : 12 February 2012. 
466 See Bartels, Lorand., and Ortino, Federico., Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, Oxford University 
Press Inc., New York, 2006, p. 52. 
467 See Ibid., p. 52. 
468 See Radi, Yannick., 2007. 
469 See Thomas Cottier and Marina Foltea, Constitutional Functions of the WTO and Regional Trade Agreement; Bartels, 
Lorand., and Ortino, Federico., 2006, Op. Cit., p. 43. 
470 See Bartels, Lorand., and Ortino, Federico., 2006, Op. Cit., p. 52. 
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The FTA is universally practiced among WTO member since it is considered 
economically significant. Viet D. Do and William Watson wrote an analysis about 
welfare improving of RTAs from normative perspectives. FTAs are the most common 
use to form RTAs rather than the customs union. FTAs are seemingly easier to 
negotiate than customs union. In the FTA there is no need to establish an agreement on 
the common external tariff or common policies, however rules of origin are required. 
The establishment of WTO in 1995 brought implications of the increasing and 
proliferation of RTAs, however, many of those agreements were not implemented 
properly or were sometimes just a paper agreement. It has been estimated that the 
total amount of world trade covered by such agreements is roughly 40%471. Referring 
to Jacob Vinner (1950) the existence of PTAs especially in RTAs, such as CEPT AFTA, 
have goals of trade creation and trade diversion.472 However, Viet D. Do and William 
Watson consider that proliferation of RTAs do not yet successfully create trade 
diversion in the world trading system. Trade seems to increase in most intra-regional 
trade agreements, for instance AFTA.473 
The current rules of Articles XXIV of GATT fail to address the problem of trade 
diversion. Article XXIV of GATT was drafted before Viner pioneered economic research 
and the doctrine of trade creation and trade diversion in the 1950s.474 The existing 
Articles XXIV of the GATT text taken from the Havana sessions where a significant re-
working and expansion of the customs union Article was made. This occurred as a 
result of a referral to a specially formed joint subcommittee of both Development and 
the Commercial Policy Committees to resolve the relationship between the MFN Article, 
the customs union Article, and the Charter’s Development Chapter provisions. Article 
15 of this Chapter permitted “regional” preferences, but only subject to ITO 
membership vote and waiver. The general conference record is clear on a hostile 
developing country’s response to the new Generalised MFN clause that permits 
“standstill” provisions for existing preferential systems, but then requires all future 
preferential systems other than the customs union to be subject to a voting waiver 
according to Article 15.475 
The establishment of preferential agreements is justified from the economic 
perspective to develop market expansion and promote deeper integration among the 
countries of a region. In addition, RTAs are also established for “defensive reasons”, 
raising competitiveness of the region, and also serve as a tool to “lock out” competition 
from third countries. Nowadays, RTAs cover provisions on intellectual property rights, 
rules of origin, SPS standards, MRA (Mutual Recognition Agreement), elimination of 
NTB and trade facilitation. In the end, the establishment of RTAs may be used by 
developed countries to gradually replace the dependency upon unilateral preferences, 
such as GSP schemes.476 Therefore, the negotiations of AEUFTA exclude LDC ASEAN 
member states, such as Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. However, the establishment of 
individual FTAs within ASEAN would erode the preferential margin of the beneficiary 
countries covered under the general arrangement. 
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VI. b. Political economic interest. 
ASEAN growth as one of the biggest regional organisations in Asia as well as its 
strategic position have influenced its bargaining power in external economic relations. 
After the Second World War, ASEAN external economic relations were dominated by 
three major trading partners US, Japan, and the EU.477 ASEAN’s FTA negotiation with 
Japan and the US were considered as one of the driving factors of the AEUFTA 
negotiations.478 ASEAN’s “key” member states, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines, had already concluded bilateral agreements with key 
players outside the region. In addition, US interest as the dominant power in the region 
had increasing rapidly. Given the accumulation of regional FTAs in ASEAN, the EU as 
one of the big players in international trade had to take part to keep its interest in the 
region.479 From the EU perspective the trade diversion resulting from ASEAN FTA 
proliferation could bring disadvantages to its trade in ASEAN. Therefore, the EU 
thought that AEUFTA would restore the EU’s role in ASEAN foreign trade.480 The goal of 
AEUFTA was to acquire the same concessions from ASEAN that it had granted to Japan 
and the US.481 The faster the EU grasped FTA opportunities with ASEAN countries, the 
better its chances of setting a footing in the region482 and stepping out from its economic 
crisis. 
Recently, however, the pattern of ASEAN external economic relations has shifted 
to China. Such pattern has been influenced by the immense growth of Asian Economic 
Power. ASEAN established ASEAN + 3 with China483, Japan484, and Korea485. ASEAN-
China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has strongly increased trade flows between the two 
parties. Under the FTA, India486 has gradually improved its shares of ASEAN external 
trade. However, it started from an insignificant volume. ASEAN also established FTAs 
with Australia-New Zealand. Such FTAs will be huge trade multipliers once they enter 
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fully into force487 and reduce the economic dependency of ASEAN with the EU.488 
Therefore, the proposal of AEUFTA is aimed to prevent further mutual decline of 
dependency, or at least to maintain the existing level, but the main goal is to improve 
this.489 Therefore, the AEUFTA negotiations were launched due to the falling of trade 
shares between the two regions. Based on the ASEAN statistical yearbook, the EU share 
of the ASEAN-6 exports fell from 15.3% in 2001 to 13.2% in 2004 while the 
corresponding ASEAN import shares fell from 12.6% to 11.3%.490 
The 2006 Commission communication entitled “Global Europe”, had formally 
announced the EU’s intention of negotiating “second-generation FTAs”.491 However, the 
Commission communication did not mention explicitly the FTAs’ potential role to 
speed up regional integration among the EU’s partners. Regarding regional integration 
in Southeast Asia, the Commission ASEAN recognised different levels of economic 
development. Therefore, it is strongly recommended to take into account such 
differences in the FTA negotiation.492 It is most likely aimed to narrow intraregional 
inequalities.493 
The EU’s 2006 paper laid down the criteria for EU FTA partners. The main criteria 
are based on market potential (economic size and growth), the level of protection 
against EU exporters (tariff and non-tariff barriers), and the potential partners’ 
negotiations with EU competitors. According to such criteria there were three partners 
consisting of ASEAN, Korea, and Mercosur that were considered as preferred partners 
of FTA.494 According to Astuto, the Commission’s objectives on FTA had two major 
components related to political economic interest covering international trade 
competition and market expansion.495 In this regard, the establishment of AEUFTA 
strongly aimed to dynamically maintain European interests in Southeast Asia, since 
some ASEAN member states actively established free trade agreements with other 
regions or individual states.496 The Commission noted that “[…] in the context of 
multiplication of bilateral and regional free trade initiatives in Southeast Asia, the EU has 
both offensive and defensive interests in forging stronger economic ties with the region 
[…]”. The “offensive” interest has the aim to advance the EU’s presence in important 
and growing markets. While the “defensive” interest is intended to protect its existing 
economic interests in Southeast Asia.497 
According to Lena Lindberg and Claes G. Alvstam the efforts of the EU to establish 
FTA with ASEAN are considered as part of the strategy to maintain “its traditional 
political and commercial linkages”, which began in the 1600s. Historically, ASEAN is 
closely linked with Europe due to the common colonial past. Nowadays, ASEAN has 
developed the regional organisation and balances its external trade relations between 
the US, Europe and its own neighbours in the East Asian region. Relating to the trade 
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policy preferences, both ASEAN and the EU seem to be ambivalent on supporting 
multilateral trading processes in WTO and on the other hand also promote 
interregional trade agreements. Since ASEAN has no common external policies on its 
external trade relationships, unlike the EU, each of its member states are allowed to 
pursue bilateral trade agreements with other individual states or entire trade blocs or 
regional groups.498 
Since the EU has a common commercial policy that is governed by supranational 
decision-making, its individual member states have limited opportunities to design and 
decide upon their own trade policy. On the other hand, since the beginning of its 
establishment ASEAN has not intended to be designed as a supranational organisation, 
in this regard, there is no high authority to represent the member states through a 
single voice. Dissimilarity between the organisation structures in the EU and ASEAN 
creates an asymmetrical relationship in which individual ASEAN member states can 
potentially establish bilateral trade agreements with the EU as a single entity, which is 
known as a “regional-bilateral” agreement. While an individual EU member state is not 
allowed to establish bilateral trade agreements, neither with ASEAN as a group nor 
with a single ASEAN member.499 The establishment of AEUFTA as a region to region 
agreement has the purpose of creating efficiency in trade rather than establishing 
seven bilateral agreements with ASEAN member states excluding CML.500 
The ASEAN region is the fifth largest export market of the EU and the fifth largest 
trading partner of the EU. While the EU is nominated as the second largest trading 
partner for most countries in ASEAN after the US. ASEAN exports to the EU account for 
about 13% of its total exports. EU exports to ASEAN account for around 4% of its total 
exports.501 In the area of trade in goods the establishment of an AEUFTA is considered 
as an effort of ASEAN member states to secure their market access in one of their 
largest markets.502 
For more than four decades, the EU-ASEAN relationship has been focused on 
promoting region-to-region economic cooperation including closer investment 
cooperation.503 The EU is one of ASEAN’s major trading partners and the largest foreign 
investor in the region. Throughout the period from 2006 to 2008, European firms 
invested on average €10.4 billion Euro per year in the ASEAN member states.504 
Significant improvement of two way trade and investment flows between ASEAN and 
EU have critical economic importance for the EU, thus, a new form of relationship was 
discovered between both regions. Such critical point is not simply due to the volume of 
value of trade and investments but also because of their strategic regional nature.505  
TREATI Trans Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI) functioned as a 
channel to promote dialogue and cooperation on investment flows between ASEAN-EU. 
TREATI also encouraged both sides to consider deeper economic integration through 
an FTA.506 In 2006, the EU Commission launched a new strategy called “Global Europe: 
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Competing in the World”. Global Europe contains “the guidelines for the new market-
opening commercial strategy that the EU would follow in its negotiations, both at the 
multilateral and bilateral level”.507 The FTA negotiation was part of the Commission's 
Global Europe strategy. In April 2007, the Commission was given mandate by EU 
member states to negotiate an FTA with ASEAN member states. The negotiations round 
was launched in May 2007. 508 
Appraisal has been made to examine the positive effect of the establishment of 
FTA for both regions. According to independent research commissioned by the 
European Commission, it has been suggested that the economic benefits for both 
ASEAN and the EU from an AEUFTA were probably significant. ASEAN could see its 
exports to the EU rise by 18.5%. As expected, ASEAN has economic gains equivalent to 
2% of its GDP by 2020. The EU could see its exports to ASEAN boost considerably and 
total EU global exports is expected to increase by almost 2%.509 According to Willem 
van der Geest through AEUFTA the ASEAN’s trade policy regime is opening up and the 
gains of further tariff elimination will be modest. Such conditions, due to the low tariff 
that has already been applied by most ASEAN member states and EU tariff on import 
from ASEAN, are also low. However, a further reduction could benefit both the EU and 
ASEAN because a significant share of imports is intra-firm trade, with EU firms 
operating from ASEAN as a production platform for the EU markets.510 The FTA 
deemed will directly reduce the costs to EU owned firms operating both in ASEAN and 
the EU. 511 
 
VI. c. Coverage of ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations. 
As mentioned above, RTAs, especially FTAs have a wide variety of provisions. 
AEUFTA as an inter-regional trade agreement is an opportunity to accommodate some 
delicate issues such as public procurement, competition policy, intellectual property 
and dispute settlement that could not be agreed during the Cancun Meetings 2003.512  
In this regard, AEUFTA is supposed to produce benefits on issues relating to non-tariff 
barriers such as trade facilitation, MRA, SPS, and technical standard agreements.513  
Therefore, the EU is looking for partners to engage in the FTAs that are eager not 
only to reduce the traditional tariff barrier but also non-tariff barriers and develop 
agreement in the new area of trade such as services, public procurement and IPR.514 In 
addition, the Commission is also enthusiastic to include in the negotiations of some 
non-trade issues convergent with the trade and development objectives such as 
sustainable development, environmental standards, labour standards, and human 
rights.515 With regards to trade in goods, the EU was intended to negotiate rules on 
NTBs (technical barriers to trade, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures), IPRs 
protection, and rules of origin. 516  
In order to explore the possibility to integrate such issues into FTA, in 2005, the 
Vision Group on the ASEAN-EU Economic Partnership was established.517 With regard 
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to the various levels of economic development among ASEAN countries, the Visions 
recommended the granting of some kind of Special and Differential Treatment for the 
LDCs of ASEAN member states (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar). The granting of SDTs is 
in line with the rules of WTO. According to such recommendation, the AEUFTA should 
take into account “the disparities between ASEAN and the EU as well as among 
members of ASEAN”.518 The Vision Group also conducted a quantitative study to assess 
the economic impact of the envisaged FTA. According to the study the traditional tariffs 
are not considered as the major barrier to trade in manufactured goods between 
ASEAN and the EU.519 
Non-tariff barriers are considered as the major obstacle in the two way trades of 
ASEAN-EU. The EU considered that ASEAN applied restricted access on its services 
sectors. Such inner-ASEAN restrictions hampered the development of trade in services. 
Conversely, EU import regulations on SPS applied toward ASEAN’s export products 
were apparently seen as the greatest obstacle for ASEAN member states, especially for 
LDCs. Most ASEAN countries are facing difficulties to meet such requirements and 
standards. Furthermore, under the Common Agriculture Policy the EU applied tariff 
quotas on some of ASEAN’s agricultural exports.520 In this regard, AEUFTA intended to 
open greater market access and integration.521  
Since trade facilitation is considered as non-tariff barriers to trade that 
significantly reduce transaction costs in exports and imports, the Commission proposed 
strong trade facilitation in the AEUFTA. In this regard, the EU required ASEAN 
governments to adopt a competition policy based on the principles of transparency, 
non-discrimination, and procedural fairness in line with EU legislation. In fact, such 
requirements faced obstacles since, most ASEAN countries did not have a competition 
law when the FTA negotiations were launched. For instance, Indonesia established its 
competition after the reformation era by Law No. 5/1999.522 In addition, the EU also 
emphasised for more transparent rules relating to state aid and other subsidies. The EU 
believed that there had been many cases of ‘unfair subsidisation’ and proposed to bring 
such issue to the negotiations.523 Other contentious issues in which ASEAN refused to 
discuss related to the mandate of the Commission on issues of sustainable 
development, in particular to labour and environmental standards.524 
It is also clear that the EU wants a “WTO Plus” agreement with ASEAN, leading to 
rapid and radical trade, services and FDI liberalisation. Apart from the removal of non-
trade barriers, which is a top priority, the harmonisation of trade rules and regulations 
is aimed at enhancing EU member states’ competitive advantage. Also, measures to 
protect intellectual property rights and the opening up of government procurement 
markets feature prominently.525 
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VI. b. Behind the deadlock of AEUFTA negotiations. 
In 2007, the joint committee was established consisting of senior officials from 
both parties. This committee worked to set up modalities, a work programme, and a 
timeframe for the FTA negotiations. To develop the details of the FTA negotiations the 
joint committee had to hold the meeting seven times. During those meetings, six Expert 
Groups were established, consisting of Trade in Services/Investment, Rules of Origin, 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 
Customs and Trade Facilitation, and Dispute Settlement. Unfortunately, at the 7th 
meeting of the Joint Committee, in March 2009, the parties of AEUFTA agreed to 
temporarily suspend the negotiations, allowing to allow for reflection on the 
appropriate format for the FTA negotiations.526 The suspension of negotiations was 
considered as an indication of the deadlock of the AEUFTA negotiations. Therefore, in 
December 2009, the Commission also gave authorisation to negotiate FTAs with 
individual ASEAN member states.527 According to Astuto, the main reason to suspend 
AEUFTA was due to the complexity and wide scope of issues brought onto the 
negotiations table. AEUFTA is a region to region negotiation, wherein more than two 
states are engaged into negotiations, consequently both parties have to make up their 
minds in order to reach the deals. The configuration of issues became varied and 
sensitive, in the context of AEUFTA, the EU with a single voice was represented by the 
Commission and ASEAN neither had a single voice nor a supranational body. The 
Commission was given the mandate to negotiate with seven of the ASEAN countries 
and the mandate excluded the three LDCs of ASEAN (CML). However, the possibility 
was still open for Cambodia and Laos to join the agreement in the future. The EU 
decided not to negotiate with Myanmar for various reasons. From the start the EU was 
aware of such difficulties. There was a doubt  about the choice of negotiating one 
regional agreement instead of seven bilateral deals and the negotiations were probably 
affected by those doubts.528 Related to such issues, Willem ven der Geest addresses a 
question relating to “[…] the precise nature of possible mechanisms to ensure that an 
inter-regional agreement will extend benefits to all ASEAN member states, including the 
least developed countries (CML) […]”.529 While Gauri Khandekar notes the main reasons 
why the EU dropped the FTA negotiation were due to incompatible legal frameworks 
within ASEAN; the disparities created by two f ASEAN’s states already benefiting from 
the EU’s Everything but Arms treaty; and Myanmar’s human rights record.530 
It is also interesting to take into account the open trade policy of the countries. In 
this regard, ASEAN has an open and neutral trade policy regime. For instance, among 
ASEAN member states Singapore is considered as one of the most competitive 
countries in the world. Compared to Singapore and some ASEAN member states, the EU 
trade policy regime is not so open due to some of its restrictive policies on non-tariff 
barriers to trade, especially on its CAP. Therefore, in the AEUFTA, the EU had to open 
its markets for its FTA partners.531 
Anticipating those possibilities, the EU prepared three options for negotiation. 
First, the EU will negotiate AEUFTA with ASEAN as a whole. The region-to-region FTA 
will bring advantages to promote closer integration for ASEAN.532 Second, the EU will 
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negotiate with the seven ASEAN member states but exclude three of ASEAN’s LDCs 
(CML). Second option, AEUFTA only involves six developing countries of ASEAN and 
one advanced developing country the AEUFTA. This option is intended to minimise the 
gap of economic development of FTA trading partner. The third negotiation is 
negotiating seven bilateral FTAs with seven ASEAN individual member states, includes 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand.533  
In 2010, the EU FTA negotiation with Singapore and Malaysia had already been 
launched. Negotiations with Singapore advanced significantly after eight rounds. The 
EU-Malaysia FTA is still on-going, along with the EU Malaysia Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiations. Thailand is considering the scope of a 
bilateral FTA with the EU. An EU Indonesia PCA was signed in November 2009, as the 
only Southeast Asian country that has such an agreement. The EU officials indicated 
Indonesia as a potential candidate for a Strategic Partnership. The FTA negotiation with 
individual ASEAN member states are more likely to be the building blocks rather than 
the stumbling blocks in the region.534 
AEUFTA is supposed to bring benefit to the ASEAN member states involved and 
for the EU as a whole. But the coming challenges and obstacles will be more difficult, 
especially some powerful groups in ASEAN have sceptical minds about the FTA 
negotiations. Besides, as previously mentioned , many individual ASEAN member states 
have already set up FTA negotiations with some countries in the Asia–Pacific region. 
According to Cuyvers, the suspension of the AEUFTA negotiations with the seven 
ASEAN member states was caused by the lack of government capacity. In this regard, 
six out of seven ASEAN member states, except Singapore, were anxious not to be able to 
follow negotiations with the EU closely and comprehensively enough. Cuyvers also 
highlights the weakness of the ASEAN institutional structure. Compared to the EU, 
ASEAN lacks the capacity to negotiate with a single voice and to be represented by 
supranational institutions.535 The asymmetrical economic development between 
ASEAN and EU has also become another factor that has raised doubts about the 
implementation of region to region FTAs.536 In addition, many ASEAN countries may 
not be able to meet the high regulatory standards applied by the EU. On the other hand, 
countries like China, Korea and Japan have been more flexible in their negotiations with 
ASEAN, with greater possibilities to gain more benefit.537 
 
VI. c. Trade facilitation AEUFTA. 
A number of recent studies examine whether the implementation of AFTA has 
contributed to any increase in trade among member states. Although early results 
suggest little or no effect, a more recent study by Thornton and Goglio concludes that 
AFTA did facilitate trade, especially during the late 1990s. Other studies by Tang also 
found that the implementation of AFTA has contributed to the gradual but significant 
growth of trade among the member states.538  
As acknowledged above, trade facilitation brought about a reduction in the bulk 
of NTBs to trade. According to the study by Shepherd & Wilson (2008), “[…] trade 
facilitation in ASEAN countries would bring about higher welfare benefits and reduce the 
costs of intraregional trade further than comparable tariff reductions […]”. Based on this 
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study, reduction in applied tariffs would increase intraregional trade by only 2%, while 
improvements in port facilities, limiting unofficial payments and improving 
competitiveness in e-trade services would increase trade by 7.5%, 2.3% and 5.7% 
respectively.539 In 2002, Wilson et al. discovered trade facilitation along four 
dimensions (port efficiency, customs environment, own regulatory environment and e-
business usage) could increase intra-APEC trade by around 10% ($280 billion USD). 
Francois & Manchin (2006) carried out a study on the different levels of trade 
facilitation (especially for infrastructure and institutions). Hertel & Keeney (2006) 
estimate that worldwide gains from trade facilitation ($110 billion USD) would be 
nearly as large as from full liberalisation of goods and services ($150 billion USD).540 
Many sectors are affected by poor trade facilitation that are most likely to reduce 
the benefits of the firms due to the high cost of trade transactions. Poor trade 
facilitations often affect trade in large quantities of goods. The WTO members need to 
address such problem through the improvement of existing GATT provisions on trade 
facilitation.541 Trade facilitation became one of the crucial issues brought into AEUFTA 
negotiations. Both parties agreed that trade facilitation has a significant role within 
FTA. Trade facilitation will become the driving force to reduce NTBs between the 
parties in the FTA. However, due to economic development disparities ASEAN-EU has 
an asymmetric relationship on trade facilitation.  
Most EU member states are the key players in international trade. As noted, the 
establishment of the single market in the EU has driven its member states to develop 
their trade facilitations. A sufficient trade facilitation system is the most important 
skeleton within the single market of customs union to guarantee the free flow of goods. 
Therefore, EU member states have made immense efforts to develop further their trade 
facilitation on trading goods. Based on the Global Enabling Trade Report of 2008 from 
the World Economic Forum, three of the top ten in the enabling trade index were EU 
Member States.  The trade index indicator is assessed based on four sub-indexes, 
includes, market access, border administration, transportation and communication 
infrastructure, and the business environment. Those four sub-indexes are evaluated 
based on ten aspects, covering tariffs and non-tariff barriers, proclivity to trade, 
efficiency of customs administration, efficiency of import-export procedures, 
transparency of border administration, availability and quality of transport 
infrastructure, availability and quality of transport services, availability and use of ICTs, 
regulatory environment, and physical security.542 
Compared to the EU member states, which mostly have further developed trade 
facilitation, the ASEAN member states generally continue to be less developed. Such 
situations generate non-tariff barriers for export and imports from EU to ASEAN and 
from ASEAN to EU. In this regard, poor trade facilitation in ASEAN creates obstacles for 
both parties.543 As has been explained previously, trade facilitation in ASEAN was 
exposed by the World Bank “Doing Business” data where Singapore was nominated as 
the most favourable country in ASEAN to do business and trade across borders. Lao 
PDR and Cambodia were nominated as countries in ASEAN with the worst trade 
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facilitations.544 The establishment of ASW was acknowledged as the driving force to 
create a trade facilitating environment in ASEAN. The harmonisation of rules and 
regulations within the ASW system with international standards could significantly 
improve trade facilitation in ASEAN.  
As previously mentioned, both states and business actors play important roles in 
trade facilitation. Business actors, in this term, domestic traders have a contradictory 
position within trade facilitation. Domestic traders usually seem unenthusiastic to 
support trade liberalisation of the internal market for foreign competitors. In one fell 
swoop, they are pressuring their governments to reduce trade barriers and improve 
the trade facilitation programme. The issue of trade facilitation within FTA is part of the 
shared interest between government and traders.545 
 
VI. d. Legal implication: AEUFTA versus GSP 
RTAs have been seen as both building blocks and stumbling blocks to multilateral 
liberalisation.546 As building blocks, RTAs facilitate the further liberalisation of trade 
through, for example, the WTO; they establish incentives that lead governments to 
oppose protectionism generally at both the regional and multilateral levels. As 
stumbling blocks, RTAs divert trade and clash with the economic goals of multilateral 
liberalisation.547 
As elaborated above, in the coming future the FTA are intended to gradually reduce 
the dependency of developing countries upon the GSP facility scheme. The proposal of 
the new GSP policy reduces the beneficiary countries from 176 countries to 80 
countries and focuses on the countries most in need. Reciprocal RTAs between 
developed countries and developing countries can be used to boost foreign investment 
and secure market access. However, developing countries needs to sacrifice their 
enjoyment of facilities granted under the GSP scheme. This is elaborated further by 
Chad Damro: 
“[…] Developing countries, in particular, might be willing to sacrifice the benefits 
conferred by GSP programmes and as a replacement for committing themselves to 
signing reciprocal RTAs with developed countries in order to secure access to 
their markets; such a strategy is usually deemed to have strong signalling effects 
and act as a pull for foreign investment. Thus, RTAs may perform a sort of dual 
locking function, locking out competition and locking in investment […]”.548 
The dual locking function that is enshrined in the provisions of RTA might serve 
as a new barrier to trade for third parties. In this regard, RTAs function as building 
blocks instead of stumbling blocks. Avoiding such trade distortion effects the need of 
the FTA to comply with basic  requirements such as avoiding additional barriers for 
third countries, clarifying substantial trade coverage, eliminating internal trade 
barriers, and minimising requirements on preferential rules of origin.549 
Jagdish Baghwati called the effect of significant increase and proliferation of 
FTA the “spaghetti bowl” phenomena. In the international trade perspective, the 
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complexities of FTA have raising issues of implications of those developments to the 
multilateral trading system. For instance John H Jackson refers to the report of 
Sutherland Consultative Board in January 2005 concerning the jeopardy of the 
significant increase of FTA to the multilateral system that led to the “erosion of non-
discrimination principles”. Further Jackson argued that to some extent FTAs might 
develop protectionist measures or serve as indirect discrimination that discriminate 
against certain parts of world trade and even create additional transaction costs and 
excessive trade bureaucracy due to the necessity to provide the proof of origin of the 
goods. The rules of origin is often manipulated in such a way to provide a protectionist 
effect of FTA, for instance to lock out competition of non-contracting parties. In 
addition, the more complex and detailed the rules of origin within FTAs, the more 
complex and detailed the non-tariff barriers to trade. On the other hand, the rules of 
origin are one of the basic requirements in the FTAs to prevent trade deflection and 
also to ensure that the benefits of the agreement improve the contracting parties’ 
welfare.550 
In the fifth WTO Ministerial Meeting, held in Cancun, Mexico, the issues related to 
regional integration, such as rules of origin, safeguards, GSP, and SPS measures 
emerged551 along with the issues of transparency in RTAs.552 India has raised issues 
about the GSP provisions within RTAs that are most likely to erode the principles 
embodied in the Enabling Clause. India argues the existence of such provisions within 
RTAs is not in line with the spirit of the WTO regimes and of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration. According to India, the Enabling Clause is vital to the economic 
development of poorer nations. It also gives opportunities to developing countries to 
increase their competitiveness in the international markets.  The rapid development of 
RTAs threatens to divert trade away from India and other developing countries 
towards RTA signatories, for instance AEUFTA.553  
The EC-Tariff Preferences case is an example of the issue on granting particular 
trade preferences by applying non-trade conditionality, known as drug arrangement. 
India argues that this was inconsistent with the MFN principle and the Enabling Clause. 
The panel was asked to recommend that the EC withdraw these trade incentives. The 
panel found India’s favour with regard to the breach of Article I:1 GATT. The Appellate 
Body essentially upheld the decision and ruled that the Enabling Clause does not 
exclude conditionality. However, such conditions need to be applied in a consistent and 
coherent manner to provide “identical treatment to similarly-situated beneficiaries”. As 
such, discrimination between different similarly-situated countries could be avoided.554 
According to independent research, the Commission claimed that AEUFTA would 
increase EU exports to ASEAN by 24.2%; the latter would see an increase of 18.5% of 
its exports to the EU.555 Robles argues that if ASEAN countries enter into an FTA with 
the EU, they will find themselves in the absurd situation of reversing their success in 
expanding the share of manufacturing in their economies. AEUFTA criticised it might 
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prevent developing countries from diversifying their economic structures, which still 
rely heavily on the production of primary commodities.556 
As mentioned above, region to region negotiations of AEUFTA took into account 
the different level of development of ASEAN member states.557 Within the EU external 
trading system, all ASEAN members states, excluding Singapore, are granted 
preferential access to the  EU market. According to Celine Carere et al., in the terms of 
preferential trade access given by a developed country to ASEAN, the EU is considered 
as the most generous developed country through its scheme of the GSP and free-trade 
status (with the EBA scheme) to the three low-income countries, such as CML.558  
The extensive policy of EU trade preferences has to be taken into account in the 
AEUFTA negotiations. In granting preferential access the EU categorises its beneficiary 
countries into three different groups, that is the most preferred group, the middle 
group, and the least preferred group. The most preferred group benefits from a trade 
agreement that is superior to the standard GSP. The preferential access for the most 
preferred groups includes the Cotonou Agreement and Non-Cotonou Agreement. The 
Non-Cotonou Agreement covers EBA (CML ASEAN member states), the EU’s regional 
and bilateral trade agreements with its neighbours, Turkey, EUROMED countries, and 
more distant countries such as South Africa, Chile, and Mexico. The EPAs covering ACP 
countries are also included in this group.559 The middle group consists of the GSP 
beneficiary countries under the general arrangement scheme,  covering developing 
countries of ASEAN member states such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam. This group is party to the standard GSP preferences and grants 
other regimes of preferential access.560 Third is the least preferred group, which 
includes industrialised countries such as Singapore that trade with the EU on a MFN 
basis.561  
According to such categorisation of EU preferences, it can be seen that ASEAN 
member states are divided into different groups.  As a result, ASEAN has heterogeneous 
differential access to the EU market under the current trade regime. In this regard, the 
proposed FTA with the EU considered that preferences for the low-income ASEAN 
member states would erode in comparison with other ASEAN member states. However, 
in relative terms at least, it is to be expected that there will be a significant increase in 
market access for the ASEAN partners that are not granted EBA status.562 
The export shares among the EBA group are quite similar compared to the 
general arrangement scheme of the GSP. The export shares under the general 
arrangement scheme of GSP are varied and are likely to cause strong conflicts of 
interests in the negotiations as far as market access issues are concerned.563 In this 
regard, Celine Carrere et al. argue that “one size does not fit all” is suitable to help 
understanding the difficulties and tensions in the AEUFTA negotiations since each 
ASEAN member state has a different level of development, different market access, 
different individual exception list in the FTAs, and divergent interests of each member 
states.564 
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VII. Impact of the Eurozone crisis towards ASEAN Export under GSP Regime. 
From 2006–2010 ASEAN’s export to the EU had no significant increase.  Export 
value increased by a small significant amount between 2006–2008 from €77.46 million 
Euro into €79.11 million Euro or increased €1.7 million Euro or 2.08%. However, the 
amount of this significantly crumbled in 2009 when the global crisis worsened the 
economic situation of the EU. The amount of ASEAN export to EU decreased to €66.18 
million Euro or 16.34% lower than the previous amount of exports. In 2010, ASEAN 
exports to the EU considerably rose to €77.6 million Euro or increased by 14.75%. 
Singapore dominates the amount of ASEAN exports to the EU with 35.15% of the total 
share in 2010. Thailand is in the second position, followed by Malaysia and Indonesia, 
respectively. Indonesia’s export to the EU rose significantly in 2010 to an amount of 
€12.96 million Euro, 24.54% higher than 2009. Indonesia had 16.70% of the total share 
of ASEAN exports to the EU in 2010. (See Table 20). 
All ASEAN product exports to the EU significantly increased by 25.09% or by 
€90.05 million Euro in 2010. ASEAN has a 2.28% import share of the total of all EU 
product imports from the rest of the world. ASEAN’s total exported products to EU was 
11.42% of ASEAN’s total exported products to the rest of the world. In this regard, 
ASEAN depends more on exports to the EU. In 2009, the EU’s total exported products  
from the rest of the world decreased by 21% from €4.13 billion Euro to €3.26 billion 
Euro in 2008. However, the EU’s total exported products from the rest of the world rose 
again by 17.21% in 2010. (See Table 19). The trade balance between ASEAN and EU 
increased by 100% in 2010, however, before it declined by 30% in 2009. (See Table 
22). 
Singapore is the largest EU trading partner among the other ASEAN member 
states with the total export value in 2010 of €28.94 million Euro and the total import 
value in 2010 of €26.52 million Euro. Malaysia  is in the second position with the total 
export value in 2010 of €12.70 million Euro and the total import value in 2010 of 
€16.10 million Euro. This is followed by Thailand in third position, Indonesia in fourth 
position and the Philippines in fifth position. After the FTA negotiations with ASEAN 
this paused, the EU pursued bilateral negotiations on FTA with individual countries, 
starting with Singapore and Malaysia.565 (See Table 25). 
Germany is the largest import market for ASEAN exported products among the 27 
EU member states with the total export value from ASEAN at €95.45 million Euro. This 
is followed by the Netherlands and United Kingdom, placed in second and third place, 
respectively. (See Table 24). 
Indonesia is the largest exporter on S-III of Animal or vegetable fats and oils and 
their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes with the 
export values in 2010 at €2.0 million Euro. Malaysia was in the second rank with 
exports values in 2010 of €1.27 million Euro. In 2005, Indonesia and Malaysia were 
granted section graduation under the general arrangement of the EU GSP.  According to 
this data, section graduation does not have a negative influence but instead a positive 
influence. It has been shown that export values on such section rose after graduation. 
(See Table 25). 
Indonesia is the largest exporter in Section IX of  Wood and articles of wood, and 
wood charcoal among the ASEAN member states with export values in 2010 at 
€421,688,67 Euro. In 2005, Indonesia was granted section graduation, but the 
                                                 
565 See EU to start bilateral trade negotiations with Singapore, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=519&serie=320&langId=en, last accessed : 09 February 
2012. See also http://www.eeas.europa.eu/malaysia/index_en.htm. 
 347 
recalculation of 2004-2006 trade data led to re-inclusion ("degraduation") of certain 
product sections for six beneficiaries under the 2009-2011 schemes.566 In this regard, 
the section graduation granted under general arrangement of GSP applied the open 
principle by re-considering the section concerned, which after being excluded from the 
list of GSP products declined its export value. (See Table 26). 
ASEAN member states included in the top 50 partners of the EU GSP include 
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. (See Table 25). 
EU GSP imports from ASEAN in 2010 were 10.6% of the total GSP imports among 12 
regional groups. The biggest regional group of GSP imports to the EU was BRIC at 
17.1%, and ASEAN placed in third position. (See Table 27). 
ASEAN-EU trade in goods significantly increased in 2010 after decreasing in 
2009.  At the same time, ASEAN trade in goods with the rest of the world in 2010 also 
increased after decreasing in 2009. Since the EU is the second largest trading partner 
and the first largest export market of ASEAN, therefore, the economic crisis that has 
struck the global economy since the summer of 2007567 caused the GDP of EU to fall by 
about 4% in 2009.568 (See Figure 15). 
Machinery and transport equipment was the largest share of merchandise 
products in the trading between EU–ASEAN in 2010. This is followed by agricultural 
products, chemicals products, fuels and mining products, textiles and clothing, and 
other products, respectively. (See Figure 18, 19, 20, 21). Figures 16 and 17 show 
asymmetric trade balances between ASEAN and EU, where from 2006 to 2010 ASEAN 
had more exports to the EU than imports from the EU to ASEAN. The assumption of 
generous trade preferences, in this term GSP, which provide tariff reductions until zero 
to ASEAN member states can be considered as one of the driving factors of such 
situation.  
There are five ASEAN member states included as the top 50 EU major trading 
partners such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. (See 
Table 29). ASEAN was nominated in third place as the biggest EU partner region of 
twelve other partners with import-export shares of 5.2% of the total value.  EU imports 
from ASEAN covered  5.8% of EU total imports from twelve partner regions. While EU 
exports to ASEAN had a lower value than the import value that is 4.5% of the total EU 
exports to  twelve partner regions. (See Table 30). 
EU 27 is placed as the third largest trading partner with ASEAN covering 10.3% of 
ASEAN total trade. While China and Japan are in first and second position, with values 
of 14% and 11.0%, respectively. (See Table 31). According to Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC)569, machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) are the 
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biggest imported products from ASEAN to EU, covering 43.8% of total imports. The 
value of food and live animals imported from ASEAN to EU is 6.9% of total imports. 
While the value of animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes imported from ASEAN to 
EU is 63% of total imports. (See Figure 18). 
According to Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) machinery and 
transport equipment (SITC 7) is also the biggest export products from the EU to ASEAN, 
covering 53.2% of total exports. The value of food and live animals exported from the 
EU to ASEAN is 4.0% of total imports. While the value of animal and vegetable oils, fats 
and waxes exported from the EU to ASEAN is 0.1% of total imports. (See Figure 19). 
According to product grouping manufactures, products imported from ASEAN to 
EU cover 7.7% of the share of total EU imports. According to EU-Trade statistic data 
from 2006, 2008 and 2010, the total manufactured products imported from ASEAN to 
the EU were 82.2%, 77.5%, and 80.4%, respectively. When the economic crisis initially 
struck the EU in late 2007 the imported manufactured products from ASEAN to the EU 
decreased, however, they rose again in 2010. Agricultural products cover 11.2% of the 
total share of EU imports. In 2006, 2008 and 2010, the total agricultural products 
imported from ASEAN to the EU were 12.6%, 16.2%, and 15.0%, respectively. (See 
Figure 21). 
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Table 20. List of supplying markets in ASEAN for products imported by the European Union (EU 27)570 
Product: TOTAL All products 
 
Unit: thousand euro 
 
Exporters Exported value in 2006 Exported value in 2007 Exported value in 2008 Exported value in 2009 Exported value in 2010 
ASEAN Aggregation  77,459,785.29 78,470,318.99 79,105,143.83 66,182,460.8 77,630,766.41 
Singapore  24,395,379.36 23,598,439.82 23,825,955.38 18,649,108.96 26,514,862.36 
Thailand  14,468,206.51 15,653,574.39 15,771,257.57 13,058,422.29 16,472,915.46 
Malaysia  16,339,977.66 16,529,453.68 15,275,212.1 12,232,077.74 16,105,556.7 
Indonesia  9,604,075.76 9,781,306.53 10,522,654.7 9,781,042.19 12,955,300.48 
Philippines  6,955,342.24 6,267,826.87 5,789,862.32 5,712,546.94 5,582,131.42 
Cambodia      514,817.52     
Vietnam  5,682,274.5 6,639,717.7 7,405,384.25 6,749,262.68   
Brunei Darussalam  14,529.27         
 
                                                 
570 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : 
http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx, last accessed : 16 November 2011. 
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Table 21. Bilateral trade between ASEAN and European Union (EU 27)571 
Product: TOTAL All products 
 
Unit: thousand euro 
 
ASEAN's exports to EU 27 EU 27's imports from world ASEAN's exports to world 
Product 
code 
Product label 
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 
2010 
 Value in 2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 2010  
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 
2010 
TOTAL  All products 79,496,793.77 67,458,485.88 90,050,718.71  4,133,800,783.06 3,265,970,619.8 3,946,669,746.92  669,505,973.3 581,286,791.8 788,412,789.23 
 
 
Table 22. Bilateral trade between ASEAN and European Union (EU 27)572 
Product: TOTAL All products 
 
Unit: thousand euro 
 
Trade Balance between ASEAN & EU 27 World Trade Balance for EU 27 World Trade Balance for ASEAN 
Product 
code 
Product label 
Balance in value 
in 2008 
Balance in 
value in 2009 
Balance in 
value in 2010 
Balance in 
value in 2008 
Balance in 
value in 2009 
Balance in 
value in 2010 
Balance in 
value in 2008 
Balance in 
value in 2009 
Balance in 
value in 2010 
TOTAL  All products 15,815,154.38 11,006,296.81 21,998,274.74 -187,180,879.92 -46,250,138.48 -79,561,980.86 30,218,710.9 55,393,204.34 67,640,318.62 
 
                                                 
571 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Bilateral_TS.aspx, last 
accessed : 16 November 2011. 
572 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Bilateral_TS.aspx, last 
accessed : 16 November 2011. 
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Table 23. List of importing markets in ASEAN for products exported by European Union (EU 27)573 
Product: TOTAL All products 
Unit: thousand euro 
 
Partners 
Balance in value in 
2006 
Balance in value 
in 2007 
Balance in value 
in 2008 
Balance in value 
in 2009 
Balance in value 
in 2010 
Exported value in 2010 Imported value in 2010 
ASEAN Aggregation  23,762,502.88 19,778,262.41 15,762,674.9 10,196,397.48 14,897,410.43 62,733,355.98 77,630,766.41 
Singapore  2,725,543.92 -200,955.88 -2,968,143.49 -5,724,463.36 -2,421,229.71 28,936,092.06 26,514,862.36 
Malaysia  4,450,245.64 3,819,501.13 2,704,176.07 1,880,903.02 3,408,504.06 12,697,052.64 16,105,556.7 
Thailand  5,496,193.68 6,871,186.94 6,071,978.54 4,358,732.78 6,019,883.95 10,453,031.5 16,472,915.46 
Indonesia  4,783,569.42 4,176,153.52 3,342,257.67 3,555,682.57 5,524,232.68 7,431,067.8 12,955,300.48 
Philippines  3,256,899.41 2,225,106.76 2,551,020.8 3,207,641.19 2,366,019.45 3,216,111.97 5,582,131.42 
Cambodia      449,499.37         
Vietnam  3,179,093.17 2,887,269.95 3,611,885.93 2,917,901.28       
Brunei Darussalam  -129,042.37             
 
                                                 
573 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : 
http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx, last accessed : 16 November 2011. 
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Table 24. List of importing markets from European Union (EU 27) for products exported by ASEAN574 
 
Unit: thousand euro 
 
Importers Exported value in 2006 Exported value in 2007 Exported value in 2008 Exported value in 2009 Exported value in 2010 
Total  608,288,138.35 628,685,397.67 668,714,976.35 564,358,230.8 673,719,219.54 
EU 27 Aggregation  85,782,562.28 88,747,120.05 88,626,912.18 76,246,806.78 95,454,139.93 
Germany  18,410,881.45 18,902,264.93 19,154,843.64 16,975,885.38 23,267,536.14 
Netherlands  13,942,057.1 14,141,296.02 14,136,781.45 12,057,319.58 17,552,377.61 
United Kingdom  15,024,282.93 14,666,602.84 12,769,693.45 10,041,332.71 12,265,620.67 
France  9,362,210.26 10,026,751.39 9,674,012.89 8,371,084.11 10,585,292.74 
Belgium  4,438,129.17 5,128,416.9 5,502,115.85 5,010,390.15 6,202,856.57 
Italy  4,773,118.25 5,110,869.49 5,323,009.35 4,417,166.19 5,695,760.04 
Spain  5,362,065.43 5,762,779.12 5,841,980.23 4,669,608.04 4,432,683.66 
Czech Republic  1,477,377.01 1,953,172.62 2,497,022.97 2,334,000.22 3,297,554.88 
Denmark  1,121,030.25 1,038,321.77 1,204,136.87 2,024,637.91 1,627,272.23 
Poland  1,650,078.03 1,751,417.17 2,256,428.85 1,996,058.29 1,545,533.36 
  
                                                 
574 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : 
http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx, last accessed : 16 November 2011. 
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Table 25. List of supplying markets in ASEAN for products imported by European Union (EU 27) 
Product: 15 Animal, vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products, etc.575 
Unit: thousand euro 
 
Exporters Exported value in 2007 Exported value in 2008 Exported value in 2009 Exported value in 2010 
ASEAN Aggregation  2,529,503.57 3,470,289.54 2,721,281.4 3,788,235.86 
Indonesia  1,262,771.47 1,949,934.12 1,627,807.24 2,003,970.63 
Malaysia  995,953.53 1,170,495.36 890,742.27 1,272,154.72 
Philippines  237,241.29 280,688.95 177,420.52 462,714.75 
Singapore  5,052.73 7,962.15 16,905.56 35,957.12 
Thailand  28,268.6 60,933.02 8,215.8 13,438.64 
Vietnam  215.94 275.94 190.01   
 
                                                 
575 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : 
http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx, last accessed : 16 November 2011. 
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Table 26. List of supplying markets in ASEAN for products imported by European Union (EU 27)576 
Product: 44 Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal 
 
Unit: thousand euro 
 
Exporters Exported value in 2007 Exported value in 2008 Exported value in 2009 Exported value in 2010 
ASEAN Aggregation  1,170,102.07 1,050,404.58 810,300.16 859,516.51 
Indonesia  517,507.41 459,571.84 381,088.14 421,688.67 
Malaysia  463,877.39 420,639.22 302,135.31 359,675.12 
Thailand  111,542.37 90,353.2 65,491.2 58,002.67 
Singapore  23,299.76 26,294.45 13,627.27 13,580.97 
Philippines  11,649.88 9,100.57 7,204.78 6,569.08 
Cambodia    2.04     
Vietnam  42,225.25 44,443.25 40,753.46   
Brunei Darussalam          
 
 
 
                                                 
576 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : 
http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx, last accessed : 16 November 2011. 
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Table 27. EU GSP'S trade with top 50 main partners (2010)577 
 
              
The Major Imports Partners The Major Export Partners The Major Trade Partners 
Rk Partners Mio euro %  Rk Partners Mio euro %  Rk Partners Mio euro % 
              
  World (all countries) 3,530,688.5 100.0%    World (all countries) 3,802,615.2 100.0%    World (all countries) 7,333,303.6 100.0% 
              
6 Singapore 124,274.7 3.5%  8 Singapore 108,528.9 2.9%  7 Singapore 232,803.6 3.2% 
11 Malaysia 79,227.1 2.2%  16 Malaysia 45,299.3 1.2%  12 Thailand 130,219.3 1.8% 
13 Thailand 76,861.0 2.2%  17 Indonesia 43,519.7 1.1%  13 Malaysia 124,526.4 1.7% 
15 Indonesia 52,433.7 1.5%  18 Vietnam 29,863.9 0.8%  17 Indonesia 95,953.4 1.3% 
30 Philippines 18,231.1 0.5%  23 Philippines 23,167.8 0.6%  25 Vietnam 43,978.8 0.6% 
          27 Philippines 41,398.8 0.6% 
 
                                                 
577 See EU GSP Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/january/tradoc_147291.pdf, last accessed : 14 October 2011. 
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Table 28. EU GSP'S trade with main partners (2010)578 
 
GSP's Imports from … GSP's Exports to … GSP's Trade with… 
 No. Partner regions Mio euro %    Partner regions Mio euro %    Partner regions Mio euro % 
1. ACP 114,037.0 3.2%   ACP 122,967.6 3.2%   ACP 237,004.5 3.2% 
2. Andean Community 28,386.2 0.8%   Andean Community 26,439.2 0.7%   Andean Community 54,825.4 0.7% 
3. ASEAN 372,603.9 10.6%   ASEAN 315,583.3 8.3%   ASEAN 688,187.3 9.4% 
4. BRIC 604,398.8 17.1%   BRIC 519,177.2 13.7%   BRIC 1,123,576.0 15.3% 
5. CACM 14,332.4 0.4%   CACM 25,868.4 0.7%   CACM 40,200.7 0.5% 
6. Candidate Countries 39,544.3 1.1%   Candidate Countries 55,471.4 1.5%   Candidate Countries 95,015.7 1.3% 
7. CIS 144,465.2 4.1%   CIS 120,745.3 3.2%   CIS 265,210.5 3.6% 
8. EFTA 42,216.6 1.2%   EFTA 24,609.8 0.6%   EFTA 66,826.5 0.9% 
9. Latin American Countries 239,661.3 6.8%   Latin American Countries 200,459.0 5.3%   Latin American Countries 440,120.3 6.0% 
10. MEDA (excl EU and Turkey) 44,093.9 1.2%   MEDA (excl EU and Turkey) 65,422.6 1.7%   MEDA (excl EU and Turkey) 109,516.5 1.5% 
11. Mercosur 132,743.3 3.8%   Mercosur 91,260.1 2.4%   Mercosur 224,003.4 3.1% 
 12. NAFTA 482,175.7 13.7%    NAFTA 759,090.1 20.0%    NAFTA 1,241,265.8 16.9% 
              
EFTA: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland; Candidates: Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Turkey; Andean Community: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru;   
CIS: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova Republic of, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; 
CACM: Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama; Mercosur: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay; NAFTA: Canada, Mexico, United States; 
Latin American Countries: CACM, Mercosur, ANCOM, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela; BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India, China;   
ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam;   
ACP: 79 countries; MEDA (excl EU & Turkey): Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia. 
              
Source: IMF (DoTS)                       DG TRADE 
European Union: 27 members.          8-Jun-11 
  
                                                 
578 See Ibid. 
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Figure  15. ASEAN – EU  trade in goods statistics579 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
579 See EU – ASEAN Trade (2010), available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113471.pdf, last accessed : 14 October 2010. 
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Figure 16. EU’s trade  balance with ASEAN580 
 
                                                 
580 See Ibid, 
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Figure 17.  ASEAN’s trade balance with EU581 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
581 See Ibid. 
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Table 29.  EU’s trade with top 50 main trading partners 2010582 
country by country  
 
The Major Imports Partners The Major Exports Partners The Major Trade Partners 
Rk Partners Mio euro %  Rk Partners Mio euro %  Rk Partners Mio euro % 
              
  Extra EU-27 1,501,843.9 100.0%    Extra EU-27 1,348,792.4 100.0%    Extra EU-27 2,850,636.3 100.0% 
              
14 Malaysia 20,701.2 1.4%  15 Singapore 24,043.3 1.8%  12 Singapore 42,747.7 1.5% 
16 Singapore 18,704.4 1.2%  26 Malaysia 11,243.4 0.8%  22 Malaysia 31,944.6 1.1% 
18 Thailand 17,212.3 1.1%  30 Thailand 9,992.4 0.7%  24 Thailand 27,204.7 1.0% 
23 Indonesia 13,729.2 0.9%  35 Indonesia 6,372.2 0.5%  32 Indonesia 20,101.3 0.7% 
31 Vietnam 9,431.3 0.6%  46 Philippines 3,736.0 0.3%  42 Philippines 9,115.0 0.3% 
41 Philippines 5,379.0 0.4%           
- ASEAN 86,373.8 5.8%  - ASEAN 60,635.1 4.5%  - ASEAN 147,009.0 5.2% 
 
 
                                                 
582 See Ibid. 
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Table 30. EU’s trade with main trading partners 2010583 
region by region 
 
EU Imports from … EU Exports to … Imports + Exports 
 No. Partner regions Mio euro %    Partner regions Mio euro %    Partner regions Mio euro % 
1. ACP 64,793.1 4.3%   ACP 68,722.2 5.1%   ACP 133,515.3 4.7% 
2. Andean Community 12,198.6 0.8%   Andean Community 7,905.9 0.6%   Andean Community 20,104.5 0.7% 
3. ASEAN 86,373.8 5.8%   ASEAN 60,635.1 4.5%   ASEAN 147,009.0 5.2% 
4. BRIC 505,863.7 33.7%   BRIC 265,708.2 19.7%   BRIC 771,572.0 27.1% 
5. CACM 7,576.1 0.5%   CACM 4,504.6 0.3%   CACM 12,080.7 0.4% 
6. Candidate Countries 48,616.5 3.2%   Candidate Countries 73,897.7 5.5%   Candidate Countries 122,514.2 4.3% 
7. CIS 200,474.7 13.3%   CIS 123,694.2 9.2%   CIS 324,168.8 11.4% 
8. EFTA 167,022.8 11.1%   EFTA 150,030.1 11.1%   EFTA 317,052.9 11.1% 
9. Latin American Countries 90,034.3 6.0%   Latin American Countries 84,013.5 6.2%   Latin American Countries 174,047.8 6.1% 
10. MEDA (excl EU and Turkey) 60,624.3 4.0%   MEDA (excl EU and Turkey) 80,733.3 6.0%   MEDA (excl EU and Turkey) 141,357.6 5.0% 
11. Mercosur 43,955.3 2.9%   Mercosur 40,104.0 3.0%   Mercosur 84,059.2 2.9% 
 12. NAFTA 202,632.3 13.5%    NAFTA 290,074.1 21.5%    NAFTA 492,706.4 17.3% 
              
EFTA: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland; Candidates: Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Turkey; Andean Community: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru; 
CIS: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova Republic of, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; 
CACM: Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama; Mercosur: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay; NAFTA: Canada, Mexico, United States; 
Latin American Countries: CACM, Mercosur, ANCOM, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela; BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India, China; 
ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam; 
ACP: 79 countries; MEDA (excl EU & Turkey): Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia. 
              
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4)                 DG TRADE 
European Union: 27 members.          8-Jun-11 
 
                                                 
583 See Ibid. 
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Table 31. ASEAN’s trade with top 10 main trading partners (2010)584 
country by country 
 
The Major Import Partners The Major Export Partners The Major Trade Partners 
Rk Partners Mio euro %  Rk Partners Mio euro %  Rk Partners Mio euro % 
              
  World (all countries) 727,473.0 100.0%    World (all countries) 794,653.3 100.0%    World (all countries) 1,522,126.2 100.0% 
              
1 China 111,130.7 15.3%  1 China 104,925.4 13.2%  1 China 216,056.1 14.2% 
2 Japan 90,401.4 12.4%  2 EU27 89,108.3 11.2%  2 Japan 167,726.3 11.0% 
3 Singapore 70,071.4 9.6%  3 United States 80,255.2 10.1%  3 EU27 156,365.1 10.3% 
4 EU27 67,256.8 9.2%  4 Japan 77,325.0 9.7%  4 United States 143,173.1 9.4% 
5 United States 62,917.8 8.6%  5 Hong Kong 55,241.4 7.0%  5 Singapore 119,318.3 7.8% 
6 Malaysia 46,331.8 6.4%  6 Malaysia 49,362.1 6.2%  6 Malaysia 95,693.9 6.3% 
7 South Korea 38,842.2 5.3%  7 Singapore 49,246.9 6.2%  7 South Korea 70,516.5 4.6% 
8 Thailand 36,372.7 5.0%  8 Indonesia 38,156.0 4.8%  8 Hong Kong 68,827.3 4.5% 
9 Indonesia 29,281.3 4.0%  9 South Korea 31,674.2 4.0%  9 Indonesia 67,437.4 4.4% 
10 Saudi Arabia 19,248.8 2.6%  10 Australia 29,335.6 3.7%  10 Thailand 62,026.9 4.1% 
  
                                                 
584 See Ibid. 
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Figure  18. European Union imports from ASEAN585 according to Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
585 See Ibid. 
 364 
Figure 19. European Union exports to ASEAN according to Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)586 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
586 See Ibid. 
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Figure  20. European Union imports from ASEAN according to product grouping587 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
587 See Ibid. 
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Figure  21. European Union exports to ASEAN according to product grouping588 
 
 
 
                                                 
588 See Ibid. 
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VIII. The ASEAN trade facilitations policies to support the utilisation of EU 
Generalised System of Preferences. 
The development relationship between ASEAN-EU has brought enhancement 
towards GSP utilisation to ASEAN member states. As previously mentioned, from the 
1950s until the late 1970s relations between Southeast Asian Countries and the EU 
were sunk in the hegemony of US domination.  The commitment to open markets for 
developing countries were driving most Southeast Asia products to the US market. The 
establishment of ASEAN in 1967 as the biggest regional organisation in Southeast Asia 
did not have much influence on the economic and trade relationship between ASEAN-
EU. As noted in the first two decades, ASEAN as the strategic regional organisation 
developed very slowly, especially in its external trade relations with the EU.  
ASEAN as the regional organisation that was created during the Cold War era was 
intended to create and keep politic stability and security of the regions. Due to 
economic demands, regionalism in ASEAN developed to have a better bargaining 
position with other regions such as the EU, NAFTA, East Asian countries, and South 
American countries.  The ASEAN position of bargaining influenced its trade “diplomacy” 
with the EU.  The history of European colonialism strongly affected the relationship 
between ASEAN-EU. The early concept of the ASEAN–EU relationship was between 
recipient countries and donor countries. The weakness of ASEAN economic integration 
did not perform many “concrete integrative efforts”.589 
For more than four decades, GSP has been the only trade preferential scheme 
granted by the EU to ASEAN member states. The slow development of ASEAN has 
placed ASEAN countries in the low priority for the granting of the EU preferential trade 
scheme.  At the beginning of the ASEAN–EU development relationship, the GSP scheme 
grant was one of the channels to open trade and economics. In this regard, GSP played 
an important role in strengthening cooperation between the two regions.  Almost all 
ASEAN member states are beneficiary countries of EU GSP, therefore, the improvement 
of EU GSP utilisation does not only concern the national interests of each member 
states but is also deemed as a collective interest to expand ASEAN external trade at the 
regional level.   
For 40 years, trade facilitation conducted by ASEAN to improve the utilisation of 
EU GSP has been divided into two phases. In the first phase, (1972-1991) ASEAN trade 
facilitation focused on the promotion of  the utilisation of GSP through either formal or 
informal dialogue. Since the beginning ASEAN carried out trade facilitation support to 
improve GSP utilisation through trade “diplomacy” in inter-regional forums such as the 
"ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Brussels". The slow process of economic integration 
and minimum trade cooperation among ASEAN member states impeded concrete 
regional trade facilitation. Consequently, throughout the first phase, ASEAN was using 
trade diplomacy to advocate its region’s interest in the GSP scheme. Along with the 
demands of global economic development, ASEAN also deliberated its constructive idea 
to improve the EU GSP scheme in order to respond positively to the development needs 
of the developing countries and LDCs.  
In the second phase (1992-2011), the trade facilitation conducted by ASEAN to 
improve utilisation of EU GSP increasingly developed into concrete policy measures. 
Such development was influenced by several factors, which came from inside and 
outside ASEAN. First, in 1992 ASEAN member states signed the “Agreement on the 
CEPTS for the AFTA” where ASEAN member states agreed effective tariff preferential to 
                                                 
589 See Balme, Richard.,  and Bridges, Brian., 2008, Op. Cit., p. 91. 
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be applied to the goods and products originating from its members.590 Second, the 
needs of closer economic integration through the establishment of the single market 
and production base under AEC construction. The next factor is the strong demands 
from the private sector, such as traders, producers, business actors, and related 
stakeholders to “establish a concrete trade facilitation system at the regional level”. The 
shifting of the ASEAN political landscape also led to the development of regional trade 
facilitation that started through the declaration of “ASEAN Vision 2020”. The unity of the 
vision of ASEAN member states at the regional level accelerated economic integration 
under the AEC blue print through some visible trade facilitation projects. The reform of 
the EU GSP scheme in the mid-1990s also contributed to the development of ASEAN 
trade facilitation. That reform introduced some new rules such as application of non-
trade conditionality clauses, the graduation mechanism, cumulative rules of origin, 
simplification of product category, and more complex administrative and technical 
requirements to obtain GSP facilities. 
There are some important notes from the ASEAN trade diplomacy to facilitate 
utilisation of EU GSP by its member states. As previously mentioned, the EU is the first 
region to implement the Decision of Waiver 1971 by extending its GSP scheme to 
developing countries regardless of former colonial ties or selected preferences. The 
extension of the GSP scheme granted to ASEAN opened up trade dialogue between both 
regions in 1972. The first formal meeting between ASEAN and EU that discussed the 
implementation of the GSP scheme was the “The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting” in 
1978.  
During the meeting, ASEAN criticised some measures related to trade adopted by 
the EU that considered export constraints591. ASEAN also expressed its needs to 
improve market access into the EU, especially for manufactured, semi-manufactured, 
and primary product exports.592 ASEAN demanded the EU to remove or relax tariffs and 
NTBs, and streamline its administrative procedures.593 ASEAN requested the efficiency 
improvement and excessive bureaucracy reduction that was imposed on ASEAN’s 
export products. ASEAN argued that the relaxation of tariffs and NTBs to trade could 
increase ASEAN product competitiveness in the EU market. It is important to note that 
ASEAN requested that the EU improve its GSP scheme and formalise the scheme into a 
permanent policy.594 At that time, the request to formalise GSP into a permanent policy 
due to the international legal basis of EU GSP under the Waiver 1971 of GSP, which only 
waived Article I of GATT 1947 for a period of ten years.595 Thus, the EU responded to 
ASEAN’s requests positively. Before the legalisation of GSP into the Enabling Clause, the 
EU intended the GSP scheme formalised as its permanent policy and improved the 
scheme as part of its commitment to favour economic development of developing 
countries. 
The important milestone of ASEAN-EU trade diplomacy was the Cooperation 
Agreement between “Member Countries of ASEAN and European Community in 1980”. 
The Cooperation Agreement laid down the fundamental basis of trade facilitations that 
were useful to help the improvement of GSP implementation in ASEAN.596  
                                                 
590 See Paragraph 1 Article 1 Agreement on the CEPTS for the AFTA. 
591 See Paragraph 21 of the Joint Declaration The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Brussels, 21 November 1978. 
592 See Paragraph 23 of the Joint Declaration The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Brussels, 21 November 1978. 
593 See Paragraph 24 of the Joint Declaration The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Brussels, 21 November 1978. 
594 See Paragraph 24 of the Joint Declaration The ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Brussels, 21 November 1978. 
595 See Waiver of Generalized System of Preferences, Decision of 25 June 1971, BISD 18S/24.  
596 See Paragraph 3 Article 2 of the Cooperation Agreement between Member Countries of ASEAN and European 
Community, 1980. 
 369 
During the 5th AEMM, the EU agreed to take into account the interests and needs 
of the ASEAN countries in the second phase of their GSP scheme improvement to 
ensure utilisation of GSP economic benefit.597  In the AEMM on Economic Matters, in 
1985, ASEAN and the EU agreed, “that the EU GSP is the effective tool to expand trade 
between ASEAN and EU”. Still in the 6th AEMM the EU GSP scheme was regarded as the 
effective instrument to penetrate the EU market. In other words, EU GSP still played a 
significant role in the expansion of ASEAN market access in the EU. Therefore, ASEAN 
“welcomed” the EU intention to make further improvements to its GSP scheme.598 
Significant improvements were made to the EU GSP Scheme 1989 and 1990, 
where the EU opened access to its sensitive products under GSP product coverage.599 In 
1994, the EU applied new features to the GSP scheme, and provided opportunities for 
further discussions regarding such features with ASEAN.600 The Joint Declaration of the 
EU and ASEAN in 1994 focused on the labour rights conditionality in the EU GSP. 
ASEAN did not challenge its legality under the Enabling Clause,601 however, the non-
trade conditionality that applied in the GSP, seemed to be a burden for the developing 
countries.602 
Some factors were identified as undermining the utilisation of GSP such as high 
transaction costs, excessive bureaucracy, corruption practices, lack of good governance 
practices, lack of customs modernisations, lack of e-trade services, lack of 
infrastructures, lack of information and knowledge of GSP, lack of human resources and 
lack of cooperation among member states. In order to cope with those factors, the 
establishment of a concrete project of trade facilitation at the regional level would seem 
to be the best solution. As mentioned, trade facilitation is an integrated system that is 
also very complex. It involves so many elements, a comprehensive master plan and the 
need for synergic cooperation between the national government and regional 
institutions.603 Trade facilitations must be provided for public goods to deliver benefits 
for all parties.604 Collaborative effort between the private and public sector is needed to 
establish comprehensive trade facilitation, including the political will to agree on 
concrete acts, commitments, and payments.605 Strong collaboration builds a 
complementary system covering simplification, harmonisation, automation of trade 
procedures (e-trade and e-business), guarantee of secure information, reduction of 
excessive bureaucracy procedures, and removal of other obstacles to trade. Therefore, 
ASEAN has set forth principles on trade facilitation606 in order to give guidance to the 
member states on how to carry out trade facilitation measures. 
                                                 
597 See Paragraph 25 of the Joint Declaration The Fifth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, Dublin, 15-16 October 1984, 
available at : http://www.asean.org/5630.htm. 
598 See Paragraph 19 of the Joint Declaration The Sixth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 20-21 October 1986, 
available at : http://www.asean.org/5633.htm. 
599 See Paragraph 35 of the Joint Declaration The Eighth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, Malaysia, l6-17 February 1990. 
See also paragraph 47 of the Joint Declaration The Ninth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Luxembourg, 30-31 
May 1991, available at : http://www.asean.org/5638.htm. “[...] The Minister agreed that the EU GSP Scheme was 
an important tool by which ASEAN's exports to the EU could be diversified and increased. They welcomed the 
significant increase in benefits arising from the use of GSP. The ASEAN Ministers noted that the EU is revising 
the GSP Scheme in order to make it simpler and more transparent. They urged the EU to take into account 
ASEAN interests inter alia the inclusion of the donor country content [...]”. 
600 See Joint Declaration The Tenth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Manila, 29-30 October 1992. 
601 See Robert, Howse., 2003, Op. Cit., p. 193.   
602  See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., pp. 64-65. 
603 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., p. 15. 
604 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., p. 11. 
605 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., pp. 19-20. 
606 See Article 47 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement. 
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As of two decades ago, ASEAN established concrete trade facilitation projects, 
such as CEPT ROO, ASEAN Single Window, ASEAN customs integration, ASEAN 
Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues (ACT), Trans-ASEAN transportation 
network, and ASEAN connectivity. With regard to the implementation of good 
governance and corruption eradication, the ASEAN member states agreed to establish 
the ASEAN Customs Code of Conduct607 and ASEAN Agreement on Customs608. Both 
agreements contain six principles, which endeavour to establish good customs conduct. 
The objectives of the ASEAN Agreement on Customs are to ensure consistency, 
transparency, and the fair application of the customs regulations. Related to the e-trade 
development, the e-ASEAN Framework Agreement is designed to facilitate the 
establishment of the ASEAN information infrastructure, promoting electronic 
commerce, and enhancing e-government applications.609  
ASEAN customs integration is an essential component to increase the collection of 
revenues and reduce transaction costs for traders. ASEAN established a “strategic plan 
of customs development”, which was implemented from 2005 until 2010. Customs 
integration was conducted through the modernisation of customs techniques, the 
simplification, and harmonisation of procedures and formalities aligned with 
international standards and best practices. 
As mentioned above, the single window has become a global trend in trade 
facilitation due to the significant reduction in transaction costs of trade.610 The basic 
concept of the ASW is to achieve better economic efficiency through trade facilitation. 
The ASW will be in full operation by the end of 2012 when the national window of ten 
ASEAN member states are ready to operate. ASW has been used to support the flow of 
intra-trade and extra-trade of ASEAN as part of the global supply chain.  
Since 1975, the EU has applied “cumulative rules of origin provisions” to ASEAN 
imported products under the GSP scheme. Cumulative origin has promoted trans-
national export-oriented production within regions and facilitates closer economic 
integration, particularly to attain a single market and production base.611 Therefore, in 
the 10th AEMM EU GSP Scheme, it was still considered as an important tool to diversify 
and increase ASEAN exports to the EU.612 Cumulative origin is a good opportunity to 
improve GSP utilisation among ASEAN countries. It promotes production networking 
among ASEAN member states. The cumulative origin could facilitate trade and 
investment  among  ASEAN  member states,  promote  a  regional  production  network,  
encourage  growth of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), generate jobs 
opportunities, narrow economic development gaps, and promote the usage of the AFTA 
CEPTS. Therefore, ASEAN established the rules of origin (ROO) under the CEPT scheme 
and continuously enhances the rules to respond to the dynamic international market. 
Due to the improvement of the GSP scheme, the EU applied some requirements in 
import formalities and procedures such as the certificate of origin document. Exporters 
from beneficiary countries who were allowed to obtain GSP facility only authorised 
exporters or registered exporters. The EU also requires beneficiary countries to apply 
                                                 
607 See ASEAN Customs Code of Conduct  1995 amended Customs Code of Conduct  1983,  available at : 
http://www.asean.org/2165.htm, last accessed : 30 October 2011. 
608 See ASEAN Agreement on Customs, 1997 available at : http://www.aseansec.org/1905.htm, last accessed : 30 
October 2011. 
609 See Article 3 of the e-ASEAN Framework Agreement, sign in Singapore November, 2000 available at : 
http://www.aseansec.org/6267.htm, last accessed : 30 October 2011. 
610 See Alvin C.K, 2007. 
611 See M. Dent, Christopher., 2002, Op. Cit., p. 51. Its has emerge the establishment of multinational company in ASEAN. 
612 See Joint Declaration The Tenth ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting Manila, 29-30 October 1992. 
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custom modernisation. The lack of trade facilitation could create barriers for trade and 
hinder the purpose of GSP. Successfulness of GSP utilisation is supported by the shared 
responsibility between the preference granting country and the beneficiary country. 
The beneficiary country has the responsibility to provide trade facilitation for its 
traders in order to utilise the GSP scheme properly. 
The proposal of EU GSP regulation that is more focused on the requirements to 
grant preferences on the country most in need, in the near future, may exclude some 
ASEAN that are classified as upper middle-income countries by its scheme. The 
requirements set out in the proposal of the EU GSP regulation give a warning to ASEAN 
member states not to hold on forever to GSP. Particularly, for ASEAN member states 
that have become candidates of the upper middle-income country, to be well prepared 
to design the best trade policy to maintain their trade performance, especially export 
competitiveness, after GSP graduation. In the proposal of EU GSP regulation, total 
graduation would be based on economic criteria, i.e., when the beneficiary country was 
categorised as an upper-middle income country and high-income country. In this 
regard, Brunei Darussalam (high-income country), Malaysia (upper-middle income 
country), and Thailand (upper-middle income country) would be excluded from the 
GSP beneficiary lists. Based on growth assumption, in the coming future Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam which are now classified as lower-middle income countries, 
will soon follow the other ASEAN member states to have total graduation from the GSP 
scheme. It would leave Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar as the beneficiaries of GSP, 
especially in the EBA arrangement scheme. Therefore, to address such new policy, and 
after the negotiation of the postponed AEUFTA , the ASEAN member states need to 
design a trade policy to maintain and increase their export competitiveness that also 
considers the possibilities of establishing new preferential trading agreements with the 
EU. The ASEAN member states need to improve and strengthen their trade facilitation 
on export to maximise GSP utilisation and increase their export competitiveness. 
In conclusion, over 40 years ASEAN has developed its policies on trade 
facilitations to support the utilisation of EU GSP. ASEAN has conducted facilitation 
support through trade diplomacy, establishing agreements at a regional level in the 
related areas and providing concrete trade facilitation services.  
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Chapter V 
Indonesia’s Trade Policies in EU GSP Utilisation 
 
The trade relationship between Indonesia and European countries can be traced back 
to the 14th and 15th century when “long distance trade” was booming. Indonesia had a 
strategic position in world trade sea-lane and the Strait of Malacca was an international 
trade route linking the east and west. Indonesia was recognised as an important 
producer of raw materials with a high selling price in Europe. At that time, Indonesia 
still consisted of kingdoms and its trade relationship with the Europeans experienced 
various difficulties. After the era of independence, Indonesia’s political configurations 
influenced national and foreign trade policies. The turning point of the trade 
relationship between Indonesia and the EU began after the severe economic crisis, 
through the establishment of PCA and CEPA. However, in 1971 the EU GSP was 
extended “to most developing countries” and played a significant role for some of 
Indonesia’s exports. The rules and regulations of GSP applied the standards and 
requirements needed for cooperation from beneficiaries to ensure that the facilities 
granted through such scheme were utilised properly. This chapter covers the wide 
range of aspects of Indonesia’s trade policies and other related national policies 
contributing to the utilisation of EU GSP. 
 
I. Indonesian foreign trade policy developments : The causal link of politics and 
law towards evolutions of national policy. 
During the 67 years of Indonesian independence, the direction of Indonesia’s 
national development policy has strongly been influenced by the political configuration 
and characteristics of the country’s leaders. The national development policy of each 
regime has influenced the evolution of Indonesia’s trade policies. Broadly speaking, the 
characteristics of Indonesia’s national leadership can be divided into three regimes, 
that is, the Old Order regime, the New Order regime, and the Reformation regime. Each 
of these regimes has its own policy characteristics influencing the vision and mission in 
leading the nation’s economic development. During the Old Order regime, President 
Soekarno’s leadership placed politics as the commander of national policy, while the 
New Order regime placed economic development as the commander of national policy. 
In the Reformation regime, democracy and supremacy of law were placed as the 
foundation of national policy. 
To understand the development of Indonesia’s trade policy it is important to 
understand the characteristics of each regime in the governing of national policy and in 
the attainment of its development goals. National policy is implemented through 
legislation. In fact, the process of legislation cannot be separated from political 
interests, since the legislators are representatives of political parties. In theory, 
members of parliament represent the people, but in practice, they have to obey the 
interests of their political parties. 
According to Mahfud MD, law is a political product that is influenced by political 
configuration.1 As a political product, the characteristics of each law are determined by 
political configuration. In practice, law is defined as a political decision product, where 
it is born from the crystallisation of political interaction and compromise. Law consists 
of two aspects, that is das sollen (idea) and das sein (reality). According to dass sein, 
politics must conform to the law, on the contrary, das sollen posits the law in practice 
                                                 
1 See Mahfud MD, Moh.1993. Perkembangan Politik Hukum, disertasi doctor dalam Ilmu Hukum di Universitas Gadjah 
Mada : Yogyakarta; Moh. Mahfud MD.1999, Pergulatan Politik dan Hukum di Indonesia. Gama Media : Yogyakarta. 
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that is determined by the political configuration. In their book “Toward Responsive Law: 
Law & Society in Transition”, Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick categorise the typology 
of legal ordering, which consists of: repressive law, autonomous law, and responsive 
law. Nonet and Selznick’s typology is based on the acknowledgment that “law is defined 
by its relationship to political power”. Inherently, legal systems, judiciaries, and law 
enforcement bodies are created and funded by political authorities. Law is both a mode 
of legitimating political power and a mode of exercising power, enlisting judges and 
prosecutors and police officers to enforce the prerogatives and policies of the state.2 
Nonet and Selznick characterise repressive law as “law that is subordinated to 
power politics”. The rule of laws and the judges who apply them legitimise and serve the 
interests of the politically powerful, who personally are only weakly bound by legal 
constraints. While autonomous law is characterised as “law that is independent of 
politics and acts as a restraint on political power”. This is the notion that underlies most 
contemporary understanding of the “rule of law”. With regard to responsive law, Nonet 
and Selznick state that “law is a facilitator of response to social need and aspirations” 
and claim that the idea of responsive law arises from the criticisms of autonomous law.3 
The legal system and national policy of states often change due to political change, such 
as revolution or reformation. Therefore, it is elaborated how and why the legal system 
of a state changes:  
“[…] most social scientists accord a primary causal role to political and economic 
development, such as revolution or reformation. […] judges and lawmakers are 
responsive above all to popular political attitudes, the demands of important 
interest groups, or the policy preferences of economic and political elites. A 
nation’s legal norms, institutions, and practices may be polished and re-wrapped 
at the retail level by legal professionals, but the basic production process, it is 
assumed, is dominated by the political forces […] institutional change would also 
require the support of political elites”.4 
Trade facilitation is the crucial issue in boosting export earnings, however, in fact 
Indonesia needs to improve and transform its trade institutions to be more 
professional in delivering its services. Trade facilitation is included as a “public good” 
that should deliver benefits for all parties (including the public and private sector). In 
the economic perspective, public goods were defined as goods that are non-rivalrous 
and non-excludable,5 which means they should be free and commonly enjoyed by its all 
citizens.6  Trade facilitation enables trade liberalisation as an important tool for 
development based on predictable rules, openness, and lack of discrimination.7 It is 
considered that the government has not fulfilled its major tasks to its citizens when it 
does provide public goods, in this regard trade facilitations, based on predictable rules.8 
To provide trade facilitation as public goods, collaborative effort between the private 
and public sector is needed in order to agree on concrete acts, commitments, and 
payments. Therefore, trade facilitation would be realised as long as the sum of all the 
stakeholders’ willingness to contribute goes beyond the cost of the product.9 However, 
to elaborate all of the interested parties together in less than one vision is not an easy 
job.  
                                                 
2 See Philippe Nonet, and Philip Selznick, Toward Responsive Law : Law & Society in Transition, Transaction Publishers, 
New Brunswick, New Jersey, 2001. 
3 See Philippe Nonet, and Philip Selznick, 2001. 
4 See Philippe Nonet, and Philip Selznick, 2001. 
5 See Public good, available at : http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/EEP101/spring05/Chapter07.pdf.  
6 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., p. 11. 
7 See Ibid., p. 11. 
8 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, p. 19. 
9 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., pp. 19-20. 
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The benefits not only go to business actors, traders, or stakeholders but are also 
distributed for the general welfare of society through the improvement of economic 
development. To deliver benefits for all, collaboration of political will is needed10, 
together with good government and good governance, and private sector participation. 
Pasca Lamy emphasises that political pressure from the top down is crucial to properly 
establish and run trade facilitation. In other words, the lack of “political will” hampers 
trade facilitation from running properly.11  In this regard, to reform or change 
institutions would require political will from the political elite. 
The New Order regime was characterised by autonomous law that proclaimed the 
rule of law as the basis of economic development. The Five Principles and the 1945 
Constitution became the highest law of the state.12 The New Order regime was backed 
up by the doctrine introduced by Mochtar Kusumaatmadja that law is a tool of 
development, which was derived from Roscoe Pound’s theory of law as a tool of social 
engineering. Law is established to serve economic development interests. According to 
Bernard et al.,13 autonomous law contains status quo, where it is often misused by the 
authorities to maintain their powers and benefit certain interests.  
According to Nonet and Selznick, "law is a facilitator of response to social needs 
and aspirations".14 In additions, Kagan, et al. write that in order to create modern law 
that is more responsive to social needs, a construction of responsive law is necessary.15 
Responsive law emphasises more on the process of achieving the objectives and 
principles behind the establishment of a legal and social order. Responsive law 
establishes the outcome-oriented system rather than the strict rule oriented system, 
and the legality placed as the main element of such system is based on justice and 
fairness.16 According to Mahfud MD, the Reformation regime is heading into responsive 
law. Responsive law features the openness system and is responsive towards social 
change and sovereignty of purpose. 
 
II. Indonesian trade policies after independence (Soekarno era 1945-1966). 
From 1957 to 1965, President Soekarno’s authoritarian tendencies hard-pressed 
the country beyond the limits of its economic base, its social framework and its political 
institutions. Soekarno thought that anti-neo-colonialism and anti-western influenced 
its government policy. In the name of the Revolution, Sukarno nationalised the Dutch 
company in Indonesia and increased its military power. The nationalisation of the 
foreign company was an unpopular policy and brought Indonesia vis à vis with the 
capitalist world.17  
Due to the political situation, from 1945 to 1959, Indonesia changed its 
constitution three times. The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was 
replaced by the 1949 Federal Constitution, where it was only implemented for a while 
because many of Indonesia’s national leaders rejected the federation state. Thus, it was 
replaced by the 1950 Constitution. However, this Constitution did not provide the right 
                                                 
10 See Alexander Arevalo, also argued that trade facilitation needs “highest-level support”, in this terms, can be 
interpreted as political will, and since it is not purely involve government functions, it is also necessary to 
mobilize private and public sectors participation and support. 
11 See Cosgrove-Sacks, et.al., 2003; Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, Op. Cit., pp. 13-14. 
12 See Vickers, Adrian., A History of Modern Indonesia, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, p. 161. 
13 See Tanya L. Bernard, Simanjuntak, Yoan N., and Hage, Markus Y., Theory Hukum : Strategi Tertib Manusia Lintas 
Ruang dan Generasi, Genta Publishing, Yogyakarta, 2010, p. 204. 
14 See Nonet, Phillipe., and Selznick, Philip., Toward Responsive Law : Law & Society in Transition; with new 
introduction by Robert A. Kagan, Transaction Publisher, USA, 2009, p. xi. 
15 See Kagan, Robert A., Krygier, Martin., and Winston., Kenneth, Legality and Community, On the Intellectual Legacy of 
Philip Selznick, Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, Inc, USA, 2002, p. 250. 
16 See  Tamanaha, Brian Z., On the rule of law : History, Politics, and Theory, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2004, p. 82. 
17 See  Vickers, Adrian., A History of Modern Indonesia, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, p. 144. 
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formula to create a balance between the political parties. The failures of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly to re-write the Constitution, made President Soekarno 
announce the Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959 to return to the 1945 Constitution as a 
foundation of Guided Democracy. Under this Constitution, the president was the centre 
of power, and the status of the prime minister was reduced. In the later development, 
the position of prime minister was abolished. Although, in theory, the president’s 
powers were limited by a principle of responsibility to the People’s Consultative 
Assembly.18 
Soekarno’s “revolutionary will” slogan believed it would overcome all obstacles to 
development19, and his continuing Revolution campaign brought him politically closer 
to the left (China), causing concern in the US. His advocacy of the Third World 
articulated as resistance against western imperialism.20 In 1965, Indonesia withdrew 
from the UN because of political tensions regarding West Papua and border 
confrontations with Malaysia, thus, Indonesia was isolated from the international 
community.21 
Soekarno’s government formulated an economic policy that became an eight-year 
plan in which the main goals were to create welfare through projects aimed at 
improving health, education and the provision of necessities. These were to be paid 
through other projects for promoting exports and paying off foreign debt. Massive 
dams were built, and basic infrastructure expanded rapidly. In the period of 
constitutional democracy, the primary aim of the state was to improve the lives of the 
people, rather than promote capital.22 In 1964, uncontrolled inflation and political 
turmoil hit the country.23 
Rent seeking behaviour and corruption caused those programmes to fail. 
Soekarno’s government was looking for alternative aid from the USSR and China.24 
However, this aid was not enough to fund all Sukarno’s promises. The policies could 
have boosted the economy if the government had not invested so much state revenue 
on military adventures. The inflation rate climbed to 700%.25  Import tariffs only 
served as extra sources of income for government officials, they did nothing to improve 
the situation and all kinds of consumer goods were in extremely short supply. Foreign 
investors were frightened off by Sukarno’s policies. By 1965 foreign reserves were 
insignificant.26 A drastic readjustment of the Rupiah in 1966 saw the exchange rate 
fixed, devaluing the currency by 1.000%.27  
Sukarno transferred much of his authority over to the army and parliament to 
Suharto in the presidential decree of 11 March 1966. By 1967 Suharto had effectively 
taken hold of power legitimated through the People’s Consultative Assembly. In 1968 
Suharto was inaugurated as ‘Acting President’ and had to organise an election in 1971 
to confirm his position.28 
Political characteristics in the Soekarno era influenced Indonesia’s foreign trade 
policy. First, the trauma of colonialism created negative stigma to the western world 
that was associated with neo-colonialism. As noted previously, western colonialism in 
                                                 
18 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit., p. 144. 
19 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit., p. 146. 
20 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit., p. 149. 
21 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Loc. Cit., p. 149. 
22 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  pp. 150-151. 
23 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  p. 143. 
24 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Loc. Cit.,  pp. 150-151. 
25 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  pp. 163-164. 
26 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Loc. Cit.,  pp. 150-151. 
27 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Loc. Cit.,  pp. 163-164. 
28 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  p. 160. 
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Indonesia started from trade and economic interests. Practically, Indonesia limited 
itself to trade relations with the western world.  Mistrust of the neo-colonialism agent 
led to the decision to nationalise Dutch companies in Indonesia.  Second, the decision to 
withdraw from international organisations, i.e., the United Nations, IMF, and World 
Bank, isolated Indonesia from the international community and international networks. 
In 1962, Soekarno’s campaigned to take over West Papua New Guinea and brought 
Indonesia into arms conflict with the Dutch. The fact that Irian was still in Dutch hands 
made it an evident symbol of imperialism and hindered Indonesia’s national destiny. 
The campaign was succeeded by integrating Irian Jaya as one of Indonesia’s 
Provinces.29 In 1963, Indonesia was involved in confrontation with Malaysia, which was 
under the British Commonwealth. This conflict caused British and other 
Commonwealth businesses located in Indonesia to be taken over by the Soekarno’s 
government during 1964 and 1965.30 Because of these conflicts, Indonesia spent most 
of its state budget on military equipment, which was prominently soviet-made.31 The 
members withdrew from the IMF and World Bank because these organisations were 
considered as the agent of neo-liberalism against the Five Principles of the nation. 
Third, Indonesian foreign policy, which was closer to the communist regimes (China-
Russia), had offended the US. Another one of Soekarno’s slogans was “standing on our 
own two feet” or “berdikari”, created another protectionism regime towards imports.32 
Fourth, corruption existed at all levels, for instance the favourite practice among 
politicians was handing out lucrative import–export licenses. Politicians became 
business partners of licensees.33 From this background, the political instability did not 
give the government a chance to deliver its public services properly. The political 
configuration that campaigned anti-neo-colonialism and anti-capitalism created closed 
economic policies and protectionism regimes. 
 
III. Indonesian trade policies during the New Order era (1967-1998). 
At the beginning of 1966, due to the chaotic situation regarding politics and 
security, the Presidential Decree of 11 March was issued, and was well known as the 
acronym of Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (Supersemar). It provided Soeharto with 
some legitimacy to assume effective political power over the country. The emergence of 
the New Order was marked down by the appointment of Soeharto as Acting President 
in March 1967 by the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (the country’s highest 
state body). In 1968, Major General Soeharto was officially inaugurated as Indonesia’s 
second president. The New Order government shifted the national economy policy from 
a closed economy to an open economy, therefore, “economic development” was placed 
as the priority programme of this regime.34 
Along with the emergence of the New Order regime, the Jakarta-Beijing alliance 
was dissolved. The anti-western doctrine that was campaigned by President Soekarno 
was ignored by the new regime. Change of national political leadership influenced 
Indonesian foreign policy, shifting from China-Russia (communist) hegemony to 
Western (US-Japan) hegemony.  After the fall of the Old Order, Indonesia was dashed 
                                                 
29 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  p. 149. 
30 See  Ibid.,  p. 149. 
31 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Loc. Cit.,  pp. 150-151. 
32 See  Ibid.,  pp. 150-151. 
33 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  p. 138. 
34 See  Howard Dick, Vincent J.H. Houben, J. Thomas Lindblad, and Thee Kian Wie, The Emergence of A National Economy 
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into a worse economic situation. Therefore, economic assistance, especially from 
western countries and Japan, was needed so much to help Indonesia recover from the 
difficult economic situation. During the New Order regime, it was realised that 
integration into the international system was necessary to develop Indonesia’s 
economy. During the Old Order regime, the anti-western campaign had cut the 
country’s link with the international community system, which was associated as the 
capitalist world. Indonesia re-joined the United Nations, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and  the World Bank, from which it had withdrawn in August 1965. Building 
networks and involvement with these multilateral organisations was considered 
crucial to assist Indonesia’s economic recovery.35 
The most serious economic problem left by the Old Order government was severe 
inflation due to uncontrolled deficit spending. In September 1966, the New Order 
government appointed some “economic technocrats” to establish a “Team of Experts in 
the Field of Economics and Finance”. These highly qualified economists came from the 
Faculty of Economics of the University of Indonesia (FEUI) Jakarta.36 
Based on the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly Decree No. 23/1966, 
this team of economists was given the task to carry out the “Programme for 
Stabilisation and Rehabilitation”.  At the beginning of the New Order Era, national 
economic development was focused on economic recovery, through specific policies on 
a balanced budget, the balance of payments, stabilised prices, rehabilitation of the 
physical infrastructure, economic liberalisation, food production, and agricultural 
development.37 By 1969 inflation was under control, the free market was gradually 
being established in many areas38 and foreign capital was welcomed back.39 
At the beginning of the 1990s, along with the end of the Cold War, Indonesia’s 
government proclaimed a period of liberalisation of the economy, together with an 
official “Openness” policy. The beginning of the openness policy was marked by 
relaxing laws on foreign investment in order to support the freer flow of capital. This 
policy led to significant economic growth with an annual rate of over 7% and 
suppressed the inflation rate at a low level.40 Poverty reduced to 10 million in 1996. 
Sectors such as manufacturing continued to improve as export earners.41 
The New Order economic development programme had successfully transformed 
Indonesia’s economic landscape from the “prime economic underperformer” among 
the Southeast Asian economies into a  “Newly  Industrialising  Economy’ (NIE)”.  
Indonesia experienced rapid industrial growth. This was marked by transformation 
from an economy that was highly dependent on agriculture in the mid-1960s to one 
where the manufacturing sector contributed more to GDP than agriculture in the mid-
1990s.42 In 1993 the World Bank included Indonesia as the “East Asian Miracle”, which 
was nominated as one of the “high performing Asian economies” (HPAEs).43 
On the other hand, the New Order economic growth of the 1990s had been built 
on enormous foreign loans. The effects of the economic crisis that struck Indonesia 
were worse than those of the economic crises of the 1960s or the Great Depression of 
                                                 
35 See  Howard Dick, Vincent J.H. Houben, J. Thomas Lindblad, and Thee Kian Wie, 2002, Op. Cit., p. 195. 
36 See  Ibid., p. 195. 
37 See  Salim, 1997, Op. Cit., p. 57; Subroto, 1998, Op. Cit., pp. 74–75; Howard Dick, Vincent J.H. Houben, J. Thomas 
Lindblad, and Thee Kian Wie, 2002, Op. Cit., p. 196. See also Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  p. 163. 
38 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  pp. 163-164. 
39 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  p. 164. 
40 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  p. 198. 
41 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  p. 199. 
42 See  Howard Dick, Vincent J.H. Houben, J. Thomas Lindblad, and Thee Kian Wie, 2002, Op. Cit., p. 196. 
43 See  World  Bank,  1993a, Op. Cit., p. xvi; Howard Dick, Vincent J.H. Houben, J. Thomas Lindblad, and Thee Kian Wie, 
2002, Op. Cit.,p. 196. 
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1929-1931.44 Most industries collapsed, and poverty doubled, slipping back to levels 
that had not been seen since the early 1980s. With the Letter of Intent, the 
International Monetary Fund agreed to pour $43 billion USD into the country in stages. 
The IMF support drove reformation of Indonesia’s financial sector, and encouraged fair 
business practice and antimonopoly. Borrowing Adrian words, Suharto’s age of 
development and the subsequent age of globalisation had turned into the ‘age of 
crisis’.45 The causes of the crisis were identified in the popular acronym KKN, 
‘Collusion, Corruption and Nepotism’.46 
Suharto was brought down by a combination of factors. There was significant 
external pressure to liberalise the economy and let Indonesians participate in 
international consumer society. Suharto resigned on 21 May 1998, handing power over 
to Habibie, who was hastily sworn in as Indonesia’s third president.47 
In the end, the political configuration of the New Order that claimed the rule of 
law as the foundation of economic development and campaigned the doctrine “law as a 
tool of development”, laid down the foundations of openness, liberalism and 
integration with the multilateral trade regime. The establishment of ASEAN also 
brought a positive impact to the role of Indonesia in the international stage as one of 
the main powers in the region. Politically, ASEAN had laid down the foundations of 
cooperation between Indonesia-EU through the 1980 Cooperation Agreement. This 
agreement became one of the legal bases for the EU to grant aid through the Country 
Strategy Paper. However, there were some restraints that impeded Indonesia’s foreign 
trade policy to fully participate in the multilateral trading system, such as massive 
corruption, monopoly, unfair business practices, excessive bureaucracy, lack of 
infrastructure, lack of capable human resources, lack of democracy and public 
participation, and lack of political will to boost foreign trade growth. 
 
IV. Indonesian trade policies Reformation era (1999-today) 
The new regime preferred to use the term “reformation” rather than revolution, 
so as not to frighten away international investors and aid agencies. The Reformation 
regime has promoted a new look for Indonesia with good governance, transparency, 
social capital and empowerment.48 Over the last fourteen years, massive changes in the 
Indonesian business environment have taken place through legal reforms. Some laws 
have been established to encourage business development, such as Law No. 05/1999 
concerning Prohibition against Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business 
Competition, Law No. 25/2007 concerning Investment, Law No. 40/2007 concerning 
Company Law, and Law No. 8/1999 concerning Customer Protection. As previously 
noted, massive corruption has been identified as the most severe problem impeding the 
business environment in Indonesia, therefore, the Reformation regime laid down its 
commitment to combat corruption through establishing Law No. 31/1999 Jo Law No. 
20/2001 concerning Combating Corruption. With regard to accelerating bureaucracy 
reforms, the government issued Law No. 25/2009 concerning Public Services. 
Among those new legal regimes, Law No. 05/1999 has had significant influence 
on driven trade liberalisation49, since fair business practices are the requirement for 
the friendly business environment and fair competition. Fair competition is open, 
                                                 
44 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  p. 203. 
45 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  pp. 203-204. 
46 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,   p. 205. 
47 See  Ibid., p. 205. 
48 See  Vickers, Adrian., 2005, Op. Cit.,  p. 209. 
49 See Pardede, Soy Martua., Persaingan Sehat dan Akselerasi Pembangunan Ekonomi, Cetakan Pertama, Pustaka Sinar 
Harapan, Jakarta, 2010. 
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equitable, and just competition between business competitors.50 The legal doctrine of 
unfair competition is a development of the fundamental idea that dealings based on 
deceit are legally wrong.  
Competition is a situation in a market in which firms or sellers independently 
strive for the patronage of buyers in order to achieve a particular business objective, 
e.g., profits, sales and/or market share. Competition in this context is often equated 
with rivalry. Competitive rivalry between firms can occur when there are two firms or 
many firms. This rivalry may take place in terms of price, quality, service or 
combinations of these and other factors that customers may value. Competition is 
viewed as an important process by which firms are forced to become efficient and offer 
a greater choice of products and services at lower prices. This gives rise to increased 
consumer welfare and locative efficiency, including the concept of "dynamic efficiency" 
by which firms engage in innovation and foster technological change and progress.51  
Indonesian business actors shall base their business on economic democracy with 
due attention to the equilibrium between the business actors' interest and public 
interests. Considering the principles of the philosophy on Indonesian competition 
policy, the objectives of Indonesian competition law are52:  
a. to maintain public interest and improve the efficiency of the national economy as one of 
the means to improve public welfare; 
b. to create a conducive business climate through healthy business competition, thus 
securing equal business opportunity for large, middle and small scale entrepreneurs; 
c. to prevent monopolistic practices and/or unfair business competition by the 
entrepreneurs; and 
d. to create effectiveness and efficiency in business activities. 
Due to its objectives Indonesian competition law can be categorised as one of the 
products of responsive law where law is not being used merely as a tool to drive 
economic growth but also as a tool to protect public interest. The social needs and 
aspiration for the public to get the best products and services with affordable prices 
can only be fulfilled when fair competition occurs. The fair business environment 
believes in boosting trade and driving economic growth through the enhancement of 
business competitiveness by firms. 
The unfair trading practices in exports under the EU GSP regime could lead to 
temporary withdrawal from the scheme. According to Articles 15-19 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 amended by Regulation (EU) No. 512/2011, temporary 
withdrawal may be invoked due to unfair trading practices53 that are regulated under 
the WTO agreements in which the effect of such conduct initially has to be determined 
by the competent body of the WTO.  
 
                                                 
50 See  Bryan A. Garner, op.cit, p. 302. 
51 See Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and Competition Law. 
52 See Articles 3 of Law Number 05 Years 1999. 
53 See Subparagraph (d) Paragraph 1 Article 15 Section 1 Chapter III Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
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Figure 22. Indonesian merchandise trade balance, annual, 1948-2010.54 
 
 
Measure: US dollars at current prices and current exchange rates in millions. 
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Indonesian merchandise trade balance started to significantly improve in 1974 and consistently received positive trade balance. 
                                                 
54 See  Source : UNCTAD, UNCTADstat., available at : http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx, last accessed : 18 May 2012. Data and charts treated by the researcher. 
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Table 32. Indonesian merchandise trade balance. 
(Annual 1948-1967) Old Order era.55 
 
No. Year 
Indonesian merchandise trade 
balance. 
(Annual 1948-1967) 
US dollars at current prices and 
current exchange rates in millions 
1. 1948 -70 
2. 1949 -52 
3. 1950 360 
4. 1951 419 
5. 1952 -13.9 
6. 1953 75.3 
7. 1954 238 
8. 1955 316 
9. 1956 65 
10. 1957 151 
11. 1958 246.9 
12. 1959 448.3 
13. 1960 267 
14. 1961 -10 
15. 1962 35 
16. 1963 175 
17. 1964 44 
18. 1965 13 
19. 1966 152 
20. 1967 16 
 
Figure 23. 
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55 See  Source : UNCTAD, UNCTADstat., available at : http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx, last 
accessed : 18 May 2012. Data and charts treated by the researcher. 
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Table 33. Indonesian merchandise trade balance. 
(Annual 1968-1998) New Order era.56 
 
Indonesian merchandise 
trade balance. 
Indonesian merchandise 
trade balance. 
(Annual 1968-1998) (Annual 1968-1998) 
No. Year 
US dollars at current 
prices and current 
exchange rates in millions 
No. Year 
US dollars at current prices 
and current exchange rates 
in millions 
1 1968 15 17 1984 8006 
2 1969 73 18 1985 8328 
3 1970 106 19 1986 4087 
4 1971 131 20 1987 4766 
5 1972 215 21 1988 5971 
6 1973 482 22 1989 5800 
7 1974 3584 23 1990 5039.2 
8 1975 2332 24 1991 3530.3 
9 1976 2874 25 1992 6485 
10 1977 4623 26 1993 8496.2 
11 1978 4953 27 1994 8233.3 
12 1979 8387 28 1995 6799 
13 1980 13116 29 1996 6885 
14 1981 11893 30 1997 4990 
15 1982 5469 31 1998 15091 
16 1983 4794       
 
Figure 24. 
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56 See  Source : UNCTAD, UNCTADstat., available at : http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx, last 
accessed : 18 May 2012. Data and charts treated by the researcher. 
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Table 34.  Indonesian merchandise trade balance. 
(Annual 1999-2010) Reformation era.57 
 
 
No. 
Year 
Indonesian merchandise trade balance. 
(Annual 1999-2010) 
US dollars at current prices and current 
exchange rates in millions 
1. 1999 17921 
2. 2000 22331.7 
3. 2001 18933.3 
4. 2002 21434.6 
5. 2003 22541.3 
6. 2004 16776.9 
7. 2005 10548.4 
8. 2006 22827.4 
9. 2007 25627.4 
10. 2008 12151 
11. 2009 25843.7 
12. 2010 25724 
 
 
Figure 25. 
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57 See  Source : UNCTAD, UNCTADstat., available at : http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx, last 
accessed : 18 May 2012. Data and charts treated by the researcher. 
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Table 35. Value growth rates of merchandise exports and imports. 58 
(Annual, 1981-2010). 
 
 
 
No. Year 
Annual average 
growth rates 
No. Year 
Annual average 
growth rates 
1 1981 5.073069 16 1996 4.973237 
2 1982 -11.2736 17 1997 13.01441 
3 1983 -5.2938 18 1998 -10.5281 
4 1984 3.508938 19 1999 1.731189 
5 1985 -15.0813 20 2000 27.64334 
6 1986 -20.3476 21 2001 -12.2953 
7 1987 15.74468 22 2002 3.137802 
8 1988 12.1557 23 2003  
9 1989 15.30257 24 2004 11.97336 
10 1990 20.97022 25 2005 20.05154 
11 1991 10.20629 26 2006 20.08262 
12 1992 14.39597 27 2007 14.72856 
13 1993 8.961416 28 2008 17.58389 
14 1994 9.225898 29 2009 -14.2968 
15 1995 17.98021 30 2010 31.9083 
 
 
Figure 26. 
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58 See  Source : UNCTAD, UNCTADstat., available at : http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx, 
last accessed : 18 May 2012. Data and charts treated by the researcher. 
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 In 2012, Indonesia’s recent economic situation, as showed in Table 5, had a 6.8% 
growth rate, which was the highest among other countries in Southeast Asia. It had an 
inflation rate of 5.4%, above the average inflation rate in Southeast Asian countries. In 
this respect, Indonesia’s economic growth expected to boost foreign trade. 
 
Table 36. Growth rate of GDP (% per year).59 
 
Sub 
region/Economy 
2010 ADO 
2011 
2011 
Update 
ADO 
2011 
2012 
Update 
Southeast Asia 7.9 5.5 5.4 5.7 5.6 
Indonesia 6.1 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.8 
Malaysia 7.2 5.3 4.8 5.3 5.1 
Philippines 7.6 5.0 4.7 5.3 5.1 
Singapore 14.5 5.5 5.5 4.8 4.8 
Thailand 7.8 4.5 4.0 4.8 4.5 
Vietnam 6.8 6.1 5.8 6.7 6.5 
 
Table 37. Inflation (% per year).60 
 
Sub 
region/Economy 
2010 ADO 
2011 
2011 
Update 
ADO 
2011 
2012 
Update 
Southeast Asia 4.0 5.1 5.4 4.2 4.4 
Indonesia 5.1 6.3 5.6 5.8 5.4 
Malaysia 1.7 3.0 3.4 3.0 3.0 
Philippines 3.8 4.9 4.9 4.3 4.3 
Singapore 2.8 3.2 4.3 2.0 2.4 
Thailand 3.2 3.5 3.8 3.0 3.0 
Vietnam 9.2 13.3 18.7 6.8 11.0 
 
 
V. Indonesia-European Union trade relationship: Re-discovering the emerald 
archipelago of Southeast Asia. 
V.a. Genesis of Indonesia- EU trade relationships.  
The EU is one of the major trading partners for Indonesia and other ASEAN 
member states. The important position of the EU in Indonesia’s foreign trade is 
supported by some factors such as its open market policy, preferential trade policy 
(GSP), GDP, and market size. It has to be admitted that the EU is the first initiator to 
adopt GSP into its national policy. Along with membership enlargement, the EU has 
evolved into the biggest single market in the world.61 For five decades, the EU has 
established trade polices to provide more favourable treatments for exported products 
from developing countries and LDCs, such as reducing import tariffs until 0% under the 
EBA scheme. The trade relationship between Indonesia and the EU started many years 
                                                 
59 See  Asian Development Outlook 2011 Update : Preparing for Demographic Transition, Asian Development Bank, 
Phillipines, 2011. 
60 See  Ibid., 
61 See  The European Commission, The EU is the most open market in the world and we import more from developing 
countries than anyone else, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/january/tradoc_148990.pdf, last accessed : 14 February 2012. 
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ago. Therefore, in terms of this research, it is necessary to study the “genesis” of the 
trade relationship between the Indonesians and Europeans in order to have a better 
understanding of the EU’s trade policy to Indonesia. The roles of Indonesian traders in 
international trade can be traced back to the early 12th century.  It started when 
Indonesian traders imported pepper from India and exported it to China through the 
port of Sumatra. According to historians, Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, reached 
its Golden Age of Commerce between the middle of the 15th century and the late 17th 
century. China and Europe were the main markets of Indonesian products especially 
for spices and black pepper. Java, Sumatera, and Maluku were and continue to be the 
main islands in Indonesia producing  pepper and spices.62 
Technological, economic, social, and demographic development has influenced 
international trade, raising the market demand of more supply of Indonesian products, 
especially spices and black pepper from Maluku. The significant increase of these 
products in the international market created competition between traders to build 
direct links with the producers. This was the milestone when Indonesian traders had 
direct contact with foreign traders, especially those from Europe. At that time, many 
new ports were built across the islands and became centres of spice and pepper 
production. The boost of international trade brought prosperity and new culture, which 
influenced local customs.63 
The first arrival of the Europeans in Indonesia was between the end of the 14th 
and the early 15th century, when the political power in Europe was gradually shifting 
from the south to “westward”. European political power shifted from the Italian 
peninsular states to the Atlantic coast, especially to Portugal and Spain. This situation 
made Spain and Portugal the new economic powers of Europe that led to the long 
distance trade with Southeast Asia.64 
The Portuguese were the first Europeans to reach Indonesia in the early 14th 
century. Trade interest and economic competition became the reason why Portuguese 
traders and navigators went on such voyages. They wanted to search the direct 
resources of spices and pepper products, since at that time those products had high 
demand in the international market. They sailed across the west coast of Africa, passing 
the Cape of Good Hope. They continued their voyage across the western side of the 
Indian Ocean to India itself and reached Malaka by 1511. Eventually, in 1512 they 
arrived in Maluku and built their base there in order to do trade. Initially, their 
economic activities were out of pure trading interests, especially when buying spices 
and pepper to be sold in Europe. However, since the demand of economic competition 
between European traders rose, the Portuguese made efforts to secure production 
resources through monopoly.65 
The Portuguese had important roles in the trade progress of the Indonesia 
archipelago. Besides their monopoly in the east part of Indonesia Portuguese also 
capturing Malaka that has vital role as the “primary port” for the trade to Europe. 
Portuguese thought that they are controlling the international trade through Malaka, 
yet, they were realized that they only capturing Malaka as location but not its trading 
functions. Practically, the capture of Malaka was not giving significant benefit for 
Portuguese. At the same time, the trade spread within archipelago was starting to 
develop. For instance, the local ruler such as Aceh, Jambi, Banten, Cirebon, Denmak, 
                                                 
62 See  Brown, Colin., A Short History of Indonesia The Unlikely Nation, Allen & Unwin, Australia, 2003, p. 29. 
63 See  Brown, Colin., 2003, Op. Cit., p.  30. 
64 See  Brown, Colin., 2003, Op. Cit.,  pp.  32-33. 
65 See  Ibid., pp.  32-33. 
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Surabaya, and Makassar has built some new important ports. Thus, most of main 
islands in Indonesia have own port to support trade activities.66 
The arrival of Portuguese was followed by other Europeans such as Britain, 
Spanish, and Dutch. For some centuries, the Dutch becomes the ruler of the trading in 
the archipelago. The arrival of these Europeans to Southeast Asia because of the 
economic and political rivalry’s among themselves. They were having the same reasons 
with Portuguese to search the producer resources of spices and pepper. In their 
rivalries, according to Collin, “each of them wanted to do a monopoly over Indies trade 
and each wanted to excludes others”. 67 
The Dutch made their first voyage in the 1590s. They manage to reach the 
Indonesian archipelago in April 1595, where they landed with four ships and 249 
members of crew. In 1597 the rest of the crew, 89 people, travelled back to Amsterdam 
in order to report the possibilities of Dutch ships to travel to the Indies. This was 
followed by the arrival of 22 Dutch ships in Indonesia and then the numbers 
continuously increased.68 
The Dutch company based in Amsterdam encouraged to send more ships since 
they were getting enormous profit from this trade. For example, one voyage expedition 
was giving more than 300% profit return. The central and provincial government in 
Holland calls the major Dutch company to make collective efforts under single business 
entities. The establishment of single business entities was purposed to eliminate 
competition between traders. Each company is the shareholders of the new big 
company that called as the United East India Company (the Vereenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie or VOC).  The VOC was established on 20th March 1602. 69 
The VOC established as a joint stock company or incorporated company. At that 
time, Amsterdam was the biggest shareholders among six regional chambers of 
commerce. As a company the VOC governed by a “board of seventeen directors”. The 
English East India Company is the strong competitor of the VOC, however they were 
having similarity in some respect. The establishment of the VOC is creating a new 
trading system where the traders were not invested their money in the individual 
expeditions but to the Company. Hence, the traders are the shareholders of the 
company. The establishment of single business entities is having some advantages such 
as, clear strategic business plan through long-term objectives. 70 
The VOC businesses are develops rapidly in Indonesia archipelago. In 1605, the 
VOC took over Ambon archipelago from Portuguese and establishing regional 
headquarter there. At that time, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian are dominating Asian 
traders.  The intra-Asian trade has been existed a long time before the arrivals of VOC 
and it has large networks and profitable big markets. The VOC became the single 
trading company that carry out monopoly over Indonesia archipelago and it made them 
in the very good positions in intercontinental spice trade. Therefore, VOC soon realized 
in order to expand their business and to secure their positions, they have to involve 
into intra –Asian trade networks and inter continental trade to Europe.71  
Along with the development of the businesses, the VOC want to expand the 
control over the regions by searching a new place to establish another base. Finally, 
they found place called Jayakarta located in west of Java island. In 1610, they made the 
contract with the local ruler, named Pangeran Jayakarta or Prince Jayakarta. The 
                                                 
66 See  Brown, Colin., 2003, Op. Cit.,  p.  33. 
67 See  Brown, Colin., 2003, Op. Cit.,  p.  39. 
68 See  Brown, Colin., 2003, Op. Cit.,  pp.  39-40. 
69 See  Brown, Colin., 2003, Op. Cit.,  p.  40. 
70 See  Ibid., p.  40. 
71 See  Ibid., p.  40. 
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contract contained the permission for the VOC to build storage house and settled 
headquarter in Jayakarta. Along with development and changing political situation, 
they changed the named of Jayakarta city into Batavia. However, the name was changed 
again into Jakarta where today becoming the capital city of Indonesia. 72 Batavia was 
the centres headquarter of the VOC but their businesses were operating in some Asian 
countries , such as Japan, China, and India. 73 
The VOC's decision establishing settlements and headquarter in Batavia has 
changed the landscape of the city into trading city that equipped with some facilities 
such as storagehouses, foods granary, and ship-repair services. The vast development 
of the Batavia changed the role of the VOC as pure trading company into quasi-
governmental entities or territorial administrator. 74 According to Colin, it had brought 
inevitably military conflict with the local rulers and Britain. 75 
The rise of Dutch colonisation gradually eliminated Portugal’s power over the 
eastern regions of Indonesia, especially Maluku. Afterwards, the Dutch succeeded in 
dispelling the Spanish from Ternate in 1606 and Tidore in around 1666. The Dutch 
continued to expand its control over local rulers by forcing them to sign agreements 
that contained “recognition of the latter’s sole right to participate in the spice trade”. This 
meant that the local producers were only allowed to sell their goods and products to 
the VOC.76 
At that time, Indonesia local rulers have recognized free trade principle. For 
example, at 17th century the rulers of Makassar agreed opening their ports’ to all 
traders from around the world. The free trade in spices has attracted many traders to 
come into the islands. Spice was the commodity that have high market price in 
international trade. Colin citing a well-known quotation taken from the Makassar ruler 
as the basis of free trade : 77 
“[…] God made the land and the sea; the land he divided among men and the sea 
he gave in common. It has never been heard that anyone should be forbidden to 
sail the seas […]” 
The free trade policy implemented by the ruler of Makassar brought them into 
confrontation with the Dutch, because it against the VOC’s interest to perform trade 
monopoly over the regions, especially in spice trade. The Dutch felt insecure by such 
free trade, because it potentially reduce their trade profit’s. 78 
In middle of 17th century, the Dutch succeeded  took over Maluku under their 
controls. The Dutch was earning a lots of profit from the spices trading. They sold the 
goods in the European market with the price seventeen times higher than the price that 
they bought from Maluku. Ironically, these profits did not bring any change of social 
welfare for the island inhabitant, but instead giving economic oppression. The local 
spice producers and intermediaries traders suffered losses because of the VOC’s 
monopoly. In this regard, the VOC transformed from a trading company into a regional 
power.79 Big power and authority in the trade monopoly that given to the VOC were 
used as a tool to begin the era of “European imperialism” in Indonesia at the end of the 
18th century. 80 
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In the middle of 1600s, Indonesia’s “age of commerce” started to decline. The local 
traders were not able to compete with the Europeans traders that more organize, using 
advance technology, having modern knowledge of commerce, and backed up by 
powerful and modern military power. Many of local rulers forced to agree with the 
rules applied by the Europeans traders. 81 
To control their power the Dutch monopolize intra-trade and external-trade of 
Indonesia’s through the transportation, communication, and administration. The Dutch 
cut off all the international contacts and the international networks between 
Indonesia’s islands with international trade community. Practically, Indonesia was 
“isolated” from international marketplace and away from the idea of international 
marketplace. In this regard, Indonesia entered into deterioration era of commerce 
where they had to step backward from the open market into isolated market. 
Apparently, such situation gave the full advantages to the VOC and Chinese. 82  
In the end 17th century, the VOC businesses started to collapse. Four major factors 
has been identified as causes the company gradually lose theirs power, i.e., war, conflict 
of interest, miss management, debt, and corruption. The VOC suffered loss of 70% of its 
total asset’s including extensive shipping and facilities because of the Fourth Anglo-
Dutch War, which happened around 1780-1784. Economically the Dutch suffered of 
losses because of this war. Mixing the business interest and politics causes conflict of 
interest inside the VOC and hinder its bussiness development. The VOC was holding 
two important roles, that is, acting as territorial administrator and a trading company. 
In this regard, governing people and administering region is totally different tasks from  
managing company.. As the territorial administrator, the VOC had to deal with 
inevitable conflict with the local rulers or local traders. On the other hand, it is 
important to keep the business stability and security to ensure the company business 
survival. At the end, the VOC prefer to focus on their businesses rather than their 
politic’s roles. Gradually, the VOC had started loss their power’s and entered into 
failures to have full control over the regions. In the 18th century, the VOC debt increased 
because most of their profits were used to pay the dividends to the shareholders. At the 
same time, the profits earned by VOC from the trade started to decrease. Their’s 
representatives corrupts most of the VOC profits in Indonesia. Therefore, Colin wrote, 
“corruption in business is not new phenomenon in Indonesia”. 83 In addition, in the first 
half of the 18th century the Dutch trade monopoly eroded by the activities of the English 
East India Company and private British traders. 84 
The changing economy and political situation in North Asia and in Europe was 
much affecting the trade in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. After the collapse of 
VOC in 1799, Dutch imperialism in Indonesia ended by default. The administration was 
shifted from the VOC to the Dutch government. In 1806, Netherlands was ruled under 
Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon’s brother, Louis was appointed as the Dutch throne. It 
had changed the Dutch policy in Indonesia in line with the spirit of French Revolution. 
Louis appointed Herman Daendels as Governor-General to Indonesia (Indies) and 
brought the idea of liberalism from French revolution into his administration. 85 
Between 1870 until 1900, Indonesia experienced the era of liberalism under 
Dutch colonization’s. At that period, the Dutch investment on agriculture increased 
driven by the establishment of the Agrarian Law of 1870. Collin noted two important 
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features in this act that recognizing the private ownership of indigenous people of 
Indonesia and giving the right to cultivate the land to the foreigner through leasing or 
renting agreement. 86 
 “[…] it provided that the only people who could own land in Indonesia were 
Indonesians: that is to say, people belonging to one of the ethnic groups indigenous 
to the archipelago. Europeans and Chinese were thus prevented from becoming or 
remaining landowners. The Law made provision for the leasing or renting of land by 
foreigners; it was on the basis of these leases that the major late nineteenth-century 
privately managed plantations were established […]”. 
During the liberal era Java were became the market for the Dutch manufacture 
products. Java was recognized as raw materials exporter, started engaged as the goods 
importer. The shifting of trade relationship pattern placed Java as the important market 
for the Dutch products’.87 In this point of view, the liberal era is the milestone of the 
export/import relationship between Java and the Dutch. In the colonial era, the 
economy of Java once experience severe depression, especially affecting sugar industry. 
88 
Entering the 20th century population of Java grown rapidly, yet it was not 
balanced with the foods production, consequently decreased the standard of living. To 
manage this situation the Dutch adopting the new policy, named “Ethical Policy in 
1901”. 89 
After the collapse of cultivation system, the Dutch build the economy by 
reforming the government system and public infrastructures. Education and public 
administration were placed as the main priority of the development. The development 
of public infrastructures were carried out by railways building, expanding ports, 
improving communications links, supplying gas and electricity. 90 
Dutch taught the democracy to Indonesian through the establishment of 
“Volksraad” that carried out function as “joint legislative body” with colonial 
authorities. Volksraad given authority “to discuss the Indies budget, present petitions, 
draft legislative proposals, suggest amendments to legislation proposed by the 
government and request information from the Governor-General on specific matters”.  
Yet, the authority of Volkstraad did not have any powers to force the colonial 
government “to take any particular action”. 91 In 1931, the composition of Volkstraad 
were consisting of 30 Indonesians, 25 Europeans and 5 “foreign oriental”. In fact, 
Indonesian was dominating 50% of the Volkstraad seats. 92 In the colonial period, the 
populations of Indonesia were divided into three groups: European, Indonesian, and 
Foreign Oriental. Foreign oriental comprised of Chinese, Arabs and Indians 
communities.93 This division influenced the Indonesian legal system, which applied 
different law to the non-native people. 
In the beginning of 1900s, the landscape of Indonesia social and cultural changed 
because of more educated young people came to realize about the importance of 
political movement to attain state independence. Budi Oetomo and Indische Partij are 
the first modern movement formed by nationalist intellectual on 20th May 1908.94 
Major changes happened “in the Second All Indonesia Youth Congress” on 28 October 
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1928, which well known with a Youth Pledge. One the pledge declared that Indonesia 
language is the language of unity.95  This is the path of the Indonesia to attain their 
independence. The Indonesia language plays important roles to unite various 
differences in the pluralist society. Bahasa Indonesia was originating from Riau islands 
in Sumatra and the southern part of the Malay Peninsula, and very small population in 
Indonesia archipelago spoke it. However, the spirit of “modernity and democracy” 
brought bahasa Indonesia being amenable in the national level. 96 
On 10 January 1942, the Pacific War started bringing massive changes to 
Indonesia when the Japanese army invaded the islands of Java and Sumatera. The 
Dutch surrendered without condition to Japan on 8 March 1941 and ended the long 
period of colonisation for good.97 The Japanese occupation lasted 3.5 years, which was a 
very short time compared to the 350 years of Dutch colonisation.98 The Japanese lost 
the Pacific War and Indonesia declared its independence on 17 August 1945. Somehow, 
the Dutch did not recognise this independence and tried to invade Indonesia again 
through military aggression from 1947 until 1949. However, by 1949 the Dutch 
eventually acknowledged Indonesia independence. 
After suffering from both colonisation and war, Indonesia needed to re-build its 
economy, especially through international trade. On 24 February 1950, Indonesia 
joined GATT 1947 as a contracting party.99 Indonesia actively participates in the GATT 
negotiations to advocate its interest in international trade. Between the early 1950s to 
the late 1960s, Indonesia went through difficult times regarding its economic and 
political situation. Such situation was worsened by the Cold War between the US and 
Communism Bloc of the USSR and China. 
Indonesia state constitution 1945 govern political, economic, and administrative 
matters. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution reflects the mixed economy ideology of the 
national political leaders. It creates special system of market economy based on the 
national ideology Pancasila (five principles). The basic principle of Indonesian national 
economy is familial system and cooperation. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution 
contains four principles of national economic ideology : 
1. The economy shall be organized as a common endeavour based upon the principles of 
the family system. 
2. Sectors of production which are important for the country and affect the life of the 
people shall be under the powers of the State. 
3. The land, the waters and the natural resources within shall be under the powers of the 
State and shall be used to the greatest benefit of the people. 
4. The organisation of the national economy shall be conducted on the basis of economic 
democracy upholding the principles of togetherness, efficiency with justice, continuity, 
environmental perspective, self-sufficiency, and keeping a balance in the progress and 
unity of the national economy. 
5. Further provisions relating to the implementation of this article shall be regulated by 
law. 
According to the Article 33 important branches of production, and land, water 
and natural resources, are regulated by the state. The word “regulated” rather than 
“owned” shown that Indonesia has open economic policies that ensure the resources 
deliver social welfare for the society. State has important roles but not dominating and 
vice versa for the private sector. Therefore, state and private sector must cooperate and 
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supporting each other to keep the economic developed in balance. Article 33 placed 
public society as the economic actor and having function to control of economic 
activities. In this regard, the constitution recognized public participation and 
democracy in the state economic.  
In the early 1950s, the indigenous business was very weak, therefore, many 
Indonesia policy makers considers that state intervention is necessary for economic 
development. 100  Heavy bureaucracy had become the great obstacles in the early 
Indonesia economic development. 101  
 
V.b. GSP and the status quo period in the EU-Indonesia trade relationship. 
As a single entity, the European Union is the world’s largest economic power, 
having the value of total trade equal to more than 40% of GDP. The EU’s openness to 
trade is more than three times greater than that of either the US or Japan. In 2009, the 
EU’s total value of imports nearly reached $1.7 trillion USD, which represents over 18% 
of total world trade. The ASEAN countries share 5% of those EU imports and Indonesia 
contributes to 18% of that share.102 The European Union’s trade regime consists of 
tariff and non-tariff measures. Most-favoured-nation (MFN) rates in the European 
Union average 5% and GSP rates average less than 2% .103 The average ad valorem MFN 
tariff is 6.7%. The highest rates of MFN ad valorem tariff apply to agricultural 
products.104 The EU’s main import sectors are machinery and equipment, manufactures 
and chemicals. Raw material and foods have a small share in total imports, but have 
experienced strong growth in the last decade.105 Telecommunication instruments, 
television and audio equipment, garments and footwear are the Indonesian export 
products that most utilise the GSP facility.106 
In fact, GSP is the only trade preference granted by the EU to Indonesia. Over 40 
years there has been no significant changes in the trade preferences policy of the EU to 
Indonesia, which is known as a “stagnancy period”. Indonesia’s political and economic 
situation contributes towards such situation. In the late 1960s until the 1980s, 
Indonesia sank into economic and political instability. After the New Order era replaced 
the Old Order era, Indonesia’s national politics totally changed.  
According to Pahre, political scientists often use the term hegemony instead of 
leadership in defining the dominant power in international systems. The term of 
hegemony started to be used to explain developments in international economy after 
the Second World War. The hegemonic theory is commonly used to describe the United 
States leadership of the Pax Americana. The dominancy of US leadership is rooted in its 
position as the winner of the World War and the economic superpower. Therefore, a 
state hegemonic is associated with that state’s share of world gross domestic product 
(GDP) or other material resources.107 Where after the Second World War, the US and 
Japan occupied the first and second rank of world GDP. 
The hegemony of the US and Japan as a dominant power in Southeast Asia also 
influenced Indonesia. As mentioned above, the United States market was the largest 
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importer for Indonesian products and Japan was the largest exporter into Indonesia’s 
market. The hegemony of the US as the dominant economic power in international 
trade relations started at the end of the Second World War. The ITO failed as an 
international trade organisation to administer the GATT due to the lack of US 
participation. Conversely, there are some international organisations that were 
considered to bring success and development, such as the WTO, IMF, UNCTAD, IBRD, 
World Bank, and OECD, where the US has strong involvement in the establishment of 
such regimes. Nowadays, these regimes have become the supporter of free trade policy 
and market economy.108 
During the era of New Order, Indonesia changed its foreign trade policy in order 
to support its economic development programme. From the late 1960s to the 1980s, 
Indonesia was facing serious economic problems such as a high poverty numbers and a 
high rate of inflation caused by unrestrained deficit spending. To cope with such severe 
economic problems, President Soeharto established an economic team consisting of a 
group of economists from the Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia in 
Jakarta. The reason why President Soeharto chosen FE UI economists as his 
government advisors started from a series of lectures on Indonesia’s economic 
problems delivered by five FE UI economists at the Second Army Seminar in August 
1966. They consisted of Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, Sadli, Emil Salim and 
Subroto.109  
Officially, in September 1966, President Soeharto appointed them as the ‘Team of 
Experts in the Field of Economics and Finance’. The team was coordinated by the late 
Major-General Sudjono Humardani.110 The establishment of this team started the era of 
“economic technocrats” in Indonesia, which were sometimes known as the “Berkeley 
Mafia”. They were given the name Berkeley Mafia because most of these economists, 
including their leader Professor Widjojo, had pursued their postgraduate studies in 
economics at the University of California in Berkeley. In the hands of a well-qualified 
group of economic technocrats, enjoying the full support and confidence of President 
Soeharto, Indonesia experienced full economic transformation into a “Newly  
Industrialising  Economy” (NIE) among the Southeast Asian economies. In 1993 the 
World Bank, classified Indonesia, along with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, as one of the ‘high performing Asian economies’ 
(HPAEs).111 From such facts it can be understood that the economic policy pattern of 
Indonesia during the New Order era, especially on foreign trade policy tended to the US 
rather than to Western Europe. Practically, from the 1970s until the late 1990s, there 
was no significant change in the EU’s policy pattern on trade preferences towards 
Indonesia. In addition, the EU’s trade preference policies were mostly given to African 
and South American countries. 
Even though GSP has been the only EU trade preference given to Indonesia until 
today, some progress on trade diplomacy has been made by the EU and Indonesia. The 
EU-Indonesia PCA is an on-going progress of ratification and adoption, which is 
considered as the milestone to strengthen the trade relationship between two parties. 
There are some factors that attracted EU traders to do business with Indonesian 
traders such as the application of the open trade policy regime, the reduction of 
barriers to trade, and the decrease in domestic protectionism. Strengthening of the 
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trade relationship between the EU and Indonesia reduced US and Japanese hegemony. 
In addition, it also created trade diversion and lowering trade dependency on certain 
states. 
 
V.c. ALA and Indonesia’s economic crisis. 
Since 1976, the EU has had a commitment to grant financial and technical 
assistance to some developing countries in Asia and Latin America.  On 17 February 
1981, the EU issued Council Regulation No. 442/81 on Financial and Technical 
Assistance to Non-Associated Developing Countries.112 Establishment of the 1981 
Regulation is pursuant to Article 235 of the EEC Treaty (amended by Article 308 TEC, 
thus, amended by Article 352 of the TFEU).  It is aimed to give assistance to "the 
poorest developing countries", through financial grants.113 The EU considers Asia and 
Latin America as “especially needy regions”. There were forty-four ALA developing 
countries that received such grant assistance.114 According to the 1981 Regulation, 
there were three main purposes of granting such assistance to ALA countries.  First, it 
aimed to improve living conditions in the neediest sections of developing countries. 
Second, it aimed to develop rural areas and improve food production. Third, it provided 
disaster relief.115  
In order to enhance its aid programme, by 22 February 1991 the EU replaced the 
1981 regulation with Council Regulation 443/92 of 25 February 1992 on Financial and 
Technical Assistance to, and Economic Cooperation with, the Developing Countries in 
Asia and Latin America. The 1992 Regulation significantly extend the ALA aid 
programme by implementing policies promoting democracy, human rights, 
environmental protection, and the role of women.116 The 1992 Regulation significantly 
increased its financial assistance and focused more on humanitarian matters.117 The 
policy behind the assistance programme was the implementation of mutually 
advantageous assistance and cooperation through expanded trade and increased 
financing.118  
Articles 7 and 8 of Council regulation (EEC) No. 443/92 deals with economic 
cooperation. It is intended to serve the mutual interests of the EU and its beneficiaries 
through development of business and technology. This development will improve the 
developing country's potential to "make the most of the prospects opened up by the 
growth of international trade,” eventually its benefit goes to the EU.119 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 443/92 of 25 February 1992 on “financial and 
technical assistance to, and economic co-operation with the developing countries in Asia 
and Latin America” (“ALA Regulation”) applies to Indonesia. It aims to strengthen the 
co-operation framework and to make an effective contribution, through institutional 
dialogue, economic and financial co-operation, to sustainable development, social and 
economic stability and democracy.120 Based on the ALA Regulation, the EU granted 
financial assistance to Indonesia during the recovery period of the economic crisis. The 
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financial assistance of the EU was mostly used to improve the economic sector, 
especially to boost Indonesia’s trade. The ALA Regulation is the only EU regulation that 
is used to grant financial aid to Indonesia. 
 
V.d. The roles of the EU in the Indonesian trade reform policy. 
V.d.1. Country Strategy Paper (CSP) on Indonesia. 
The first Country Strategy Paper (CSP) on Indonesia was made during the 
recovery period after the economic crisis. In March 2000 the Commission made a 
communication to re-evaluate and improve the relationship between the EU. 
Enhancement of trade promotion and investment was part of the subject within the 
communication. The CSP was prepared based on the assessment of the dialogue input 
from Indonesian authorities, public society, NGOs and related stakeholders. Through 
CSP, the EU mapped out its aids to Indonesia to be used appropriately in the sectors 
that were considered crucial to drive economic development and political 
transformations in the context of crisis recovery. The first CSP contained the broad 
lines of EU cooperation and support to Indonesia for five years from 2002–2006. 
Since 1975, the EU has granted development aid to Indonesia at the amount of 
€300 million euros, which have mostly focused on the programme to alleviate poverty. 
However, the first CSP acknowledged the importance of prioritising the development 
needs of the Indonesians.121 In this regard, the first CSP took into account the main 
priorities of the Indonesia government to restructure its economy post crisis such as 
enforcing good governance and the rule of law, improving the capacity of local 
government in a framework of local autonomy, alleviating poverty, and minimising 
social conflict. However, the EU considered two priority sectors that needed to be 
addressed in the first CSP, that is, cooperation to improve the implementation of good 
governance and sustainable management of natural resources.122 In the first CSP, the 
EU provided a budget of €216 million euros for the five-year period of 2002−2006.123 
With regard to local autonomy, a new challenge was created in poverty reduction 
and economic development in which there was fragmentation and different policies in 
certain sectors from region to region. Decentralisation policy was defined as conferring 
some of the central government competences to the local government in order to 
deliver welfare effectively and to give greater authority to the regions managing their 
specific development based on local needs and characteristics. The first CSP considered 
that economic growth was a pre-condition for Indonesia to reduce poverty in the long 
term. In this regard, the first CSP emphasised closer economic and commercial 
cooperation.124 
Intensive cooperation in trade and investment between Indonesia and the EU had 
become one of the major focuses of the Commission Communication to the Councils 
and to the European Parliament on “Developing Closer Relations between Indonesia and 
the European Union”.125 In 2000, the Commission reviewed the bilateral relationship 
between the EU and Indonesia. The Communication contained “comprehensive re-
assessment of Indonesia – EU cooperation”. Thus, in 2001, the Commission proposed the 
                                                 
121 See  Point 5 Council Conclusion of 20 March 2000, available at : http://eeas.europa.eu/indonesia/csp/02_06_en.pdf, 
last accessed : 26 January 2012. 
122 See  Indonesia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, available at : http://eeas.europa.eu/indonesia/csp/02_06_en.pdf, 
last accessed : 26 January 2012, p. 3. 
123 See  Indonesia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Op. Cit., pp. 4-5. 
124 See  Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
125 The Union should intensify its trade and investment relations with Indonesia and support the process of 
restructuring Indonesia's economy. See COM (2000) 50, dated 02.02.2000, Council Conclusion of 20 March 2000, 
available at : http://eeas.europa.eu/indonesia/csp/02_06_en.pdf, last accessed : 26 January 2012. 
 396 
Communication on "Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for enhanced 
partnerships". This communication contained three focal points that were important to 
help boost Indonesian exports. First, to strengthen Indonesia – EU mutual trade and 
investment flows. Second, to promote the implementation of good governance and the 
rule of law to combat corruption.  Third, to build global partnerships and alliances with 
Asian countries and help strengthen the awareness of Europe in Asia (and vice versa).  
Subsequently, in 2003, the Commission adopted a Communication on a "New 
Partnership with South East Asia", that contained a comprehensive strategy for future 
EU relations with the region.126 
Since the 1970s, the EU has extended its GSP beneficiary to ASEAN countries 
including Indonesia. In the earlier implementation of GSP the focus was to boost export 
earnings and poverty alleviation in the beneficiary countries. The Communication also 
identified significant progress of poverty alleviation from 1975 to 1996.127 The Council 
released its conclusion regarding the Commission Communication on March 2000. 
In May 2001, the Council re-evaluated and re-asserted its findings. Thus, the 
Council concluded the strategy of EU cooperation with Indonesia for the five-year term 
of 2002-2006, including:128 
1. Support to trade and investment in a framework of more intensive economic co-
operation with the European Union and, 
2. To achieve higher visibility for both European Union aid and the European 
Union as an economic, and political partner for Indonesia – commensurate with 
the scale of EU trade and finance for Indonesia. 
However, the first CSP placed the promotion of “good governance and sound 
development and economic management policies” as the main priority on the reform 
agenda.129 The legal basis of EU cooperation with a third country such as Indonesia can 
be found in Articles 177 and 179 of the TEC. Article 177 was later amended by Article 
209 of the TFEU. After the Treaty of Lisbon, Paragraph 1 of Article 188 D was amended. 
Article 177 of the TEC of the EU Treaty lays down three broad objectives for Union 
development cooperation, consisting of the “fostering of sustainable economic and social 
development, poverty reduction, and the integration of the developing countries into the 
world economy”.130 
In the last sentence of Article 188C Paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Lisbon indicated 
the Principle of Consistency in the respect of conducting CCP.131 Article 205 of the TFEU 
concerning the Union’s external action amended and replaced by Article 188 A, 
stipulated as follows : 
“[…] The Union's action on the international scene, pursuant to this Part, shall be 
guided by the principles, pursue the objectives and be conducted in accordance with 
the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1 of Title V of the Treaty on European 
Union […].” 
This article clearly stated that all of Union external action must compliance with 
the principles which written in the Chapter 1 of Title V of the TEU. In the context of 
establishment GSP this article linking to Article 3 paragraph 5 of the TEU. 
The TFEU provide special chapter on the development cooperation with the third 
countries that addressed for poverty eradication. It is accommodated in the Title III on 
                                                 
126 See  Indonesia – European Community Strategy Paper 2007-2013, available at : 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/documents/indonesia_csp_2007-2013_en.pdf, last accessed : 26 
January 2012, p. 27. 
127 See  Indonesia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Op. Cit.,  p. 8. 
128 See  Indonesia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Op. Cit.,, p. 9. 
129 See  Ibid., p. 9. 
130 See  Indonesia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Op. Cit., p. 7. 
131 See  Balan, George-Dian., 2008, Op. Cit., p. 3. 
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Cooperation with Third Countries and Humanitarian Aid Chapter 1 on Development 
Cooperation Article 208 (ex Article 177 TEC), which is amended in the Treaty of Lisbon 
by Article 188 D paragraph 1 which stipulated as follows : 
1. Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within 
the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. 
The Union's development cooperation policy and that of the Member States 
complement and reinforce each other.  
Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the 
reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take 
account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it 
implements which are likely to affect developing countries. 
2. The Union and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take 
account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United 
Nations and other competent international organisations. 
It is stipulated clearly that in the framework of development cooperation the 
Unions must considers establishing a policy in favour developing countries to reduce 
and eradicate poverty.132 
Article 209 (ex Article 179 TEC) the Union allows to conclude any agreement with 
the third countries and competent international organisations to carry out the 
objectives mentioned in the Article 21 of the TEU and Article 208 of the TFEU. In the 
Treaty of Lisbon this article replaced by Article 188 E, which stipulated as follows: 
1. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures necessary for the implementation 
of development cooperation policy, which may relate to multi annual cooperation 
programmes with developing countries or programmes with a thematic approach; 
2. The Union may conclude with third countries and competent international 
organisations any agreement helping to achieve the objectives referred to in 
Article 10 A of the Treaty on European Union and in Article 188 D of this Treaty. 
The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to Member States' competence 
to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude agreements. 
In the sphere of the international agreement Article 217 (ex Article 310 TEC) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, it is stipulated that the “Union 
may conclude with one or more third countries or international organisation agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action 
and special procedure”. Then in the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 188 M was amended and is 
substantially similar to Article 217 of the TFEU. In Article 217 of the TFEU and Article 
188 M of the Treaty of Lisbon, the word “States” in Article 310 TEC have been replaced 
with “third countries”, to emphasise more clearly the external relation of the Union 
with non-member states. 
Regarding the 10th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM), held on 5–8 July 
1977, ASEAN and the EU agreed to formalise their “dialogue relation” into “formal 
cooperation”. This agreement is known as “ASEAN’s formal cooperation and relationship 
with the European Economic Community (EEC)”. Cooperation formalisation involved 
“the Council of Ministers of the EEC, the Permanent Representative of the EEC countries 
and the EEC Commission”. This stage of cooperation between ASEAN and the EU 
covered some areas such as politics and security, economic and trade, social and 
cultural issues, and development cooperation.133 
                                                 
132 Ibid., p. 3. 
133 See  Overview of ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations, available at : http://www.asean.org/23216.htm, last accessed : 21 
September 2011. 
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In 1975, during several informal meetings, ASEAN and the EU established the 
Joint Study Group134 that focused on trade sectors.135 Since 1977, the dialogue relations 
between ASEAN and the EU were formalised in the 10th ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
Meeting (AMM) attended by the Council of Ministers of the EEC, the Permanent 
Representative of the EEC countries and the EEC Commission. Hence, both regions 
agreed to establish formal cooperation and relationship.136 In 1978, the ASEAN-EU 
Ministerial Meetings (AEMMs) had greater political significance and improved 
cooperation between both regions. On March 1980, the ASEAN-EU Cooperation 
Agreement was signed. This agreement started the new era of cooperation between the 
two regions.137 As previously mentioned, this agreement covered provisions on trade 
and development cooperation, promoting investments, joint ventures and other 
miscellaneous economic issues such as technological transfers.138 Indonesia also 
participated in the EU-ASEAN regional programmes, covering energy, environment, 
transport, as well as education and communication technology. Indonesia was involved 
in EU-Asia horizontal co-operation programmes such as Asia-Urbs and Asia-Invest.139 
The 1980 cooperation agreement brought positive progress in the trade relations 
between the two regions. The EU extended its GSP to ASEAN to enhance market access 
for ASEAN exports. As noted before, ASEAN saw that the GSP scheme did not go far 
enough and demanded further concessions. However, after the millennium there were 
no bilateral co-operation agreements with Indonesia, however, the Council’s ALA 
Regulation 4 applied to Indonesia.140 
The first CSP raised two “delicate” issues faced by Indonesia during its struggle on 
its earlier economic recovery, that is corruption and local autonomy. Indonesia’s public 
sector and public business corruption were deemed as the “chronic” diseases in 
Indonesian bureaucracy, becoming the “invisible barriers” to trade that have caused 
high cost economics for related business actors, traders, and others economic 
operators. Such corruption has hindered the firms or companies by maximising profits 
from trade. In addition, it has also caused a high cost economy and massive losses of 
state revenues, which impede economic development. However, according to CSP “the 
decentralisation policy may in fact offer new opportunities for corruption”.141 The other 
problems correlated to decentralisation are expertise and human resources, the 
coordination between districts and provinces on cross-border issues, budgetary issues, 
and market disintegration.142 
The key issues of the second CSP 2007-2013 are poverty reduction, the 
promotion of sustainable economic growth, the promotion of good governance, and law 
certainty. The second CSP allocated a budget of €494 million euros to Indonesia under 
the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). One of the focuses of the assistantship  
programme was the promotion of Indonesia’s economic growth through the 
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improvement of trade relations.143 The second CSP still considers that poor governance 
in Indonesia generates corruption and creates a negative impact on the economic 
situation.144 In this regard, the assistance of the second CSP is addressed to promote 
trade and good governance. 
According to the assessment of the second CSP, Indonesia’s trade performance, 
especially in exports, is weaker compared to some other Asian countries. The erosion of 
cost competitiveness in the manufacturing sector is identified as one of the factors. 
Another factor is the lack of transportation infrastructures and export clearance 
processes that often cause delay and create high cost trade. Other aspects that influence 
export performance are technical skills in the SMEs and, in addition, marketing matters 
are very low.145 In short, trade facilitation is still becoming the export constraint in 
Indonesia. 
Before 1998, Indonesia implemented protectionism in foreign trade policies. 
However, after the Reformation era Indonesia implemented open foreign trade policy 
that advanced into unilateral liberalisation measures. However, the lack of trade 
supports was also identified, for example trade facilitation in foreign trade. The open 
trade policy was a positive contribution to Indonesia’s total external trade, amounting 
to 56% of GDP in 2004.146 
The second CSP also highlighted the weaknesses of the trade strategy and lack of 
strong coordination between related stakeholders such as ministries at the central 
level, local authorities, traders, business actor, and other economic operators.147 In 
2005, the EU represented 15% of Indonesia’s total external trade. The EU was one of its 
major trading partners and the main market destination for non-oil and gas exports. 
Indonesian imports from the EU are smaller than its exports, thus creating an 
asymmetric trade relationship. According to data in 2005, Indonesia exported €10.1 
billion euros to the EU and imported only €5.7 billion euros, thus, there was a €4.4 
billion euro trade surplus.148  
Nowadays, the rise in unemployment has become the focus of economic 
development. Indonesia’s government has a target to create 2.5 million positions of 
employment every year. The Indonesian government needs to accelerate export 
growth, enlarge markets access, increasing export capacity, and export diversification. 
In order to upgrade the environment for exports more efforts are needed on export 
promotion and export supporting services, creating a friendly business environment, 
legal certainty, acceleration of infrastructure development, and a speedy distribution 
system.149 
With respect to the enhancement of trade facilitation, the second CSP also focused 
on the modernisation of customs operations. This policy has been realised into “EU-
Indonesia customs improvement project” and is aimed to enhance the capacity of 
customs operations in order to raise tax revenue and facilitate international trade. 
Under the second CSP project, technical assistance was given in the areas of post-
clearance auditing, risk analysis, customs intelligence, anti-corruption measures and 
human resources development. This project started in October 2005.150 
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As previously identified, the technical barrier to trade is one of the weakness 
factors in Indonesia’s trade performance. This technical barrier could also erode the 
competitiveness of the Indonesian product in the EU market. March 2005 saw the 
beginning of “the EU-Indonesia Trade Support Programme (TSP)” with a budget of 8.5 
million euros coming from EU contributions. TSP is a programme dedicated to 
overcoming technical barriers to trade such as in SPS area, standard and quality 
control, and WTO capacity building. The executing authority of this programme is the 
Ministry of Trade. However, the implementation of this programme was delayed 
because Indonesia applied the decentralised management approach.151 With regard to 
the implementation of local autonomy in Indonesia, the second CSP looked for the 
possibility to have direct cooperation with selected local authorities.152  
The National Indicative Programme (NIP) is a set of operational guidelines of CSP. 
CSP covers a period of five years, and NIP is established annually. The first National 
Indicative Programme (NIP) was established within the framework of the CSP to 
identify the actions that need to be launched in general terms. Trade Related Technical 
Assistance (TRTA) has been considered as one of the main priorities on EU external 
policies, therefore, it is clearly identified as a critical sector activity.153 
 
V.d.2. Trade Support Programme. 
Trade Support Programme 1 (TSP 1) was conducted for a three-year period, 
starting in March 2005 and finishing in April 2008. The Ministry of Trade of the 
Republic of Indonesia was appointed as the leading institution responsible for TSP 
implementations. It also acted as the main coordinator of the involvement of the 
different components. The TSP 1 was a joint funded programme with the EU 
contributing 90% of its budget at the amount of 8.5 million euros and Indonesia 
contributing the remaining 10% at the amount of 944 thousands euros. The TSP 1 was 
designed to support the economic and social recovery of Indonesia through the 
improvement of bilateral trade flows, which aimed to generate growth and contribute 
to poverty alleviation. The TSP 1 projects covered WTO capacity building, standard 
harmonisation with EU practices, research and development issues, and technical 
fishing laboratories.154 Significant progress was made under the EU’s Trade Support 
Programme (TSP-I), which contributed to the identification, adaptation and 
dissemination of EU technical standards to the local industries in Indonesia. This 
programme was also aimed to enhance quality control processes and SPS compliance 
by Indonesian exporters.155  
The second generation of the Trade Support Programme, known as TSP 2, 
commenced in 2009. A general objective of TSP 2 is facilitating Indonesia’s further 
integration into the international trade system. The project of TSP 2 focuses on 
improving the quality of Indonesia’s infrastructures to support its access into the 
international market. More specifically, the TSP 2 is directed to enhance an export 
quality infrastructure system that comprises of export  quality management and 
control, standardisation, inspections and certification, rapid alert systems and market 
surveillance. The Ministry of Trade is still placed as the coordinating institution of TSP 
2. The budget of the TSP 2 has been increased by 50% from the budget of TSP 1. The 
contribution of the Commission reached 15 million euros. One of the outputs of TSP 2 is 
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expected to improve government capacity to formulate and implement trade policy 
related to export quality infrastructure.156 
 
V.e. PCA: Framework Agreement Indonesia – EU. 
On 9 November 2009, Indonesia and the EU signed the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation between the European Community and 
the Republic of Indonesia, hereafter referred to as the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA). Indonesia was represented by its Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa 
and the EU was represented by the Foreign Minister of Sweden as the incumbent EU 
Presidency.157 The PCA between Indonesia and EU was established due to the 1980 
Cooperation Agreement between ASEAN and the EU and its subsequent accession 
protocols. The PCA also takes into account activities under the regional framework. In 
this regard, the implementation of PCA between the EU and Indonesia should be 
aligned with the interregional cooperation such as ASEAN-EU dialogues, ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia – Europe Meeting (ASEM).158  
Both parties recognised the importance of good governance, combating 
corruption, and law enforcement as the common principles of the PCA. The PCA was 
implemented based on principles of equality and mutual benefit.159 Consequently, the 
PCA can be regarded as the focal point of where the EU has shifted its external policy 
towards Indonesia from the donor-recipient relationship to the partnership 
relationship. Within such partnership both parties have more opportunities to 
cooperate more in trade. 
The critical objectives of PCA are trade and investment enhancement. More 
specifically, they focus on trade facilitation, investment flow improvement, and 
elimination of trade and investment obstacles based on mutual interests and 
advantages.160 The EU is one of the biggest markets for Indonesian export products. 
According to the paper on the “Perception of the EU in Indonesia” by ASEF, it notes how 
a public opinion survey was carried out by “the EU through the Eyes of the Asia research 
team”. The EU was ranked seventh in a list of the most important partners for 
Indonesia with only 8.9% of respondents listing the EU as among Indonesia’s most 
important partners compared to the US, China and Japan, and, neighbouring economic 
partners such as Australia and Singapore. However, the research highlights that such 
perception is not in line with reality, where based on the IMF, the EU is Indonesia's 
second largest export partner.161 
With respect to promoting its profiles, both parties have agreed to raise its 
profiles in both regions. More EU profile rising in Indonesia and vice versa, it is believed 
that this could increase public trust and encourage improvements in two way trade and 
investment flow. The EU efforts to promote the countries’ profile (member states) in 
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the partner countries (Indonesia) have also been included in the country’s strategy 
paper. According to Prof. Martin Holland162, “misperception or ill-informed views of the 
European Union’s global role puts the EU at risk of being overlooked or undervalued by 
non-EU countries, which the EU is a significant partner. Similarly, low awareness of the 
EU exposes countries, like Indonesia, to the risk of slipping under the EU’s radar.” 163 
Cooperation on trade and investment is included in Article 8 of the PCA. One step 
forward to enhance market access conditions have been noted in the PCA through 
scheduled removal of non-tariff barriers and transparency improvement. The PCA also 
recognised advantages of trade preferences towards developing countries. Both parties 
are obliged to inform each other regarding their development of trade and policies 
related to trade as part of information transparency. 
There are eight areas includes into the cooperation of trade and investment, it’s 
consist of SPS, TBT, IPR protections, trade facilitation, customs cooperation, 
investment, competition policy and services. In the last decade, the SPS regulations 
becomes the most delicate issues between EU and Indonesia.  Protest done by 
Indonesia because the EU banned of some of export products entering their market,, 
especially agricultural and food products. The shrimp case, for example, happened 
when the EU based on the SPS reasons banned the shrimp product from Indonesia. 
Implementation of such standard is based on the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary. The application of such standards cannot be separated from the issues 
of customer protection policy, health policy, and food safety in the EU. On the other 
hand, such standards create non tariff barriers to trade for the developing countries, 
including Indonesia. To fulfil such standards the developing countries needs to be well-
prepared on technology, knowledge, infrastructures, and human resources. Yet, from 
different perspective, implementation of SPS brings positive effects for the developing 
countries because it would help them enhancing competitiveness in the international 
markets through implementation of international best practices on trade. 
To boost two way trades, the Article 12 of the PCA provides provisions of trade 
facilitation, which recommends of simplifying foreign trade procedures and customs 
procedures, increase transparency of trade regulations, develop customs cooperation, 
enhance infrastructures, and combating the trade fraud. The fight against corruption 
stipulated in the Article 35 of the PCA. In this point, both of parties agreed to cooperate 
and to contribute combating corruption through full compliance to the mutual 
international obligations. 
Article 39 of the PCA regulate the cooperation in the modernisation of the public 
administration, which indicating the strong support to the improvement of trade 
facilitation and fight against corruption. This article expected to driving progress on 
improving organizational efficiency, increasing institutions effectiveness in public 
service delivery, ensuring transparency management of public resources and 
accountability, improving the legal and institutional framework, capacity building and 
legal enforcement. 
In order to implement the PCA, Article 41 of the agreement mandated the 
establishment of a Joint Committee, comprising of representatives from both sides at 
the highest possible level. According to the agreement, the Joint Committee should 
meet not less than every two years in Indonesia and Brussels. To assist its tasks and 
performance the Joint Committee can set up specialised working groups. 
According to Article 48, the PCA would enter into force on the first day of the 
month following the date on which the last Party notified the other of the completion of 
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the legal procedures. The legal procedures in Indonesia concerning adoption and 
ratification of international agreements are regulated under Acts No. 24 of 2000. For 
the purposes of ratification of such agreement, on 12−14 April 2011, the Indonesian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a meeting with related ministries and agencies to 
discuss the ratification drafts of the PCA into Indonesian national law. While some EU 
member states such as Estonia, Denmark, Latvia, Poland, Austria, Slovenia, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Portugal ratified the PCA. Such ratification aimed to enact the 
legal basis in each party’s national law aiming to ensure the efficiency of PCA 
implementation.164 Today, the ratifications of the EU-Indonesia PCA are still on going. 
 
V.f . CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement). 
While the PCA is still on going for adoption and ratification by both parties, at the 
end of 2009, the Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the European 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso met to discuss further efforts to strengthen 
the economic and trade relationships. Therefore, it was agreed to establish a Vision 
group, which was given the task of examining how to deepen cooperation between both 
parties through more comprehensive actions. This Vision Group consists of reputable 
and important persons from both parties. The Vision Group worked for six months 
through open discussion regarding the relevant matters on economics and trade 
between the two parties. At the end of its task, the Vision Group had to compile a final 
report for the two Presidents. The result of the Vision Group was used to explore the 
further possibilities establishing the “Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement 
(CEPA)”. On 4 May 2011 in Jakarta, the Vision Group presented its recommendations to 
Indonesia’s Minister of Trade Mari Pangestu and the European Commissioner for Trade 
Karel de Gucht.165 To sum up, the Vision Group has specific objectives consists of: 166 
1. Providing a strategic view of EU – Indonesia trade and investment relations. 
2. Identifying the basis EU – Indonesia trade and investment relationship can best be 
improved in an innovative way. 
3. Identifying opportunities for fostering trade and investment between EU and 
Indonesia. 
4. Exploring the feasibility of an Economic Partnership Agreement and Free Trade Area 
between the EU and Indonesia. 
5. Providing recommendations to the Government of Indonesia, the EU, the business 
community, and the academic society about the ways to bring into realization the 
trade and investment potential between both parties. 
Some important recommendations were submitted by the Vision Group to 
deepen trade relations. The establishment of CEPA must be based on a free trade area. 
The CEPA has three important triangular pillars, which consist of market access, 
capacity building, and facilitation of trade and investment. According to the Vision 
Group, combinations of those elements could bring positive impact to Indonesia’s 
exports improving value added exports and increasing Indonesia market 
competitiveness.167  
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Figure 27. CEPA Constructions 
 
 
 
According to the Vision Group, capacity building and trade facilitation are the 
primary vehicles to optimise market access compared to improving the operating and 
investment climate, and also to improving Indonesia’s investment performance.168 
Related to the markets in goods, it is recommended to reduce tariffs to zero for 95% of 
tariff lines with at least 95% of trade value within a period of 9 years maximum. 
However, it is emphasised that the economic development disparities between parties 
should be taken into account. Since SPS, TBT, and NTM (Non-Tariff Measures) are 
considered as the most delicate trade issues between Indonesia and EU, therefore, the 
CEPA constructions, especially capacity building, are addressed to help both parties 
overcome such problems. Under a CEPA, capacity building should go beyond the 
already existing, substantial efforts in a range of sectors. It is essential for effectiveness 
that capacity building is not only output oriented, but also outcome oriented. Wherein 
that the capacity to comply with EU health, safety and environmental requirements is 
sufficiently improved for exports to reach the EU market. Capacity building efforts 
should therefore be measurable and carefully implemented based on the intended 
purpose. Dialogues covering business to business and business to government are 
essential to support more comprehensive and responsive capacity building. The 
combination of facilitation and capacity building is a fundamental aspect behind the 
CEPA.169 Capacity building could raise the capability of Indonesian producers to comply 
with European standards. The Vision Group includes the role of the EU GSP as one of 
the essential foundations of CEPA,170 in this regard, about 58% of exports of industrial 
products from Indonesia are sent to the EU zero-duty under the GSP.171 Relating to the 
Rules of Origin (RoO), the Vision Group accentuated that it should be facilitating trade. 
The CEPA should adhere to a RoO regime, which is trade and investment friendly.172 
 
V.g. Implication of the proposal of the New EU GSP to Indonesia. 
The proposal of a new GSP has applied a merit standard on the countries most in 
need by reforming the crucial components of the graduation mechanism and rules of 
origin. The wording of countries most in need is not merely based on economic criteria, 
in this regard, it also refers to the beneficiary countries’ GDP. According to the World 
Bank, Indonesia is categorised as a lower-middle income country. Hence, its GDP is 
included into a general arrangement scheme in the proposal of a new GSP. As already 
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noted, Indonesia has a utilisation GSP rate less than 75%,173 which means it still lacks 
optimisation.  
There are three important elements in the proposal of the new GSP, which could 
possibly bring implications to Indonesian exports.  The proposal of the EU GSP 
regulation that is more focused on requirements to grant preferences on the country 
most in need, in the near future, may exclude some ASEAN countries that are classified 
in the upper-middle income countries from its scheme. The requirements set out in the 
proposal of the EU GSP regulation give a warning to ASEAN member states not to hold 
on to the GSP forever. Before GSP graduation is put into effect, ASEAN member states 
need to be well prepared in designing their trade policy in order to maintain their trade 
performance, especially regarding their export competitiveness. In the proposal of the 
EU GSP regulation, total graduation would be based on economic criteria, i.e., when the 
beneficiary country is categorised as an upper-middle income country and a high-
income country. In this regard, Brunei Darussalam (high-income country), Malaysia 
(upper-middle income country), and Thailand (upper-middle income country) would 
be excluded from the GSP beneficiary lists. Based on the assumption of growth, in the 
coming future Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, which are currently classified as 
a lower-middle income country, will soon follow the other ASEAN member states to 
total graduation from the GSP scheme. It would leave Cambodia, Lao PDR, and 
Myanmar as GSP beneficiaries, especially in the EBA arrangement scheme. Therefore, 
to address such new policy, and after the negotiation of AEUFTA is postponed, the 
ASEAN member states need to design a trade policy to maintain and to increase their 
export competitiveness and consider possibilities of establishing a new preferential 
trading agreement with the EU. The ASEAN member states need to improve and 
strengthen their trade facilitation on exports to maximise GSP utilisation and increase 
their export competitiveness. 
 
V.h. Eurozone crisis and GSP. 
The Eurozone crisis started along with the global economic crisis in late 2007 and 
continues today, it has provoked anxiety for most Asian countries, one of which is 
Indonesia. The reason for this anxiety is down to the fact that most Eurozone countries 
are potential trade partners for Indonesia.  The table and charts descriptively explain 
the overall trade situation between the EU and Indonesia. 
In general, the EU merchandise imports have grown faster than those of the rest 
of the world, despite its poor domestic economic performance. Between 2003 and 2008 
the growth in the value of EU imports averaged 12.8%.174 The demands of foreign 
products in the EU depend on three factors: income, population, and the rate of 
economic growth.175 In this regard, therefore, the EU is still considered as a strong 
market for export products from third countries. Based on studies on Indonesia’s Trade 
Access to the European Union: Opportunities and Challenges, November 2010, carried 
out by Lord et al. in 2010, Indonesia has four main export products, consisting of 
fisheries and agri-food, electronics, furniture, and cosmetics. 
The EU is the world’s largest importer of fishery products, accounting for 25% of 
the world total. However, the EU market only accounts for 11% of Indonesia’s total 
exports.176 Indonesia is a GSP beneficiary with preferential duties on fisheries. The GSP 
rates range from a low of zero for some products to a high of 18 to 19.5% in the case of 
                                                 
173 Cited from Gasiorek, Michael, 2011, Op. Cit., p. 72. 
174 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Op. Cit., pp. 16. 
175 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Op. Cit.,  pp. 39. 
176 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Op. Cit., pp. 66. 
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some products like fresh, chilled or frozen sardines, some tuna products like long-
finned and yellow-fin tuna, and skipjack or stripe-bellied bonito.177 
For fisheries and agri-foods, the demand derives from a combination of broad 
demand dynamics, domestic supply trends, and trade policies.178 In the case of 
fisheries, the import demand has been estimated for the most important types of 
products exported by Indonesia to the European Union. The product groups are (a) 
crustaceans (55% of exports to the EU market); (b) molluscs (nearly 20% of exports to 
the EU market); (c) fish fillet (14% of exports to the EU market); (d) live fish (6% of 
exports to the EU market); and (e) frozen fish (6% of exports to the EU market).179 For 
fishery products, the average MFN rate is 10.8%, with a range of 0 to 23%; the average 
GSP rate is 7.1%, with a range from 0 to 19.5. For crustaceans, an ad valorem tariff of 
11.1% applies to third countries, with a range of 6 to 18%; the preferential tariff rate 
for GSP recipient countries is 5.1%, with a range of 2.1 to 14.6%.180 
Since Indonesia does not have any processed meat establishments approved by 
the EU, the demand for agri-food imports targets non-meat processed products. Major 
materials such as fruits, nuts or other parts of plants and animals used in processing 
should be wholly obtained in the originating country, e.g., Indonesia. The 
manufacturing material used in the processing of the products should not exceed 30% 
of the ex-works price of the product for the non-originating materials.181 
In electronic products, the EU is Indonesia’s largest export market for consumer 
electronics. Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom are the most 
important markets for Indonesia’s import products.182 Indonesia’s major export 
demands consist of four product groups: (a) radio and TV transmitters, television 
cameras; (b) video recording and reproducing apparatus; (c) insulated wire and cable, 
optical fibre cable; and (d) electric transformers, static converters and rectifiers. These 
four categories represent nearly 40% of Indonesia’s total electronic export products.183 
According to the GSP rules of origin, the material used in the manufacturing process 
cannot exceed 30% of the ex-works price of the product for the non-originating 
materials under the rules of origin.184 For electronics, the ad valorem tariff average of 
2.8%, ranges from 0 to 14%; the average GSP tariff rate ranges from 0 to 7% and 
averages 1.7%.185  
Indonesia’s furniture exports to the EU covered 33% of all furniture exports. 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Belgium are the largest 
markets within the EU member states. Among the different types of furniture, over 
two-thirds of exports to the EU market are in the form of wooden furniture and the 
remaining one-third is made of bamboo, rattan, cane or osier.186 For furniture, an 
average MFN tariff of 2.3% applies to third countries, and an average preferential tariff 
rate of 0.2% applies to Indonesia.187 The value of all the materials from non-originating 
countries should not exceed 40% of the ex-works price of the furniture product under 
the rules of origin.188 
                                                 
177 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Op. Cit., pp. 39-43. 
178 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Op. Cit.,  p. 39-40. 
179 See  Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
180 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Op. Cit., pp. 53. 
181 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Op. Cit., pp. 54. 
182 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Loc. Cit., pp. 66. 
183 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Loc. Cit., pp. 39-40. 
184 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Op. Cit.,  p. 55. 
185 See  Ibid.,  pp. 55. 
186 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Loc. Cit.,  pp. 66. 
187 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Op. Cit.,  pp. 56. 
188 See  Ibid.,  pp. 56. 
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Related to cosmetic products, the EU import demand has been estimated for the 
two types of product groups in which Indonesia’s exports are concentrated: (a) 
essential oils, resinoids and terpenic by-products; and (b) beauty, make-up 
preparations. These two product groups account for one-half of all exports of cosmetic 
products by Indonesia.189 The biggest markets for cosmetic products are Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain.190 For cosmetics, an average 
MFN rate of 2.5%, and an average preferential tariff rate of 0.2% applies to 
Indonesia.191 With respect to the GSP rules of origin, materials of the same product 
classification group as the cosmetic product can be used, provided that the total value 
does not exceed 20% of the ex-works price of the product for non-originating materials. 
For manufactured cosmetics, the value of all the materials from non-originating 
countries should not exceed 40% of the ex-works price of the product.192 
Massa et al., in their paper entitled “the Eurozone crisis and developing countries”, 
analysed the vulnerability of developing countries in the Eurozone crisis, including the 
potential effects of trade shocks caused by the crisis on lower income economies. This 
paper notes that lower income and lower-middle income countries, mostly GSP 
beneficiaries, are highly likely to be impacted by the Eurozone crisis through trade 
channels because of their high dependence on trade with European countries. The 
result of this paper shows that a drop of 1% in export growth could reduce growth 
rates in lower income countries and lower-middle income countries by an average of 
0.4% and 0.5% respectively. However, the impact of the crisis on developing countries 
can be seen from “symptoms” such as export reductions, declining portfolio flows, 
cancelled or postponed investment plans, and falling remittances and aid flows. There 
are some factors that affect the degree of risk of the impact of the Eurozone crisis to the 
lower income countries such as a significant share of exports to crisis-affected 
countries in the EU, exports of products with high income elasticises, heavy 
dependence on FDI and cross-border bank lending, and dependence on aid.193 
Indonesia is vulnerable to a slowing import demand growth in the EU194, in this 
regard, the EU 27 is ranked at 4th place as Indonesia’s major trade partner and 
Indonesia’s major import partner. EU 27 is the second biggest major exports partner 
for Indonesia’s goods and products. Indonesia’s exports to the EU cover 11.2% of 
Indonesia’s total exports to the rest of the world.  Total Indonesian exports to Japan, EU 
27, China, and the US is 47.7% of Indonesia’s exports to the world. (See Table 14).195 
According to the Indonesian Statistic Agency, Indonesia’s export to EU 27 on March 
2012 was 1.540, 4 million USD, thus, it decreased on April 2012 to 1.459, 1 million 
USD.196 
 
Table 38.  The vulnerability of Indonesia as a lower-middle income country in the 
Eurozone crisis. 
                                                 
189 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Op. Cit.,  pp. 41. 
190 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Loc. Cit.,  pp. 66. 
191 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Op. Cit.,  pp. 57. 
192 See  Ibid., pp. 57. 
193 See  Massa, Isabella., Keane, Jodie., and Kennan, Jane., The Euro Zone Crisis and Developing Countries, Working Paper 
345, Results of ODI research presented, Overseas Development Institute, May 2012, available at : 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7688.pdf. 
194 See  Massa, Isabella., Keane, Jodie., and Kennan, Jane., 2012. 
195 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ tradoc_113391.pdf, last accessed : 15 
June 2012. 
196 See  Perkembangan Ekspor dan Impor Indonesia 2012, Berita Resmi Statistik, Badan Pusat Statistik, No. 
35/06/Th.XV, 1 Juni 2012, available at : http://www.bps.go.id/brs_file/eksim_01jun12.pdf. See also 
Perkembangan Ekspor dan Impor Indonesia 2012, Berita Resmi Statistik, Badan Pusat Statistik, No. 
16/03/Th.XV, 1 Maret 2012, available at : http://www.bps.go.id/brs_file/eksim_01mar12.pdf. 
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Indonesia  High  Worsened  Deficit  Low Low Low  Medium No 
 
Trade dependence: exports to the Eurozone/total exports to world (%). Dependence on 
remittances: total remittance inflows/GDP (%). FDI dependence: total FDI inflows/GDP (%). Aid 
dependence: total DAC countries’ aid/GDP (%). Dependence on cross-border bank lending from 
European countries: foreign claims from European banks/GDP (%). Fiscal space: fiscal 
balance/GDP (%). Source: Massa, Jodie Keane and Jane Kennan, The Eurozone Crisis and 
Developing Countries, Working Paper 345, Results of ODI research presented, Overseas 
Development Institute, May 2012. 
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Table 39. The country groups of countries highly dependent on the EU Market. 
 
 
 
LDC  :  Least Developed Country  
LIC  :  Low-Income Country  
LMIC  :  Lower-Middle Income Country  
SIDS  :  Small Island Developing States  
CDDC  :  Commodity-Dependent Developing Country 
Source : Massa, Jodie Keane and Jane Kennan, The Eurozone Crisis and Developing Countries, Working Paper 345, 
Results of ODI research presented, Overseas Development Institute, May 2012. 
 
Some export products have significantly decreased in the import demand by EU 
27 and the Eurozone (especially demand from the Greek and Italian market). The 
symptoms of export reduction were perceived in the last quarter of 2011, covering a 
wide range of products, for instance manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials, 
machinery and transport equipment, miscellaneous manufactured articles, and crude 
materials except fuels.197 Based on the SITC section, machinery and transport 
equipment is the second biggest EU import from Indonesia or 15.1% of the EU’s total 
imports from Indonesia, which is followed by animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 
in the third rank with 15.0% of EU total imports from Indonesia.198 However, there are 
some products that seem to be more stable such as chemicals and related products, 
animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes, beverages, tobacco, and food and live 
animals.199 
 
 
 
                                                 
197 See  Massa, Isabella., Keane, Jodie., and Kennan, Jane.,2012. 
198 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclibtradoc_113391.pdf, last accessed : 15 
June 2012. 
199 See  Massa, Isabella., Keane, Jodie., and Kennan, Jane., 2012. 
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Table 40. Bilateral trade between Indonesia and the European Union (EU 27)200 
Product: TOTAL All products 
 
Unit: Thousand euros 
 
Indonesia's exports to European Union 
(EU 27) 
European Union (EU 27)'s imports from world Indonesia's exports to world 
Product 
code 
Product 
label 
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 
2010 
 Value in 2008 Value in 2009 Value in 2010  
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 2010 
TOTAL  All products 10,522,654.7 9,781,042.19 12,955,300.48  4,133,800,783.06 3,265,970,619.8 3,946,669,746.92  93,126,479.25 83,541,858.62 118,819,655.77 
Sources: ITC calculations based on COMTRADE statistics. 
 
In 2008 Indonesia’s exports to EU 27 were 11.23% of Indonesia’s total exports to the world. In 2009 Indonesia’s exports to EU 27 decreased by 
7.05%, then, in 2010 increased by 24.05%. In 2010 Indonesia’s exports to EU 27 were 10.90% of Indonesia’s total exports to the world. (See Table 
40). 
 
 
Table 41. Percentage of Indonesia's exports to the European Union (EU 27) of Indonesia’s total exports to the world 2006-2010.201 
 
No. Year Percentage of Indonesia's exports to European Union (EU 27) of Indonesia’s total exports to world 2006-2010 
1. 2006 11.97% 
2. 2007 11.75% 
3. 2008 11.23% 
4. 2009 11.71% 
5. 2010 10.90% 
 
 
The average percentage of Indonesia's exports to the European Union (EU 27) of Indonesia’s total exports to the world 2006-2010 above 10% per 
year. The percentage of Indonesia’s export to EU 27 has declined during the economic crisis. (See Table 41).  
                                                 
200 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Bilateral_TS.aspx, last accessed : 16 
November 2011. 
201 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Bilateral_TS.aspx, last accessed : 16 
November 2011. 
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Table 42. Bilateral trade between Indonesia and European Union (EU 27) 202 
Product: TOTAL All products 
 
Unit: Thousand euros 
 
Indonesia's imports from European 
Union (EU 27) 
European Union (EU 27)'s exports to world Indonesia's imports from world 
Product 
code 
Product label 
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 
2010 
 Value in 2008 Value in 2009 Value in 2010  
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 2010 
TOTAL  All products 7,180,397.03 6,225,359.61 7,431,067.8  3,946,619,903.15 3,219,720,481.32 3,867,107,766.06  87,841,235.56 69,429,995.72 102,164,760.25 
Sources: ITC calculations based on COMTRADE statistics. 
 
In 2008 Indonesia’s imports from EU 27 were 8.17% of Indonesia’s total imports from the world. In 2009 Indonesia’s imports from EU 27 fell by 
13.3%. In 2010 Indonesia’s imports from EU 27 increased to 16.23%. In 2010 Indonesia’s imports from EU 27 were 7.27% of Indonesia’s total 
imports from the world. (See Table 42). 
 
                                                 
202 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Bilateral_TS.aspx, last accessed : 16 
November 2011. 
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Table 43. Bilateral trade between Indonesia and the European Union (EU 27)203 
Product: TOTAL All products 
 
Unit: Thousand euros 
 
Trade Balance between Indonesia and 
European Union (EU 27) 
World Trade Balance for European Union (EU 27) World Trade Balance for Indonesia 
Product 
code 
Product label 
Balance in 
value in 
2008 
Balance in 
value in 
2009 
Balance in 
value in 
2010 
 
Balance in value 
in 2008 
Balance in 
value in 2009 
Balance in 
value in 2010 
 
Balance in 
value in 
2008 
Balance in 
value in 
2009 
Balance in 
value in 
2010 
TOTAL  All products 3,342,257.67 3,555,682.57 5,524,232.68  -187,180,879.92 -46,250,138.48 -79,561,980.86  5,285,243.69 14,111,862.9 16,654,895.52 
Sources: ITC calculations based on COMTRADE statistics. 
 
In fact the bilateral trade between Indonesia and EU 27 created an asymmetric trade relationship, where Indonesia exported more to EU 27 than it 
imported from EU 27. For instance in 2010 Indonesia’s exports to EU 27 were 42.64% higher than Indonesia’s imports from EU 27. (See Table 43). 
                                                 
203 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Bilateral_TS.aspx, last accessed : 16 
November 2011. 
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Figure 28. Indonesia Trade Balance with EU 27204 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
204 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tradoc_113391.pdf, last accessed : 15 June 2012. 
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Figure 29. EU Trade Balance with Indonesia205 
 
 
                                                 
205 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tradoc_113391.pdf, last accessed : 15 June 2012. 
 415 
Figure 30. Indonesia Trade Balance with EU206 
 
 
                                                 
206 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tradoc_113391.pdf, last accessed : 15 June 2012. 
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Table 44. List of importing markets from European Union (EU 27) for a product exported by Indonesia207 
Product: TOTAL All products 
 
Unit: Thousand euros 
 
Importers 
Exported value in 
2006 
Exported value in 
2007 
Exported value in 
2008 
Exported value in 
2009 
Exported value in 
2010 
World  80,239,427.88 83,240,123.98 93,126,479.25 83,541,858.62 118,819,655.77 
European Union (EU 27) Aggregation  9,604,075.76 9,781,306.53 10,522,654.7 9,781,042.19 12,955,300.48 
Netherlands  2,004,706.15 2,005,815.57 2,668,596.18 2,085,911.5 2,803,291.52 
Germany  1,612,530.56 1,689,601.82 1,675,455.17 1,668,305.43 2,247,684.1 
Italy  965,600.84 1,012,041.15 1,291,942.05 1,184,177.78 1,785,148.58 
Spain  1,306,393.83 1,390,648.77 1,131,851.59 1,312,504.28 1,753,685.07 
United Kingdom  1,140,230.66 1,060,854.8 1,051,328.91 1,046,404.34 1,275,081.17 
Belgium  904,504.21 971,861.5 918,193.52 751,680.31 896,265.87 
France  592,397.2 603,756.21 656,657.23 640,534 866,531.42 
Poland  114,255.19 139,246.31 186,314.91 186,240.06 235,927.41 
Denmark  113,636.67 102,704.1 116,139.28 121,010.58 135,709.57 
Czech Republic  43,534.47 74,342.86 63,455.9 122,869.14 124,811.8 
Sweden  107,785 80,123.66 91,151.12 103,486.22 117,868.44 
Greece  100,158.97 170,344.76 145,629.46 118,782.03 116,992.62 
Finland  140,619.14 88,522.75 73,702.36 43,868.26 92,434.05 
Romania  37,921.61 43,065.67 53,290.31 35,763.6 70,109.12 
                                                 
207 Cited from Trade Map-International Trade Statistic, Trade Statistic for international business development, available at : http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Bilateral_TS.aspx, last accessed : 16 
November 2011. 
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Portugal  90,838.17 69,398.1 68,526.11 73,334.14 69,459.96 
Slovenia  85,365.42 53,924.74 59,887.71 60,789.6 67,229.35 
Slovakia  31,687.84 33,291.42 26,973.43 46,123.34 56,757.83 
Hungary  52,269.38 26,662.9 27,126.35 36,206.73 55,673.4 
Ireland  82,060.27 56,867.67 61,057.4 29,550.49 39,672.04 
Austria  19,419.32 17,594.1 23,693.42 29,513.92 34,010.42 
Bulgaria  15,254.46 27,369.81 48,574.19 20,604.75 29,824.07 
Luxembourg  11,201.04 262.63 4,311.72 7,456.46 23,018.52 
Lithuania  7,943.65 14,509.64 23,428.35 23,523.8 21,965.72 
Estonia  4,870.15 13,793.97 16,366.75 13,804.38 16,482.57 
Latvia  5,822.21 7,832.97 7,178.51 6,140.7 9,104.69 
Cyprus  8,960.99 9,113.3 10,606.68 9,860.68 8,115.9 
Malta  4,108.35 17,755.33 21,216.08 2,595.67 2,445.24 
Sources: ITC calculations based on COMTRADE statistics. 
 
It has to be noted that the EU comprises of 27 states and has a population of 500 million that represents the biggest regional market in the world. 
Seventeen of its twenty-seven member states use the single currency, the euro. The EU is the major trading partner for lower-middle income 
countries, for instance Indonesia.  Among the 27 EU member states the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy are the biggest three importers of 
Indonesian goods and products. The top ten EU importing countries are included in the Eurozone except for the United Kingdom. (See Table 44). 
Today, Italy and Greece are the third and fourth biggest trading partners, which are included as the crisis-affected countries due to the Eurozone 
crisis.208 
 
                                                 
208 See  Massa, Isabella., Keane, Jodie., and Kennan, Jane., 2012. 
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Table 45.  Indonesia’s export products to the EU 27 on Animal, vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products, etc. 
 
Unit: Thousand euros 
 
Indonesia's exports to European Union 
(EU 27) 
European Union (EU 27)'s imports from 
world 
Indonesia's exports to world 
Product 
code 
Product label 
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 
2010 
 
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 
2010 
 
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 
2010 
'1511  Palm oil & its fraction 1,416,531.47 1,334,365.99 1,635,404.69  4,488,027.9 3,814,214.92 4,624,429.61  8,411,105.65 7,433,957.49 10,143,155.04 
'1513 
Coconut (copra), palm 
kernel/babassu oil & their 
fractions 
485,088.77 267,280.91 333,657.85  1,378,611.53 942,827.77 1,247,244.47  1,490,543.07 1,060,609.54 1,727,376.36 
'1517 Margarine 25,638.59 21,427.9 20,616.96  1,526,961.65 1,365,748.51 1,435,600.83  361,189.2 189,504.01 261,018.4 
'1516 
Animal or veg. fats, oils & fract, 
hydrogenated 
5,522.87 581.52 6,474.95  1,096,153.45 784,625.25 842,790.7  192,465.1 48,706.82 111,839.32 
'1521 
Vegetable waxes, beeswax & 
other insect waxes 
4,280.46 4,054.84 5,243.67  56,761.98 53,277.93 71,719.95  14,214.96 10,893.93 19,438.4 
'1522 Degras and residues 23.79 11.47 1,315.62  29,435.14 42,534.58 47,802.25  2,535.79 4,870.83 9,494.03 
'1510 Other oils from olives 0 30.83 900.68  85,976.23 76,694.17 84,431.87  0.68 2,805.76 900.68 
'1518 
Animal or vegetable fats & oils 
chemically modified; inedible 
mixtures 
11,804.23 45.89 189.78  654,633.22 467,967.81 717,483.37  120,517.61 60.23 1,273.45 
'1512 
Safflower, sunflower/cotton-
seed oil & fractions 
0 0 124.26  2,668,017.8 1,866,605.32 2,004,061  45.54 66.68 469.92 
'1515 
Fixed vegetable fats & oils & 
their fractions 
4.08 5.74 40.67  976,816.4 720,711.53 873,263.92  336.43 597.29 4,318.89 
'1508 Ground-nut oil & its fractions 0 0 0  169,866.6 113,491.74 115,373.5  63.21 0 8.28 
'1509 Olive oil and its fractions 2.04 0 0  2,554,323.24 2,089,870.97 2,299,336.83  2.72 22.95 38.41 
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'1503 
Lard stearin & oil, oleostearin 
& oil & tallow oil 
0 0 0  16,466.66 12,558.17 17,481.91  0 0 0 
'1507 Soya-bean oil & its fractions 0 0 0  1,813,975.46 832,303.84 1,008,972.73  0.68 0.72 0.75 
'1520 Glycerol (glycerine) 1,020.84 0 0  108,502.68 47,153.72 57,308.33  20,630.9 6,957.4 4,455.2 
'1502 Bovine, sheep & goat fats 0 0 0  247,611.55 165,278.95 243,118.54  0 0 0 
'1504 
Fish/marine mammal, fat, oils 
& their fractions 
15.63 0 0  421,834.73 340,548.36 372,346.38  5,256.44 1,906.6 550.5 
'1501 
Lard and other pig & poultry 
fat 
0 0 0  195,698.89 158,170.25 188,741.18  0 842.52 0 
'1514 
Rape, colza or mustard oil & 
their fractions 
0 0 0  2,465,095.54 1,889,914.01 1,911,826.51  6.12 0 1.51 
'1505 
Wool grease and fatty 
substances derived therefrom 
(including lanolin) 
0 0 0  45,750.23 62,187.1 64,104.84  0 0 0.75 
'1506 
Animal fats & oils & their 
fractions 
0 0 0  87,677.4 56,511.04 79,760.54  0.68 10.76 18.83 
Sources: ITC calculations based on COMTRADE statistics. 
 
In 2005 Indonesia graduated in two sections, that is, Sections III209 and Sections IX210.211 While, in 2002 Indonesia graduated from 3 sectors, 
i.e., Section X, XIX, and XXIII.212 In 1998 Indonesia graduated in Chapter 15213, Chapters 44 to 46214, and Chapters 64 to 67215.216 (See Table 45). 
                                                 
209 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes. 
210 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal; cork and articles of cork; manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basket ware and wickerwork. 
211 See Annex I Beneficiary countries and territories of the Community's scheme of generalised tariff preferences Council Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 applying a scheme of generalised 
tariff preferences (Official Journal, L 169/1, 30.6.2005, EN). 
212 See Annex I Beneficiary countries and territories of the Community's scheme of generalised tariff preferences Council Regulation  (EC) No .2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of 
generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 (Official Journal, L 211/1, 6.8.2008, EN). 
213 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes. 
214 Wood products. 
215 Footwear products. 
216 See Annex  II Part I List of sectors and countries referred to in Articles 3 and 4 (a) Council Regulation (EC) No. 2820/98 of 21 December 1998 applying a multiannual scheme of generalised tariff 
preferences for the period 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001 (Official Journal, L 357, 30.12.1998, p. 1). 
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Table 46.  Indonesia’s export products to the EU 27 on wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal 
 
Unit: Thousand euros 
 
Indonesia's exports to European Union (EU 
27) 
European Union (EU 27)'s imports from 
world 
Indonesia's exports to world 
Product 
code 
Product label 
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 
2010 
 
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 
2010 
 
Value in 
2008 
Value in 
2009 
Value in 
2010 
'4409 
Wood continuously shaped along any 
edges 
114,092.16 96,923.19 122,649.72  1,696,854.08 1,279,514.89 1,465,223.83  289,205.69 267,982.17 363,205.54 
'4412 
Plywood, veneered panels and similar 
laminated wood 
138,427.85 98,454.78 114,355.34  3,197,033.29 2,042,127.85 2,535,382.48  1,038,003.61 852,922.21 1,231,559.4 
'4418 Builders' joinery & carpentry of wood 132,342.23 92,588.71 111,422.87  4,524,537.56 3,643,880.15 4,080,741.12  288,799.94 206,920.81 238,606.11 
'4420 
Wood marquetry & inlaid wood; 
caskets & cases or cutlery of wood 
42,511.68 67,573.47 44,127.99  502,148.09 413,194.15 441,107.49  104,581.08 120,117.15 110,760.91 
'4408 
Veneer sheets & sheets for plywood & 
other wood sawn lengthwise 
10,315.11 7,085.03 11,162.85  1,363,655.75 917,641.16 1,028,627.26  20,466.42 15,348.16 19,795.36 
'4402 
Wood charcoal (including shell or nut 
charcoal) 
2,319.66 5,611.52 6,767.14  243,834.71 277,875.83 296,037.94  37,240.28 46,502.65 48,889.69 
'4414 
Wooden frames for paintings, 
photographs, mirrors or similar 
objects 
5,650.64 5,424.38 5,709.07  259,748.81 227,184.97 246,210.67  66,691.73 61,068.52 57,134.37 
'4407 
Wood sawn/chipped lengthwise, 
sliced/peeled 
11,570.43 5,321.12 3,670.49  9,309,882.14 6,985,798.52 8,283,982.85  37,518.94 25,814.73 23,265.53 
'4417 
Tools, tool & broom bodies & handles, 
shoe lasts of wood 
899.18 669.71 607.73  90,302.23 80,461.48 92,269.13  6,617.79 5,575.67 5,275.3 
'4419 Tableware and kitchenware of wood 405.07 402.97 542.21  256,099.06 208,801.6 233,842.15  2,460.35 2,855.24 2,949.05 
'4421 Articles of wood, n.e.s. 286.81 501.93 305  1,947,678.35 1,763,172.88 1,977,063.98  8,569.08 8,207.19 11,880.53 
'4415 Packaging materials of wood 507.02 448.86 220.65  1,505,653.82 1,110,806.36 1,287,015.17  3,936.56 2,582.76 2,898.59 
'4401 
Fuel wood; wood in chips or particles; 
sawdust & wood waste & scrap 
49.61 25.1 134.05  1,423,291.31 1,545,791.95 2,062,226.33  7,205.01 26,042.03 51,343.97 
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'4416 Casks, barrels, vats, tubs etc. of wood 4.08 0 6.78  164,752.89 150,181.04 133,317.8  42.82 0.72 12.05 
'4413 
Densified wood, in blocks, plates, 
strips or profile shapes 
65.93 5.02 6.02  104,018.33 67,273.75 85,368.7  292.93 665.41 259.06 
'4410 
Particle board and similar board of 
wood or other ligneous materials 
12.91 0 1.51  2,663,665.29 2,019,401.39 2,351,586.75  775.49 1,587.52 2,140.24 
'4403 Wood in the rough 0 0 0  3,731,628.05 2,217,276.08 3,012,302.49  24.47 58.08 14.31 
'4411 
Fibreboard of wood or other ligneous 
materials 
116.9 54.49 0  2,887,783.24 2,344,121.9 2,583,463.37  42,375.07 32,983.66 35,426.95 
'4405 Wood wool; wood flour 0.68 0 0  23,969.36 22,269.7 26,121.95  1,650.88 962.98 472.18 
'4404 
Hoopwood; split poles; piles, pickets, 
stakes; chipwood 
0 0 0  109,634.31 87,766.64 94,665.42  825.78 520.57 5,105.86 
'4406 
Railway or tramway sleepers (cross-
ties) of wood 
0 0 0  94,224.51 58,668.6 62,795.24  0 3.59 0.75 
Sources: ITC calculations based on COMTRADE statistics. 
 
The recalculation of 2004-2006 trade data led to the re-inclusion ("degraduation") of certain product sections for six beneficiaries under the 
2009-2011 schemes. These included Algeria (for Section V "Mineral products"); India (for Section XIV "Jewellery, pearls, precious metals and 
stones"); Indonesia (for Section IX "Wood and articles of wood"); Russian Federation (for Section VI "Products of the chemical or allied industries" 
and Section XV "Base metals"); South Africa (for Section XII "Transport equipment"); and Thailand (for Section XVII "Transport equipment"). The 
GSP preferences suspended Vietnam for Section XII "Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sun umbrellas, artificial flowers".217 (See Table 46). 
                                                 
217 See Column C of annex I to the regulation No. 732/2008 (Official Journal L 211, 6.8.2008) against column C of annex I to Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 (Official Journal L 139/1,30.6.2005). See also 
United Conference on Trade and Development, Generalized System of Preferences : Handbook on The Scheme of The European Community, 2008, Op. Cit., pp. 21 - 34. See also Graduation from 
the Generalised System of Preference Scheme of the European Union (EU - GSP Scheme), 1998. 
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Table 47. EU Trade with main trading partners (2010)218 
 
The Major Imports Partners The Major Exports Partners The Major Trade Partners 
              
Rk Partners Mio euro %  Rk Partners Mio euro %  Rk Partners Mio euro % 
              
  Extra EU27 1,501,843.9 100.0%    Extra EU27 1,348,792.4 100.0%    Extra EU27 2,850,636.3 100.0% 
              
1 China 282,011.1 18.8%  1 United States 242,095.1 17.9%  1 United States 411,562.5 14.4% 
2 United States 169,467.4 11.3%  2 China 113,117.7 8.4%  2 China 395,128.8 13.9% 
3 Russia 158,384.9 10.5%  3 Switzerland 105,433.4 7.8%  3 Russia 244,893.7 8.6% 
23 Indonesia 13,729.2 0.9%  35 Indonesia 6,372.2 0.5%  32 Indonesia 20,101.3 0.7% 
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4)                 
DG 
TRADE 
European Union: 27 members.          8-Jun-11 
 
According to EU trade statistics, Indonesia takes rank 32 as EU 27’s major trade partners, rank 35 as EU 27’s major exports partners and rank 23 
as EU 27’s major imports partners. (See Table 47). 
 
                                                 
218 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tradoc_113391.pdf, last accessed : 15 June 2012. 
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Table 48. Indonesia’s trade with main trading partners (2010)219 
 
The Major Imports Partners The Major Export Partners The Major Trade Partners 
              
Rk Partners Mio euro %  Rk Partners Mio euro %  Rk Partners Mio euro % 
              
  World (all countries) 100,087.8 100.0%    World (all countries) 115,455.9 100.0%    World (all countries) 215,543.7 100,0% 
              
1 China 15,474.6 15.5%  1 Japan 19,463.5 16.9%  1 Japan 32,298.8 15,0% 
2 Singapore 15,278.0 15.3%  2 EU27 12,960.4 11.2%  2 China 27,299.8 12,7% 
3 Japan 12,835.3 12.8%  3 China 11,825.3 10.2%  3 Singapore 25,607.6 11,9% 
4 EU27 7,456.9 7.5%  4 United States 10,801.3 9.4%  4 EU27 20,417.3 9,5% 
5 United States 7,112.2 7.1%  5 Singapore 10,329.6 8.9%  5 United States 17,913.5 8,3% 
 
The EU 27 is placed in the 4th rank as Indonesia’s major trade partners and Indonesia’s major imports partners. EU 27 is the second biggest major 
exports partner for Indonesian goods and products. Indonesia’s export to the EU covers 11.2% of Indonesia’s total exports to the world.  
Indonesia’s total exports to Japan, EU 27, China, and USA are 47.7% of Indonesia’s exports to the world. (See Table 48).220 
 
                                                 
219 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tradoc_113391.pdf. 
220 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tradoc_113391.pdf. 
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Table 49  & Figure 31. EU imports from Indonesia based on SITC Section (2010)221 
 
SITC 
Codes 
SITC Sections 
Value 
(Million 
euros) 
Share of 
Total (%) 
 
Share of 
total EU 
Imports 
SITC T TOTAL 13,729 100.0%  0.9% 
SITC 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 3,232 23.5%  1.6% 
SITC 7 Machinery and transport equipment 2,077 15.1%  0.5% 
SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 2,055 15.0%  31.1% 
SITC 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 1,844 13.4%  2.9% 
SITC 6 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material 
1,708 12.4%  1.1% 
SITC 5 Chemicals and related prod, n.e.s. 943 6.9%  0.7% 
SITC 0 Food and live animals 932 6.8%  1.3% 
SITC 3 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials 
736 54%  0.2% 
SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco 105 08%  1.5% 
SITC 9 Commodities and transactions n.c.e. 12 0.1%  0.0% 
 
 
 
Based on SITC section, machinery and transport equipment is the second biggest EU import from Indonesia or 15.1% of EU total imports from 
Indonesia, which is then followed by animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes in the third rank with 15.0% of EU total imports from Indonesia. 
(See Table 49 and Figure 31).222 
 
                                                 
221 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tradoc_113391.pdf. 
222 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tradoc_113391.pdf. 
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Table  50. Adjusted EU-EXTRA Imports by tariff regime, by CN8 [DS-041691] 
        
Last update 02.03.12      
Extracted on 23.11.12      
Source of Data Eurostat      
PARTNER 
INDONESIA (ID+TP from 77,excl. 
TP -> 2001)      
PRODUCT TOTAL      
STAT_REGIME NORMAL      
INDICATORS VALUE_IN_EUROS      
        
Declarant/Period 
Beneficiary 
Country 
Eligibilty Import regime 
Jan.-Dec. 2007 Jan.-Dec. 2008 Jan.-Dec. 2009 Jan.-Dec. 2010 
EU 27 Indonesia 
E1 (Only MFN), E7 (GSP 
and/or Preferences), 
Unknown. 
U10 (MFN Zero), U11 (MFN 
non zero), U70 (Any 
Preference Zero), U71 (Any 
Preference non zero), UZZ 
(Unknown). 
1.142.627.385 1.442.663.955 1.279.698.599 1.775.304.467 
EU 27 Indonesia 
E7 (GSP and/or 
Preferences) 
U70 (Any Preference Zero), 
U71 (Any Preference non 
zero), 
5.268.391.636 5.662.385.769 4.807.895.402 5.957.090.494 
 
Source : Eurostat. 
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Figure 32. Adjusted EU-EXTRA Imports by tariff regime, by CN8 [DS-041691] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Eurostat. 
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Figure 33. EU imports from Indonesia by product grouping223 
 
 
 
Agricultural products are one of the primary import products from Indonesia to EU 27 amounting to 31.2% of total import products in 2010. 
Manufacture products are the biggest import products from Indonesia to EU 27 amounting to 56.0% of total import products in 2010. (See Figure 
11). 
                                                 
223 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tradoc_113391.pdf. 
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Figure 34. Asymmetric trade EU – Indonesia  
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned, EU trade with Indonesia has established an unsymmetrical trade relationship where EU imports from Indonesia are larger than EU 
exports to Indonesia. (See Figure 34). 
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VI. Indonesian foreign trade policy and decentralisation. 
VI.a. General overview of decentralisation in Indonesia. 
The demand for decentralisation in many parts of the world is often motivated by 
the need to enhance public service delivery. However, such demand is in fact more 
closely linked with control over resources and political and legal autonomy than with a 
supposed need to enhance public service delivery at a local level.224 Many economists 
use the term the “Big Bang Theory” to define the implementation of decentralisation in 
Indonesia since it was established and implemented in a very limited time. Apparently, 
it lacks some aspects mainly related to economic and fiscal considerations.  Hasty 
implementation of Indonesia’s decentralisation was most likely based on political 
consideration in order to reduce tensions between the central government and regions. 
The Big Bang Theory is used by economists to explain radical migration from 
centralisation into decentralisation. Law No. 22/1999 is perceived as the “Big Bang” of 
decentralisation in Indonesia after some decades of centralisation. In this regard, 
Indonesia swiftly migrated the country from one of the most centralised systems in the 
world to one of the most decentralised.225 
January 2001 was regarded as the milestone to breakdown the centralisation era, 
however, it was not Indonesia’s first attempt to implement decentralisation with a lot 
of challenges and difficulties. The pros and cons of the implementation of 
decentralisation took place at a central level, with the concern that it could undermine 
the authority and competences of the central government. In addition, there were some 
opinions that decentralisation could lead into republic disintegration. There were also 
some sceptical opinions regarding the sustainability of the decentralisation 
implementation. According to Marsillam Simandjuntak, decentralisation can be 
described as an idea that is made into a political decision. In this regard, 
decentralisation will strongly be influenced by the existence of various interests at the 
conceptual level. The interpretations of the decentralisation conception depend on the 
interests of the stakeholders involved. The existences of various interests most likely 
increases tensions between the stakeholders involved, which might also result in a 
conflict of rights. The settlement of such conflict can be performed either at a national 
or local level. Therefore, as an idea alone, “decentralisation” is perceived as quite risky, 
and as potentially threatening national integrity.226 On the other hand, Gary Goodpaster 
argues that decentralisation is also considered as one method of diffusing social and 
political tensions and enhancing social cohesion.227 Due to the evolution and 
dynamisms of the local autonomy in Indonesia, Law No. 22/1999 was amended by Law 
No. 32/2004 and lastly amended by Law No. 12/2008. 
 
VI.a.1. Legal historical reviews. 
Indonesia is the biggest archipelago state in the world, it consists of more than 
17,000 islands, and has more than 800 local languages and tribes. The centralisation  
system in Indonesia was started in the 1950s. At that time, it also took the form of a 
                                                 
224 See  Dillinger, 1994; Ehtisham Ahmad and Ali Mansoor, Indonesia : Managing Decentralization ,IMF Working Paper, 
WP/02/136, International Monetary Fund, 2002, available at : 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02136.pdf, p. 3. 
225 See  Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser, The making of the ‘Big Bang’ and its aftermath: a political economy perspective, p. 15. 
226 See  Marsillam Simandjuntak, Indonesian decentralization: opportunities appear but risks abound, p. 263. 
227 See  Gary GoodPaster, Decentralization, Internal Barriers to Trade, and Local Discriminatory Action, A Joint Project of 
USAID and the Government of Indonesia, 25 February 2000, available at : 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN015676.pdf. 
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multi-tier unitary state, where many governmental tasks were performed by 
deconcentrated central government agencies in provinces and districts.228 
Decentralisation can be traced back to the colonial era where many efforts were 
attempted but none was successful.229 The Decentralisation Act of 1903 was issued by 
the Dutch and commenced the “formal” establishment of local governments in 
Indonesia. The Decentralisation Act of 1903 aimed to establish a sort of elected local 
council to balance the deconcentration principle in the regions. This Act was reformed 
by the Act of 1922 to give more autonomy to local governments by including eminent 
native figures in the local Council.230 
 The local government structures in Indonesia, which consist of provinces, 
municipalities and districts, were created for the first time during the colonial era. The 
first municipalities were created in 1905. This was followed by the establishment of the 
first districts (gewesten) in 1910. Thus, in the 1920s the first provinces were 
established on Java island. The first law issued that dealt with “local autonomy” after 
the proclamation of Indonesia’s independence was Law No. 1/1945. This Law was 
established under the umbrella of Article 18 of the 1945 constitutions.231 
From 1942 to 1945, Japan, as the winner of the Asia-Pacific War, started to invade 
Asia including Indonesia. The Dutch administration was replaced by Japanese military 
administration. In fact, the Japanese military administration kept most of the local 
government system established by the Dutch. Under the deconcentration principle, a 
governing relationship between the local and central government was still applied. All 
political activities were prohibited under the Japanese military administration. The 
Japanese occupation terminated when it was conquered by the allied forces, thus giving 
Indonesia the opportunity to proclaim its independence on 17 August 1945.232 
As a matter of fact, the Kingdom of the Netherlands did not recognise Indonesia’s 
independence on 17 August 1945. At the same time, the Dutch, as the colonialist, 
wanted to preserve its power by creating numerous Indonesian republics on some 
islands outside Java, which were placed as subsidiaries of the Dutch government. These 
Indonesian republics outside Java island were united under the Dutch Crown.  Such 
policy was put into force by the Dutch government as a political movement to 
demoralise Indonesia as a unitary state. Due to such situation, the Dutch argued that 
“Republik Indonesia” (referring to Java island), was only one part of Indonesia that was 
seeking independence from the Dutch.233 Such political movement created a federal 
state or the United Republic of Indonesia over the Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia. The establishment of the United Republic of Indonesia was based on the 
1950 constitution. The United Republic of Indonesia, similar to the commonwealth 
system, only lasted for a year. After it dissolved, the 1950s constitution was replaced 
again by the 1945 constitutions, and returned to the implementation of the unitary 
state concept.234 
Made Suwandi concludes that the Dutch laid down important foundations of the 
modern local government in Indonesia. Even though, it tended to be deconcentration 
heavy rather than decentralisation heavy. As previously mentioned, the Act of 1922 
introduced the involvement of eminent native figures in the local councils, at the same 
                                                 
228 See  Shah and Qureshi, 1994; Booth, 1996; Aten, 1999; James Alm and Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Decentralization and 
local government borrowing in Indonesia, p. 237. 
229 See  De Jong, 1970; Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser, Op. Cit., p. 16. 
230 See  Made Suwandi, The Indonesian experience with the implementation of regional autonomy, p. 273. 
231 See  De Jong, 1970; Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser, Loc. Cit., p. 16. 
232 See  Made Suwandi, Op. Cit., p. 273. 
233 See  Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser, Op. Cit., p. 16. 
234 See  Ibid., p. 16. 
 431 
time the Head of the Region was appointed by the Dutch. The Japanese military 
administration did not make any significant changes to the inherited system 
implemented by the Dutch.235  
Soon after its independence, there were seven main local government laws and 
one Presidential Decree, including Law No. 1/1945, Law No. 22/1948, Law No. 1/1957, 
Presidential Decree 6/1959, Law No. 18/1965, Law No. 5/1974, Law No. 22/1999, and 
Law No. 32/2004 as amended by Law No. 12/2008. Each of the regulations provides a 
moderately different picture of the local government system.  Law No. 1/1945 was 
more focused on deconcentration while Law No. 22/1948 initiated migration into 
decentralisation. The decentralisation was marked down by increasing the roles 
assigned to the Head of the Region. The Head of the Region has the dual role as a local 
representative and as an agent of the central government.236 
Invigorating the implementation of local autonomy was issued by Law No. 
1/1957237, it increased the extent of decentralisation by obliging the Head of the Region 
to be exclusively responsible for the Local Council.238 Unfortunately, this law was 
cancelled after political riots took place in some regions in Indonesia such as Sumatra, 
Sulawesi, Maluku, and West Java. The Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 returned to the 
1945 constitution, and effectively abolished the 1957 autonomy law by the passage of 
Law No. 18/1965.239 The Presidential Decree 6/1959 turned the decentralisation heavy 
into deconcentration heavy, where local powers were mainly conferred in the hands of 
the Head of the Region, who was appointed by the central government, mainly from 
Civil Servants.240 
The issuance of Law No. 18/1965 ended the heavy deconcentration. Law No. 
18/1965 tended to favour decentralisation. The regions were given broad autonomy.  
Deconcentration functions were placed as a supplement to those to be performed 
under decentralisation. The issuance of this law was driven by the domination of 
political parties at the national power. Decentralisation was mandated by Law No. 
18/1965 and allowed the Head of the Region to hold party membership. The failed 
coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965, started a new regime 
that was dominated by bureaucracy and the armed forces.241  
The issue of local autonomy was raised again in the New Order era, it led to the 
establishment of Law No. 5/1974, however, during that time, such law was never in fact 
fully implemented because of the strong centralisation system.  To implement local 
autonomy under Law No. 5/1974 required the regions to prove they were ready for 
implementation. The central government acts as the judge and jury for the local 
government.242 The issuance of Law No. 5/1974 obviously started the dominant role of 
the central government over the local governments.243 According to Hofman and Kaiser, 
an experimental local autonomy was implemented in 1996 in 26 local governments, 
and it failed. This was due to difficulties where the resources and facilities were not 
handed over together with the tasks.244  
In the middle of 1997, economic crisis struck Indonesia and was followed by 
political crisis, and then ended in a severe multi-dimensional crisis. After the fall of the 
                                                 
235 See  Made Suwandi, Op. Cit.,  p. 274. 
236 See  Made Suwandi, Loc. Cit.,  p. 273. 
237 See  Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser, Op. Cit.,  p. 20. 
238 See  Made Suwandi, Loc. Cit., p. 273. 
239 See  Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser, Loc. Cit., p. 20. 
240 See  Made Suwandi, Loc. Cit.,  p. 273. 
241 See  Made Suwandi, Loc. Cit.,  p. 274. 
242 See  Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser, Loc. Cit., p. 20. 
243 See  Made Suwandi, Loc. Cit., p. 274. 
244 See  Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser, Loc. Cit., p. 20. 
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New Order, two new laws on local autonomy were passed, Law No. 22/1999 and Law 
No. 25/1999.245 Law No. 22/1999 reflected the massive political changes at the central 
government, and broke down the strong centralisation power into decentralisation.246 
Dwight Y. King describes Law No. 22/1999 as the “radical departure” from the 
structures of governance that have been carried out over more than three decades.247 
Law No. 22/1999 introduces two basic levels of governance, the central 
government and the autonomous district governments (city/kota and 
municipality/kabupaten) whose relationship involves a division of responsibilities and 
powers.248 District governments no longer perform the doubled function as an 
administrative area of the central government. In other words, the Head of a District is 
directly responsible to the People’s Representative Council at local level. While in the 
centralisation system, the Head of District is responsible for the president through the 
provincial governor.249  
Under Law No. 22/1999, the provincial governments are comprised of 
autonomous units but at the same time as extensions and administrative regions of the 
central government. In other words, provincial governors continue to wear two hats, as 
head of a region and as representative of the central government in a province.250 
With regard to improving democratisation on the level of local government, a 
direct election of heads of regional governments was proposed (i.e. governors, regents 
and mayors). On January 2003, the government official proposed a partial revision of 
Law No. 22/1999.251 Finally, Law No. 32/2004 concerning Local Government, was 
replaced Law No. 22 /1999, thus, it was amended by Law No. 12/2008.  
 
VI.a.2. Decentralisation in Indonesia today: Law No. 32/2004 Jo. Law No. 
12/2008. 
According to Law No. 32/2004, local autonomy must be implemented based on 
decentralisation, deconcentration, and assistantship tasks principles.252 Local 
autonomy is aimed to envisage the people’s welfare through the enhancement of public 
services, people empowerment, and the improvement of the people’s participation in 
the local development. Article 1 Subparagraph 5 Law No. 32/2004 Jo. Article 1 
Subparagraph 4 Government Regulation No. 38/2007, defines local autonomy, as 
follows:  
“[…] Regional autonomy is the right, authority, and obligation of the 
autonomous regions to govern and manage their own affairs and interests 
of local communities in accordance with statutory regulations […]”. 
Thus, Law No. 32/2004 differentiates the terms of the deconcentration principle 
and decentralisation principle. Decentralisation is described as the transfer of central 
government authority by the government to the autonomous region to govern and 
manage the affairs of government within the system of the Republic of Indonesia.253 
Thus, deconcentration is described as the delegation of the central government 
authority by the government to the governor as the representative government and/or 
the vertical institutions in a particular area.254 
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Authority distribution between central government and local government is 
regulated under Article 10 Law No. 32/2004. Local governments carry out government 
affairs that are included in their authority, except government affairs, which are 
determined by law as central government affairs.255 There are six crucial government 
affairs that are determined as exclusively central government affairs, that is, foreign 
affairs, defence, security, justice, national fiscal and monetary affairs, and religion.256 
There are thirty-one government affairs that are shared among the government levels 
and/structures, where trade affairs is included in this category.257 The implementation 
of the distribution of government affairs is based on the criteria of externalities, 
accountability, and efficiency by taking into consideration the harmonisation 
relationship between the government structures in order to avoid overlap the 
competency of bureaucracy.258 The implementation of the authority distribution 
between the central government, province government and municipality/regency must 
be based on interrelationship, interdependency and synergy under one governmental 
system.259 Local government affairs are divided into two categories, i.e. obligatory 
affairs and optional affairs.260  Optional affairs are defined as government affairs that 
exist and could potentially improve community welfare in correspondence with the 
conditions, uniqueness, and potential of the regions concerned.261 A trade affair is 
included into optional affairs.262 
Local autonomy creates a new challenge in the foreign trade, such as 
harmonization of the rules and regulations between local government and central 
government. Nowadays, this challenge becomes one of the main concerns of the 
government and the business community. Indonesia’s Trade Chamber is emphasizing 
the importance of harmonization of the rules and regulations between local and central 
government to provide better business environment.263 It’s reiterated by General 
Secretary Ministry of Trade, Mr. Ardiansyah Parman, as follows 
“[…] Ministry of Trade is continuously carrying out a synergy with local 
governments and invites support from local governments to participate 
strengthening domestic trade and international trade, secure domestic trade, 
developing distribution of infrastructure and consumer protection system […]”. 
Through the harmonization and synergy of the rules and regulation, local 
autonomy must not impeded the export boost. This demand is  based on some 
perceptions and scepticism on local autonomy, for instance : 264 
1. Different perceptions among central government ministries or agencies particularly 
between the Ministry of Home Affairs and sectoral/line ministries. 
2. Different perceptions between central ministries and local governments. 
3. Different perceptions among local governments themselves, particularly between the 
province and the districts and cities. 
Scepticism on local autonomy rises because creating overlap of tasks and competencies 
in the local and central level, excessive bureaucracy procedures, and create opportunity 
of misuse power for corruption. E-trade system, such as INSW and Inatrade, is the 
example of national integration of public service delivery on trade. It provided 
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uniformity of export-import procedure’s, which including automation of issuing 
certificate of origin. 
 
VI.a.3.  Decentralisation from the political-economic perspective. 
As explained in the historical perspectives, decentralisation in Indonesia started a 
century ago. The implementation of decentralisation in Indonesia was mainly 
influenced by the political configuration at national level. Political changes of the 
Reformation era brought significant changes to the political and administrative system. 
The centralised system of administration, which had been instrumental in supporting 
national development for more than 30 years, shifted into a decentralised system.265  
In a broader perceptive, the broader aims of decentralisation were to create more 
efficient public services, to boost local economic growth, to deliver equality 
development due to its needs, and to give the local governments the opportunity to 
manage their own economic resources for the welfare of the people. From the political-
economic perspective, there are some reasons why the decentralisation system is 
chosen as the best solution to cope with Indonesia’s political and economic problems. 
Ryaas Rasyid as the former minister of regional autonomy, perceived the rigid and 
centralised system as eventually proving itself powerless to cope with the economic 
monetary crises that struck Indonesia in mid-1997.266 Politically, decentralisation is 
used as a tool to gather the sympathy, support and trust from the regions to the central 
government after the collapse of the centralised system. In addition, decentralisation is 
also perceived as one of the catalysts to improve the implementation of good 
governance and good government. Therefore, Dwight Y. King considers the law on local 
autonomy as the key component of political reform in Indonesia.267 
Returning to the economic crisis that first hit Thailand in early July 1997, most of 
Indonesia’s political and economic leaders were very confident with their assessment 
that even though Indonesia was affected by the inevitable regional crisis, it would not 
be as badly affected as Thailand. They argued that the fundamentals of the Indonesian 
economy were strong enough to cope with the crisis. Unfortunately, such optimism 
only lasted for three weeks. Thus, in August 1997, Indonesia was swept out by the great 
wave of economic crisis, which in fact was much worse than what had hit Thailand.268 
In the early economic crisis, the Indonesia Rupiah lost 40% of its value, thus it 
decreased by 80%. Such situation was unpredictable and destroyed the economic 
structure of Indonesia. It placed the government in a very difficult situation and caused 
fear and chaos in society. It affected industry and caused a bank rush. Industries that 
depended on imported materials were forced to shut down. Thus, it brought increased 
unemployment numbers, which was capitalised by opposition as the hot political issue 
to demand President Soeharto to step down. Other implications were security and 
stability issues due to widespread social conflicts.269 These situations sunk Indonesia 
into a multidimensional crisis.  
Indonesia’s economic condition extremely decreased and was worsened by the 
economic crisis. During 1998, the inflation rate reached almost 80%, the exchange rate 
depreciated more than 80%, and unemployment and poverty rates more than doubled. 
Compared to other countries in Southeast Asia that experienced the same crisis, there 
is compelling evidence that Indonesia suffered the most. Public debts jumped from 
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around 45% of GDP before the crisis in 1996 to 110% in 1999, an increase that raised 
serious questions regarding the capacity of the national government to manage the 
fiscal risk and to sustain its budget.270 
According to Ryaas Rasyid, our excessively centralised administration spent most 
of its time and energy dealing with domestic and local affairs. Therefore, Ryaas Rasyid 
perceived such backgrounds as the reason why the central government failed to solve 
the crisis in creative ways. On the other hand, regional and local administrations that 
was in fact only given very limited authorities, and had been for a long period put under 
the control of central government, could not be expected at all to help manage the 
impact of the crises in their own regions and territories.271 In other words, local 
government did not have enough capacity and capability to help the central 
government deal with the economic crisis.  
The decentralisation policy reduced the authority of the central government and 
extended the authority of the provincial and local governments. Thus, local 
governments will be able to initiate policies and bring their people into a better life. In 
other words, the local governments will be focused to solve regional and local 
problems, and reduce the burden of the central government dealing with such 
problems as what had happened in the past. It is expected that the central government 
will focus its time and energy on dealing with globalisation, and achieving its national 
interests.272 The central government is the key actor behind the success of 
decentralisation. The central government has the important task of guarding the unity 
of the country, to maintain national integration, to guide, supervise and control the 
implementation of the decentralisation policy.273  
 
VI.b. Significance of trade to local economic development: the philosophy of law 
and economics. 
VI.b.1. Does trade contribute to economic development? 
It is widely believed by most economists that trade brings benefits for economic 
development in developing countries. The establishment of GSP as a unilateral trade 
preference has the purpose of improving the economic development of developing 
countries and LDCs through export boosts. Until today it is argued that trade is 
considered as the most effective tools to support the economic development of 
developing countries and mainly LDCs. According to Resolution 21 at UNCTAD II in 
1968, the Conference Agreed that the objectives of the GSP were dedicated to 
increasing the export earnings, to promote industrialisation, and to accelerate the 
economic development of developing countries and LDCs.274 
James Riedel posits trade as an engine of growth in developing countries, which is 
characterised as “highly mechanistic”. Trade is analogous as an engine because it serves 
to transmit growth from developed to developing countries. According to Riedel 
Mechanical, the efficiency of an engine requires the gearing of the interconnecting parts 
to be fitted properly.275 This proposition is established on the basis that there is a 
stable, mechanical relationship between economic growth in developed countries and 
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export growth in developing countries. Such relationship is explained by Lewis as 
follows:276 
“[…] The growth rate of world trade in primary products over the period of 1873 to 
1913 was 0.87 times the growth rate of industrial production in the developed 
countries; and just about the same relationship, about 0.87, also ruled in the two 
decades to 1973….We need no elaborate statistical proof that trade depends on 
prosperity in the industrial countries […]”.277 
In this regard, Lewis makes observations of a stable hundred year’s link between 
growth in developed countries and primary exports of developing countries. It is 
geared at the ratio 0.87, and is taken as evidence that the trade engine is mechanically 
efficient. If one of the parts slows down (developed country growth), this mechanically 
leads to the slowing down of the connecting parts (LCD trade and, connected to that, 
LDC growth).278  
The economic growth and stability of developed countries has a significant 
influence on the growth of developing countries and LDCs. It can be understood 
because the biggest exports market of developing countries and LDCs is developed 
countries. Indonesia’s main export partners are mostly developed countries such as the 
US, Japan, and the EU. According to Prof. Boediono, Indonesia’s Vice President, 
Indonesia is well prepared for the worst possible scenario of the Eurozone crisis that is 
feared by most developing countries, for instance China, India, and Brazil. The 
economic growth of these countries is slowed down resulting from the Eurozone 
crisis.279 The economic deterioration of developed countries, such as the EU, affects the 
economic growth of its main trading partner. Inevitably, the impact of the Eurozone 
crisis to Indonesia is the decrease of exports. It is predicted that it would reduce 
Indonesia’s total exports to 4.4%, however, this amount is lower compared to the 
export decrease of India (9.83%), China (5.16%) and Thailand (6.62%). Some main 
Indonesian export commodities, where the main destination is the EU, have 
significantly been affected by the Eurozone due to declining market demand, for 
instance fishery products and textile products.280 According to Tulus Tambunan, the 
export of goods is one of the main channels that can by affected by the Eurozone either 
directly or indirectly. However, the direct effect would not be very harmful since the 
main important export destinations for Indonesian exports are not in the Eurozone.281 
According to Oscar Afonso, the positive effects of international trade on economic 
growth were first pointed out by Smith (1776). Up until today, it is believed that 
international trade has a role as an economic growth driving force.282 While Marco 
Neuhaus notes “trade leads to welfare gains” and is the standard answer to the 
                                                 
276 See  James Riedel, Op. Cit., p. 58. 
277 See  Lewis, 1980, Op. Cit., p. 556; James Riedel, Loc. Cit., p. 58. 
278 See  James Riedel, Loc. Cit., p. 71. 
279 See  Indonesia ready to anticipate Eurozone crisis, The Jakarta Post, Monday 12 December 2012,  available at : 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/12/indonesia-ready-anticipate-eurozone-crisis-says-vp.html, 
last accessed : 21 April 2012. 
280 See  Ekspor Kulit dan Tekstil Paling Terpukul Oleh Krisis Euro, Jaring News, 3 January 2012, available at : 
http://jaringnews.com/ekonomi/umum/7606/ekspor-kulit-dan-tekstil-paling-terpukul-oleh-krisis-euro, last 
accessed : 21 April 2012. 
281 See  Tulus Tambunan, Would Indonesian economy be seriously affected by the euro zone debt crisis?, Center for 
Industry, SME and Business Competition Studies, Trisakti University, Jakarta, available at : 
http://www.apeaweb.org/publications/news/vol-02/issue1/021-tambunan.pdf, last accessed : 22 April 2012. 
282 See  Oscar Afonso, The Impact of International Trade on Economic Growth, Working Papers, Investigaçao-Trabalhos 
em curso – n° 106, Maio de 2001, Faculdade de Economia Universidade do Porto, Portugal, pp. 1-3, available at : 
http://fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/_.old_WP_Fev09/wp106.pdf. 
 437 
question why open economies are able to achieve more growth.283 Andrew Berg and 
Anne Krueger consider that trade policy is only one of the many determinants of 
growth and poverty alleviation. Their paper addresses questions concerning the 
importance of trade policy for poverty reduction and whether trade openness is an 
important determinant of growth.284 They conclude that trade openness is an 
important determinant of growth, and that openness tends to increase growth. In this 
regard, they suggest that if poor countries are open, poverty would increasingly fall.285 
In Frederico G. Jayme Jr’s paper, he critically explores the relationship between 
trade and growth.286 He believes the relationship between trade and growth lacks its 
micro economic foundations, therefore, he only analyses macroeconomic aspects of 
trade and growth, taking into consideration their external constraints and the limits of 
openness in foster economic growth. The analysis of this aspect using microeconomic 
foundations has been carried out by neo-Schumpeterian literature and further studies 
can be connected to the above mentioned tradition with Post Keynesians and 
Structuralists.287 Jaime argues that the traditional theory of international trade is 
limited to the examination of the impact of trade to economic growth. On the other 
hand, Srinivasan and Bhagwati argue that the traditional theory of international trade 
still shows the best way to understand trade and growth. They maintain that openness 
to trade, and factor and technology flows, significantly contribute to sources of 
growth.288 
Baldwin suggests that the extent to which exports generate economic growth 
depends on the characteristics of the production functions of export products 
particularly as regards input requirements, the incidence of scale economies, and the 
like.289 Caves lists some of the channels through which export activities are connected 
to sources of intensive growth, in this regard, growth is related to per capita income. 
First, skill requirements, including entrepreneurial skills, and exports that require 
skilled labour generate more favourable linkages than those using unskilled labour. 
Second, substantial economies of scale in the production of exported goods seems to 
favour the contribution to intensive growth. Third, activities associated with the 
construction of social overhead capital is favoured as intensive growth. Some 
characteristics of the export commodity would favour local processing industries.290 
Literature on productive linkages posits that demand and supply characteristics of 
trade specialisation of a given country will have an effect on the way trade can be 
translated into economic growth. However, not all productive activities are similar in 
creating the virtuous process of cumulative causation that is at the root of economic 
development.291 
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The fantastic example of economic success linked to export boost is the high 
performance of Asian countries. In the mid-1990s the economies of Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand reached great 
success, which is indicated by the highest GDP growth rate in the world at an amount of 
6% per year since 1965. This was also followed by the highest rates of export growth, 
averaging more than 10% per annum. According to Thirlwall, those successes have not 
always been driven by free trade and laissez-faire. For instance, Japan and South Korea 
have been very interventionist, pursuing unyielding export promotion but also import 
substitution at the same time.292 In 1993 the World Bank published a specific study 
titled “The East Asia Miracle”, where it was concluded that there is “no single East Asian 
model”. It has been identified that they have their own growth model and that “what is 
important for growth is not whether the free market rules or the government intervenes, 
but getting the fundamentals for growth right”.293 
According to the World Bank, three policies have been identified as contributing 
to the economic success of the “Asian Tiger”. First, it has been identified that industrial 
policies have a significant role in the promotion of particular sectors of the economy. 
Second, the government control of financial markets to lower the cost of capital and to 
direct credit to strategic sectors. Third, the policies to promote exports and protect 
domestic industries has also been identified as having an importance contribution to 
economic growth. In addition, the vital factor that needs to ensure those policies is 
implemented properly good governance.294 
 
VI.b.2. Law and economics. 
Economic analysis of law (EAL) is a practical alternative to Classical 
Utilitarianism.295 Utilitarianism theory is also known as the principle of utility laid 
down by the English jurist and philosopher, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)296. The 
principle of utility is famous for the slogan “the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number”. The basic idea here is that human actions and practices should be evaluated 
ultimately in terms of their tendencies to advance the general welfare or social good – 
i.e to produce as a consequence other happiness or well-being or satisfaction of a 
majority of persons. The more persons who are likely to be made better off by an act or 
practice, then the better that act or practice from the moral point view. “Look to the 
future and promote human welfare”, this is the basic utilitarian advice in ethics, advice 
formally expressed in the Principle of Utility: “Of all the possible actions open to you, 
perform that action with greatest tendency to bring about the greatest balance of 
happiness over misery for mankind as a whole”.297 
EAL emphasises the rationality of persons and their desire for efficiency in the 
processes that lead to the achievement of individual and social goals.298 The EAL 
philosophical approach is based on the human as homo economicus. In this regard, 
“humans are regarded as primarily economic agents, who act and react essentially for 
economic reasons, seeking as much as possible to maximise wealth and the satisfaction 
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of their preferences”. To this extent, Chinhengo elaborates, “the law becomes an 
economic tool, to be utilised efficiently for the maximisation of happiness. Its creation and 
application is governed by economic considerations”. Based on the two elements of 
rationality and efficiency, thus, it places “justice” as an economic standard.299 
 
VI.b.3. Classical international trade theory. 
Christopher Bliss describes that the theory of international trade is a very wide 
field and that most of its theories apply to developing countries. An immense field has 
been created that deals with the trade and economic development process of 
developing countries. Extensive literature has been written in relation to trade theory 
and economic development.300  There are two important theories to explain how trade 
boost contributes to economic growth or to the process of economic development 
growth, that is, the Adam Smith (1776) theory and the David Ricardo (1817) theory. 
These theories are recognised as the standard theories of international trade.301 It is 
explicated that those two countries with absolute and comparative cost advantages can 
benefit from trade.302 
With regard to the development of international trade theory a question has been 
raised by Christopher Bliss, that is, “are classical and neoclassical theories of 
international trade suitable for application to the situation of developing 
countries?“303This question has been raised to question which theories between 
classical and neoclassical theories on international trade and growth are applicable for 
today’s situation. In this regard, we will discuss the development of these classical 
theories towards economic development. There are two foundation theories in classical 
theory that is the Adam Smith Theory and the Ricardian theory.  
 
VI.b.3.a. The Adam Smith Theory 
The doctrine that trade enhances welfare and growth derives from Adam Smith’s 
famous book An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). 
According to Thirlwall, he emphasises “the importance of trade as a vent for surplus 
production and as a means of widening the market thereby improving the division of 
labour and the level of productivity”.304 The term “vent surplus model” on the ideas of 
Smith on external trade was created by Mill305 and followed by William306 and Myint307. 
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Myint considers that Smith’s model was fit to explicate a specific part of the trade of 
developing countries.308 
According to Smith, the industrial revolution in England drove economic growth, 
which provided the base for lowering labour costs, thus, it ensured effective 
competition across countries.309 Surplus productive capacity was the cause of the 
narrowness of the domestic market. The excess of productive capacity that is not 
demanded in the domestic market can be exported outside the country. In other words, 
to absorb the excess productive capacity requires market expansion. Exports are 
believed to increase the wealth of a nation through the improvement of the division of 
labour and enhancement of national productivity. However, the incapability of 
exporting those “surplus” products could cause under-employed of the production 
factors of the country. Therefore, exports are the vent for surplus and an instrument to 
ensure the full-employment of factors of production in the Wealth of Nations.310 
Thirlwall explains that the classical trade theory is often associated with 
colonialism. In which Smith’s productivity doctrine of the benefits of trade is developed 
into an export driven argument, particularly in the colonies.311 Returning to the 
colonialism era in Indonesia, with trade monopoly being ruled by VOC Dutch and 
obliging all domestic products, particularly relating to agriculture, only to be allowed to 
be exported to the mother colony. Sunanda Sen argues that industrialist capitalism, 
especially in England, because of the rapid growth of large-scale industries and 
enslaved markets in overseas colonies. Smith, initiated the doctrine of free trade as a 
tool to achieve production efficiency.312 
The idea Smith explains is, “a dynamic, self-feeding process of trade driven by 
economies of scale and imperfect competition”, in the modern terminology it is 
described as an attempt towards endogenisation of comparative advantages between 
countries.313 Kibritçioglu considers that the Smith theory tends to neglect the 
possibility that a country, wherein all products are produced by using more inputs per 
output as in the rest of the world, can gain from free trade. In other words, the trade 
structure depends on comparative advantages.314 
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In his era, Smith saw agriculture as the most important economic advantage 
sector of a “young country”. Such thought was based on the availability of plentiful and 
cheap land that was useful for agricultural production. At that time, unfortunately, 
labour was not expensive, and land was limited and pricey in Europe.  
Hence, according to Holander, the comparative advantage of the European 
nations was to produce manufacture products.315 In fact, Smith’s doctrine was almost 
similar to the idea of comparative advantages before Ricardo.316 According to Staley 
and Bloomfield, Adam Smith “seems to have missed the chance to be the first economist 
who stated the rule of comparative advantages explicitly”.317 This reason most likely led 
to the argumentation of Myint, Hong, and Gomes, that Smith’s ideas on foreign trade are 
generally ignored, or associated only to the concept of absolute advantages, in 
textbooks and theoretical surveys on international trade.318 In the words of 
Bloomfield:319 
“[…] Various writers, while acknowledging his undeniable importance and 
influence as an economist, have referred to short-comings, oversimplifications, 
and even inconsistencies in his theorising on foreign trade. Others have 
questioned the originality of his free-trade ideas […]”.320 
According to Kibritçioglu, Smith’s (1776) main contribution to international trade 
theory cannot be found in his static economic analysis. Smith’s dynamic approach to 
the extent of the market is essential for modern trade theory. In the words of Gomes, 
Smith’s principle of free trade was nothing more than the application of specialisation 
and division of labour to a global scale.321 Explicitly, Smith had not seen any difference 
between domestic and foreign trade.322 
Aykut Kibritçioglu, on the paper of “the Smithian origins of “new” trade and 
growth theories”, explains the Smith theory on long run economic growth. Brewer and 
Ahmad posit about Smith’s theory in which capital accumulation holds a leading role in 
the economic growth process of a country, and is followed with technological progress 
passively.323 Barkai argues that the technological change in the Wealth of Nations is 
more important than other factors to explain the nature and causes of the wealth of 
nations.324 In the words of Kibritçioglu, the determinants of economic growth and 
development in Smith’s theory consist of capital accumulation, technological progress, 
and institutional and social factors. These determinants have complex interactions and 
play a crucial role in the economic development process of a country.325 In addition, 
Tezel states that Smith’s thoughts were strongly influenced by the natural philosophy 
of his age.326 
According to the new growth theory, there are some ways that might drive long 
run growth such as openness, where it encourages developing countries to fully 
participate in the world trading system. Technological change and technological gaps 
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are considered as some of the driving engines of long run growth. In this regard, 
Harrison and Hanson, argue that more backward countries will provide more 
opportunities to absorb new ideas. Thus, this accelerates them to participate in the 
international trading system, which allows them to benefit from technological change. 
Therefore, new growth theory also acknowledges that participation in the world 
market through openness and technological improvement, could strongly drive long 
run growth.327 
Regarding technological change, Smith recognises the role of the invention on the 
new machine to increase productivity. Kibritçioglu elaborates the significant role of 
technological change in the form of learning by doing as determinant factors to 
improve the wealth of nations. According to Kibritçioglu, Smith does not totally neglect 
the role of machine-makers and philosophers in inventing new machines. Smith 
construes its contribution as a powerful source of technological change.328 
Furthermore, it has elaborated the role of labour on technological change through 
simple inventions or improvements in existing machines, which principally come from 
the rise of experiences of “workman”. However, philosophers and machine-makers 
make inventions that are more fundamental. Technological change can only be 
performed through market expansion. In this case, Smith’s theory combines the 
concept of learning by doing with economies of scale through the concept of division of 
labour. Technological change is driven by economic scale improvement, experience, or 
cumulative output, and labour skills. Finally, it concludes that, “technological change in 
terms of learning by doing, such as inventing new machines or improving an old one, 
stimulates the division of labour and specialisation through increases in wealth, profits, 
and the process of capital accumulation”.329 
Kibritçioglu notes that Smith distinguishes between three stages of economic 
growth. The lowest stage is named as “a low level equilibrium trap”, which is 
characterised by cultural and institutional backwardness. In modern terminology, the 
countries are placed at such level when they fail to provide guarantees towards basic 
human rights, freedoms and “property rights” protection. During his era, there were 
two countries categorised as the leading nations and were placed in the middle stage or 
second stage, that is England and North America. They were still regarded as 
environments of “natural freedom”. In this regard, they were also characterised in a 
progress of economic growth. In the 18th century, Smith regarded that there was no 
country that had reached an advanced stage of economic growth.330 
Smith’s next theory is about “the natural limits of economic growth beyond a 
certain level”. In the words of Kibritçioglu, Smith believed that “falling profit rates along 
the growth path of an economy, changes in the relative factor scarcity, and decreases in 
profitable investment opportunities all play a significant role in constraining economic 
growth”. Further Kibritçioglu, based on Smith’s theory, elaborates some factors that 
cause natural limitations of economic growth, for instance limited land endowment, 
lack of favourable conditions, and both the climate and geographical location of the 
country. Hence, it has to be underlined that the importance of Smith’s theory is that 
“every growing economy, has to slow down and stop at an upper limit of 
development”.331 This theory can be explained as the cycle of the economic global crisis, 
particularly the crisis in Europe. Smith believed that technological improvements in the 
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manufacturing industry could extend the natural limit of the country’s economic 
growth. In the end Kibritçioglu, emphasises that we should not misapprehend Smith’s 
opinion on the role of technological development as a determinant of economic 
growth.332 
 
VI.b.3.b. Ricardian Theory. 
Following Adam Smith, David Ricardo (1772-1823) developed the theory of the 
comparative advantage, or more famously, the Ricardian Theory. In 1817, he wrote 
about Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, which explained the assumptions of 
perfect competition and the full employment of resources, however this was not made 
explicit. Afterwards, many economists tried to describe the Ricardian theory in 
developing the relationship on trade and the economic growth model. 
According to Ricardian theory, “countries can achieve welfare gains by specialising 
in the production of goods with the lowest opportunity cost and trading the surplus of 
production over domestic demand”. The comparative advantage takes place if the 
international rate of exchange between commodities lies between the cost ratios of 
domestic opportunities.333 Viner elaborates the Ricardian theory and states “that 
foreign trade is gainful for a nation if and only if those products are imported into the 
country which cannot be produced domestically or which are produced more expensively 
in comparison to that in the rest of the world”.334 According to Kibritçioglu, the role of 
comparative advantages is emphasised in explaining the structure of foreign trade.335 
Frederico G. Jayme Jr describes comparative advantage as when trade allows a more 
efficient use of the economy’s resources by enabling imports of goods and services that 
could otherwise only be produced at home at higher resource costs. He uses an 
example, when trade enables developing countries to import capital and intermediate 
goods, which are important for long run economic growth, and would be quite 
expensive to produce locally.336 
Jones states that “comparative advantage determines that each nation will always 
find a set of products in which production it can successfully compete in world markets 
regardless of the degree of efficiency of its technology or service basis”.337 Jones’ opinion 
stresses comparative advantage on trade diversion by neglecting the role of 
technological change and the improvement on productivity. On the other hand, Tobias 
Bidlingmaier states that today’s comparative advantages have shifted “to the production 
of the goods a country produces best”, where specialisation in production is necessary. 
As explained by Smith’s theory of long run growth, such specialisation will be 
influenced by technological change.338  
The Ricardian theory introduced the static gains that arise from the reallocation 
of resources from one sector to another along with the increase in specialisation, in this 
regard, comparative advantage takes place.339 Kibritçioglu elaborates that Ricardian 
theory on the static approach of comparative advantages was based on exogenity of 
division of labour between nations.  Therefore, it identified that they were created by 
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international differences in exogenous factor-productivities.340 Tobias Bidlingmaier, 
explains that the gains from trade are rooted in the specialisation in production due to 
international trade. The improvement of resource allocation can be achieved when 
countries specialise according to their comparative advantage.341  Further, Tobias 
Bidlingmaier elaborates that this allocation is efficient because resources, which have 
formerly been employed in the production of other goods, are now shifted to the 
production of the goods a country produces best. As a result, the welfare income of all 
trading nations is improved.342  
Srinivasan and Bhagwati, state that various authors have defended the benefits of 
openness by the efficiency-enhancing role of free trade in a static context.343 For 
instance, Frederico G. Jayme Jr considers that the comparative advantage theory deals 
with the static gains of international trade, which does not deal directly with growth.344 
According to Jayme, a country that opens up can be assured the benefits of welfare 
gains in a static model. The Ricardian theory posits the welfare gains if any country 
specialises in producing goods in which it has a comparative advantage. The standpoint 
of these theories is that international trade is the way to achieve static productivity 
efficiency and international competitiveness.345 The Ricardian static argument stated 
that there is an improvement in income and welfare when countries engage in 
international trade.346 
However, the static gains are “exhausted” once the tariff barriers among countries 
have been removed and no further reallocation takes place. This happens when trade 
creation gains that occur within the Customs Unions or FTA as the barriers to trade are 
removed between members, but the gains are one for all.347  
The static gains theory is in contrary with the dynamic gains from trade that 
composes a vital link in the causal chain between exports and growth. Dynamic gains 
from trade are applied in the modern trade theory348 and in the “new” growth theory349. 
Thirwall explains that dynamic gains from trade continually shift away from the whole 
production possibility frontier of countries. In this regard, he emphasises that trade is 
associated with more investment and faster productivity growth based on scale 
economies, learning by doing and the acquisition of new knowledge from abroad, 
particularly through foreign direct investment.350 
Thirlwall notes that trade has acted as an important engine of growth for 
countries at different stages of development. It not only contributes to a more efficient 
allocation of resources within countries, but also spreads growth from one part of the 
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world to another. However, the growth between one country to another can be 
different due to some factors such as “production and demand characteristics of the 
goods that a country produces and trades, the domestic economic policies pursued, and 
the trading regime it adopts.”  Thirwall, provides example of exports disparities 
between developing countries and developed countries, as follows : 351 
“[…] the volume of exports has grown slower than for developed countries since 
1950 – 5 percent per annum compared to 8 percent – because developing 
countries still largely produce and export primary commodities and low value-
added manufactured goods with a relatively low income elasticity of demand in 
world markets. The difference in rates of growth of exports has been even wider 
in value terms because the terms of trade of developing countries have 
deteriorated vis à vis developed countries causing the developing countries’ share 
of the total value of world trade to have fallen from 30 percent in 1965 to 20 
percent today […]”. 
From this example, the disparities on export diversification and industrialisation 
between developed countries and developing countries is identified as one of the 
factors that influence different stages of economic development. Therefore, one of the 
basic philosophies of institutionalisation of GSP is to improve export diversifications 
and stimulate industrialisation in developing countries. Thirlwall believes in the 
existence of both static and dynamic gains from trade, and that trade provides a vent 
for surplus production.352 
Thirlwall raises an issue concerning the double standards that are applied by 
developed countries to developing countries. While the developed world promotes free 
trade for developing countries, in fact they continue to apply protectionism to their 
own markets from imports from developing countries, particularly agricultural 
produce and textiles. Such protectionism is practiced through the application of non-
tariff barriers, for instance sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and quota 
restrictions. Thirlwall believes that developing countries could gain greater benefits 
from trade if developed countries modified their policies towards developing 
countries.353 
According to Thirlwall, export growth is defined as “the only component of 
demand that provides the foreign exchange to allow other components of demand in an 
economy to grow faster, such as investment, consumption and government expenditure, 
all of which have an import content which needs to be paid for in foreign exchange”. Thus, 
export growth has roles lowering a balance of payments constraint on demand, and 
affecting growth from the supply-side. With regard to the monetary or balance 
payments as the consequences of trade, classical theory of international trade both 
Smith’s theory and the Ricardian theory neglect such matter.354 
Marco Neuhaus argues that economic growth is not an immediate consequence of 
trade. It has to be noted that a higher level of welfare is not synonymous with higher 
GDP. Neuhaus relates the boost of the total number of manufactured goods that both 
countries can consume, and higher consumption means higher welfare. It is believed 
that trade openness could raise the total value of goods consumed in each country.355 
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VI.c. Benefiting from export: non-revenues. 
According to Oscar Alfonso, the classic theory does not distinguish the questions 
of economic growth from the questions of international trade.356 There are two main 
ideas conceived by Smith related to the interaction between international trade and 
economic growth. First, the international trade considered succeeds to overcome the 
problem when the size of the internal market shrinks. Second, market expansion 
improves labour division and increases productivity. With regard to technology 
development, Smith’s theory considers that international trade has brought a positive 
contribution to improve the ability and skills of workers, encouraging technical 
innovations and the accumulation of capital. Thus, it makes it possible for a country to 
overcome technical difficulties in productivity.  In the end, it would give participating 
countries the possibility to enjoy economic growth. Hence, Smith’s theory is applied in 
the long-run economic growth.357 
Ricardian theory characterises “progressive states” as “having high savings, 
capital accumulation, production, productivity, benefits and labour demand forcing the 
increase of wages and demographic growth”.358 In his theory, Ricardo recognises that 
the ‘stationary state’ underlies the ‘progressive state’, and that ultimately the force 
capable of delaying this state is technical progress.359 Technical progress or 
technological development can be transmitted through international trade. Therefore, 
he believed that international trade could delay the fall in the rate of profit.360  
The Ricardian model assumes that international trade is between two trading 
partner countries, with two commodities and that all factors of production can be 
reduced to one single factor, that is, labour. In addition, the production of each 
commodity is performed based on “fixed technical coefficients”. The term “fixed 
technical coefficients” is interpreted as the technological factor. In this regard, the 
pattern of international trade can be explained, particularly related to the improvement 
of productive capacity. Assumption is made by eliminating the costs of transportation, 
the conditions for international trade created are the existence of differences between 
comparative costs in production of both goods in both trading partner countries. 
According to Ricardian theory, although one country has an absolute advantage in costs 
of production in both goods, international trade is an option better than autarky 
(closed economy).361 Specialisation on commodities by countries would encourage 
them to engage in international trade due to less comparative cost, thus, it would 
increase the welfare of both economies and the world as well.362 In other words, the 
openness of countries to international trade produces efficiency, mutual benefits and is 
positive for the entire world.363 However, Oscar Afonso observes that the followers of 
Ricardo neglected the question of the foundations of comparative advantages and did 
not analyse factors resulting from international trade that could increase, in a lasting 
form, the rate of economics and its tendency in the long-term.364 
Ricardo A. Lòpez, in his paper Trade and Growth: Reconciling The Macroeconomic 
and Microeconomic Evidence, states that those companies that enter the export markets 
are more productive than non-exporters and that this difference in productivity is 
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achieved before a company becomes involved in exporting. In brief, exporting 
companies are more productive than companies that focus on the domestic market.365 
In the 1990s, a series of empirical studies began to uncover the different characteristics 
of exporters and non-exporters.366 These findings have challenged the traditional view 
that openness to trade increases productivity and economic growth. In short, these 
findings reiterated the idea that exporting increases productivity and economic 
growth.367 According to this study, learning by exporting created a possibility for 
companies to acquire information from foreign customers and foreign contacts, which 
is important to obtain information for the purposes of improving the manufacturing 
process, new product designs, and increasing the quality of goods.368 According to 
earlier case studies, information from foreign customers is an important source of 
knowledge for developing countries. Foreign buyers (traders) seem to prove worthy 
information on new technologies and product designs. In this regard, foreign buyers 
also seemed to contribute to improving the quality of the exported goods.369  
Effects of international trade to boost an economic growth is explained 
systematically by Marco Neuhaus. According to him, trade is a tool for technology 
transfer, improving institutional capacity, enhancing infrastructure developments, and 
increasing international competitiveness.  
“[…] trade can indeed boost economic growth, the main ones being technology 
transfer and institutional improvements. Technology transfer occurs via the 
importing of high-tech capital goods, production facilities, patents and licences, as 
well as knowledge-intensive services. 370 Furthermore, the importing of new 
technologies also stimulates the development of domestic technology via the 
imitation and enhancement of imported products. So trade accelerates 
technological progress, which in turn is the key source of long-term economic 
expansion according to growth theory.  Besides technology transfer the 
improvement of the institutional framework also plays a major role: “opening up 
to foreign influences directly generates incentives to adjust and improve domestic 
rules and facilities so that opportunities for trade and investment are not wasted”. It 
encompasses improving infrastructure, boosting capital market efficiency and 
safeguarding property rights. This process is facilitated by increasing 
international competition, which prompts domestic companies to continually 
optimise their production pro-cesses and develop new products; this also speeds 
up technological progress and thus boosts economic growth […]”371 
Technology licensing is one of the “point d’entre” of technology transfers from 
developed countries. Exports could encourage technology licensing from developed 
countries. According to the World Bank, technology developers usually prefer 
exporting companies, because this would be a good indicator about the abilities of the 
potential partner.372 Pack and Page consider that licensing, which constitutes 
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technological knowledge about production processes, offers significant opportunities 
to developing countries for improving the level of productivity.373 
A country that successfully integrates into the world economy would have large 
manufacture shares in its exports. For instance, India, Turkey, Morocco and Indonesia 
have shares that are close to the world average. Moreover, many developing countries 
have manufacture shares in their exports that are above the world average of 81%.374 
Market expansion to developed countries will be necessary, especially for its 
manufactures and semi-manufactures export destination. In this regard, the need to 
improve such access to the market of developed countries has been responded by 
UNCTAD through the adoption of resolution 96 (IV), on 31 May 1976, entitled "a set of 
interrelated and mutually supporting measures for expansion and diversification of 
exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures of developing countries". Section I of 
that resolution contains "improving access to markets in developed countries for 
manufactures and semi-manufactures of developing countries", which is later 
institutionalised as GSP.375 Development of manufactures as exports commodity is 
associated with the degree of industrialisation of a developing country, in this regard, 
one of the main purposes of GSP is to promote industrialisation.  
 
VI.d. Implication of decentralisation to boost exports: impact of good governance 
to trade. 
During the second half of the century, the role of trade in the world economy 
increased significantly. Most countries had faster economic growth and 
industrialisation was identified because of their rapid participation in the world trade 
system. The export-oriented policies that were applied by East Asia and Southeast 
Asian countries succeeding drove high-growth economies. By the 1980s, policy makers 
in developing countries, began to apply a more open trade regime. This situation 
changed the landscape of most centrally planned regimes that had previously avoided 
the use of market-based trade and had either collapsed or made remarkable reforms 
that placed foreign trade and investment as their development programmes priority.376 
Subsequently, trade policies reformed in most developing countries, and their 
engagement in international trade also significantly changed. Starting in the early 
1980s, developing countries significantly increased the share of manufactures in their 
exports. In the late 1990s, about 80% of exports from developing countries were 
manufactured goods. This significantly changed the developing country paradigm 
about the role of trade. In 1994, at Marrakech, when 124 countries as contracting 
parties signed the WTO agreement, perhaps it was the culmination point of 
international policy enthusiasm for open trade policies. While, at the same time, in 
Bogor, Indonesia, the leaders of Asia-Pacific countries, representing nearly half of the 
world economy, set a goal of achieving completely free trade in the Pacific by 2010 for 
industrial countries and 2020 for developing countries.377 
Many factors have driven the rapid growth in the openness of world economies, 
such as reductions in trade barriers, reductions in transport costs, and reductions in 
the costs of communications. Ng and Yeats note that another influence of increased 
international trade is the improvement of trade shares in manufactures, shifting trade 
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patterns from dependency into interdependency (equal two-trade), and widespread 
multinational companies due to more fragmentation of production processes.378 
Will Martin notes that policy changes that improve transparency are included as 
incremental policy reforms that would be welfare improving.379 While Rodrik argues 
that the policies imposing export performance requirements on foreign investors could 
be second-best welfare improving.380 Further, it is explained that in an ideal world, 
trade policies would be determined at a national level by a government in order to 
maximise national welfare. The government would have at least one policy instrument 
for each policy goal it wanted to achieve. Realistic efforts are needed to accomplish 
these objectives, such as maximising national welfare, by taking into consideration the 
balance between its objectives, and recognising constraints such as weak institution 
capacities.381 
Berg and Krueger, defines the openness of an economy “as the degree to which 
nationals and foreigners can transact without artificial (that is, governmentally imposed) 
costs (including delays and uncertainty that are not imposed on transactions among 
domestic citizens)”. They are identifying some constraints that likely raise the costs of 
transaction. These constraints consists of tariffs and non tariff barriers, domestic 
content requirements, health and safety requirements, inspection delays and corrupt 
bureaucracy (rent-seeking behaviour). Trade openness identified reducing rent seeking 
behaviour among government officials. Trade openness is generating innovation due to 
its openness character to new ideas and developments.382  
The institutions capacity are holding vital role in economic growth,  especially to 
increase trade and investment. Good institutional environment more likely providing 
friendly business environment. 383 Berg and Krueger noted that trade openness is 
correlating with the quality of institutions. Generally, the good institutional 
environment is accompanied by the  trade openness and other indicators such as 
adherence of good governance and good government principles. Good institutional 
environment is vital for development process because it provide political stability and 
national security, effective government, rule of law, and effective bureaucracy. 
Therefore, the trade openness is one of the elements to build a strong and healthy 
institutional environment. 384  
The institutions reform in Indonesia has been started since 1999; soon after 
reformation era begin. Such reform was driven by the conditionality imposed on the 
Letter of Intend (made by the World Bank and the IMF), which is designed to assist 
Indonesia exit from severe economic crisis. 385 This conditionality brought positive 
impact on trade reforms, for instance, establishment of regulation to enhance business 
competitiveness. In addition, Indonesia established non-ministries institutions to 
ensure all those reforms agenda are carried out properly, such KPPU (Komisi Pengawas 
Persaingan Usaha) or the Supervisory Commission on Bussiness Competition. 
As elaborated in the previous chapter, that good governance and capacity 
building are the key elements of trade facilitation. Implementation of good governance 
and enhancement of capacity building are increasing efficiency in exports 
administration procedures, reduce transaction cost, and minimizing rent seeking 
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behaviour of government employee and corruptions practices. According to Ehtisham 
et.al, decentralization, however, offers considerable opportunities for better 
governance. The decentralization is improving the capacity of local government to 
manage and to distribute public goods based on their needs and preferences. 386 In 
addition, decentralization likely to enhance more responsive and efficient government 
to meets the local needs and preferences.387 
The main conception of decentralisation is bringing the government closer to the 
people.388 Decentralisation in developing countries has generally been caused by the 
incapability of the central government to meet increasing demands for local services.389 
Therefore, decentralisation can be used as a driving force towards generating 
improvements in Indonesia’s notably poor governance environment. The poor 
governance environment is a chronic problem in Indonesia, where it has suffered as a 
country with the highest levels of corruption. It has proven to undermine both public 
service delivery and the private-sector environment.390 Simanjutak and Mahi note that 
it is commonly thought that bringing service delivery closer to the people allows them 
to better hold the government accountable for its actions.391 In other words, 
decentralisation increases public participation to control the authority in performing 
its executive tasks. While Made Suwandi notes three parameters that can be used to 
guide the distribution of authority to provide services. It consists of externalities, 
accountability, and efficiency. Based on these three parameters, the authority delivers 
services among three layers of government (the centre, the province, and the 
district/city).392 
According to Simanjutak and Mahi, fiscal decentralisation is aimed to improve 
national and regional government operational efficiency; to enhance accountability, 
and to increase transparency; to assure the delivery of basic public services to citizens 
across the country; to ameliorate the social welfare of Indonesians; and to support 
macroeconomic stability.393 De Mello and Adam B. Elhiraika consider that fiscal 
decentralisation responsibilities have implications on increasing efficiency in public 
service delivery and in reducing information and transaction costs, where it is always 
associated with the provision of public services.394 
The benefits of decentralisation depend crucially on governance. If good 
governance is applied correctly by the local authorities, it will improve accountability 
by minimising high cost economy and ensuring the public service is delivered properly 
to the society. In fact, governance and accountability are still placed as the serious 
concerns in the implementation of decentralisation in developing countries.395 Made 
Suwandi identifies one of the problems of decentralisation in Indonesia is lacking 
professionalism combined with strong political ideals, which often resulted in 
inefficiency at local government level. Administrative inefficiency was neglected for 
decades, which chronicled the bureaucracy problem in Indonesia. In fact, most local 
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government positions were held by officials who did not have sufficient education and 
experience, thus causing low professionalism in public service delivery.396 
Hofman and Kaiser, is underlining the significant relationship between 
decentralization with governance and accountability. 397 Elhiraika is elaborating that 
decentralization provide’s greater accountability, because it is enhancing assurance for 
public service to be delivered properly to the society. Moreover, greater accountability 
is strengthening the institutional capability at the local level. Institutions capacity 
building is needed to ensure public participation and accountability of policy-makers, 
service providers, and users. 398 
With regard to capacity building, lack of professionalism in delivering public 
would hinder the decentralization process. Incapacity of local government’s 
understands existing’s regulations in carrying out their roles more likely causing 
problems and delays in delivering services. Capacity building at the local government 
level is becoming a necessity to improve their capacity in performing public services 
delivery.  In order to manage the local government functions, institutions, personnel, 
finance, representation, and service delivery it is necessary to improve the capacity of 
civil servant of the local government and other related officials to guarantee adequate 
human resources. According to Made Suwandi, the improvement of such capacities 
should be placed as the key agenda in promoting decentralization reform in Indonesia 
today. 399 
Kalamova and Kessing in their paper “Decentralisation and International Trade”, 
analyse the relationship between the form and degree of decentralisation of 
government structures and international trade.400 They use the theory-based gravity 
model to examine the effects of decentralisation on international trade. The form and 
the degree of decentralisation influence domestic trade costs. The main questions in 
their paper cover two aspects about how decentralisation affects international trade, 
and examines the impact of different forms of decentralisation on foreign trade.401  
They assume that vertical decentralisation increases international trade whereas 
horizontal disintegration reduces it.402 They argue that these different forms of 
decentralisation affect international trade differently.403 In this regard, decentralisation 
is distinguished into two forms, known as horizontal decentralisation and vertical 
decentralisation. Horizontal decentralisation is characterised by the division of sub-
national government layers into mutually exclusive territorial units, such as states, 
regions and counties. Horizontal decentralisation causes economic agents to become 
subjects of different local jurisdictions, with potentially different regulations, taxes, and 
public infrastructure.404 While, vertical decentralisation is characterised by the number 
of government tiers in a country and relates to the fact that decentralisation makes the 
economic agents subject to several vertically differentiated government levels.405  
The main assumption is that decentralisation affects the costs of intra-national 
trade. This modifies the relative prices of imported goods, and consequently the 
demand for domestic and foreign goods. Whenever decentralisation increases the costs 
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of internal transactions, foreign goods become relatively cheaper, and an increase in 
imports can be observed. On the other hand, if decentralisation facilitates internal 
transactions, domestic goods become relatively cheaper, and a reduction in imports 
should be observed. Analogous arguments can be made for exports. Vertical 
decentralisation increases domestic trade costs, whereas horizontal decentralisation 
creates different effects on the profitability of internal trans-actions with a combined 
effect of which the direction is theoretically ambiguous.406 
Over taxation is identified as one of the weaknesses in the vertical 
decentralization. Overlap of authorities is resulting vertical fiscal externalities, when 
more than one level of government levies taxes on the same tax base most likely 
occurring over taxation. The red tape bureaucracy, bulk of regulatory provision and 
overlap taxation are identified as factors that caused costly internal transaction and 
triggering high trade cost. 407 
“[…] Assumed if internal transactions are likely to be subject to some kind of taxes 
or fees, negative vertical externalities between the different layers of government 
are likely to arise. These externalities would imply that internal transactions 
should be more costly, as the number of government levels in a country increases. 
A similar argument can be made with regard to trade costs resulting from 
regulatory provisions and red tape. They are increasing in the number of 
government tiers and will make intra-country trade more expensive in countries 
with more government tiers. Since international transactions become relatively 
more attractive and therefore it expected that international trade is increasing in 
the number of government tiers of the trading countries […]”. 408 
Kalamova and Kessing find significant effects of decentralisation on trade. 
Vertical decentralisation increases international trade, whereas horizontal 
decentralisation decreases international trade. The amount of trade between countries 
is positively related to the number of government tiers in the exporting as well as in the 
importing country.409 Kessing et al. argue that vertical decentralisation is a more 
decentralised economy that is more integrated into the world economy, whereas more 
horizontal decentralisation actually implies less integration.410 The degree of market 
openness and the integration of the country into a multilateral trading system brings 
influence that lowers the high internal barriers. Therefore, the level of decentralisation 
itself depends on the extent of economic integration with the rest of the world.411  
 
VI.e. Local government competences in boosting exports. 
According to Law No. 32/2004, Government Regulation No. 38/2007 and 
Government Regulation No. 41/2007, local government has the right to establish local 
trade institutions under its authority. In this research, we will take an example from the 
Special Province of Yogyakarta (herein after SPY). SPY is geographically located in the 
south of the Province of Central Java. It is adjacent to Wates and Kulomprogo in the 
west, Wonosari and Gunungkidul Regency in the east, Sleman Regency in the north and 
Bantul Regency in the south. SPY consists of areas of land and sea with a total area 
reaching 3,185.80 cubic kilometres. The SPY area that is capitalised in the City of 
Yogyakarta is divided into 4 regencies and 1 city, namely the Regency of Kulonprogo, 
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Bantul, Gunungkidul, Sleman and the City of Yogyakarta. The widest area of the SPY is 
the Regency of Gunungkidul with an area of 1,485.36 cubic kilometres and the smallest 
area is the City of Yogyakarta with an area of 32.50 cubic kilometres. The economic 
structure of the SPY in 2010 was dominated by the trading sector (19.77%), services 
sector (19.47%) and agriculture sector (15.25%). The main commodity of the SPY is 
the agriculture sector and services sector. The main commodity of agriculture is the 
plantation sub-sector with the commodity of coconut; the fishery sub-sector with the 
commodity of fishery catch, and fishery cultivation. The main commodity of the 
services sector is tourism, nature and cultural tourism.412 
 
Table 51. Total export value of the Special Province of Yogyakarta413 
 
Values in million USD 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Exports 143.47 138.47 125.56 130.25 108.7 130.39 131.6 
 
The local trade institution that is established under the Local Government of SPY 
is integrated with three other fields, that is industry, cooperation (“koperasi”), and 
Small and Medium Enterprises. According to Local Regulation of SPY No. 6/2008 on the 
Establishment and Organisation of Local Institutions in the scope of the Local 
Government of SPY, it is named the “District Office of Industry, Trade, Cooperation, and 
SMEs”. This local institution has four different tasks that are interrelated and integrated 
to support economic activities especially at the local level. Industry, trade, cooperation, 
and SMEs are the prominent sectors to accelerate local development. This complies 
with the vision of the institution, which has the role as an accelerator of industry, trade, 
cooperation, and SMEs driving improvements in competitiveness to achieve society 
welfare. The local institution is a driving force to improve competitive advantage and to 
accelerate full participation in the world trade trading system. The mission of the 
institution is to deliver excellent service, in this regard, on trade, by efficient 
management of the institution. Excellent service is provided to satisfy the business 
community and society. 
To encourage foreign trade by local traders the District Office of Industry, Trade, 
Cooperation, and SMEs, established the “Division of Foreign Trade” (herein after named 
DFT). The DFT has three Sections, consisting of the Section of Export and Import 
Facilitation, Section of Export Development, and Section of Foreign Trade Cooperation. 
Each section has its own main tasks and job description. Further, we will elaborate 
more about their main tasks and job description to portray the role of the local trade 
institution in foreign trade, especially on export facilitation.   
The Section of Export and Import Facilitation has the main task of carrying out 
the facilitation and promotion of export and import activities. In detail, this section 
includes nine job descriptions, which include the following: 
1. making programme planning on export-import; 
2. compiling technical guidance, facilitating, and supervising export-import 
activities; 
3. preparing export licence recommendations; 
4. preparing the issuance of the Importer Identity Number; 
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5. preparing recommendation letters for the importation/entry of goods;  
6. tracing the origin of goods and issuance of certificates of origin (SKA) items;  
7. developing exporter-importer human resources (traders) on import-export 
activities; 
8. facilitating dispute settlements between importers and exporters; 
9. making evaluation and reports of section programmes on export and import 
facilitation; 
The second section is Export Development, which has the main tasks of carrying out the 
supervision and development of exports. Under this section there are eight job 
descriptions, consisting of: 
1. making programme planning on export development; 
2. preparing technical guidelines of export development; 
3. managing export-import data and information; 
4. providing analysis of potential export commodities and potential export 
destinations; 
5. supervising the quality of exported goods; 
6. facilitating the big exhibition of export products (trade promotion); 
7. developing exporter human resources related to export management; 
8. making evaluation and reports of section export development programmes. 
The third section is foreign trade cooperation, which has to carry out tasks on 
facilitating foreign trade cooperation, promotion, and the monitoring of foreign 
cooperation agreements. Under this section there are six job descriptions, consisting of: 
1. making programme planning on foreign trade cooperation; 
2. compiling technical guidance on facilitation and monitoring implementation of 
foreign trade cooperation; 
3. promoting and monitoring the implementation of foreign trade cooperation 
agreements; 
4. analysing and evaluating the performance potential of foreign trade cooperation; 
5. providing facilitation of foreign trade cooperation efforts; 
6. making evaluation and reports of section foreign trade cooperation programmes. 
Under the District Office of Industry, Trade, Cooperation, and SMEs of SPY, the 
“Business Service Centre”, was also established, which has two main roles as a business 
service centre and business information centre. As a business information centre, it is 
entitled to the main function of carrying out the preparation, presentation, and 
provision of services on business information. This centre has the task of collecting and 
processing data and business information, managing business information systems, 
providing business information, and providing business information services. As the 
business service centre, its main function is to provide business development service, 
covering business-counselling services, counselling services on the use of ICT for 
business, design services, and to provide services and facilitation of business 
development. 
 
VI.f. Trade facilitation in the framework of local autonomy. 
Indonesian National Long-Term Development Plan 2005–2025 envisioned “high 
and inclusive economic growth as a means of achieving sustained prosperity for its 
people and the protection of its natural resources and environment”. Thus, Indonesia 
needs to drive its economic development to achieve such vision. High export growth is 
one of the tools to encourage the acceleration of economic development. As a matter of 
fact, Indonesia still faces many internal and external constraints that impede the 
country’s export performance which, in this respect, are often associated with trade-
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related policies and its hard and soft infrastructure.414 These internal problems consist 
of inadequate organisational resources for export marketing, lack of export financing, 
insufficient information about overseas markets, product problems related to quality 
and technical requirements, and lack of knowledge of foreign markets.415 The 
fragmentation of responsibilities in public institutions is charged with export quality 
issues, the absence of a well-integrated roadmap to improve the system, and 
insufficient interaction between public sector institutions and representatives of 
private sector interests in the export sector are also identified as the constraints in 
increasing export performance.416   
Transactions across states borders are costly because of tariffs and other trade 
barriers that unobservable. 417 Gary GoodPaster, on his paper of “Decentralization, 
Internal Barriers to Trade, and Local Discriminatory Action”, has wrote  : 
“[…] Since the foreign trade is a great concern to the national government, e.g., only 
the national government enters international trade agreements, the national 
government should take special care to protect foreign commerce from local 
taxation. Local tariffs and local imposition of non-tariff barriers to trade can 
interfere directly with the nation’s international obligations, and there are foreign 
policy implications whenever a locality taxes foreign commerce. In this respect, 
Indonesia should develop some sort of import-export rule that prohibits regions 
from imposing tariffs or duties on imports and exports, and on the activities of 
importing and exporting, and prohibits regions from creating non-tariff barriers to 
trade not sanctioned by the central government […]”.418 
Decentralisation brought about a perspective that increased government 
performance to bring the public service closer to the people. Trade facilitation is one 
“public good” that should be delivered properly and adequately to society, especially to 
economic operators. Indonesia has struggled with many problems related to 
improvements of more effective and efficient trade facilitation. One of the big problems 
is overlapping administrative and formalities procedures due to decentralisation, such 
as double taxation and red tape bureaucracy. In this regard, Elhiraika has identified 
three constraints that cause inefficiency in the improvement of public service delivery 
carried out by local governments, covering lack of sufficient revenue assignments, 
inadequate access to financial markets, and lack of necessary administrative capacity 
on the part of local authorities.419  
Local revenue collection is one of the main components of decentralisation 
related to fiscal aspects. Under the centralised system, local tax based in Indonesia has 
no significant improvement. Local governments remain vastly dependent on the central 
government to supply their revenues. Therefore, Simanjuntak and Mahi emphasise the 
importance for local government to look for alternative additional local taxes and to 
improve the administrative capacity of the existing taxes.420 Brodjonegoro and Vazquez 
also note the need for local government to expand local revenue autonomy.421 Business 
registration tax is included as one of the good candidates of tax to be assigned from 
central government to local government. The improvement of local revenue collection 
would accelerate and enhance decentralisation in Indonesia.422  
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Law No. 28 /2009 regulates local tax. Previously, it was regulated under Law No. 
34/2000423, which is acknowledged as the first regulation in early decentralisation that 
greatly expands the scope for local government revenues. Amendments of local tax 
followed the policy of decentralisation. In the era of the centralised system, local 
government taxes were regulated by Law No. 18/1997. Implementation of Law No. 
18/1997 was identified as a high cost to the taxpayer and the economy.424  
Law No. 28/2009 divided local tax into two categories: local tax and local 
retribution. Article 1 Paragraph 10 of Law No. 28/2009 stated that “local tax [is] used 
for local interest with the purpose for the greater welfare of the people”. With regard to 
local contribution, Article 1 Paragraph 10 of Law No. 28/2009, was defined as a local 
charge having the function of a payment upon services or particular permits provided 
or granted by the local government to individuals or institutions. Local taxes are 
divided into two categories, that is, local taxes imposed by the district and city and local 
taxes imposed by the province.425 Law No. 28/2009 regulates local taxes more simply 
and clearly. Its aim is to minimise overlapping taxations between the government tiers. 
According to Davey, there are six criteria to evaluate the performance of local 
taxes. It consists of adequacy and elasticity426; equity427; administrative feasibility428; 
political acceptability429; economic efficiency430; and suitability as local tax/revenue431. 
432 The principal objectives of local revenues are: 433 
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1. To raise revenues from the local communities under local legislation to financing local 
public services. It is relieving the full burden of central government for financing such 
services through budget transfers. 
2. To reinforce local autonomy and democracy, by facilitating a degree of local choice and 
trade-off between levels of services and local tax and charge burdens. 
3. To promote local accountability of regional governments. 
4. To provide incentives to improve efficiency and effectiveness in local services delivery. 
Indonesia’s decentralization give an authority to the local government to 
establish their own’s new sources of revenues, such as local tax and local retribution, 
but such charges should be based on “good” tax criteria, as follows434 : 
1. The tax must be suitable as a regional government tax; that is, the tax base must clearly 
be located within, or arise from within, the regional government area, and must relate 
primarily to economic activity from within the regional government area. 
2. The tax must be politically acceptable at national and regional levels; 
3. The tax base must not overlap with that of another central or local tax or license fees 
having the characteristics of a tax. 
4. The estimated potential yield of the new revenue source should repre-sent a substantial 
additional contribution to the present total of local revenues, and should be founded on 
a buoyant revenue base. 
5. The gross costs (i.e. costs before deduction of any staff-related grant) of collecting the 
revenue must be acceptably small compared to the yield of the revenue. 
6. The tax must not prejudice national economic policies. 
7. Except as a matter of deliberate and justified policy, the tax must not seriously change 
the allocation of economic resources within the re-g ional government area or between 
regions, nor disrupt intra- or inter-regional trade. 
8. The tax burden must be affordable, both by the majority of those directly liable to pay it 
and by those on whom it would ultimately impact. 
9. The tax must not be unduly regressive. 
10. The tax must not unfairly discriminate between particular sections of the community. 
11. Regional governments must be able to administer the revenue effec-tively; that is, 
regional governments must be able to identify the vast majority of liable taxpayers, to 
assess each taxpayer’s liability readily and accurately, and to enforce collection of the 
revenues assessed as payable. 
12. The tax must not discourage taxpayers from taking proper action to comply with 
environmental conservation needs. 
In fact, many inappropriate new taxes have been created at local level. 435 
According to Simanjuntak and Mahi, the implementation of these principles apparently 
would be difficult to some extent. Miss-interpretation due to superficial understanding 
of these principles by local officials could resulted tax regulations that contrary with 
basic criteria of taxation.  The tax must not creating double taxation. 436 
There are some important notes related to the Indonesian business actors, 
particularly small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), which mostly lack awareness of 
EU market access requirements, product design needed for European customers, and 
available government support programmes, such as trade promotion. In this regard, 
collaboration support between the government and business community through trade 
facilitation could encourage SMEs to expand their market to the EU.437 
Export promotion is playing important role to open overseas market access for 
local exporters. The most successful countries on export’s promotions are South Korea 
and Taiwan. Theirs governments are actively intervening trade, especially in facilitating 
                                                 
434 See  Robert A. Simanjuntak and B. Raksaka Mahi, Op. Cit.,  p. 143. 
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436 See  Robert A. Simanjuntak and B. Raksaka Mahi, Loc. Cit., p. 111. 
437 See  Lord, Montague., Oktaviani, Rina., and Ruehe, Edzard., 2010, Loc. Cit., p. 4. 
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promotion of manufactured exports. The common feature of Taiwan and Korea is that 
the high rates of economic growth that accompanied by improvement of human capital,  
increase of capital accumulation and an impressive exports boost, mainly in the 
manufactures sector. According to Nelson and Park, assimilation perspective might 
explain for the success of these countries.438 The assimilation perspective emphasizes 
the role of learning and mastery of foreign technologies in explaining the 
industrialization process and rapid economic growth of some East Asian countries. 439  
Promotion is tools to introduce and to advertise export products, therefore, 
market created. Promotion plays significant role in the tough trade competition and 
market expansions. Traders or manufacturers carry out promotion in three ways, i.e., 
direct promotion by advertising, trade exhibition, and information dissemination to the 
target market. Because of the high cost and unaffordable for SMEs, only big 
manufacturer’s that carry out overseas trade promotion. In this regard, the government 
needs to organize or facilitate overseas trade promotion that involving SMEs. The 
activities of exports promotions activities are covering overseas trade exhibition, 
sending trade mission, Indonesian Week at department store in abroad, Buyer 
Reception Desk (BRD), and Permanent Trade Display in abroad. 
The National Agency for Export Development (NAFED) and Indonesian Trade 
Promotion Centre (ITPC)440 is a government agency under the Ministry of Trade that 
carries out the task of facilitating and supporting improvements of national exports. 
This agency also has the task of improving the country’s profile overseas, facilitating 
promotion of national products, and monitoring foreign trade activities. It is important 
in the strengthening of export development on commodity aspects and market access 
in order to increase export competitiveness. In the management of export policies and 
strategies it is recommended to strengthen sustainable export promotion, especially for 
SMEs.  
 
VI.g. Government efforts in the legal framework of decentralisation and 
deconcentration to support GSP utilisation. 
From the historical legal perspective “deconcentration” in Indonesia existed a 
long time before the establishment of Law No. 25/1999. According to the prevailing 
laws, the current deconcentration definition is not so different from the definition in 
the previous law.441 In brief, the implemented deconcentration is derived from the 
concept of previous laws, and is made into a new legal instrument. Deconcentration 
had been used by the centralised government as a tool to delegate some central 
government affairs to its representative at the local level. In the New Order era Law No. 
5/1974 was issued in which it was mentioned that the central government was allowed 
to delegate its tasks and functions to “autonomous” local governments, with the 
exception of defence and security affairs, judicial system matters, monetary and other 
functions that can only be handled by the central government. In fact, Law No. 5/1974 
was never fully implemented by the central government. In 1996, its implementation 
was attempted but in the end failed, since in practice the central government still kept 
its strong domination, especially in human resource management.442 
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The concept and definition of deconcentration in Indonesia is a delegation of 
some state official competences at the central government level to state official at the 
local level.443 From a political perspective, deconcentration was used to bring the 
central government closer to the people through direct contact with some government 
affairs. It was also used to minimise complaints and protest from the local level 
towards the central government policy. While from the legal perspective, it was used to 
implement government law and policy at the local level. Economically speaking, 
deconcentration could enhance the efficiency of bureaucracy where government 
officials or apparatus at the local level were actively involved in the planning-making 
and implementation of government policy.444  
In order to implement deconcentration, guidelines are needed, therefore, 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007 and Government Regulation No. 7/2008 were 
issued.445 These regulations are regarded as the legal basis of the implementation of 
deconcentration. Deconcentration is the delegation of authority to the Governor as the 
representative of central government at the local level and/or the vertical institutions 
in certain areas. In the elucidation Government Regulation No. 7/2008, it is clearly 
stated that: "the Republic of Indonesia in executing its administration adheres to the 
principles of decentralisation, deconcentration and assistantship task". This means that 
deconcentration and assistance tasks are undertaken as a consequence of the unitary 
state in which central government entitles authorities except for some competences 
that are delegated to the local governments.446 In addition, Government Regulation No. 
7/2008 states that in conducting its affairs, the government can execute its own 
government's affairs, delegate part of the governmental affairs to the Governor as the 
representative of the government (deconcentration) or assign the local government's 
affairs (assistantship task).447 Specifically, Article 16 Paragraph 5 of Government 
Regulation No. 7/2008 regulates the implementation of the deconcentration system 
between the central government and local government.448  
Article 1 Paragraph 1 of Trade Minister Regulation No. 42/M-DAG/PER/12/2011 
defines deconcentration as an authority delegation from government to Governor as 
the government representative and/or to the vertical institution in a particular area.449 
Concerning deconcentration in the trade sector, Article 3 Paragraph 1, stipulates 
that:450 
“[…] Government delegates some of its affairs in the trade sector under the Minister 
competences to Governor as the government representative […]”. 
Thus, Article 5 Paragraph 1 stipulates that in the implementation of deconcentration on 
the trade sector, the government entitles the tasks of synchronisation of local 
government affairs, implementing effective and efficient principles in deconcentration, 
and undertaking the duty of coordination, management, monitoring, supervision, and 
reporting.451 
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The transformation of the national management system from the centralised ones 
into a decentralised system has granted greater autonomy for local government to 
organise its own public services and give more opportunities for local government to 
participate in determining the direction of its economic development. Given the 
important role of the local government, as well as the geographic coverage and 
economic reasons, the central government needs the local government as its 
representative to implement programmes and policies at the local level.452 
Deconcentration on the trade sector is used to support development and trade 
expansion in order to promote the acceleration of economic growth at the local level.453 
As stated in President Regulation No. 29/2010 on Government Work Plans of the Year 
2011 wherein a relationship of synergy and harmony between local government and 
the central government is one of the main focuses of Indonesia’s national 
development.454  
Development of foreign trade facilitation at the local level is aimed to expand 
market access on exports, and to improve export competitiveness through the 
enhancement of export product quality in the global market.455 The technical 
development of foreign trade facilitation at the local level is conducted through 
optimising the opportunity provided by international trade agreements456 such as FTA 
and/or unilateral trade preferences (GSP). The scope of foreign trade facilitations at the 
local level is to cover facilitation on export-import licenses and facilitation non-licenses. 
One of its main programmes is to provide online service on issuing certificates of origin 
and to establish electronic management on the utilisation of certificates of origin.457 
The foreign trade facilitation service became the main menu of the deconcentration 
programmes during the fiscal year of 2012. A significant result of the deconcentration 
programme on foreign trade facilitation is an automation certificate of origin that is 
operated online in eighty-five issuing agencies across Indonesia. In order to enhance 
the quality trade service and to ensure the appropriate implementation of 
deconcentration of the central government is carried out by coordinating with local 
trade institutions and certificate of origin issuing agencies.458 
It is important to strengthen coordination and communication between central 
government and local government to implement of trade policy and to achieve 
harmonization on trade service. 459 The coordination and supervision of foreign trade 
policy at the local level includes several activities such as dissemination, evaluation and 
harmonization. Integrated foreign trade’s policy is aimed to enhance understanding 
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and cooperation between the business actor, trade officials, and relevant technical 
agencies. 460 Supervision and evaluation of foreign trade activities at the local level is 
encompassing export-import’s performance at the local level and development of 
potential exports products in world market. 461 
Coordination activity is conducted in two ways, i.e., establishing coordination 
forum with related institutions at the local level to promote exports and establishing 
coordination to provide integrated management dealing with foreign trade issues. 
Coordination is aimed to improve performance of local government institutions. Local 
government institutions are expected to design policies for increasing exports 
performance through reducing trade barriers, utilizing preferences opportunities and 
local comparative advantages. Integrated coordination is used to collect feedback from 
stakeholders and business actors toward government’s foreign trade policies. This 
activity is scheduled to be held in thirty-three provinces from February to October 
2012. 462 
Dissemination of foreign trade policy includes general policies of the exports-
imports such as, barriers to trade issues; management of export-import; customs 
procedures; transportation policy to support flow of goods; the role of banking in 
export financing. Dissemination activities is conducted in thirty-three province from 
February to October 2011.463 The participants of dissemination activity consist of 
business actors, civil servant in the foreign trade sector, business agencies and related 
technical agencies, with composition 60% business actors and 40% civil servants. 464  
Anticipating the rapid development of international trade and its’ complexity,  
civil servants as the elements of stakeholders have to be equipped with the sufficient 
knowledge and skill. Technical assistantship is the activities to upgrade human 
resources knowledge and competency in delivering public services of foreign trade. 
Technical assistantship’s on foreign trade policies conducted with purposes to improve 
technical knowledge of civil servants of the local trade institution in delivering 
adequate public service of export-import to business actors. 465 Technical assistantship 
is covering the technical policy of export and import; technical policy of facilitating the 
export and import; and management of trade barriers issues. 466 467 
According to Made Suwandi, public sector reform is needed to improve the local 
governments’ capacity to carry out their functions on service delivery.468 Local 
governments are given greater responsibilities of delivering key development projects 
and public services.469 Anwar Shah and Theresa Thompson reflect on the ‘silent 
revolution’ in public sector governance that is sweeping across the globe and has aimed 
to move decision-making for local public services closer to the people.470 Further Made 
Suwandi describes that the sub-unit of central government (the district and city 
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governments) is the front line of the whole governmental structure, which has the role 
of delivering services according to established standards and norms. He argues that the 
main reason for granting authority to delivering services to the districts and cities is 
due to their closeness to the people, thus, it gives them better knowledge of the needs 
and preferences of the people. In addition, a close position to the people will enhance 
accountability and effectiveness in service delivery.471 Therefore, improving service 
delivery has been placed as a common factor of the demand for decentralisation.472 The 
trade facilitation system in Indonesia is strongly influenced by special patterns of the 
local autonomy applied, which are based on decentralisation, deconcentration, and 
assistantship tasks principles. 
Delegation of some government affairs in the trade sector to the governor, as a 
government representative at the local level to implement deconcentration is regulated 
by Article 15 of Trade Minister Regulation No. 46/M-DAG/PER/12/2011.473 Article 1 
Paragraph 2 Trade Minister Regulation No. 46/M-DAG/PER/12/2011 stipulates that 
one of the functions of the deconcentration budget is to develop foreign trade 
facilitation and to develop exports at the local level.474 
The deconcentration budget is used to finance the implementation of 
competences delegation from government to local government. The deconcentration 
budget is taken from the allocation of the state budget.475 Most deconcentration 
programmes on the trade sector are used to support capacity building and the 
development of human resources in order to accelerate development and economic 
growth at the local level.476 Improvement of human resource capacities is carried out 
through education and training in foreign trade.477 
 
VII. Indonesia’s certificate of Rules of Origin  
VII.a. Indonesia’s certificate of Rules of Origin 
Indonesia’s certificate of origin has existed since the 1970s. President Directive 
No. 58/1971 concerns the appointment of government officials who have the authority 
to issue certificates of origin. The existence of the certificate of origin has been changed 
many times since its establishment, as a consequence of Indonesia’s participation in the 
international forum, particularly to fully integrate with the multilateral trading system. 
The certificate of origin must comply with international practices and standards. On the 
other hand, the market expansion of Indonesian export products has increased the 
demand for certificates of origin. Therefore, to respond to such challenges, it is urgent 
to improve the public services related to the issuance of certificates of origin. Trade 
Minister Regulation No. 33/M-DAG/PER/8/2010, emphasises affectivity and efficiency 
principles on the process of the issuance of certificates of rules of origin through a 
simple, speedy, correct, and transparent public service. 
International trade practices have evolved along with the development of 
technology, consequently, the government has been asked to adopt new technology 
into trade facilitation. Thus, it brought implication of ICT implementation in the 
issuance of certificates of origin. The establishment of Indonesia’s rules of origin is 
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based on the WTO legal framework478 and on other international legal instruments 
ratified by Indonesia.  
Certificate of origin is defined as documents accompanying Indonesia’s export 
products that have complying rules of origin, for entering the territory of certain 
countries, evidencing that such product comes from Indonesia. In other words, the 
certificate of origin is used as a legal document to show the nationality of the export 
products. Since the EU decided to require certificate of origin as one of the criteria to 
grant GSP, therefore, it is granted based on the requirements of unilateral stipulation of 
the preference-granting country.479 
Article 2 of Trade Minister Regulation No. 33/M-DAG/PER/8/2010 divided the 
certificate of origin into two types, preferential certificate of origin and non-
preferential certificate of origin.480 According to this regulation, preferential certificate 
of origin is issued to obtain facility of reduction or elimination of tariff duty from states 
or a group of states towards Indonesia’s export products that comply with the 
requirements of international agreements or unilateral preferences.481  While non-
preferential origin is issued for the purpose of proving the national origin of goods 
without asking to obtain any tariff preferences.482  Indonesia preferential certificate of 
origin consists of :483 
1. General System Of Preferences (GSP)  (using Form A)  
2. ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)  (using Form D) 
3. Certificate in Regard to Traditional Handicraft Batik Fabrics of Cotton 
4. Certificate in Regard to Certain Handicraft Products 
5. Certificate Relating to Silk Cooton Handlooms Products 
6. Industrial Craft Certification (ICC) 
7. Global System of  Trade Preference Among Developing Countries (GSTP) (using Form 
GTSP) 
8. Certificate of Handicraft Goods 
9. Certificate of Authenticity Tobacco 
10. ASEAN China FTA (ACFTA) (using Form E) 
11. ASEAN Korea FTA (AKFTA) (using Form AK) 
12. Indonesia Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJ-EPA) (using Form IJ-EPA) 
13. ASEAN India FTA (AIFTA) (using Form AI) 
Indonesia non-preferential certificate of origin consists of: 
1. International Coffee Organization 
2. COO for Imports of Agricultural Products Into the EEC 
3. Certificate in Regard to Handlooms Textile Handicraft & Traditional Textile Products of 
the Cottage Industry 
4. COO (using Form K) 
5. Certificate in Regard to Handlooms Textile Handicraft Traditional Indonesia Handicraft 
Batik & Traditional Textile Products of the Cottage Industry 
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6. COO TP 
7. Form B 
8. Annexo III 
Handicraft preferences started to be introduced in 1971. Preference-granting 
countries of handicraft preferences are all developed countries that grant GSP. 
Receivers of these preferences are all handicraft products from all countries including 
developed countries. Handicraft preferences give facility of tariff duties reduction. The 
Global system of Trade Preferences (GTSP) was introduced in April 1989, and now has 
43 member countries484, including Indonesia. In 2007 the third negotiation round was 
held in Sao Paulo, Brazil, during which Market Access and Rules of Origin were 
discussed. 
 
VII.b. Formalities and procedures of Certificate of Rules of Origin. 
The form of certificates of origin is issued based on the development of 
international agreement, unilateral stipulation, or stipulation from the Indonesian 
government.485 Based on this provision the Indonesian government may issue 
certificates of origin for the purpose of complying with requirements of unilateral 
stipulation. The EU has made specific regulations that regulate the rules of origin of 
their unilateral preferences (in this regard GSP) through Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 1063/2010. As mentioned above, the rules of origin have important roles in the 
implementation of the EU GSP scheme in order to prevent trade deflection or trade 
fraud. It is stipulated that the rules of origin are used to ensure that the benefit of GSP is 
enjoyed and utilised properly by the beneficiary countries to fulfil their “development 
needs”. Therefore, the rules of origin must comply with the objectives of the GSP 
scheme.486 With regard to the certificate of origin stipulated by Indonesia’s 
government, it will be issued for specific export products and certain export 
destinations, which require certificate of origin.487 The Director General, for and on 
behalf of the Minister, stipulates the certificate of origin issuing agency.488 The Director 
General is also entitled to change the certificate of origin issuing agency based on the 
principle of affectivity and efficiency.489 To obtain the certificate of origin, the exporter 
must submit a request to the certificate of origin issuing agency.490 While Article 7 
Paragraph 2 regulates the requirement documents that need to be submitted to obtain 
certificate of origin. The list of the certificate of origin issuing agencies is regulated 
under Trade Minister Regulation No. 60/M-DAG/PER/12/2010. 
As explained previously, the existence of the certificate of origin, particularly the 
preferential one, is designed to prevent trade deflection or trade fraud in foreign trade. 
The certificate of origin is used to ensure that the benefits of trade go to those who are 
supposed to receive it. There are five important principles that should be applied in the 
procedures of issuing certificates of origin, including accuracy, prudentiality, 
transparency, simplicity, and speed.  
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The first two principles, accuracy and prudentiality, have been set forth in Article 
7 Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Trade Minister Regulation No. 33/M-DAG/PER/8/2010. In 
brief, those provisions were applied to the measures of checking, examining, and 
verifying documents that are submitted to obtain certificate of origin. Paragraph 3 
obliges the certificate of origin issuing agency to check and examine every request 
submitted by the exporter to make sure it has been completed in compliance with the 
rules of origin according to international agreements or unilateral stipulation (for 
instance GSP rules of origin). Thus, checking and examining whether the information 
and documents submitted by the exporter are correct and accurate. 
In order to confirm whether such information is correct and justified, it needs 
verification. With regard to the compliance of the rules of origin, Paragraph 4, regulates 
verification towards the first request certificate of origin that has been made by the 
exporter and verification towards the request certificate of origin that is allegedly 
doubted.491 Such verifications must be conducted and at least cover four aspects, as 
regulated by Paragraph 5, that is, the real existence and the legality of the company, 
justified local invoice documents, production capacity, and production process.492 Such 
aspects are implemented to prevent trade deflection and trade fraud, which is 
committed by certain parties to take advantage of trade through circumvention 
conducts. The real existence and the legality of the company are crucial to ensure that 
the export company or the trader actually exist in the area of jurisdiction of the 
republic of Indonesia. This has the purpose of avoiding SPV (special purpose vehicle) 
companies or false companies obtaining certificate of origin for illegal use. The 
production process and capacity are used to justify whether the exported products are 
compliant with the rules of origin. In this regard, exported products must comply with 
the rules of origin that regulate the value content such as the percentage of local 
content and/or regional content.493 
The following principles of transparency, simplicity, and speed are envisaged in 
Paragraph 6. This principle is implemented with a time limit for the issuing agency to 
issue the requested certificate of origin, which means all requirements should be 
completed and confirmed. It is regulated at a maximum of one day after the documents 
are received by the certificate of origin issuing agency. Regarding the refusal of the 
requested certificate of origin, the certificate of origin issuing agency must issue 
written notice containing the reasons for refusal. This complies with the application of 
the transparency principle. Further, Trade Minister Regulation No. 59/M-
DAG/PER/12/2010 regulates the details of the technical procedure of issuing 
certificate of origin for Indonesian export products.  
In order to ensure that such procedures are implemented properly in the process 
of issuing the certificate of origin, sanctions towards any violations are regulated. 
Article 9 Paragraph 1 of Trade Minister Regulation No. 33/M-DAG/PER/8/2010 
stipulates that in case the certificate of origin issuing agency on carrying out its 
competences violates the regulations, it would lead to a sanction to reduce its 
competences on issuing certificates of origin. However, the worse sanction is to revoke 
all the competences of the certificate of origin issuing agency.  Further, Article 2 
Paragraph 5 of Trade Minister Regulation No. 60/M-DAG/PER/12/2010 regulates the 
revocation of competency of the certificate of origin issuing agency. The competency of 
the certificate of origin issuing agency will be revoked, in the case of:  
a. not issuing a certificate of origin for six months consecutively. 
                                                 
491 See Article 7 paragraph 4 the Trade Minister Regulation No. 33/M-DAG/PER/8/2010. 
492 See Article 7 paragraph 5 the Trade Minister Regulation No. 33/M-DAG/PER/8/2010. 
493 See Estevadeordal, Antoni., Harris, Jeremy., and Suominen, Kati., 2009, Op. Cit., p. 9. 
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b. not submitting reports of export realisation based on the certificate of origin issued 
for six months consecutively. 
c. not submitting reports of the number of requested certificates of origin and 
certificates of origin that have been issued over six months consecutively. 
Article 9 Paragraph 2 of Trade Minister Regulation No. 33/M-DAG/PER/8/2010 
regulates the sanction of the violation, which is conducted by the government officials 
who are in charge of signing the certificate of origin (Authorised Signer Officers). If it is 
proven that the official concerned has committed violation again the rules he/she will 
be sanctioned through revocation of his/her competences to sign the certificate of 
origin.  Further, Article 3 of Trade Minister Regulation No. 60/M-DAG/PER/12/2010 
regulates the criteria of government officers who are appointed as the official with the 
competency to sign the certificate of origin (Signer Officers). There are some benefits of 
using the e-SKA (e-CO) verification system such as improving accuracy, eliminating 
document fraudulence, document exchange enabling technology, web based 
verification for endorsed customs partners, and faster services. 
 
Figure 35. Standard Operational Procedure verification scheme from importing 
country authority. 494 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
494 Cited from National Single Window (NSW) System, History, Establishment, Development & Implementation in 
Indonesia, Presented on Indonesia Trade Facilitation Policy Studies Forum held by Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta Plaza Hotel, 12 July 2012 (attended directly by 
the researcher). 
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Figure 36. Proposed Certification of origin verification through electronic 
certification of origin.495 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37. e-Certificate of origin verification option.496 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
495 See Ibid. 
496 See Ibid. 
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Figure 38. Automation certificate of origin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39. Web based e-certificate of origin verification page. 
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Figure 40. e-certificate of origin verification option.497 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41. Example of automatic data reconciliation/verification through ASW/INSW. 
 
 
 
 
 
VII.c. Institutions in Indonesia with the competence to issue certificate of origin. 
The list of certificate of origin issuing agencies is regulated in Trade Minister 
Regulation No. 60/M-DAG/PER/12/2010, which has recently been amended by the 
new Trade Minister Regulation No. 21/M-DAG/PER/4/2012. To submit request for 
certificate of origin the exporter may choose the venue for the issuance at the Issuing 
                                                 
497 See Ibid. 
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Agency based on the location or work area of the certificate of origin Issuing Agency, as 
follows:498 
a. The certificate of origin Issuing Agency whose work area includes the manufacturing 
area of the merchandise. 
b. The certificate of origin Issuing Agency whose work area includes the location of the 
foreign exchange bank used by the exporter. 
c. The certificate of origin Issuing Agency whose work area includes the location of 
Customs and Excise Service Office that issues the Merchandise Export Notification 
and/or the location where the Merchandise Export Notification is approved by the 
Customs and Excise Service Office official. 
d. The certificate of origin Issuing Agency whose work area includes the location where 
the merchandise is purchased. 
e. The certificate of origin Issuing Agency whose work area includes the location of 
merchandise shipment. 
f. The nearest certificate of origin Issuing Agency. 
The certificate of origin issuing agency is the institution/agency in Indonesia that 
is appointed by the Minister and that is given the authority to issue certificate of 
origin.499  The certificate of origin issuing agency is divided into two types, i.e. the 
certificate of origin issuing agency for common export commodities and the certificate 
of origin issuing agency for certain export commodities. There are eighty-five 
institutions and agencies listed as issuers of the certificate of origin for common export 
commodities. The list of government officials who act as the authority signer the 
certificate of origin are appointed by Trade Minister Directive No. 26/M-
DAG/KEP/1/2012 amended by Trade Minister Directive No. 299/M-DAG/KEP/3/2011. 
 
Figure 42. The distribution of the locations of regional Issuing Authorities of 
certificate of origin.500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
498 See Article 8 the Trade Minister Regulation No. 59/M-DAG/PER/12/2010. 
499 Certificate of origin issuing agency shall be any agency/body/institution specified and authorized by the Minister for 
issuing certificate of origin. Certificate of origin signing official shall be any official authorized and responsible 
for signing SKA at the SKA Issuing Agency the Minister stipulates. 
500 Cited from National Single Window (NSW) System, History, Establishment, Development & Implementation in 
Indonesia, Presented on Indonesia Trade Facilitation Policy Studies Forum held by Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta Plaza Hotel, 12 July 2012 (attended directly by 
the researcher). 
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VII.d. The significance of e-CO (e-SKA) application: Automation of issuance of 
certificate of origin towards utilisation of GSP. (http://e-ska.kemendag.go.id/). 
Simplification, harmonisation and automation of the rules of origin of the GSP is 
essential to facilitate its utilisation.  This leads to the question, why are these 
documents so important in the GSP? First, a certificate of origin is one of the legal 
documents required to obtain the GSP facility. Second, failure or non-compliance to the 
rules of origin may lead to the temporary withdrawal of GSP. Third, rules of origin is 
one of the factors that undermines GSP utilisation.  
Firstly, it has to be noted that GSP facilities are granted based on the origin of the 
goods or products, thus, the goods must fulfil the conditions to be originating from the 
beneficiary country. Trade preferences given under GSP are directed at certain target 
countries with the objective of helping to improve the economic development of those 
countries. Therefore, the rules of origins have become the crucial technical requirement 
to obtain the GSP facility. The beneficiary country is obliged to demonstrate evidence to 
obtain the originating status of its products. It should be in compliance with the 
standards applied by the EU. The beneficiary country is also required to provide 
“administrative structures and systems” to comply with the rules and procedures 
determined by the regulation. More details and complex rules of origin create more 
difficulties for exporters to demonstrate evidence to obtain the certificate of origin. To 
assist exporters and simplify the formalities and procedures of issuing certificate of 
origin, therefore, digital issuance of the certificate of origin is provided. One of the aims 
of automation is to reduce the excessive documents and long chain procedures in 
issuing certificates of origin. One of the automation processes of issuing the certificate 
of origin is transforming paper documents into electronic documents, as stipulated by 
Article 5 of the Trade Minister Regulation No. 59/M-DAG/PER/12/2010 concerning 
provisions in issuing the certificate of origin for Indonesia’s export merchandise: 
“[…] To accelerate the SKA issuance, in addition to submitting the certificate of 
origin request and support document directly to the certificate of origin issuing 
agency, the exporter is required to submit the certificate of origin request and 
support documents using electronic data storage such as a diskette, memory stick 
(USB), optical disc, electronic mail or website […]”.  
The withdrawal system of the EU GSP is regulated in Articles 15–19 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008 is amended by Regulation (EU) No 512/2011. 
Temporary withdrawal is due to the failure or non-compliance to the rules of origin, 
elaborated as follows: 
“[…] the fraud case; irregularities or systematic failure to comply with or to ensure 
compliance with the rules concerning the origin of the products and the 
procedures related thereto; or failure to provide the administrative cooperation as 
required for the implementation; and policing of the arrangements under EU GSP 
scheme […]”.501 
Administrative cooperation is one of the elements that has to be provided by the 
beneficiary country in order to implement the EU GSP scheme.502 The beneficiary 
country should keep communications and send updates of the indispensable 
information regarding the implementation and controlling the rules of origin. The 
technical procedures on managing and controlling issuance of the certificate of origin is 
regulated under Article 7 of the Trade Minister Regulation No. 59/M-
DAG/PER/12/2010, i.e.: 
                                                 
501 See Paragraph 1 Article 16 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
502 See Paragraph 2  Article 16 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
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(1) The certificate of origin Signer Officer  shall inspect the correctness of the certificate 
of origin form and any supporting documents before such certificate of origin is 
signed by the certificate of origin Signer Officer. 
(2) When in doubt about the correctness and completeness of any certificate of origin 
form or supporting document prior to the signing, such certificate of origin Signer 
Officer may: 
a. ask for additional information from the exporter. 
b. conduct verification by using data/information from the survey for comparison 
regarding data from the exporter, type of merchandise, source of raw material, 
and the production process, survey for comparison regarding data from the 
exporter, type of merchandise, source of law material, and the production 
process, including the cost structure per unit, made based on data from 
Merchandise State of Origin Tracking (PNAB) available in the database of the 
certificate of origin issuing system. 
(3) The Survey Merchandise State of Origin Tracking (PNAB) shall include general data of 
the exporter, type of merchandise, source of raw material, and the production 
process, including the cost structure per unit, and the results shall be stored in the 
database for reference in the certificate of origin issuing system, and such survey 
shall be conducted by the certificate of origin Issuing Agency and/or an independent 
surveyor. 
The beneficiary country can assist the Union, based on a request from the 
customs authorities of the member states, to verify the origin of the goods and 
promptly communicate its results. The beneficiary country can also assist the Union by 
allowing the Commission to coordinate and closely cooperate with the competent 
authorities of the member states, in order to verify the authenticity of the documents or 
the accuracy of information that is relevant to obtain the GSP scheme facilities. The 
beneficiary country should undertake the appropriate enquiries to identify and prevent 
infringement of the rules of origin. The beneficiary country must ensure the compliance 
of the rules of origin in respect of regional cumulation. The beneficiary country must 
assist the Union in the verification of processes, in terms of the presumption of origin 
relating to fraud. Non-compliance with the rules of origin, and/or failure to provide 
administrative cooperation can be sufficient evidence for temporary withdrawal. It 
could also lead to suspension of the preferential arrangements.503 In the suspension 
mechanism, the Commission first has to inform the Generalised Preferences 
Committee504. The investigation is established by cooperation with the beneficiary 
country concerned. In this matter, the Commission shall provide the beneficiary 
country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate in the investigation.505 
In addition, the Commission may verify the information received from the 
economic operators in the beneficiary country concerned.  The findings are made based 
on the available facts. If the information requested by the Commission cannot be 
provided within the period specified in the notice investigation announcement. The 
investigation period must be completed within one year. However, the Commission 
may extend this period in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 27(5). 
                                                 
503 See Paragraph  3  Article 16 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
504 As Stipulated by Paragraph 1 Article 27 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008, that the Commission shall be 
assisted by a Generalised Preferences Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee). Paragraph 2 
governs the competence of the Committee, which may examine any matter relating to the application of this 
Regulation, raised by the Commission or at the request of a Member State. Further, paragraph 3 stipulated that 
the Committee shall examine the effects of the scheme, on the basis of a report from the Commission covering 
the period since 1 January 2006. This report shall cover all of the preferential arrangements, and the result will 
be presented in time for the discussion on the next Regulation. 
505 See Paragraph  1  Article 18 Section 1 Chapter III of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008. 
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The EU regulation is related to the procedure to verify and to investigate that 
failure or non-compliance to the rules of origin is in line with Article 11 of Trade 
Minister Regulation No. 59/M-DAG/PER/12/2010, that is stipulated as follows: 
1. The certificate of origin Issuing Agency is required to respond and settle any demand 
for certificate of origin verification from any government/formal agency of the 
country of export destination regarding validity and correctness of certificate of 
origin data/information. 
2. Exporters related to such verification are required to provide data and information 
regarding the validity and correctness of certificate of origin data/information 
certificate of origin Issuing Agency. 
3. The Certificate of origin Issuing Agency shall respond to any demand for certificate of 
origin verification from any governmental/formal agency of the country of export 
destination within thirty (30) working days as of the date of receiving such demand. 
Too complex GSP rules of origin create obstacles for the developing country and 
LDCs to obtain facility of preferential tariff, since it would give the burden of extra cost 
on formalities and procedures to comply with the regulations. Therefore too rigid and 
detailed rules of origins could undermine the utilisation of GSP. Carrère et al. note that 
“[…] benefiting from market access requires proving the origin which itself is costly and 
reduces the benefits from that market access […]”506. Inama has written on assessing the 
impact of rules of origin in the utilisation of trade preferences under the GSP.507  
“[…] the fact that the utilisation rate is strictly linked to the origin requirements is 
very clear to beneficiary countries….In some cases, exporters may have not submitted 
the necessary documentation (such as a certificate of origin) to get preferential 
treatment because of lack of knowledge or incorrect information […].508 
The roles of government trade institutions in beneficiary countries become crucial 
to ensure that their traders have sufficient information to obtain tariff facilities under 
the GSP scheme. Dissemination of GSP information in the beneficiary country is crucial 
since not all traders are aware of the tariff reduction given under the GSP scheme. 
Therefore, trade institutions in the beneficiary country are deemed as the core engine 
to drive GSP utilisation. The preference-granting country has designed its policy to 
simplify and relax the GSP rules of origin, however, the role of the beneficiary country 
institutions to deliver information, public services, and assistantship to the traders to 
access the GSP facility is much more significant. Lack of knowledge or incorrect 
information would be the common problem faced by local companies (SMEs) or local 
traders, which are located away from the centre of the central government institutions. 
Generally, beneficiary countries lack infrastructures in transportation and 
communication that causes the high cost fee for producers and traders to obtain 
documents of rules of origin.  
                                                 
506 See Cèline Carrère, Jaime de Melo, and Bolormaa Tumurchudur, 2008. 
507 See Inama, Stefano., 2009, Op. Cit.,  pp. 360-361. 
508 See Ibid., pp. 360-361. 
 474 
Table 52. Utilisation of the Certificate of Origin Form A GSP to EU 27 2010. 
 
 
YEARS No. 
EU 27 Member 
Countries Exports 
Destinations 
Total Number of 
Certificate of Origin  
Form A 
FOB USD 
2010 1 Austria                                     1.739                              34,041,903  
2010 2 Belgium                                  24,994                            788,675,704  
2010 3 Bulgaria                                        648                              32,280,437  
2010 4 Cyprus                                        294                                9,479,332  
2010 5 Czech Republic                                     1,836                            112,680,329  
2010 6 Denmark                                     3,596                            142,315,416  
2010 7 Estonia                                        166                                7,509,160  
2010 8 Finland                                     1,556                              51,797,100  
2010 9 France                                  22,625                            696,106,543  
2010 10 Germany                                  43,413                        1,535,349,783  
2010 11 Greece                                     3,663                            127,106,728  
2010 12 Hungary                                     1,151                              24,683,337  
2010 13 Ireland                                     1,072                              30,760,697  
2010 14 Italy                                  19,798                        2,142,747,345  
2010 15 Latvia                                        287                                9,599,409  
2010 16 Lithuania                                        291                              21,686,935  
2010 17 Luxembourg                                        212                              14,322,124  
2010 18 Malta                                        132                                2,556,844  
2010 19 Netherlands                                  32,540                        1,871,444,124  
2010 20 Poland                                     4,118                            172,445,481  
2010 21 Portugal                                     1,817                              79,044,658  
2010 22 Romania                                        639                              18,744,137  
2010 23 Slovakia                                     1,594                              70,705,002  
2010 24 Slovenia                                        503                              23,206,888  
2010 25 Spain                                  12,793                            732,019,888  
2010 26 Sweden                                     3,862                            128,104,996  
2010 27 United Kingdom                                  29,084                        1,055,749,511  
Total CoO Form A EU GSP                             214,423                       9,935,163,811 
 
Source: Directorate General of Export and Import Facilitation Ministry of Trade Republic of 
Indonesia May 2012. 
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Table  53. Utilisation of the Certificate of Origin Form A GSP to EU 27 2011. 
 
YEARS No. 
EU 27 Member 
Countries Exports 
Destinations 
Total Number of 
Certificate of Origin  
Form A 
FOB USD 
2011 1 Austria                                     1,883                            102,834,263  
2011 2 Belgium                                  26,679                            899,592,205  
2011 3 Bulgaria                                        540                              30,141,020  
2011 4 Cyprus                                        308                                7,959,596  
2011 5 Czech Republic                                     2,014                              92,903,716  
2011 6 Denmark                                     3,262                            158,467,741  
2011 7 Estonia                                        225                              19,339,018  
2011 8 Finland                                     1,458                              59,422,981  
2011 9 France                                  22,302                            819,991,954  
2011 10 Germany                                  43,497                        1,849,691,986  
2011 11 Greece                                     3,365                            112,365,239  
2011 12 Hungary                                     1,167                              43,962,587  
2011 13 Ireland                                     1,076                              35,788,230  
2011 14 Italy                                  20,001                        1,953,901,938  
2011 15 Latvia                                        358                              22,022,141  
2011 16 Lithuania                                        394                              32,417,236  
2011 17 Luxembourg                                        194                              14,253,071  
2011 18 Malta                                        138                                2,935,554  
2011 19 Netherlands                                  29,546                        1,936,401,280  
2011 20 Poland                                     4,588                            218,294,024  
2011 21 Portugal                                     1,462                            113,827,840  
2011 22 Romania                                        644                              53,406,230  
2011 23 Slovakia                                     1,244                              46,309,576  
2011 24 Slovenia                                        405                              31,035,460  
2011 25 Spain                                  13,151                            840,156,762  
2011 26 Sweden                                     3,673                            136,909,207  
2011 27 United Kingdom                                  28,054                        1,017,381,986  
Total CoO Form A EU GSP                             211,628            10,651,712,841 
 
Source: Directorate General of Export and Import Facilitation Ministry of Trade Republic of 
Indonesia May 2012. 
 
 
VIII. e-Trade: e-government implementation to improve foreign trade services. 
VIII.a. Idea of e-government. 
Rapid developments in information and communication technology (ICT) creates 
challenges and opportunities for the government which demand transformation and 
innovation in public service delivery. From social changes and dynamicisation of world 
development emerges the need to reinvent government systems, which are aimed to 
deliver efficient and cost effective services, information and knowledge using ICT.509 
Reinventing the government system is a sustainable effort to fulfil the obligations of the 
                                                 
509 See Zhiyuan Fang, E-Government in Digital Era : Concept, Practice, and Development, International Journal of The 
Computer, The Internet and Management, Vol. 10, No.2, 2002, pp. 1-22. 
 476 
government as a provider of public services, which should meet the needs of the 
customer, not bureaucracy.510  
Nowadays, e-government is part of an organisational process including decision-
making, supervising, planning, organising, coordinating, staffing effectively, and 
delivering public services to society properly.511 In this regard, Osterweil writes that 
the awareness of understanding and documenting organisational processes began 
before the existence of computers or other digital means.512 Max Weber identifies 
written documentation as one of the core characteristics of bureaucracy. Weber 
elaborates that the importance of written documentation because “it splits the working 
life from the private life of public officials”.513 Documentation now becomes part of 
administration which is essential for the viability and development of the organisation.  
The use of computers in government started right from when computers were 
first created, in fact, Curtin notes that the first mainframe computers in government 
agencies started to be introduced in the 1950s.514 In the 1970s, literature on “IT in 
government” began to be developed.515 In the early stages of development, computers 
more often dealt with internal use in the government, compared to today, where they 
are used for internal and external use, such delivering public services to citizens. As 
noted by Ho, recent e-government literature is more focused on external use.516 The 
computing in government continues to evolve along with the development of 
technology.  
The term “e-government” began to be used and promoted in the mid-1990s517 
when the Internet boom started518. The use of the term became more popular after the 
Internet reached all levels of society.519 The idea of e-government itself was brought up 
by Albert Arnold "Al" Gore Jr, the former United States Vice President (1993-2001). The 
concept of e-government was born from his vision of an automated public service 
delivery to the citizen. In this regard, the citizen was linked to all the various agencies 
of government to access all kinds of government services in an automated and 
automatic way. Al Gore considered that the completion of public service delivery to 
citizens depended on some factors such as information and communication networks 
to reduce time and costs, advance performance, speed of delivery, and effectiveness of 
implementation.520 In other words, e-government is how it brings citizens and the 
business community closer to their governments.521 
                                                 
510 See Osborne, David, and Gaebler, Ted., Reinventing Government : How the Entrepreneurial is Transforming the Public 
Sector. 
511 See Shailendra C. Jain  Palvia and Sushil S. Sharma, E-Government and E-Governance: Definitions/Domain  Framework 
and Status around the World, available at : http://www.iceg.net/2007/books/1/1_369.pdf. 
512 See Osterweil, Leon J., et.al, Analyzing Processes for E-Government Application Development : The Emergence of Process 
Definition Languages, Journal of E-Government, Vol. 1 (4) 2004, The Haworth Press, Inc, available at : 
http://www.haworthpress.com/web/JEG.  
513 See Weber, 1946; Osterweil, Leon J., 2004.  
514 See Curtin, Gregory G., E-Government, Manuscript accepted by Sage Publications for publication in the “Encyclopedia 
of Political Communications” E-Governance April 2007, School of Policy, Planning, and Development, available at 
: http://www.usc.edu/schools/price/bedrosian/private/docs/encyclopedia_of_political_communications.pdf. 
515 See Kraemer, et al, 1978; Danziger and Andersen, 2002; Thomas A. Horan  and Åke Grönlund, Introducing e-Gov:  
History, Definitions, And Issues, Communications of the Association for Information System, available at : 
http://www.cips.org.in/public-sector-systems/Introducing_e_governance.pdf. 
516 See Ho, 2002; Thomas A. Horan  and Åke Grönlund 
517 See Thomas A. Horan  and Åke Grönlund. 
518 See Thomas A. Horan  and Åke Grönlund. 
519 See Curtin, Gregory G., E-Government, 2007. 
520 See Tamara Almarabeh, and Amer AbuAli, A General Framework for E-Government: Definition Maturity Challenges, 
Opportunities, and Success, European Journal of Scientific Research, ISSN 1450-216X Vol.39 No.1 (2010), pp.29-
42, © EuroJournals Publishing, Inc. 2010 , available at : http://www.eurojournals.com/ejsr_39_1_03.pdf, pp. 29. 
521 See Zhiyuan Fang, 2002, Loc. Cit., p. 1-22. 
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This idea followed up by Vice President Al Gore on the National Performance 
Review, he placed a strong emphasis of the role of e-government in federal services.522 
Common people understood the concept of e-government as a transformational 
process in government, governance, politics, democracy and public management that 
associated with the application of information technology use. 523 
The application of information technology in all aspect of public administration 
migrate its position from supporting tool’s to one of the major necessity.  Structures 
and function of e-government not merely dealing with documentation but becomes 
more complex either technically or socially. These changes give influences in the public 
administration reforms, transformation of public services delivery, and the pattern of 
institutional partnership between (local) government, citizens, and their local 
communities. 524 
According to Molnar, public administration consist of two main areas, called as 
the service-side (or back-office) and the customer-side (or front-office). E-government 
is required to balance public administration working properly on both area’s, especially 
on the distribution of public goods (the content) and administration (control). In this 
point, e-government running two functions. At the back office e-government functioned 
as service provider, which is responsible at renewal of the internal operation of public 
administration institutions. At the front office, e-government dealing with customers, 
which is functioned as communication tools connecting government institutions, the 
population and the business sectors. 525 
Front office services as an “interface” is handling direct interaction between 
public administration and customers, where the exchange of information takes place. 
Interface of e-government usually takes a form of web portal or software application. 
The back-office’s tasks is serving the front-office, receiving and processing documents 
from the customers. In other words, the back-office’s tasks are ensuring all the 
necessary conditions for integrated administration and carry out processing 
(workflow, integrated databases, electronic signature, data protection, data safety, etc), 
then to return the result to the front-office. In addition, the back office task also 
supporting the efficiency operation, management, and control of public administration. 
526 In this point, the back-office has multi tasking function that determines the speed, 
accuracy, and fluency of public services distributed by front office. 
In the context of Indonesia’s foreign trade facilitation services, the front office or 
interface of the trade service is the e-trade portal, such as Inatrade and e-ska, which is 
integrated into a single portal known as Indonesia’s national single window (INSW). 
While, the back office services are carried out by the trade service unit (unit pelayanan 
perdagangan). This point will be discussed further in later in this chapter. 
 
VIII.b. Advantages of e-government as a driving force implementation of good 
governance in the government. 
E-government development finds its roots in the emergence of information 
society, which demands the government to improve its services in order to create a 
                                                 
522 See Gore, 1993; Salem, 2003; Thomas A. Horan  and Åke Grönlund. 
523 See Curtin, Gregory G., E-Government, 2007. 
524 See Szilard Molnar, E-Government in the European Union, Budapest, July, 2007, available at : 
http://www.ittk.hu/netis/doc/ISCB_eng/09_Molnar_final.pdf. 
525 See Ibid. 
526 See Ibid. 
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more competitive environment in the global community. In other words, information 
technology has a positive impact on the economic development of activities.527 
E-government is widely believed as a  driving force public service delivery 
enhancement through efficiency and transparency. The advantages of e-government 
are reducing the high cost bureaucracy, producing economic benefit, and enhancing 
government performance’s, it has been explained by some writers such as, Palvia, et.al.,  
Dada (2006), Middleton (2010), Tamara Almarabeh, et.al (2010), and DeBenedictis, i.e. 
:  
“[…] One of the benefits of E-government in developed countries is cost reduction in the 
transfer of information and online transactions […]”.528  
“[…] E-government program seeks to achieve greater efficiency in government 
performance, through raising the performance of services for beneficiaries and investors 
from all segments of society easily and accurately and efficiently, to become a new type of 
performance of official governmental and governmental transactions. Online interactive 
services may include such facilities as petitioning, rate paying, licensing or information 
queries. There continues to be a diversity of implementation quality and levels for such 
services […]”. 529 
“[…] E-government initiatives aimed at raising the level of government performance in 
general, where the proper application of these initiatives lead to upgrade the 
governmental services provided to citizens and the private sector and enhance the 
effectiveness of government work internally, in addition to broadening the participation 
of citizens in decision-making process […]”. 530 
“[…] E-government facilitates provision of relevant government information in electronic 
form to the citizens in a timely manner; better service delivery to citizens; empowerment 
of the people through access to information without the bureaucracy; improved 
productivity and cost savings in doing business with suppliers and customers of 
government; and participation in public policy decision-making […]”. 531  
“[…] E-government aimed to enhance and/or to transform the performance and 
accountability of government to be better, faster, and cheaper  […].” 532 
E-government is not just an interface for citizen to access the public services but 
it is also tools of social engineering of the information society. Fang (2002), emphasized 
the importance of e-government toward implementation of good governance 
principles, as follows: 
“[…] E-government is more than a website, email or processing transactions via the 
internet. E-government becomes a natural extension of the technological revolution that 
has accompanied the knowledge society. The E-government added new concepts such as: 
transparency, accountability, citizen participation in the evaluation of government 
performance […]”. 533 
 Furthermore, the essential task of government is governance that means their 
job’s is regulating society. They defined e-governance as the transformation of 
governance processes resulted from the continual and exponential introduction into 
society of more advanced digital technologies. 534 E-government provides many 
advantages for the government to carry out functions of governance in effective and 
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efficient way with higher quality of services and disseminating knowledge of 
technology to the wider community.  
Curtin homologates that the use of ICT in e-government would facilitate better 
and more open government and governance. Using such technology governments 
operate more effectively and transparently, provide more and better information and 
services to the public, and increase participation of society as individuals or groups in 
their own governance.535 E-government also contributes to improve better relationship 
between citizens and government536, in terms of public services and social political 
aspects.537 E-government changes the entire range of the relationship public agencies 
have with citizens, companies and other governments. In this respect, e-government 
even goes so far as fundamentally changing the production process in which public 
services are produced and delivered.538 Molnar noted, according to the Commission's 
initiative, e-government must have three essential characteristics, i.e., :539  
1. Open and transparent: public administration capable of comprehending citizens’ 
expectations, and it is accountable and open towards democratic participation;  
2. Cannot exclude anyone: user-centred public administration must reach everyone with 
personalised services;  
3. Effective public administration: operates to use taxpayers’ money in the most efficient 
way saving time and cost.  
To sum up, the application of e-government is intended to improve the delivery of 
public services closer to the citizens/users, to enhance interactions with business and 
industry, society empowerment through the access of information, and to increase 
efficiency in government management. The outcome of the application of e-government 
is expected to reduce corruption through transparency and better good governance, 
revenue growth, more convenience, and greater coverage of service areas. In the area 
of trade, it is intended to reduce transaction costs, to harmonise and simplify 
formalities and procedures. In the context of international trade, e-government would 
accelerate integrations into the world trading system.  
 
VIII.c. Definition of e-Government. 
As noted above e-government is acknowledged as a bright contemporary concept 
including multifarious aspects of applications from a social, organisational, and 
technical viewpoint, thus, it creates various definitions among researchers and 
specialists. Borrowing the words from Tamara Almarabeh et al, e-government is about 
how the government organises itself, its administration, rules, regulations and 
frameworks set out to carry out service delivery and to co-ordinate, communicate, and 
integrate processes within itself.540  
Palvia, et.al, describing e-government in broad definition as generic term for web-
based services from agencies of local, state and federal governments, to deliver national 
or local government information and services via the internet or other digital means to 
citizens or businesses or other governmental agencies. 541 While, Molnar defines e-
government from the practical perspective as a new culture created from a 
comprehensive and radical transformation in the course to which public administrative 
organisations make use of all the possibilities of electronics in order to improve the 
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availability, quality and transparency of public services, and reducing the costs of 
public administration. 542 From the technical term, Fang define e-government as an 
integrated tool comprising three enabling sets of new technology, consists of 
infrastructure, exploitation of public portals and solution for public service delivery. 543 
There are various definitions about e-government made by international 
organization that covering range of aspects. United Nations defined e-government in 
less broad sense, as the use of information and communications technology (ICT) and 
its application by the government for delivering government information and public 
services to the people. According to Curtin, the United Nation definition is lack of social 
and political aspects since it is not taking into account social and political participation 
of citizen.544  
According to the World Bank, e-government refers to the use by government 
agencies of information technologies (such as wide area networks, the Internet, and 
mobile computing) that have the ability to transform relations with citizens, 
businesses, and other arms of government. The outcome of such technology use is 
better delivery of government services to citizens, improved interactions with business 
and industry, citizen empowerment through information access, and more efficient 
government management. In addition, it is also deliver further benefit such as 
minimizing corruption, increased transparency, greater convenience, revenue growth, 
and/or cost reductions. 545 The Working Group on e-government in the developing 
world defines e-government as the use of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) to promote more efficient and effective government, to facilitate more accessible 
government services, allow greater public access to information, and make government 
more accountable to citizens.546 The European Commission defines e-government as 
tool that combines information technology, organisational changes and new skills in 
public administration, aimed to improve the quality of public services, reinforce the 
democratic process and support community objectives.547 OECD defines e-government  
as the comprehensive, smooth reorganisation of processes and endowing them with 
opportunities made possible by new  technologies,  whereby  administrative  and  
governmental  tasks  can  be  performed  on  the  interfaces  of agencies, citizens and 
politics, as well as within and between government agencies. 548 
From those various sources above, e-government is a multidiscipline field 
covering a range of aspects, mainly administration, political science, communications 
and media studies, law, public policy, engineering and computer sciences.549 Most of the 
definitions above also describe the application of e-government and its benefits to 
increase the people’s welfare. To sum up “e-government” is defined as the use of 
information technology by government institutions/agencies with the purpose to 
transform relations with society, businesses, and other government 
institutions/agencies. For example, INSW is an e-trade service that integrates 
government agencies or Ministry lines. E-trade that serves the relation between central 
government and local government is the automation of certificates of origin (Ina-trade 
system). Both of these e-trade services (INSW and Ina-trade) also transform relations 
between government agencies/institutions with business actors/traders.  
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VIII.d. Scope of e-government. 
Commonly, the scope of e-government is classified into three forms that is 
government to government (G to G), government to business (G to B) and government 
to citizen (G to C). G to C provides services and facilitates communication between the 
government and citizens. G to B provides services and facilitates communication 
between the government and the business sector. G to G facilitates communication in 
intergovernmental and among government institutions. However, researchers and 
experts have number of ways to classify e-government services based on the use or 
function or cluster of users. Many variants of the e-government services are established 
along with social changes and customers demand. For instance Fang added two other 
forms of e-government, i.e., government to non-profit organisations (G to N) and 
government to employees (G to E).  In the G to N, government provides information and 
communication to non-profit organisations, political parties and social organisations, 
and legislature. G to E is an initiative that facilitates the management of the civil service 
and internal communication with governmental employees, such as e-recruitment, e-
office, e-career development and e-assessment.550 
The resolution of the European Union describes that e-government consists of the 
following three main activities, i.e., the use of information and communication 
technology tools in public administration, modernisation of public administration, and 
dissemination of new tools and technologies through training to all stakeholders and 
citizens. There are six stages to build a system of e-government. Yet, each government 
agency has a different role in building such system. The degree of stages would depend 
on the capacity and capability of the related agencies. The first stage is very basic 
infrastructure such as the application of an internal network and the setting up of an 
email system. The second stage is enabling inter-organisational and public access to 
information. The third stage is authorisation of two-way communication. The fourth 
stage is allowing the exchange of value. The fifth stage is the application of digital 
democracy. The last stage is joined-up government.551 
According to Lowery, there are three key areas covered under e-government 
service, i.e., service provisions, digital democracy, and economic development. 552  
These areas shall meet the needs of the customers that include individual, economic 
operators, stakeholders, and community. Curtin is dividing e-government into three 
main areas that is e-administration, e-services, and e-participation. E-administration is 
dealing with the internal mechanisms, formalities, procedures, and structures of 
government. Implementation of e-administration is purposed to improve efficiency of 
administrative processes, eliminating red-tape bureaucracy, and promote the 
transparency and accountability. Core of e-administration is streamlining and 
automating bureaucratic processes that previously use large amount of paper and 
human discretion, in this regard, the inputs, process and results accessible and easy to 
monitor by the public. E-administration focused on internal matters since it is mainly 
deals with the backend processes and internal structure of government. E-
administration also associated with translating government documentation records 
into digital file, which available to be accessed through ICT tools. 553 
E-services defined as a tool that connecting the back-end processes with the end 
users, such as citizens, businesses community/economic operator, and other 
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government agencies.  554 E-services are consisting of four areas, where it is 
differentiated based on the cluster of customers and the needs of customers. First, e-
service dealing with government and citizen (G to C) relationship becomes the main 
focus of e-service initiatives, which delivering the immediate and tangible benefits to 
individuals and government. E-service on G to C mostly dealing with the basic needs of 
the citizen related to public service access such as education, health, housing, 
insurance, consumer protection, etc. Second area’s of e-service is dealing with business 
community, known G to B, which providing e-service to assist and to support economic 
operators in doing business. E-trade, e-procurement, and e-customs are type of 
services delivers in the area G to B. 555 In Indonesia e-trade service is implemented 
through Indonesian National Single Windows (INSW) System, which integrating 
government services to business community such as Inatrade system and e-custom into 
single entry and single exit. The G to B e-service is one of the most prominent projects 
in trade facilitations. It’s promoting low cost transaction, business friendly 
environment, encouraged fair business practices and enhances competitiveness.  
Third area’s of e-service is dealing with the relations of government to 
government. The G to G defined as the use of ICT by different governmental 
bodies/agencies, for instance among government line ministries (INSW), central 
government and local government (e-ska), or among different states (ASW). It has 
purposes to share and/or centralize information, or to automate and to streamline 
intergovernmental business processes, such as regulatory compliance, efficiency on 
time and cost savings, and service improvement. The scheme of G to G requires sharing 
of electronic information and integration because it’s integrating service delivery 
programs across government agencies and between levels of government.556It’s 
believed that more better internal’s e-service of the G to G could driving more 
improvement of external services, such as G to C and G to B.  
The fourth area’s of e-service is dealing with the relations of government to 
employees. The G to E refers to initiatives for internal purposes to integrate third-party 
services, such as allowing employees access to manage their benefits online to partake 
in tailored information related to the agency mission. 557  Among e-services the G to G is 
the large area and the most complex organizations, then followed by the G to B. The G 
to C is the “interface” of e-services that gone through a lot of challenges and pressures. 
558 
E-participation is mainly dealing with external focus, which includes formal 
interaction. E-participation is implemented on e-voting, formal participation tools 
(electronic input on policies, regulations and legislation), and more informal 
participation mechanisms (online citizen forums, direct access to government officials 
and policy makers). 559 E-Participation is associated with e-rule making, e-democracy, 
or e-regulations. E-participation aimed to promote the social empowerment of citizens 
and allow citizens to engage in the decision-making or participatory processes. The 
United Nations define the objective of e-participation to improve the citizen's access to 
information and public services; and promote participation in public decision-making 
that impacts the well being of society, in general, and the individual, in particular.  560 
As explained above, e-trade as part of G to B is a form of application e-
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government that connects the government to business community. Traditionally, the 
interaction between traders or business actors and government agencies/institutions 
is carried out in a government office. Along with ICT development, it is possible to bring 
service centres closer to the users (traders or business actors). Such centres may cover 
more services and integrate government agency services under one roof of e-services. 
E-trade allows businesses to transact with each other more efficiently (B to B) and 
brings customers closer to businesses (B to C), e-government is designed to make 
interactions between government and citizens (G to C), government and business 
enterprises (G to B), and inter-agency relationships (G to G) more friendly, convenient, 
transparent, and inexpensive.561  
 
VIII.e. E-Government in Indonesia. 
As concluded from many definitions of e-government, it covers a wide range of 
aspects from a cultural, social, economic and technological viewpoint. In this regard, 
establishing e-government is not just merely converting the manual formalities and 
procedures into a digital and automatic system, but rather to change the mind set and 
social behaviour of stakeholders and its society (customers). It has to be noted that e-
government, for most developing countries and LDCs is an expensive investment, 
however, it would deliver long rung benefits to the economic development of a state. 
Tamara Almarabeh and Amer Abu Ali note that “government readiness” is not the only 
factor to affect the success of e-government systems. It is also necessary to make an 
appraisal of some factors that have a strong correlation within e-government such as 
society (customers), government institutional frameworks, human resources, existing 
budgetary resources, interdepartmental relationships, national infrastructure, 
economic health, education, information policies, private sector development, and 
others related issues.562 These others factors may vary from one country to another 
country due to the different landscape of economic development. The United Nations 
divides the E-Government Readiness Index (EGDI) into three indexes, i.e. network, 
infrastructure, and human resources. Appraising these factors can help the government 
to define its strategy and grand design of e-government.  
Curtin notes that some countries, in the mid-to-late 1990s, for instance the United 
Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore were recognised as the 
early adopters of the e-government system. Canada and the United Kingdom were 
credited in contributing to building e-government systems that promoted and 
facilitated e-participation.  According to Curtin, South Korean and Estonia are 
considered as countries that have succeeded in implementing “comprehensive e-
services”, applying e-democracy and e-participation tools that facilitate citizens to 
participate virtually in online cabinet (ministries) meetings.563 E-government has 
become a trend that has quickly spread globally, it is based on the fact that the growth 
of government managed websites are extremely high, with an increase from 142 
government websites in 1995 to 50,000 government websites in 2001.564 
In the fourteenth year after the fall of the New Order, Indonesia continues to 
carry out its reforms in all aspects, relating to politics, economy, social issues and 
bureaucracy. Some important issues were raised during the Reformation era, that is, 
bureaucratic reforms, openness, good governance, and combating corruption. 
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Accountability, responsiveness and transparency in public services have become the 
main features to achieve a “clean” government. Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) is needed to implement these features in the daily activities of public 
services. The migration from manual services into ICT basis services was supposed to 
build a clean and transparent government capable of responding to the changes 
effectively, and to build a new dimension regarding organisation, management and 
processes with the aim of finally transforming the processes towards e-government. 
According to Haryono et al, the development of e-government in Indonesia is based on 
the following; a) supporting governmental change towards a democratic governance 
practice; b) supporting the application of authority balances between central and local 
government; c) facilitating communication between central and local governments; d) 
gaining openness; and e) transforming towards the information society era.565 
From the development perspective, it should be taken into account that Indonesia 
has specific characteristics in terms of its geography, culture, dispersion of population 
and economic circumstances.566, Indonesia as the biggest archipelago island in the 
world has more than 17,000 islands with a population of more than 230 million, where 
the economic development gap is still high. This gap causes the different levels of 
information technology capabilities and accessibilities vary. People who live in major 
cities have more access to ICT compared to those who live in rural areas who may have 
difficulty accessing such technology.567 However, the use of technology products such 
as computers and other high-tech gadgets is becoming more common in society 
regardless of its social economy status. This situation has occurred along with the 
improvement of people’s standard of living, education (human development index), 
and household income. In the information society era, technology is no longer seen as a 
luxury but as a necessity to assist people in their daily activities. Trade liberalisation is 
one of many factors driving the fast development of information society, where it 
provides many choices of ICT products with various affordable prices and a range of 
performance. In short, trade liberalisation increases competitiveness in the area of ICT 
that has benefited society, where people can get affordable products with the lowest 
price. The features of public services in Indonesia were characterised by closed 
bureaucracy, excessive documentation, time consuming procedures, and corruption. 
These backgrounds became thoughtful consideration for the Indonesian government to 
transform its public service into e-government.  
Since trade is one of the backbones of Indonesia’s national economy, the 
government services on trade urgently need addressing, especially regarding export-
import facilitation. E-trade is a manifestation of e-government that connects 
Government to Business. E-trade provides e-public services on trade sectors. There are 
five priority programmes, which are the key programmes of Indonesia’s national ICT 
development, including e-government, e-infrastructure, e-industry, e-learning, and e-
commerce.568 
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VIII.f. Legal framework of e-government. 
Democratic reforms that are primarily based on great demand for transparency 
and openness have contributed to the emergence of information society. 
Transformation of the centralised system into a decentralised system has brought an 
essential demand to the delivery of public services closer to the people by 
implementing good governance principles. Indonesia’s National ICT vision is “to bring 
into reality a modern information society, prosperous and highly competitive, with strong 
support by ICT”.569 
To provide the legal framework for the implementation of e-government the 
Indonesian government issued two Presidential Directives. Presidential Directive No. 
6/2001 on Telecommunications (Telecommunications, Media and Information) 
enclosing a five-year National Information and Communications Technology Action 
Plan for Indonesia.  Presidential Directive No. 3/2003 concerning National Policy and 
Strategic Development of E-government. Both of these Presidential Directives are used 
as a guidelines for the implementation of e-government at central and regional levels. 
The rapid development of ICT usage in business, such as e-commerce, has brought a 
demand of legal certainty for such activities. Therefore, the government of Indonesia 
established Law No. 11/2008 on Information and E-Commerce. To ensure 
transparency and public participation in the development process, the Indonesian 
government also issued Law No. 14/2008 concerning Openness of Public Information. 
By the issuance of Presidential Directive No. 6 /2011, e-government is officially 
started to be used in the public administration. This legal framework’s mandated the 
government of Indonesia to usage ICT’s for supporting implementation of good 
governance in the public services delivery. There are some strategic plans prepared to 
develop e-government, i.e.,: 570 
a) Developing a good service system with reasonable cost, with focuses to extend and to 
improve the quality of information and communication networks; to build the 
information portals and integrated public services; to build the electronic document 
management system, standardization and information security system. 
b) Developing management system of central and local government, with focuses to 
improve the quality of services needed by the community, to manage the changes, to 
enforce the leadership and to improve the regulation products. 
c) Optimizing the use of information technology, with focuses building the 
interoperability, standardization and procedure of electronic document management 
system, information security, basic application (e billing, e reporting) and to develop 
intergovernmental network. 
d) Improving the participation of private sector and information technology industry with 
focuses to use the expertise of the private sector, to encourage participation of private 
sector and small industries. 
e) Developing man-power’s capacity in the central and local government, with objectives 
to develop ICT culture in government institutions, to optimize the use of ICT training 
facilities, to extend the use of ICT for distant learning, and to put ICT as input for school 
curriculum and to improve the quality of teaching. 
Based on Presidential Directive No. 3/2003 concerning National Policy and Strategic 
Development of E-government, it setup e-government strategy consists of : 
a) Developing reliable, trust and affordable public services; 
b) Organization, management system and business process reform; 
c) Optimal use of ICT; 
d) Public - private partnership; 
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e) Human resource development and increase society e- literacy; 
f) Realistic and measurable implementation plan; 
The implementation of e-government is one of the tools of bureaucratic reform. 
E-government is expected to accelerate institutional reforms, improving 
professionalism and accountability of civil servants, and to reduce corruption in 
bureaucracy. According to Effendi, the important element in bureaucratic reform is the 
change in mind-set and culture-sets and the development of work culture.571 Based on 
the State Ministry of the Empowerment of State Apparatus Regulation No. PER 
15/M.PAN/7/2008, bureaucratic reform is defined as:  
“[…] effort to reform and fundamentally change the system of government 
administration in order to realise good governance […].”  
It has to be noted that transparency and the right to obtain information are two of 
the characteristics of good governance, while, the main objective of bureaucratic 
reform is the implementation of good governance.572 The UNDP defines good 
governance as “[…] among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable […] 
effective and equitable…promoting the rule of law…ensuring that political, social and 
economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the 
poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of 
development resources […]”. The OECD notes that good governance “[…] encompasses the 
role of public authorities in establishing the environment in which economic operators 
function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the relationship 
between the ruler and the ruled […].” The World Bank associates good governance with 
“[…] predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a 
professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a 
strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law 
[…]”.573 Heeks notes the advantage of good governance such as cost saving, time saving, 
boundary-breaking, better decisions, changed behaviour of public servants, changed 
behaviour of public sector clients, and empowerment.574  
There are three key elements that need to be applied to guarantee the 
implementation of good governance, consisting of internal rules and restraints, “voice” 
and partnership, and competition. Each of these elements is implemented into public 
service delivery. Internal rules and restraints are applied by internal accounting and 
auditing systems, independence of the judiciary and the central bank, civil service and 
budgeting rules). “Voice” and partnership are implemented through public-private 
deliberation councils, and service delivery surveys to solicit client feedback. The 
competition element would cover competitive social service delivery, private 
participation in infrastructure, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and outright 
privatisation of certain market-driven activities. According to the World Bank’s 
Corruption study for Europe and Central Asia, there are five dimensions of good 
governance i.e. public sector management, competitive private sector, structure of 
government, civil society participation and voice, and political accountability.575 The 
Indonesian National flagship strategy on e-government is “[…] utilising ICT as the basis 
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for re-engineering government administration at central, provincial and local levels and 
in the delivery of government services, seeking to build modern ICT enabled 
administration throughout Indonesia that will deliver world class information and 
services to all Indonesian citizens […]”.576 
It is believed that transparency and accountability principles, which is an 
essential part of good governance, can be carried out properly in public service delivery 
through e-government operations. Therefore, all e-government operations must be 
designed to support the creation of clean, transparent and credible government. 
However, Heeks notes that e-government is only an instrument, while ensuring the 
implementation of transparency and accountability requires more than just employing 
technology.577 
 
VIII. g. Obstacles and challenges in the implementation of e-government. 
Limitations in the ICT infrastructure are considered as on of the obstacles 
hampering economic development in Indonesia. According to ITU, lack of ICT inhibits 
the economic development programme.578 ICT infrastructure is also considered as one 
of various other crucial factors hampering the implementation of e-government in 
Indonesia. The E-Government Workshop identified challenges in the development and 
implementation of e-government such as budget and financial constraints, human 
resources, telecommunication infrastructure constraints, low computer penetration, 
low internet penetration, regulatory environment, organisational culture and design, 
and e-leadership.579 While, Tamara Almarabeh et al. identify a number of challenges 
and obstacles that have been encountered in building the e-government system, 
covering a range of aspects, such as infrastructure development, law and public policy, 
e-literacy, accessibility, trust, privacy, security, transparency, interoperability, mapping 
and assessing existing record systems, records management, permanent availability 
and preservation, education and marketing, public/private competition/collaboration, 
and workforce issues.580 With regard to causes of failure of e-government 
implementation, Danish Dada writes about "the failure of e-government in developing 
countries", stating that “the problem that often arises with developing countries is that 
there is frequently a mismatch between the current and future systems, due to the 
large gap in the physical, cultural, economic, and various other contexts between the 
software designers and the place it is being implemented”.581  However, the 
government of Indonesia has made a series of efforts to promote e-government 
development in the area of awareness building, human capacity building/increasing 
society e-literacy, regulatory framework and policies, and telecommunication 
infrastructure.582 The implementation and development of e-government could also 
accelerate integration with the world trading system and global communities.  
 
                                                 
576 See e-Government Development in Indonesia, e-Government Workshop, Doc No.  telwg29/EG/04, 
577 See Okhman,  A, 2010; Ambar Sari Dewi, 2011, Op. Cit.,  pp. 49-51. 
578 See Basri, Faisal and Munandar, Aris., Lanskap Ekonomi Indonesia : Kajian dan Renungan Terhadap Masalah-Masalah 
Struktural, Transformasi Baru, dan Prospek Perekonomian Indonesia, Edisi Pertama, Cetakan ke-1, Kencana 
Prenada Media Group, Indonesia, 2009, p. 178.  
579 See e-Government Development in Indonesia, e-Government Workshop, Doc No.  telwg29/EG/04. 
580 See Tamara Almarabeh, and Amer AbuAli, 2010, Op. Cit., p. 32. 
581 See Dada, 2006; Tamara Almarabeh, and Amer AbuAli, 2010, Op. Cit., p. 34. 
582 See e-Government Development in Indonesia, e-Government Workshop, Doc No.  telwg29/EG/04. 
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VIII.h. E-Trade as an effective trade facilitation in exports: connecting central and 
local governments to integrate, harmonise and synergise foreign trade 
services. 
E-trade is one of the priorities in Indonesia’s e-government programme. 
Indonesia’s e-trade is known as InaTrade, and is an online public service related to 
import-export licensing operated under the Ministry of Trade. Inatrade was officially 
implemented on 10 August 2010, beginning the new era of public services in import-
export licensing.583 As regulated under Ministry of Trade Regulation No. 28/M-
DAG/PER/6/2009,584 Inatrade was established with the purpose to support the ASEAN 
Single Window and National Single Window, therefore, it applied single entry and 
single exit point principles. Through an electronic system traders can easily submit 
their import-export licence requests. In other words, traders do not need to physically 
present themselves at the government agencies and directly deal with bureaucrats. It is 
expected that such system could reduce bribery and corruptions in import-export 
licensing. Inatrade has fundamentally transformed procedures of issuing licensing 
through web-based services, which is easier, faster, and more efficient. Specifically, the 
Ministry of Trade elaborates the purposes of the establishment of Inatrade, as follows: 
1. To support the implementation of the National Single Window and ASEAN Single 
Window. 
2. To provide online services on import-export licensing, which are simpler, easier, and 
faster. 
3. To help traders control their licensing submission process through document tracking. 
4. To reduce excessive documentation on submitting licensing.  
5. To provide better monitoring on import-export procedures. 
6. To build a database for import-export licensing.  
7. To provide automation of document verification as it is connected to the Government 
Agencies related to import-export . 
8. To provide speedy customs clearance. 
The implementation of Inatrade is expected to bring some benefits, such as 
speeding up customs clearance; improving product competitiveness in the 
international market; reducing bureaucratic formalities and procedures in export-
import licensing and customs; enhancing transparency; preventing rent seeking 
behaviour and bribery (authority abuse); improving information access of export-
import policy; and creating measurable costs for traders. 
                                                 
583 See Pelayanan Online Inatrade Resmi Dibuka, available at : 
http://inatrade.kemendag.go.id/index.php?module=login&action=lihatBerita&id=36&rd=13781, last accessed : 
28 May 2012. 
584 See Concerning terms of service on licensing of export and import using electronic system of Inatrade in the 
framework of INSW. 
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Figure 43. Process of Inatrade: 
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IX. The Indonesia National Single Window (INSW) as a comprehensive 
improvement trade facilitation service. 
IX.a. The urgency comprehensive trade facilitation at the national level: 
Indonesia’s Trade Potential.  
The Indonesian National Single Window (INSW) is Indonesia’s national system 
that allows a single submission of data and information, single and synchronous 
processing of data and information, and the creation of single decision-making for 
custom release and clearance of cargoes.585 
The urgency of the establishment of INSW involves some aspects relating to 
economics, law, politics, and socio-culture. Regarding economics, INSW has been 
designed based on the efficiency principle to reduce the high cost economy of trade, 
specifically transaction costs. Relating to the legal aspects, INSW is expected to be able 
to provide legal certainty on providing services for cross-border trade procedures. To 
guarantee legal certainty the proper implementation of good governance principles 
within INSW is needed. The adherence of good governance principles is most likely to 
eradicate corruption. INSW is also regarded as the reform of public services on foreign 
trade services.586  
From the political aspect,  INSW plays a strategic (important) role for Indonesian 
economic operators, especially for those whose are located faraway from the public 
service facilities. Politically, implementation of INSW brings the public service closer to 
people. It also delivers public service equally to the people. In this regard, the portal of 
INSW is expected to be an effective media to deliver information related to cross border 
trade to stakeholders and economic operators.587 The INSW Portal is defined as a 
system that performs the integration of information related to the handling of customs 
documents and expenditures, which ensures data security and information also 
integrating information flow and processes between internal systems automatically, 
which includes the system of customs, licensing, ports/airports, and other systems 
related to the handling of customs clearance documents and the release of goods.588 
With regard to the socio-cultural aspect, it is believed that INSW can change 
government agencies culture and attitude by migrating manually handled public 
services into e-trade services. ICT application in the INSW minimises bribery and rent 
seeking behaviour in the services and licence system of foreign trade.589  
Related to this aspect two theories prevail. The first theory is “social changes as 
causes of legal changes”. Vago writes that the law could respond to social changes over 
decades or even centuries. He takes an example from the industrial revolution, where 
changes induced by the invention of the steam engine or the advent of electricity were 
gradual enough to make legal responses valid for a generation. In terms of INSW, the 
establishment of the INSW regime is analogous to making social changes in the 
bureaucracy attitudes that tend to corrupt.590  
In the words of Loth and Ernst “[…] technological changes leading to legal changes 
abound […]”.591 According to Vago “[…] many sociologists and legal scholars argue that 
                                                 
585 See According Article 1 paragraph 2 President Regulation No. 10/2008. 
586 See INSW Preparation Team, Indonesia National Single Window, Submitted by : Indonesia, 
2009/SCCP/SWWG/WKSP4/016, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Single Window Working Group Capacity, 
Building Workshop 4 Singapore 6-8 April 2009. 
587 See Ibid. 
588 See Article 1 paragraph 3 President Regulation No. 10/2008. 
589 See INSW Preparation Team. 
590 See Vago, Steven., Law and Society, Third Edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1991, p. 217. 
591 See Loth and Ernst, 1972; Vago, Steven., 1991,  Op. Cit., p. 218. 
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technology is one of the great moving forces for change in law […]”.592 Thus Miller notes 
that law is influenced by technology in at least three ways:593 
“[…] the most obvious is technology’s contribution to the refinement of the legal 
technique by providing instruments to be used in applying law. A second, no less 
significant, is technology’s effect on the process of formulating and applying law as 
a result of the changes technology fosters in the social and intellectual climate in 
which the legal process is executed. Finally, technology affects the substance of 
law by presenting new problems and new conditions with which law must deal 
[…] (Stove, quoted by Miller, 1979:14)”. 
The implementation of INSW is considered as part of public service reform by 
migrating manually handled services into automation services using ICT. The 
development of ICT has transformed information society and its demanding changes on 
public service delivery. Therefore, the establishment of acts on e-government would be 
very urgent in the near future. Quoted from Vago, “[…] change in law may be induced by 
a voluntarily and gradual shift in community value and attitudes […]” and “[…] change in 
social conditions, technology, knowledge, values, and attitudes, then, may induce legal 
change […]”. In this regard, “the law is reactive and follows social changes” and “changes 
in law are one of many responses to social change”. The legal response depends on the 
political will of the authority and whether it is responsive to meet the demands of social 
change or not. In addition, the legal response needs a back up from sovereignty to 
operate its norms effectively. Therefore, a new law in response to a new social or 
technological problem is expected to provide a solution to those problems.594 In this 
respect, the INSW regime is the response to the problem of ineffective bureaucracy, low 
transparency, high cost economy and other related problems in foreign trade 
procedures. 
The second theory places law as a tool of social challenge, which means that 
enactment and implementation of laws have been used intentionally to induce social 
changes in society. Since Romans times, major ages of social changes and mobility have 
usually involved great use of law and of litigation.595 According to Aron, law is an 
important tools of social change.596  
Joel B. Grossman and Mary H. Grossman consider law as a desirable, necessary, 
and a highly efficient means of inducing change, preferable to other instruments of 
change.597 While, the famous article, “Law and Social Change”, written by Dror, argues 
that “[…] law plays an important indirect role in social change by shaping social 
institutions, which in turn have a direct impact on society […]”.598 In this regard, the 
establishment of the INSW regime is expected to shape trade institutions to boost 
foreign trade and increase economic growth of society.  
The electronic system599 application in the framework of INSW is regulated by 
President Regulation No. 10/2008 in order to provide legal certainty and protection 
from any fraud or system irregularities in the electronic procedures of customs and 
licences related to export and import.600 This regulation is also used as the guidance for 
                                                 
592 See Vago, Steven., 1991, Loc. Cit., p. 218. 
593 See Miller, 1979: 4-14; Vago, Steven., 1991, Loc. Cit.,  p. 218. 
594 See Vago, Steven., 1991, Op. Cit.,  pp. 217-219. 
595 See Vago, Steven., 1991, Op. Cit., p. 219 
596 See Aron, 1989;85-114; Vago, Steven., Vago, Steven., 1991, Op. Cit.,, p. 220. 
597 See Joel B. Grossman and Mary H. Grossman, 1972, Op. Cit., p. 2; Vago, Steven., 1991, Loc. Cit., pp. 217-219. 
598 See Dror, 1968;673; Vago, Steven., 1991, Loc. Cit., pp. 217-219. 
599 See According Article 1 paragraph 1 President Regulation No. 10/2008, “[…] electronic system defined as a system to 
collect, to prepare, to store, to process, to analyze, and to disseminate information electronically […]”. 
600 See Article 2 paragraph 2 President Regulation No. 10/2008. See also See Article 3 paragraph 1 President Regulation 
No. 10/2008. The handling of customs documents and licensing services related to export activities and / or 
imports carried out through INSW. 
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the development and implementation of the INSW system.601 The Regulation states 
clearly the spirit of establishment of INSW which is designed to enhance national 
competitiveness, to facilitate trade in the global competition, to guarantee flow of the 
export-import goods and to reduce transaction costs.  
 
Figure 44. Overall development stages of INSW.602 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IX.b. Stakeholders on INSW. 
Each National Single Window has its own scheme of line ministries or 
government agencies involved in the system. Stakeholders in the INSW consist of 
government agencies and users (economic operators). There are eight government 
agencies that engage in the INSW, i.e, Ministry of Trade, Food and Drug Agency, Fishery 
Quarantine, Plant and Animal Quarantine, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Industry, 
Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency, and Directorate General of Post and 
Telecommunication. While economic operators cover all importers, customs brokers 
and selected exporters. According to the regulation, these stakeholders are also 
included as the users of INSW.603 The users of INSW would be granted access to the 
INSW portal.  
 
                                                 
601 See Article 2 paragraph 2 President Regulation No. 10/2008. 
602 Cited from National Single Window (NSW) System, History, Establishment, Development & Implementation in 
Indonesia, Presented on Indonesia Trade Facilitation Policy Studies Forum held by Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta Plaza Hotel, 12 July 2012 (attended directly by 
the researcher). 
603 See Article 1 paragraph 10 President Regulation No. 10/2008. The users of INSW covering the government agency 
that issued licence related to export/import, Directorate General of Customs, traders (exporters/importers), 
shipping agencies, and Service Provider of Customs and Clearance.  
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Figure 45. The first government agencies integration.604 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46. INSW  integrated government agencies  system interoperability.605 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
604 Cited from National Single Window (NSW) System, History, Establishment, Development & Implementation in 
Indonesia, Presented on Indonesia Trade Facilitation Policy Studies Forum held by Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta Plaza Hotel, 12 July 2012 (attended directly by 
the researcher). 
605 See Ibid. 
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Table 54. The issuing of import licence government agencies.606 
 
No Government Agencies Imp-Exp. Licensing Recommendation 
1 Ministry of Trade X  
2 Fishery Quarantine X  
3 Animal Quarantine * X  
4 Plantation (Quarantine * X  
5 Food & Drugs Control X  
6 Ministry of Industry   
7 Ministry of Energy X X 
8 Nuclear Control NA X X 
9 Ministry of Forestry X  
10 DG of Post & Teleco X  
11 Ministry of Agriculture X X 
12 Ministry of Health X  
13 National Police X  
14 Ministry of Environment X X 
15 Ministry of Defence  X 
16 Ministry of Transport. X  
17 Central Bank (BI)  X 
18 Customs (DGCE) -- -- 
 
IX.c. Features of INSW as an instrument of trade facilitation. 
In agreement with its purpose to simplify the formalities and procedures on 
export and import, therefore, INSW has the motto of “consistency, transparency, 
simplicity, and efficiency”. The features and facilities that are provided by INSW must 
be able to translate such motto into practice of public services. For that reason, the 
system of INSW must provide features and facilities, covering: 
1. Tracking and tracing of documents.  
2. Compatibility with the ASW system. The communication facility with the ASEAN Single 
Window (ASW) system.  
3. Network Security. Related to electronic transactions from/to INSW portal. 
4. Log Audit Trail.  Function to record the  details of  transaction e.g.  uploading,  
downloading,  cancelling,  editing,  deleting and submitting/transmitting information 
5. Uploading and Downloading. Function on INSW system and allocated for smart clients 
to update the regulations and to table references. 
6. Data Extraction, Transformation, Loading. This facility is used to process the data 
automatically to records in the database portal. 
Audit trails that result from the electronic security process system function as a 
tracking system towards  progress of the process in the INSW.607 Through the audit 
trail, traders (exporters/importers) can control their document process remotely by 
using the ICT interface, anytime and anywhere. The electronic data exchange in the 
INSW is categorised as a legal conduct.608 Therefore, all the processes and procedures 
of the INSW system have to ensure legal certainty to avoid any legal fraud that might 
cause losses for the parties concerned.609 
                                                 
606 See Ibid. 
607 See Article 1 paragraph 9 President Regulation No. 10/2008. 
608 See Article 1 paragraph 8 President Regulation No. 10/2008. 
609 See Article 11 President Regulation No. 10/2008. 
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Figure 47. Features, functions, and facilities: INSW Portal.610 
 
 
 
Figure 48. INSW e-Collaboration.611 
 
 
 
 
IX.d. The role of InaTrade in the INSW. 
The terms of service on the licensing of exports and imports using the electronic 
system of Inatrade in the framework of the INSW are regulated by Ministry of Trade 
                                                 
610 Cited from National Single Window (NSW) System, History, Establishment, Development & Implementation in 
Indonesia, Presented on Indonesia Trade Facilitation Policy Studies Forum held by Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta Plaza Hotel, 12 July 2012 (attended directly by 
the researcher). 
611 See Ibid. 
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Regulation No. 28/M-DAG/PER/6/2009.612 The idea of integrating Inatrade into the 
INSW system is to deliver a public service on exports and imports to traders according 
to affectivity, efficiency and transparency principles. Inatrade is an online service on 
the licensing of exports and imports provided by the Ministry of Trade.613 The users of 
Inatrade cover private legal persons, legal entities, companies/enterprises, government 
institutions, which submit their requests for the licensing of exports and imports.614 
 
Figure  49. The government agencies integrating into INSW 615 
 
 
 
IX.e. Improvement of good governance on foreign trade services through INSW. 
Implementation of INSW should be seen as a good opportunity for the 
fundamental reform on public services, particularly to provide transparency and 
excellent service on exports-imports. The INSW system is designed to simplify business 
processes in which public services on exports-imports will become simpler, faster and 
more effective. With regard to the hierarchical bureaucracy chains, such as local 
autonomy, the establishment of INSW is intended to harmonise and synchronise the 
procedures and formalities in exports-imports related to the issuing of permit licences 
and certificates of origin. Therefore, overlapping on issuing licences allows bureaucracy 
constraints and corruption to be avoided.  
Practically speaking, INSW fundamentally changes and totally transforms 
government agencies that are related to exports and imports. The existence of one 
                                                 
612 See Trade Minister Regulation No. 28/M-DAG/PER/6/2009. 
613 See Article 1 paragraph 5 Trade Minister Regulation No. 28/M-DAG/PER/6/2009. 
614 See Article 1 paragraph 6 Trade Minister Regulation No. 28/M-DAG/PER/6/2009. 
615 Cited from National Single Window (NSW) System, History, Establishment, Development & Implementation in 
Indonesia, Presented on Indonesia Trade Facilitation Policy Studies Forum held by Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta Plaza Hotel, 12 July 2012 (attended directly by 
the researcher). 
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single national portal on exports and imports is the reflection of the successful 
integration of government agencies e-data and information. Government agencies are 
recommended to provide the service level for stakeholders through the Service Level 
Arrangement (SLA) in order to deliver a transparent service and guarantee legal 
certainty.616 For instance, the management of Inatrade in delivering its service must 
implement SLA to guarantee transparency and legal certainty in the procedures of 
exports and imports.617 
 
IX.f. The role of INSW in the utilisation of GSP 
As described before, INSW is as a system that enables “single submission of data 
and information, single and synchronous processing of data and information and single 
decision-making for customs release and clearance of cargo”. There are four principles 
attached to the implementation of INSW, i.e.: 
1. One single National Portal, with one Web-address (Internet) which is officially applied 
to carry out all kinds of transactions related to “trading & logistic” activities. 
2. National Portal, which functions as a “Messaging-Hub”, connecting all related 
stakeholders (government agencies and traders). 
3. Authorisation of licensing, permits & recommendation of exports-imports remains 
within the authorisation of each government agency. 
4. Output of licensing, permits & recommendation from government agencies shall be 
uploaded or transmitted electronically to the database of the national portal, therefore 
customs are allowed to give approval in a timely manner (for customs clearance & 
release). 
As previously mentioned, INSW is a fundamental reform of public services, 
therefore, it is not an easy change due to some challenges that need to be addressed 
with extra effort. First, the change-management process due to transformation from 
the manual system into an electronic and automatic system. Second, necessary reforms 
of the laws and regulations, especially in the area of public services, to support the 
automation process and guarantee transparency. The existing laws and regulations 
considered are not in line with the INSW system. Third, the need to improve capability 
and capacity of the bureaucracy of human resources who are able to operate the INSW 
as a public portal. 
 
X. The trade policies of the Indonesian Government in maximising the utilisation 
of the EU’s GSP scheme.  
In 2009 Indonesia’s economic performance showed a growth of 4.5%, supported 
by an export performance at the amount of 116.5 billion USD with a trade surplus of 
9.6 billion USD. In January 2009, Indonesia’s export performance reached 9.2 billion 
USD and its growth was 47.6% higher than in January 2008. It was claimed as the 
highest growth in Indonesia’s export history. 
Since GSP is a unilateral preference that is granted autonomously and is non-
reciprocal, no negotiations were carried out between the preference-granting country 
and the beneficiary country. In the framework of EU GSP utilisation, the Indonesian 
government has no specific agreement or policy. However, in general terms, the 
Indonesian government’s trade policies have been focused to enhance its trade 
services through the adoption of international standards and international best 
practice. It is aimed to increase Indonesia’s export performance by maximising 
utilisation of tariff preferences. According to the Ministry of Trade, Indonesia enjoyed 
                                                 
616 See Article 10 paragraph 4 President Regulation No. 10/2008. 
617 See Article 1 paragraph 11 Ministry of Trade No. 28/M-DAG/PER/6/2009. 
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nine international trade preferences, consisting of the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP); Handicraft Preferences; Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP); 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff/ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement for ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (CEPT/ATIGA-AFTA); ASEAN China Free Trade Area (ACFTA); ASEAN Korea 
Free Trade Area (AKFTA); Indonesia Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJ-EPA); 
ASEAN India FTA (AIFTA); and ASEAN Australia New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA). 
Although the GSP was established based on non-reciprocal principles, this does 
not mean that the GSP is a “free gift”. The Enabling Clause enabled the possibility for 
the preference-granting country to establish “standards” with the purpose of 
responding positively to the "development, financial and trade needs” of the beneficiary 
country.  To ensure the implementation of the non-discriminatory principle, therefore, 
such standard must be established based on objective principles. The standard is used 
as a tool to ensure the GSP scheme is delivered properly and benefits the targeted 
group.  
To promote the utilisation of GSP requires cooperation and synergism efforts 
between the preference-granting country and the beneficiary country. The UNCTAD 
resolution 96 (IV) 1976 mentioned additional measures to increase utilisation of 
preferences, as follows: 
 “[…] efforts should be made by all preference granting countries and beneficiary 
countries to increase, as much as possible, the degree of utilisation of the different 
schemes of generalised preferences by all appropriate means […]”618 
Indonesia as the beneficiary of GSP in which 40% of its total import to the EU is 
qualified under the GSP scheme. In addition, EU 27 is the fourth major trade partner 
and second biggest major export partner for Indonesia.619 EU GSP is an opportunity for 
Indonesian traders to strengthen their competitiveness and penetrate EU market 
access. Capturing such opportunity, the Government of Indonesia has built up policies 
to increase utilisation of GSP. Some commitments have been issued by the Government 
of Indonesia to boost export performance through enacting laws and regulations that 
facilitate foreign trade. On 12 July 2012, the Policy Analysis and Development Agency 
of Indonesia’s Ministry Foreign Affairs held the Forum of Foreign Policy Studies on 
“trade facilitation priorities in Indonesia”. This forum involved the Ministry of Trade, 
Directorate General of Customs, INSW Agency, the business community and 
academicians. The government of Indonesia expressed its commitment to improve 
competitiveness and accelerate integration of Indonesia in the global value chain 
(global value chains), through reforming some regulations related to foreign trade.  
Law and policy reforms on foreign trade have the purpose to enhance related public 
services on foreign trade that involve related line ministries and various government 
agencies. The set of regulations on establishing INSW is a serious commitment of the 
government of Indonesia to increase utilisation of the generalised system of 
preferences. More specifically those commitments have been implemented in some 
concrete steps, as follows: 
1. Service reforms in particular export trade through Inatrade. 
2. Optimising the utilisation of granting preferences such as GSP via e-SKA that can be 
accessed more easily, quickly, and have a wider range. 
3. Export-import licensing system integration with line ministries such as customs, 
ministry of health, and the ministry of agriculture. 
4. Delegation of authority on foreign trade from the centre to the regions in the 
framework of regional autonomy. 
                                                 
618 See Commentaries on the ILC’s Draft Articles, 1978, Op. Cit.,  p. 64. 
619 Cited from EU Trade Statistic, available at : 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113391.pdf, last accessed : 15 June 2012. 
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5. Improved skills and knowledge through training exporters. 
6. Socialisation of e-government services related to export-import Inatrade, e-ska, and 
INSW. 
7. Dissemination and dissemination of information about exports and imports. 
8. Bureaucratic reform trade with the implementation of e-Government, human resource 
capacity building and advocacy exporter. 
9. Communication between the central and local governments. 
10. Bilateral communication between Indonesia and the EU. 
In the regard of advocacy, the Ministry of Trade of the Government of Indonesia 
gives assistantship and/or advocacy on export difficulties faced by exporters. For 
instance, legal aid is given to help exporters deal with the problems occurred related to 
the rules and regulations and administrative procedures. To avoid trade fraud the 
Indonesian government, through its line ministries and agencies, controls and 
monitors the issuance and usage of certificates of origin. Strengthening coordination 
between central government and regional government to avoid the overlap of 
authority and reducing barriers to trade due to the decentralisation of authorities. The 
government of Indonesia promotes the enhancement of export competitiveness 
through export facilitation, export diversification, the strengthening of export product 
quality, trade promotion, trade diplomacy, and trade defence. 
Trade facilitation plays a strategic role in increasing export performance through 
the integration and automation of the formalities and procedures of foreign trade. 
Therefore, the Indonesian Ministry of Trade has developed online electronic trade 
services, which are integrated in the web-portal called “Inatrade”. As mentioned above, 
Inatrade is an e-trade service providing e-licensing of exports-imports. It is integrated 
into the Indonesia National Single Windows (INSW) at national level and ASEAN Single 
Window (ASW) at regional level. Broadly, the Single Window system is built to 
improve efficiency in trade through the acceleration of good flows, validity and real-
time data transaction. With regard to supporting such system, the Indonesian Ministry 
of Trade established the Trade Service Unit in which services are manually carried out 
on the “single entry and single exit point” without direct face to face meeting between 
applicants (traders) and authority officials. The establishment of the Trade Service 
Unit aimed to provide trade services that were more predictable, transparent, efficient, 
and in order (good trade governance).  
In order to develop export growth, the government of Indonesia focuses its 
efforts to increase diversification on export commodities and export market 
diversification. The Government of Indonesia stressed its programmes on the 
improvement of the human resource capacity of exporters, the enhancement of the 
web based enquiry system, market intelligence, and trade promotion. Improvement of 
market intelligence is deemed as the crucial tool to boost export performance by 
providing information on strategies of market penetration overseas. 
International trade cooperation is directed to promote and to secure global 
market access, to secure trade policies, to enhance economic partnerships and 
strategic bilateral trade, to promote participation and leadership in multilateral and 
regional fora. 
Indonesia’s multilateral approach is directed to succeeding the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) that would benefit Indonesia, for instance increasing 
trade capacity building, securing national interests on agricultural and food security, 
and eliminating barriers to trade. 
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XI. Does the European Union’s Generalised System of Preferences affect the 
implementation of good governance in Indonesia’s foreign trade policies?  
There are some key points that need to be noted in the rules and regulations of 
granting EU GSP, particularly related to trade facilitation, where it has a strong relation 
to optimising trade preference utilisation. EU GSP provides standards related to trade 
facilitation, and requires the beneficiary country to comply with such standards. 
Regarding the standards, the granting of tariff reduction under the EU GSP scheme is 
emphasised on the application of “trade governance”. Application of trade governance 
is aimed to ensure that the goals of GSP are achieved properly. In this regard, the term 
“governance” refers to the requirement that needs to be complied by the beneficiary 
country to facilitate its utilisation of the GSP scheme by its traders.  
According to Hall, trade should deliver prosperity not only to the “triumphant” 
traders or economic actors but also to economic development on the whole, thus, good 
governance must be applied to ensure such trade advantage is distributed properly for 
everyone. Therefore, good governance is in line with the Bentham theory on the 
utilitarian principle, where trade law and its policies must be directed for the happiness 
of the greatest number. In this regard, as written by Hall, GATT originally had a highly 
utilitarian purpose, as stated on the objectives to raise standards of living and to ensure 
full employment by “developing the full use of the resources of the world” and growing 
trade. Further it recognised the particular needs for a trading system to help increased 
development efforts of the poorer countries by noting “that there is need for positive 
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed 
among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the 
needs of their economic development.” Under WTO, trade has been rolled into one 
package as a tool to achieve sustainable development, boosting development in LDCs 
and recognising the different needs of countries at different stages of development.620  
Borrowing the words from Hall, governance is defined as “the mechanisms used to 
ensure that a system or regime advances smoothly and effectively towards the goal it has 
set for itself and can deal efficiently and justly with the issues that arise along the way”. 
Governance is functioned to ensure the system works properly, effectively and 
efficiently by attaining the objectives that have been set up.  Good governance contains 
three essentials elements, including transparency, participation, and accountability.  
Application of the transparency principle is crucial since open and up to date 
information is very important in doing business and in decision making. In the 
application of trade facilitation (INSW and ASW), the transparency principle plays a 
significant role in which “people affected by decisions have timely access to accurate and 
up to date information on the issue, as well as information on the positions and proposals 
of the different parties”. Access of up to date information is necessary related to the GSP 
scheme given that it is characterised as unilateral preferences that might change at 
anytime. Participation is defined as the “right to take part in the debate or decision 
making process links to the extent a stakeholder has interests at play or will be affected by 
the decisions”. In the case of GSP, participation and cooperation of the stakeholders and 
                                                 
620 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind Panagariya, and T. N. Srinivasan, Lectures on International Trade, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1998; Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, eds., Economic Interdependence and 
International Con-flict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2003; Oli Brown et al., eds., Trade, Aid, and Security : An Agenda for Peace and Development, Sterling, VA: 
Earthscan, 2007; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence , 2nd ed., Glen-view, IL: 
Scott Foresman and Company, 1989. Box 14–1 draws on U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific, “What IsGood Governance?” at www.unescap.org, undated; see also Philippe Sands,  Lawless World, 
Penguin Books, London, 2006, Chapter 1; Mark Halle, New Approaches to Trade Governance; State of the World: 
Innovation for Sustainable Economy, 25th Anniversary Edition,The Worldwatch Instirute, 2008. 
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economic operators from the preference granting countries and beneficiary countries 
its common objectives need to be achieved.  
Accountability is defined when “decision makers and the regime itself are 
answerable for their actions, decisions, and compromises in terms of the stated goals and 
objectives as well as any statements and declarations they make about their actions and 
decisions”. In the context of bureaucracy, the World Bank accountability is defined as a 
benchmark to ensure that actions and decisions taken by public officials are subject to 
oversight in order to guarantee that government initiatives meet their stated objectives 
and respond to the needs of the targeted community, by this means contributing to 
better governance and poverty reduction. In other words, every decision and action 
taken by the government and its officials must be measurable in accordance with the 
existing rules. According to the World Bank, accountability consists of two different 
stages, i.e., answerability and enforcement, different institutions of accountability might 
be in charge for one of these stages or both of these stages. Answerability refers to the 
obligation of the government, its agencies and public officials to provide information 
about their decisions and actions and to justify them to the public and those institutions 
of accountability tasked with providing oversight. Enforcement suggests that the public 
or the institution responsible for accountability can sanction the offending party or 
remedy the contravening behaviour.621 In addition, Hall states that firm goals, 
objectives, and priorities are a foundation of good governance application.622  
Compared to others GSP systems, according to the Directorate General Export 
and Import Facilitation Ministry of Trade, the EU GSP is more emphasised on trade 
governance in its procedures of granting trade preferences. For instance, related to the 
withdrawal of GSP, when the exporter from a beneficiary country allegedly conducts 
non-compliance to the regulation it will not directly be punished, but the EU authority 
will carry out communications then enquire by involving authorities in the beneficiary 
country. To enhance the EU GSP scheme modalities to be more predictable, 
transparent, and stable, therefore, trade governance should be applied to ensure goals 
of such preferences benefit the development of the beneficiary country. The 
implication of trade governance requires the beneficiary country to take some policies 
and measures in order to comply with the regulation so that it will boost exports to the 
EU market. The EU GSP regulation demands the government of beneficiary countries 
to implement good governance in export formalities and procedures, especially related 
to the issuing of certificates of origin.   
The rules and regulation on GSP issued by the EU indirectly encourage the 
beneficiary countries to apply good governance principles in export formalities and 
procedure processes. This policy is aimed to drive the beneficiary to enhance its trade 
services and infrastructure. 
 
                                                 
621 See Accountablity of Governance, available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ AccountabilityGovernance.pdf. 
622 See Mark Halle, 2008. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Conclusion 
 
 
The EU GSP is designed by emphasising the implementation of good governance in 
formalities and procedure. This policy is applied to ensure that such norms are 
implemented properly within the GSP scheme. The EU GSP requires beneficiary countries 
to provide minimum trade facilitation standards. In the GSP regulation the good 
governance principle is not implied explicitly, however, there are some provisions that are 
related to formalities and procedures, which are the embodiment of good governance. For 
instance, the provisions that regulate fraud of rules of origin that requires beneficiary 
countries concern the provision of cooperation, investigation, and/or verification, the 
application of good governance implicitly applied during the process of decision making. 
The application of good governance in foreign trade formalities and procedures can 
gradually enhance trade governance in the beneficiary country, which is expected to 
produce boosts in exports. The EU GSP is designed to provide a more transparent, 
predictable and stable scheme. 
ASEAN is the third largest trading partner of the EU and the EU is the second 
largest trading partner for ASEAN. Yet, this trade relationship is asymmetric, because 
ASEAN exports to the EU are larger than ASEAN imports from the EU. This has made the 
EU market play an important role for ASEAN exports. ASEAN is not included in any other 
PTA, therefore, GSP is the only trade preferential scheme granted by the EU to ASEAN 
member states. The GSP scheme is expected to help ASEAN export products compete in the 
“sensitive” and “semi-sensitive” EU market. Therefore, GSP has played an important role in 
its contribution to strengthen cooperation between the two regions. The Cooperation 
Agreement between the “Member Countries of ASEAN and European Community in 1980” 
is the cornerstone of ASEAN-EU cooperation, which laid down the fundamental basis of 
trade facilitations that is useful to help improve GSP implementation in ASEAN. The 
cumulative rules of origin provisions under the GSP scheme have been applied to ASEAN 
imported products since 1975. The cumulative origin has promoted trans-national export-
oriented production within the regions to facilitate closer economic integration, 
particularly to attain a single market and production base. Cumulative origin is an 
opportunity to increase GSP utilisation among ASEAN countries. Restrictive rules on origin, 
low quota provisions, and high administrative costs incurred upon beneficiaries are 
identified as factors that have caused low utilisation of GSP. ASEAN demanded the EU to 
remove or relax its tariffs and NTB and to streamline its administrative procedures. ASEAN 
requested efficiency improvements and excessive bureaucracy reductions that were 
imposed on ASEAN’s export products.  
Since its establishment, ASEAN has not intended to be a supranational organisation, 
therefore ASEAN has no “supranational institution”. ASEAN has evolved into a regional 
trade block through AFTA, which was finalised by the completion of the AEC. Many efforts 
have been made to improve ASEAN internal and external trade, either through agreements 
or through commitments between member states and/or third states. The implementation 
of the agreements and commitments into the national policies are member states’ 
sovereignty. ASEAN has made commitments to encourage the establishment of institutions 
of trade facilitation at the regional level. Yet those commitments are not easy to be fully 
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implemented due to the existence of economic development diversities and national 
policies among ASEAN member states. There are some points that need to be underlined as 
the challenges in the integration of ASEAN trade facilitation, which include: 
1. Development of trade facilitation at the regional level has evolved slowly due to the 
difficulties to achieve a meeting of minds among the member states. 
2. Issues on market intelligence and trade competition are very sensitive and 
potentially impede integration of the trade facilitation system into the regional 
system. 
3. Disparities of economic development influence the capability of each member state 
to provide infrastructures on trade facilitation. To reduce the gap of such 
disparities ASEAN needs to set a minimum standard that should be provided by 
member states to support the single system. 
4. A range of arrangements granted through the GSP scheme to ASEAN member states 
bring about differences on product coverage and depth of tariff cuts. In the near 
future, due to the amendment on the graduation mechanism provisions on the GSP 
proposal, the member states, which include upper-middle-income countries, will be 
excluded from the scheme. Thus, this may lead to disagreement on whether to hold 
onto the GSP scheme or start FTA negotiations. 
For Indonesia, GSP has been placed as the prominent trade preference in the trade 
relationship with the European Union. EU GSP has been extended to Indonesia for almost 
40 years, and it has undergone many enhancements along with changes of EU trade 
policies with developing countries, especially ASEAN countries. Likewise with Indonesia’s 
trade facilitation policies, many changes have been made, which have been influenced by 
the policy of the regime in power. In spite of such facts, Indonesia currently continues to 
improve its trade facilitation services with the purpose to be able to participate in global 
competition. During economic crisis recovery, Indonesia made giant leaps, by transforming 
its centralised system into a decentralised system. Based on its character, the changes were 
very fast and drastic with some economist referring to this as the “big bang” phenomenon. 
The scope of decentralisation that has been implemented by Indonesia covers a wide range 
of areas as well as trade sectors.  
Indonesia’s decentralisation system is designed to enhance the role of local 
government in providing trade facilitation services, especially for local traders. Inherently, 
the basic idea behind the decentralisation system is to bring public service delivery closer 
to the customer (community). Red tape bureaucracy is also expected to be cut, as well as 
reducing transaction costs, increasing openness and transparency, and adherence of good 
governance principles in public services. On the other hand, decentralisation is considered 
as controversial because it has been done in haste and is not well prepared. Nowadays, 
decentralisation takes the blame because it increases the corruption of the local elite and 
creates more difficulties in bureaucracy. 
Finally, this study suggests recommendations for the stakeholders in ASEAN to 
strengthen regional trade facilitations in order to increase ASEAN external trade with the 
EU, especially to encourage the maximum utilisation of EU GSP by ASEAN member 
countries. For the acceleration of ASW into full operation, more communications, 
coordination, and information dissemination among member states are required. These 
keys areas could help ASEAN member states become aware of their potential size, 
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especially in the cumulative of origin in which ATIGA provides facilitation of common 
preferential trade until zero tariffs.  
This study provides some recommendations for the Government of Indonesia to 
maximise utilisation of the EU GSP facility. First, related to local autonomy, in this regard, 
the Indonesian government needs to strengthen harmonisation rules and regulations to 
avoid any bureaucratic difficulties that lead to high cost transactions by traders. Second, 
the Government of Indonesia needs to promote the implementation of good governance in 
foreign trade services through single window services with wider access across the 
country. It is important to establish communication and cooperation with related 
institutions of the EU in assisting and advocating traders to utilise GSP properly. In 
addition, dissemination of information on the GSP benefits traders and stakeholders and is 
important to encourage them to utilise such facility in their exports. In anticipation of the 
application of Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012 by 1 January 2014, the Government of 
Indonesia has to prepare its institutions and economic operators, through information 
dissemination, improvement of good governance in foreign trade services, the 
strengthening of its export product competitiveness and improvement of its 
infrastructures. 
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